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1ABSTRACT
The Negotiation of Marriage in the People's Republic of China 
Elisabeth J. Croll
: i
This thesis, based on documentary sources and a brief period of 
intensive interviewing in the People's Republic of China, is a study of 
the new marriage patterns as they have evolved in contemporary China and 
an analysis of the specific economic and ideological variables working 
for and against their social change. It examines the processes of change 
within the institution of marriage itself, in terms of the procedures of 
negotiation, the criteria governing choice of spouse, the age of marriage 
and its ritual and ceremonial forms. It argues that the substitution of 
the ideology of arranged marriage by that of free-choice marriage has 
not only brought the younger and older, generations into direct conflict, 
but has brought the resources and sanctions of kin and neighbourhood 
groups into competition with those at the disposal of the State and new 
political associations. The variety of marriage patterns identified in 
this thesis derive^ from patterns of social behaviour evolved in the last 
two decades to mediate this competition between the generations and 
between primary and political groups for control of the marriage 
negotiations. The evidence suggests that these conflicts have been 
resolved in favour of the older generation and primary groups in rural 
areas and the. younger generation and political associations in the urban 
social field. This thesis argues that in comparison to urban China, the 
structure and function of rural households has encouraged the older 
generation to defy the new ideology and maintain their authority over the 
•marriage procedures, and that the structure and function of primary groups 
in rural areas has enabled them to retain their controls. In correlating 
marriage patterns with both social and economic relations within the 
household and between the household and primary kin or neighbourhood 
groups, this thesis questions both the analogies drawn from the 
comparative social fields of Republican China and Taiwan, and many of 
the factors believed to underlie this process of social change that 
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8CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The negotiations of marriage or procedures of mate selection may be 
distinguished by the degree to which persons other than the parties to 
the marriage, the bride and groom, participate in the selection and 
enter into the negotiations for marriage. Almost every society has 
been found to have rules governing the degree to which.others may 
participate in the process of mate selection. Social scientists have 
usually identified two principal means by which mates may be acquired: 
by arrangement and by mutual volition (Winch 1971: 264). A marriage is 
said to be 'arranged* when it results from negotiations between the kin 
groups or persons other than the bride and groom. In this procedure 
the parties to the marriage contract are rarely consulted, there is 
frequently an exchange in the form of the dowry and bridewealth, and 
the negotiations are often mediated by a marriage broker. Mutual volition 
is the mate-selective procedure whereby a man and a woman select each 
other and agree to marry. They may or may not consult with and obtain 
permission from their respective families or kin groups, but in any case 
the selection is made voluntarily by the bridal couple. In cross-cultural 
studies,.societies have often been categorised according to which practice 
is normally followed (Freeman 1958 ; Goode 1959 ). Within cultures 
anthropologists have drawn attention to the role of marriage systems in 
maintaining social order and cohesion, or to the coincidence of two 
processes of social change, that is the cyclical or repetitive develop­
mental changes in the life-cycle of an individual or groups within a 
social structure itself undergoing a process of social change.
9A significant feature affecting these anthropological studies is 
the fact that marriage is at one and the same time a process located 
within the domestic -field of social relations and a process determined 
by its relations with the external field. For some time there has been 
much interest in the relationship of specific structures of marriage to 
certain economic and political systems. Radcliffe-Brown (1950), Evans- 
Pritchard (1951) and many other anthropologists have suggested that the 
well-defined rules and customs regulating marriage found in every society 
have as their social function, the preservation, maintenance or continua­
tion of an existing social order. They thought that where marriage 
threatened disruption or disorder to the established kinship or social 
class system, the stronger were the sanctions and disapproval with which 
it was met. Other anthropological studies have noted not the function of 
marriage systems in maintaining social order and cohesion, but their 
role in situations of social change. In particular they have examined 
changes in the procedures of marriage as they have been affected by 
contact with the culture of another country. For example Mair (1969), 
Barnes (1951) and Schapera (1966) each set out to study changing patterns 
of marriage in Africa as a result of a century of contact with European 
peoples, ideas and institutions. In each case they identified the degree 
and direction of changes, distinguished a number of causes and agencies 
of social change, and outlined the manner in which processes initially 
external to the indigenous society first impinged and then were 
subsequently incorporated into the society under study. The modification 
of customary marriage procedures were broadly comprehended within the 
concept * culture contact1 and the amount of change was thought to vary 
according to the degree of acculturation. The aims of these studies 
were either to aid the attempts by governments and administrators to
10
understand and control the direction of social change (Hair 1969), or to 
provide comparative data of some interest to social scientists enquiring 
into the transformations of marriage procedures and kinship organisations 
in contemporary Western society (Schapera 1966).
The early anthropological studies of marriage and related familial 
institutions in Republican China (1911~1949) were influenced both by the
i
anthropological studies of ’culture contact1 and social change, and 
sociologists of the family for whom the central conceptual issue was 
the relationship of industrialisation to familial structures (Smelser 
1966: 115). The studies of Olga Lang (1946), Marion Levy (1949) and 
C.K. Yang (1959) each attempted a systematic analysis of the effects of 
the incursion of new ideas and new forms of economic organisation and 
institutions originating in the Western nations on the pre-existing 
marriage system and familial structures. Olga Lang thought that to the 
student of cultural change, Republican China offered a rare opportunity 
to observe fa tremendously complicated process of transformation being 
produced in one culture by the contact with another’ and to assess ’the 
relative importance of the new economic environment and the new ideas as 
factors of social change in China’ (1946:xi), Both she and C.K. Yang 
were interested in the series of social changes in the family structure 
which had occurred within the family as a result of the introduction of 
Western ideas and economic forms into China. Marion Levy was particularly 
interested in the relationship between the changes in the family structure, 
which he observed to be taking place, and the process of industrialisation 
(1949: xi). All these direct and first-hand accounts of the procedures 
of mate selection took the movement from an arranged form of marriage to 
one of mutual volition as an expression of broader economic, political 
and social changes.
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In the People’s Republic of China the forms which marriage and 
the family take are also considered to be reflections- of broader 
economic social and political systems. Following the example of Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, the forms which marriage and familial forms 
take are linked to particular stages of socio-economic development.
In this connexion two passages from their works are constantly quoted:
*... with the development of social reproduction, there 
is evolved a state of marriage and family, which is, in 
keeping with the existing state of society.’
(Engels, Origin of Family, Private Ownership and the State,
H2X, 15 December 1956)
’... where there is a certain stage of development of 
production, exchange and consumption, there will be a 
certain social system of family, grade or class 
organisation.'
(Marx, Letter to B.V. Aninkov, KMRB 13 December 1963)
Recent histories of the institution of marriage in China have followed 
the lead of Marx and Engels in identifying a sequence of forms from the 
’most primitive period of free social intercourse and free marriage to 
group marriage within blood relations, group marriage without blood 
relations, the choice of mates and finally monogamy1, and link them to 
a particular sequence of changes in the relations of production (Z.Q 
16 December 1956). The substitution of arranged marriage (funru baoban 
ernu hunyin) by free-choice marriage (hunyin ziyou) as the form of 
marriage with all its ramifications most appropriate to a socialist 
society, has been taken by the government as one symbol or one measure 
of their degree of success in developing a socialist society.
What differentiates the relationship between changing norms of 
marriage and changing social structure in the People’s Republic of China 
from that of most other social fields of enquiry is the conscious and 
planned nature of social change towards certain defined and explicit 
social goals. In 1950 a new ideology of marriage was introduced into
12
China and, although the reform of the economic system is seen as a pre­
requisite to the reform of marriage patterns, the subsequent movement 
to establish a new marriage system has been largely defined in terms of 
ideological change. As early as 1953, before the establishment of new 
economic relations, it was emphasised that the ’marriage campaign was 
to be largely directed against the remnants of feudal thinking1. It was 
defined as essentially a movement for 'ideological remoulding' to 
eliminate the influence of reactionary social customs within the con­
sciousness of the people (P's G 1 March 1953). Again in 1957 the 
movement was described as a 'battle in which new ideas were pitted 
against the old, a struggle to get people to change their ways of 
thought' (P's C 16 November 1957). In the early 1960s, following wide­
spread transformations in the economy, the role of ideology in effecting 
social change was again reiterated:
'... after we have eliminated the system of private 
ownership of the means of production, instituted the 
socialist system of public ownership of the means of 
production, and thus laid a sound foundation for the 
socialist system of marriage and the family, the struggle 
between the new and old ideologies over the question of 
marriage and the family is a matter of decisive 
significance.'
(RMRB 13 December 1963)
That the struggle to eliminate the old and introduce new marriage 
patterns continues to be largely defined’in ideological terms has been 
confirmed during the recent campaign to criticise Confucius and Lin 
Piao in 1974-5 which was described as a 'deep socialist revolution in 
the realm of ideology' (JPRS 1974, 256: 11). Throughout the movement 
for ideological change in marriage systems it has been the aim of the 
government to eliminate the influence of traditional custom and ritual 
through expressing, exploring and communicating meanings behind symbols
13
and rituals and making latent functions manifest in order to 'raise the
consciousness' of the people to effect changes in their social behaviour
of their own accord. In this respect the government is sharing an
assumption with some anthropologists, that once the social functions
of symbols become manifest the symbols lose a great deal of their
efficacy (Cohen A. 1974: 8). The strategy developed to bring about
. ■ *
social change in China raises questions on the relationship of ideology 
to economics in bringing about social change. The emphasis on the role 
of ideology in introducing and maintaining processes of social change 
in China seems to be a departure from the usual emphasis of the Marxist 
theory of social change in which a more active role is assigned to the 
economic base.
It is primarily as a field for the study of the processes of social 
change that social scientists have particularly recommended the study of 
the People's Republic of China. For example, Maurice Freedman recommended 
the study of the People's Republic of China on these grounds. On one 
occasion he wrote that 'if Communist China is an experiment, or rather 
a series of experiments - then anthropologists should have been busy with 
it, testing their ideas about the transformability of society against 
attempts to transform it' (1969: 8). Surely, he thought, anthropologists 
could assess the extent to which pre-existing modes of behaviour/re-assert 
themselves within institutions deliberately designed to exclude them 
(1963: 15). G. William Skinner also recommended the anthropological 
study of the People's Republic of China on the grounds that the modernisa­
tion of China is of special interest to students of social change. Not 
only was this due to the fact that it was proceeding under the aegis of 
Communism, but because of the extraordinary nature of China as a total 
system at the onset of the relevant change. He thought that the
14
impressive longevity of the traditional society, the continuity of its 
sub-systems and what can only be termed as an inherent capacity for 
renewal, had brought about the achievement of an internal consistency 
which was extraordinarily stable. Thus he suggests that 'the very 
process of modernisation, with its necessary disorganisation and 
reorganisation of the total system and the likely persistence of 
traditional forms whenever pressure for social change is relaxed should 
commend its study to social scientists concerned with processes of 
change in the contemporary world (1964: 521). Other social scientists 
have argued for the study of social change in China on the grounds that 
the scope and intensity of planned social changes are greater than that 
of other social systems on which most contemporary sociologists and 
anthropologists focus (Greenblatt 1968: 4) . Within the context of social 
change these social scientists think there are important specific questions 
which anthropologists should properly ask and help to answer. Among 
these were certain questions to do with the role of marriage and kinship 
organisations. On one occasion Freedman asked:
'Has marriage reform (a key feature of the remaking of 
the Chinese society by the Communist state) disrupted 
the pattern of patrilocal residence by formally equalis­
ing the rights of men and women? Has the lineage 
remained an exogamous unit? Are marriages still 
"arranged" and therefore political?'
(1966: 177)
He thought that a consideration of these and related questions would 
raise many issues of great interest to anthropologists.
15
Marriage redefined
The government of the People's Republic of China has not only 
redefined the institution of marriage itself, but has taken the fact 
that it is both a consequence of and has consequences for social 
structure as the basis of a strategy to implement changes both within. i
marriage and in society itself. In China the institution of marriage 
has been defined as 'the social form of the union of a man and a woman 
and the foundation of the domestic group which,is the basic social cell 
of society' (ZQ 16 December 1956). Underlying all the policies to do 
with marriage is the assumption that it is a necessary and 'natural' 
step for each individual (RMRB 29 May 1959, Lu Yang 1964: 7). For 
instance it is often stated that once young people reach an appropriate 
age, 'it is necessary that they find a life's companion' (ZQ 14 September 
1962) and it is 'rational and irreproachable that they should get married 
and have a family of two children' (ZQ 1 October 1963). Although divorce 
is allowed by law, for both men and women it remains the exception; the 
normal concept of marriage is a stable union lasting the lifetime of the 
parties.* Freedom of marriage or free-choice marriage was defined as 
the provision of full rights to handle matrimonial affairs without inter­
ference or obstruction from relatives, friends, family and the public, 
and without regard for social status, occupation or property (KMRB
* Divorce was more common in the early 1950s when many marriages 
arranged in the traditional manner were dissolved. Since the mid- 
1950s, however, it seems that divorce has become much less common. 
Certainly all the educational materials to do with marriage assume 
that if a marriage partner is carefully chosen at an appropriate 
age and on appropriate criteria then there will be little needfor, or 
likelihood of divorce.
16
27 February 1957). The placing of the negotiations of marriage within 
the control of the individual parties, the resting of the marital bond 
exclusively on the congeniality of the parties, and the strengthening of 
the marital bonds as opposed to all other kin bonds has invested marriage 
with a new significance for the individual. The educational materials 
alike recognise the importance of the new form of marriage for the 
individual. As one article suggested, 'viewed from the perspective of 
an individual's life, love and marriage are important matters in a 
person's life-cycle'. 'Choosing a life companion', it continued,
'can never be said to have no significance' (ZQ 14 September 1962).
The institution of marriage has also been invested with a new 
social significance as the basis of the domestic group. The domestic 
group or the household is said to stem from the marriage bond (ZQ 
16 December 1956), and it is the domestic group which is to remain the 
basic social unit in society. As one article pointed out:
'The family, as a form of joint life of the two sexes 
united in marriage, we' may definitely say will never 
be eliminated. The existence of this form of joint 
life is dictated not only by the physiological differ­
ence of the sexes, but also by the perpetuation of the 
race. Even in Communist society we cannot conceive of 
any objective basis and necessity for the "elimination 
of the family".'
(HUB 8 April 1959)
The new form of marriage by self-determination and the strengthening 
of the marriage bond, however, was designed to redefine the familial and 
kin relations within and between households. The relations between the 
parties based on congeniality might be expected to affect vertical 
relations between the generations and the sexes, and especially those 
between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.
The new marriage contract was also invested with a new social 
significance as an instrument determining social structure and a symbol
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of the degree to which social structures have been rearranged. It both 
contributed to and' was a consequence of the rearrangement of social 
structures. Of all the forms of association and social intimacy that 
expresses social equality, courtship and marriage have been singled out 
by social scientists as one of the most significant of indices (Barber 
1957: 123). Certainly in China, the degree to. which marriage patterns 
have changed has been used by the Chinese government as a measure of 
their success in establishing egalitarian policies and breaking down 
hierarchical relations. For instance the abolition of socio-economic 
criteria as a factor governing choice of marriage partner may work towards 
and reflect the reduction of social stratification. In the early 1950s 
a number of social reforms such as the reform of the education system, 
the introduction of an egalitarian incomes structure, the redistribution 
of land and capital and the gradual reduction of the private ownership 
of the means of production were introduced to substantially alter the 
former balance of class advantages, and it was anticipated that these 
structural changes would soon be reflected in patterns of marriage.
In turn, the free choice of marriage partners without regard for 
property and.other socio-economic factors might equally work towards 
the same end. For this reason the media have publicised cross-class 
marriages, between professional and factory workers or between urban- 
educated brides and rural-peasant grooms, as a sign of the decreasing 
divisions between the ’mental’ and ’manual1 and rural and urban social 
categories (WC March 1962; SWB 14 February 1974).
It is the instrumental function of marriage in introducing changes 
in broader social structures which challenged the assumption common in 
China before 1949 that marriage is the private concern of the individual 
or domestic group. Marriage as a family affair had always belonged to
18
that sphere of the social field dominated by the informal relations
! '
conceived as non-contractual, normative relations, based on kinship,
\
friendship or ceremonial and ritualised relations as opposed to the
contractual and formal relations of society rationally based on
bureaucratic lines (Cohen 1974: xi). Marriage which was formerly
defined as a family or domestic affair has been reallocated to the
social, public or political spheres. In emphasising its public and
political repercussions many educational materials emphasise that the
marital bond which provides for the birth, training and education of a
new generation makes it a matter of vital significance to society and
not a personal affair or trifling matter of daily life (GRB, 15 November
1962). In China it has become an object of public and political import:
’We must regard marriage not as a problem of the enjoyment 
of "private life", but as a "cell" of the entire cause 
of Revolution, as something important to the interests of 
the whole society.’
(TKP 22 December 1956)
In the People’s Republic of China, the institution of marriage more 
than any other ’social drama’ (Turner 1957) or ’sociodrama1 (Duncan 
1968), has become the vehicle by which the State has intervened and 
attempted to modify or change the procedures and symbols of the drama 
in order to articulate major changes in social relations between the 
generations, the sexes and between domestic, kin and other groups.
Change both within the life-cycle of the individual and within social
structures was to be effected through the manipulation of the procedures
\
and symbols of marriage. These primarily have been modified to represent 
inter-personal relations based on an exchange between individual parties, 
rather than inter-group relations based on the interests of those groups. 
The substitution of the one symbolic order by the other negates or rejects 
the alliance and descent models of marriage which have characterised
19
previous sociological and anthropological studies of marriage.
A central and distinctive feature of the study of kinship systems,
defined by Radcliffe-Brown as a ’network of social relations which
\
constitutes part of the total network of social relations or the 
social structure' (1950: 13), has been an examination of the role of 
marriage in binding individuals into kinship groups. In studying the 
web of kinship that binds individuals into kin groupings, ranging from 
the nuclear and extended familial structures to lineages, clans and 
moieties, anthropologists have distinguished relations based on 
marriage (alliance and affinity) and those based on birth (descent 
and filiation). Because kin groups are usually exogamous in that their 
members must find their spouses from some other groups, all kinship 
ties involve marital ties that form links between kin groups. The 
relative importance or strength of blood (cognate) versus affinal 
relationships in integrating members and groups into society has formed 
the basis of the controversy between alliance and descent theorists.
Very briefly, descent theorists emphasise the role of marriage in 
reproducing the unilineal descent groups. For example Fortes (1971) 
placed the study of marriage firmly within the context of the develop­
mental cycle of the domestic group. He thought it necessary to establish 
the domestic field as a separate analytic category with its own system 
of social relationships, institutions and activities which could be 
viewed from within as an internal system. Fortes suggests that 
although status in the domestic domain receives definition and sanction 
from the politico-jural domain, marriage is primarily designed to 
reproduce and maintain the domestic group. In contrast, Levi-Strauss, 
the doyen of alliance theorists, examined marriage as the mechanism 
whereby women are exchanged between men and groups of men. He has
20
emphasised that the total relationship of exchange which constitutes 
marriage is not established between a man and a woman in which kach. 
receives something, but rather, between groups of men. Women figure 
only as objects of exchange and not as one of the partners between whom 
the exchange takes place (1969: 478-488). Marriage then represents the 
relations between domestic and kin groups in which groups are function­
ally dependent on others for wives. This controversy between alliance 
and descent theorists has characterised most recent studies of marriage, 
but Rivi&re in a recent article (1971) reappraised the study of marriage 
and attempted to turn the attention of anthropologists to the composition 
of marriage itself or its constituent elements and the relationship 
between them. Rivi&re suggests that marriage is primarily a symbolic 
statement about one of the possible forms of relationship between the 
two sexes. 'What X am trying to do,' he says, 'is to get marriage 
viewed as part of the total male/female relationship' (1971: 66).
In China over the past twenty-five years there has been what has 
amounted to a rejection of both the alliance and descent models of 
marriage and a redefinition of marriage as an institution symbolising 
relations between equal partners of the opposite sex who enter into 
relationships of exchange themselves. This redefinition is not part of 
a theoretically-based rejection of common anthropological theories. 
Indeed, the materials to do with the reforms make no explicit references 
to anthropological theories as such. But the redefinition itself and 
the arguments cited in favour of reform make it possible to identify a 
contrasting model of marriage. Although it is recognised that marriage 
has the natural aim of begetting children, no longer is the primary 
object of marriage the reproduction of the unilineal descent group.
In contrast to the old definition of marriage which had described the
21
purpose of taking a wife as the begetting of children to 'worship the 
ancestral temple and continue the family line' (PR 8 March 1960), the 
new definition of marriage rejects sterility as grounds of divorce.
Not only is the absence of children no longer an unfilial act, but in 
the new socio-economic conditions of collective land ownership and 
collective welfare there was said to be no need to 'bring up children 
in anticipation of old age1 or to ensure the inheritance of family 
property (HRB 8 April 1959). The new definition of marriage also 
rejects the other main purpose of marriage which had been to establish 
alliances advantageous to the interests of the descent group of the 
• respective parties as a means of socio-economic and political mobility. 
The Book of Rites, which dating from the second century AD was held to 
embody the rules defining correct social behaviour, declared that the 
purpose of marriage was to unite two families with a view to harmonising 
the friendship of the two lineages (Chiu 1966: 4). This aim had always 
exerted a substantial influence on the controls over the negotiations 
and choice of marriage partner. In the new definition of marriage, it 
is designed to become a symbol of inter-personal rather than intra-group 
or inter-group relations with ensuing significance for the structure 
of groups and the position of women. In China proposed changes within 
the institution of marriage may be said to be an integral part of the 
conscious rearrangement of social structures.
Research and the People's Republic of China
Despite the pleas of senior social scientists such as Freedman and 
Skinner that anthropologists should turn their attention to the People’s 
Republic of China, there have been few such studies. Freedman remarked
22
in 1969 that there has not, as there might have been, an anthropological 
voice to speak about the transformations of the institutions of kinship 
and marriage, the new norms governing inter-personal relationships, the 
reorganisation of local groups and the change in the nature of property.
In contrast, he has found himself enormously impressed by the economists, 
political scientists and a few sociologists who have scrutinised the 
Press, studied the official literature, interviewed emigres and weighed 
up the testimony of foreign eyewitnesses in order to build up a body of 
facts and arrange them to answer important questions (1969: 8). The 
examples of Skinner1s treatment of the Chinese market town both before 
and after 1949 (1964-5), Martin King Whyte's examination of small groups 
and political rituals (1974) and Ezra Vogel's study of Guangzhou (1969) 
may serve as a few examples. There have been no detailed studies of 
marriage patterns as they have evolved in the People's Republic of China.
M.J. Meijer (1971) has undertaken a comprehensive documentary survey of 
the legal precedents for, and the provisions of the Marriage Law of 195d, 
their purposes and objectives and the measures which were taken to implement 
the new law. In his study he points out that it was at no time his inten­
tion to describe the changes in attitudes towards marriage or the marriage 
patterns themselves. Meijer points out that he undertook to trace the 
purposes and functions of the Marriage Law and the way in which it has 
been applied because the effect of the Marriage Law on society could only 
be studied satisfactorily when it is possible to conduct sociological 
investigations under better circumstances than now prevailed in China 
(1971: 2), C.K. Yang who has probably undertaken the most comprehensive 
documentary survey of marriage and the family in China up to the mid- 
1950s, states that since 1953, the Chinese press has published little 
factual information about the problem of marriage and the family and
23
’it. has therefore not been clear how the new trend is expressed in the 
actual marriage and family situation in the country as a whole1 (1959:
210). This case can still be argued in 1977, /although less so than in 
I960, for the media in the past fifteen years has devoted considerable 
space to certain types of questions concerning marriage and familial 
relations. What is clear is that it is the range and types of materials 
available for study rather than the interest and importance of the 
questions, which has deterred anthropologists from studying social 
processes in China.
One of the reasons that anthropological studies of China have lagged 
behind studies in economic and political science is that they have set 
special store by first-hand and participatory observation. This was 
the basis of their brief ’to formulate and validate statements about the 
conditions of existence of social systems and the regularities that are 
observable in social change’ (Radcliffe-Brown 1951: 22). The factor 
which,more than any other, has detracted from the People’s Republic of 
China as a field of anthropological study was the closing of its borders 
to foreign scholars. Fieldwork, the main technique of investigation, 
was no longer a possibility. Instead the tools of the anthropological 
trade have been applied to Taiwan (Gallin 1966; Diamond 1969; Pasternak 
1972 etc), Hong Kong (Ward .1967; Potter 1968; Baker 1968; Watson 1975), 
and the ’overseas Chinese’ (Freedman 1957; Skinner 1958), or what has 
been termed ’residual’ China. There are now a substantial number of 
anthropological studies which have examined various facets of social 
structure in these fields, among them kinship and marriage, economic and politi­
cal structures and religion in villages, small towns and urban complexes, 
and their number is increasing. It is the availability of these studies 
which has caused Freedman (1963; 1964) and Skinner (1964: 521) both to
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recommend the social scientist to take advantage of comparative studies 
of processes of social change or industrialisation in the three contrast­
ing Chinese environments of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Communist mainland 
China. What is missing for such a comparative study of the ’modernisation1 
of marriage and kinship organisations, is not a' study of their role in 
the modernisation of Taiwan or Hong Kong or for that matter Republican 
China, but an examination of marriage and kinship organisation in the 
People’s Republic of China. In the absence of this study, anthropologists
have been content to conjecture about similar processes in the People’s
Republic of China by drawing analogies from these and other comparable 
social fields. This thesis attempts to make good this omission by 
undertaking a study of the institution of marriage as it has evolved 
in the People’s Republic of China over the past twenty-five years.
Scope of present study
The study takes as its starting point the introduction of the
marriage contract as outlined in the first two sections of the Marriage
Law (1950) which have to do with the negotiation of the marriage 
contract (see Appendix 1). As a preliminary, it surveys the procedures 
of mate selection which characterised China before 1949 (Chapter 2) and 
introduces the new policies and programmes of marriage reform introduced 
in 1950, their goals and the means by which they were to be implemented 
(Chapter 3). The following chapters are devoted to the processes of 
change within the institution of marriage itself. They each take an 
aspect of the negotiation of marriage and assess the degree to which 
proposed changes have taken effect. These include an examination of the 
degree to which arranged marriage and the institutional intervention of
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kin and brokers in the procedures of mate' selection have been substituted 
by 1 free-choiceV negotiations based on mutual volition (Chapter! 4) and
courtship has replaced betrothal as the dominant pre-marital ritual
\
\
(Chapter 5). Chapter 6 examines the age of marriage and Chapter 7 
assesses the qualities of the preferred mate. They ask how far the age 
of marriage has been raised and how far a narrowly defined field of 
eligible mates, based on the pursuit of class status and power, has 
been replaced by a broad field of eligibl.es characterised by the negation 
of such socio-economic criteria. In Chapter 8 an examination of the 
ritual and ceremonial forms of marriage reveals the extent to which they 
have been simplified both procedurally and symbolically. For each of 
these processes the varieties in patterns are identified and attributed 
to broadly defined sub-groups in Chinese society.
Research materials
The materials used for these studies are drawn mainly from two 
primary sources. A statement of the goals, aims and policies of marriage 
reform can be found in the law, government policy directives, abstract 
discussions and statements in the media and educational materials in all 
its forms, together with a study of the public reference groups or role 
models. The latter are a particularly common didactic form in China 
(Sheridan 196S). Role models* have been defined by social investigators 
in Chipa as those which ’show common basic characteristics with the
* Role models -in the literature take the form, of personal documents or 
life histories or life courses of an individual or collective either 
compiled in a face-to-face interview or written up by the respondents 
themselves.
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totality, and possess a definite representative nature among phenomena 
of the same type1. That is, they carry the meaning of specimen or 
exemplar rather than the most common phenomenon or the statistical 
average (Hong Yen1in 1956: 39). For instance the life-histories of 
young men or women who defied their parents, friends and neighbours and 
chose their own marriage partner, waited to get married until their late 
twenties or chose a marriage partner regardless of their socio-economic 
status do not suggest that these are common practices. Rather they 
have been singled out by the media as examples for emulation. The 
process of selection of models as outlined by Hong Yen lin is to generally 
investigate and isolate the major characteristics of the totality, 
classify the totality into different types and select models from the 
various types to illustrate both the positive experience (positive models) 
and negative experience (negative models) (Hong Yenlin 1956: 4). An 
examination of those materials designed to publicise and educate its 
readers in the new forms of marriage illustrates the assumptions and 
propositions on which platforms are based and how they are to be 
implemented.
The second type of materials which furnish information for the 
basis of this study is the case studies drawn primarily from the press 
- books, periodicals, newspapers and monitored radio broadcasts. These 
consist of interviews, life-histories*and descriptions of marriage 
practices for a particular area or enterprise and letters to the editor 
which appear in the press from time to time. The didactic nature of 
the press has been commented on many times (Vogel 1969; Oksenberg 1969).
In the discussion of the press as a source of information, Oksenberg concludes 
that it tends to play a heavy exhortary role and informs the scholar more 
about how things ought to be done and ought not to be done rather than how things
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are (1969: 594). This is certainly true of the abstract discussions 
of goals and policies to do with marriage, although even here and for 
role models too it can be argued that they reveal a certain concern with 
contemporary practical problems.* This may sefem a surprising statement 
to make about role models, but they usually involve a sequence and relate 
the details of life-passage from 'real to- ideal' states of behaviour.
They assign major importance to the social norms by which the models 
choose to interpret their experience, the response of the model to a 
particular dilemma or choice of behavioural patterns and the role passage 
or sequence of experiences in the movement from one stage to another.
In displaying these characteristics they are akin to the life-histories 
or personal documents recommended for study by Kluckhohn (1945) and 
Langness (1965). However, within the media this study has taken as its 
primary source of information that provided by the letters to the editor 
in the correspondence columns which periodically feature in magazines 
such as Zhongguo Funu (Women of China), Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese Youth), 
Gongren Ribao (Workers' Daily) and various regional newspapers. For 
instance a number of letters concerning the age of marriage were pub­
lished in Gongren Ribao in 1962 and Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily) in 
1962, the types of marriage ceremony in. Nanfang Ribao in 1964-5 and 
choice of marriage partner in Zhongguo Funu in 1963-4 and Hunan Ribao 
in 1956-7.
* In an Interview with Edgar Snow, Chou En-lai has suggested that where 
there is an article published in the media about a particular problem 
it is an indication that the social attitudes demanded of those in 
the article are precisely those things which some people still find 
hard to accept. 'When we encourage the good and criticise the bad, 
it means that bad things surely still exist and good ones are not 
yet perfect' (Snow 1972: 228-9).
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Letters to the press may provide a useful source of information for 
anthropological enquiry into problems caused by the pressure oflconflict­
ing norms and belief patterns. In his discussion of the use of personal
\
documents in anthropology, Kluckhohn referred to letters to the press as 
one of the 1 yet unexplored research resources on conflict situations such 
as acculturation1 (1945: 105). Gus.tav Jahoda has used such letters as 
his primary source in his survey of the social attitudes and behaviour 
of young people in Ghana in 1959, and in the study of China, Chin Ai-li S* 
(1948) and Huang Lucy Jen (1962) have used letters to the press for similar 
short surveys in 1948-9 and 1956-7 respectively. The letters used in 
this study, as in these others, have revealed the existence of competing 
and conflicting values and customs dilemmas, and delineate the areas and 
forms conflict is likely to take for sub-groups in Chinese society as 
well as the status and power relationships involved. One of the dis­
advantages of this type of material is that the scholar has to be content 
with such information as the informants choose to give about themselves.
Most of the letters do however provide references to the sex, 
socio-economic background of the correspondent and his or her family, 
their class affiliation, and location of residence; all of which make 
it possible to identify certain spatial and social contexts in which 
particular types of conflict might be found. Perhaps more important, 
the letters usually describe informal group activities and glimpses of 
individual thought processes. For example many refer to the expectations 
and advice of those around them, be they peers, parents, kin or neighbours, 
which may be said to reflect the norms governing inter-personal relations. 
Many letters also reveal the thoughts of correspondents as they enter 
into conflict situations or individual rationalisations as they resolve 
them. For example, a correspondent might follow one of a number of thought
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sequences such as TI thought to myself...1 or 'if I follow this advice 
then the result will be ... but if I follow that course of action the 
result will be ...'-or 'I know I should do this, but I really think I 
shall do that because...' (see Appendix 2). But however interesting 
these letters, no assumptions can be made that the problems which they 
identify are representative or in any sense typical for China as a whole. 
The principal weakness of this type of source material has to do 
with the method of sampling or the processes by which the letters are 
selected for publication. In the first place the magazines chosen are 
likely to draw correspondents from certain age groups and a certain sex 
and there must be a variety of motives involved in writing a letter to 
the editors of any one of these magazines. Generally the motives may 
well fall into one of two categories, those who primarily wish to appear 
in print and those who are asking for help with a personal problem.
Some of the letters merely reflect socially approved behaviour in that 
they express official policies or goals and describe how they have put 
them into practice, although even this very process can be informative.
The bulk of the letters relate to definite problems and dilemmas in which 
the correspondent is in effect asking 'What shall I do? 1 and some of the 
letters also expressly refute the goals and premises on which official 
policies rest. It is impossible to know the criteria used by editors in 
their selection for publication, although sometimes the editors will 
publish the number of letters received on a particular subject and 
summarise their general contents before choosing to publish a number.
It is also a possibility that the very choice of letters published will 
influence the kind of letters which are submitted for selection. Although 
there can be no positive assumptions as to the representative qualities 
of the data, a lesser assumption can be made in that, unless otherwise
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indicated, the features revealed by the case studies used in this study 
are not grossly atypical.
The lesser assumption rests on comparisons of numerous additional 
accounts by internal and external observers drawn from alternative 
sources of materials. Oksenberg has argued very cogently that research 
on the People’s Republic of China requires the use of different types 
of resources in order to draw on the advantages and escape the limitations 
of any one type of source material available to the scholar (1969: 578). 
Comparative material has been drawn from a number of sources. There are 
the accounts of internal observers. It has been pointed out by Greenblatt. 
for example,, that while untrained in sociological and anthropological 
methods, writers of articles in the Chinese media have shorn themselves 
to be keen observers of behavioural patterns (1968: 3). Certainly 
there have been numerous articles in the media which identify the range 
of general problems to do with marriage and generate abstract discussions 
on why these apparently inhibit, the.marriage reforms. There have been a 
number of external studies on subjects allied to marriage which are the 
result of interviews with those formerly resident in the People’s 
Republic of China and who are now in Hong Kong. These include the study 
xiaxiang youth by Gordon White (1974) and a short survey of the family 
in rural areas by William Parish (1975). Both of these contained useful 
comparative material for this study. In the last two decades there have 
been a few village studies undertaken by both Chinese and foreigners 
which have been based on some kind of direct observation. Jan Myrdal's 
two volumes on Liuling, a small Chinese village, was rich in the bio­
graphical data which it contained (19675 1973), William Geddes undertook 
a brief survey of one of the villages originally studied by Fei Hsiao-tung 
(1963), David and Isobel Crook recorded their observations of the life of
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a rural commune in the late 1950s (1966) and Jack. Chen, a cadre from 
Peking, has recorded the events of a year in a production brigade in 
the 1970s (1973). Each of these, and particularly the latter, have 
provided data which has been very useful in this study. Indeed, it was 
the observations of Jack Chen in the 1970s which were partly responsible 
for the initial interes.t in this subject.- In addition to these, there 
have been a number of pertinent observations drawn from a variety of 
travelogs published as the result of visits of varying durations to the 
PeopleTs Republic of China. What has often surprised scholars working 
with these different types of sources is their fundamental agreement. 
Although there are some subtle differences among the sources, they 
generally supplement each other to converge on certain broad generalisa­
tions and trends (Vogel 1969; Oksenberg 1969; Whyte 1974).
There is one last comparative source which stands out from the 
others in that it is based on first-hand observation. Although it is 
not possible to undertake fieldwork in the People’s Republic of China, 
it is possible to visit China for three to four weeks at a time. The 
author did undertake two of these visits in summer 1973 and April 1977.
The first of these trips followed the usual pattern of visiting in a 
group a wide variety of social institutions in a number of locations 
in the surrounds of the capital, Nanking and Shanghai and the northern 
provinces of Liaoning and Shandong. Such a trip does not provide the 
opportunity to gather macroscopic quantitative information or system­
atically investigate a representative sample of institutions or range 
of informants, but it is a valuable experience in that it enables scholars 
to gather a certain kind of data and information as a result of an intensive 
sequence of interviews, briefings and visits. At a certain point in time 
and in certain limited and selected institutions and fields it is possible
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to gain considerable insights into a number of concrete and specific 
cases which may or may not reinforce qualitative impressions drawn from 
previous research findings. My own experience>. and that of other 
scholars, has indicated that scant and uncertain though our materials 
and research methods may be, they do not appear to lead us in greatly 
distorted directions.
The second trip, in April 1977, however, was of a completely 
different nature. It provided an unexpected and unique opportunity to 
travel as an individual and undertake ten days of concentrated inter­
viewing on the composition of the household, marriage and kinship 
relations in a selection of rural villages and urban neighbourhoods in 
one location, the Pearl River Delta and its environs in Guangdong 
province. For a description of the precise locations see Appendix 3.
The procedures employed during the visits were quite standard. On each 
occasion cadres, or those in positions of responsibility there, gave a 
general introduction to the area which provided valuable background 
information to the village or housing estate. I was then taken to the 
village or housing blocks to interview members of a number, usually 
six to eight, of its constituent households. In the main the households 
formed a sample of convenience, including only those to which I was 
introduced by my hosts. The details of these visits are given in 
Appendix 3. In one village (hereafter called Jiang village), however, 
what began as a highly selected sample became an all-inclusive sample 
when at my own request a return visit was arranged. During this second 
visit I was particularly fortunate to be able to interview members of 
each of the twenty-seven households and make a complete survey of. the 
marriages, household composition and kin relations within the village. 
Because of the problems of relating the form which social institutions
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have traditionally taken and still take in Guangdong to the rest of 
China, I have added the findings from this second visit to the other
case studies from documentary sources to illustrate problems, patterns
\
and trends in the negotiation of marriage. During this visit I specific­
ally set out to test the correlation of differing patterns of marriage 
with the structure and function of households and primary groups which 
I had already developed from documentary sources. In Chapters 9 and 
10 on the relationship of marriage to other social institutions, I have 
used the materials from Guangdong extensively. The opportunities to 
acquire a survey of, or more comprehensive materials for, one village 
are still limited and previous collections stand out as landmarks in 
the history of the study of social institutions in China. Therefore where 
the thesis focuses on the data for this village, and it makes a substantial 
contribution to the study, it has been sub-headed to draw attention to the 
results of my own first-hand observations there.
The dimensions of the study
Ideally it should be possible to document changes through time 
(historically) and from place to place (situationally). However, the 
materials available for study are not able to provide data comparable 
through time. Perceived changes in the data may represent real phenomena 
or may merely reflect changes in the data itself. The discontinuities 
in coverage for a particular problem may mean that it has ceased to exist, 
merely become less visible or the problem has lost its salience at a 
particular conjuncture. This problem is particularly pertin&nt in 
assessing the effect of the Cultural Revolution on the procedures of mate 
selection. Many of the policies of the Cultural Revolution had direct
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relevance for some of the problems revealed by the correspondents before 
the Cultural Revolution, but because magazines such as Zhongguo Funu and 
Zhongguo Qingnian ceased publication at that time, and the other media 
has been conspicuously silent on some of these,/problems, it is impossible 
to do more than conjecture on its implication for some marriage reforms.
The case studies can normally be located geographically, but the collection 
of descriptions of marriage are thinly spread over a wide range of 
geographical locations and period of time. An alternative approach would 
have been to carve out a narrower segment of China in terms of area, of 
time period and subject matter, and for some purposes this more limited 
approach is clearly superior. Apart from Vogel’s study of Guangzhou 
(1969) and a number of recent studies of Shanghai (1977) which are 
perhaps the most accessible areas to choose, not many scholars of China 
have opted for this approach. This stems partly from the nature of the 
materials available for study and partly from the interest in China as 
a macro-social, political or economic system.
The anthropologist must have a certain reluctance to embark on a 
macro-study of a whole society which embraces many millions of inhabitants
dispersed over a large area. It can be argued by anthropologists that it
takes them over a year of fieldwork and many years of processing and 
analysing this data to make a study of the social system of a single
community of a few hundred people, and that it is absurd therefore to
attach any scientific value to the findings of those who make generalisa­
tions about large complex societies. Radcliffe-Brown thought the most 
suitable unit of study for China was the village both because most Chinese 
lived in a village and because it was possible for one or two field workers 
to make a fairly detailed study in a year or so (19365 Lin Yuehua 1936). 
This recommendation was based on the assumption that from this patient
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induction would emerge a picture of the total social system of China.
. ■. r
Indeed it has been argued by anthropologists such as Firth that they
\
should use the microcosm, or the study of small groups or of small units 
of larger groups and the operation of inter-personal and group relations 
on a small scale, to illumine the macrocosm (1951: 17-18). But the 
question remains how can the anthropologist jump from the microcosm to 
the macrocosm? Can the anthropologist be sure that the small systems 
selected for study may not be anything more than a sample of like small 
units instead of a microcosm of a total society? Should the macro-study 
await the development of micro-studies and is the reverse jump from 
macrocosm to microcosm any more of a problematic? It has been pointed 
out by both Skinner (1964: 50) and Freedman (1963: 4) that even when 
China was open to field work, the confinement of attention to the local 
community was to miss the very characteristic of the society which makes 
it so interesting to anthropologists, that is its scale and its scatter.
This case is even more appropriate for study of the People1s 
Republic of China, when it can be argued that the State has intervened 
and played a more crucial role than ever before in changing social 
structures and integrated primary or the informal groups into new larger 
systems. As this thesis illustrates well, to have taken a single small 
unit of analysis,even if it ha<^ been methodologically possible, may have 
missed the very range of variables out of which the hypotheses have been 
derived. But all this said, there remains the problem of generalising 
from scattered and disorganised data in order not to make things simple, 
but to reduce a large array of relevant case studies to a system which 
is then amenable to analysis.
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A variety of conscious models
If the nature of the data available for study has defeated any 
approach to a detailed social history or substantial study of a small 
segment of Chinese society, it enables the analyst to build up models 
of certain structures whichv are apparently common in China and seemingly 
persistent over a period of time. It is possible to express the range 
and variation in the procedures of marriage by means of a number of 
models which set out their characteristics. In this particular context 
models have a very simple meaning. They are not.a statement of the 
average of all marriage procedures, but are rather summaries or clusters 
of characteristics which as a conceptual framework can accommodate a 
whole series of concrete cases. Models are used here after Barnes 
(1971: 118) and merely represent a degree of abstraction from and order­
ing of data without which it would be impossible to begin to think about 
explanations.*
Although anthropologists have claimed to be uniquely placed to 
reflect on latent social functions and relate institutional variables 
within a single social system, one level of research has always consisted 
of noting the conscious and articulated values, norms and constructs of 
the actors themselves. It was Durkheim (1951) who first emphasised the 
importance of taking cognisance of the actors1 ideology or conception 
of the social system as a medium through which he is able to understand
* It has been claimed that models themselves have an inherent logic and 
explanatory capability. For instance both Levi-Strauss (1953) and 
Leach (1970) tended to demand of their models that they be explanatory 
constructs meant to provide the key to observed facts of social 
existence, the principles or formulae accounting for its character­
istics, and hence the logic behind social reality.
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and explain his field of social relationships. Since his time anthropol­
ogists have noted the patterns which the subjects under study perceive 
in their own behaviour and their own particular rationalisations for 
custom and departures from custom (Evans-Pritchard 1951: 152). The study 
of conscious models was further legitimated by Levi-Strauss (1953).
After Boas (1911) he differentiated two contrasting situations. In one, 
anthropologists have to construct a model from phenomena, the systematic 
character of which, has evoked no awareness on the part of the people.
In the other they have to examine on the one hand the raw phenomena and 
on the other the models already constructed by the culture to interpret 
the raw phenomena. He thought the latter was a far more difficult task 
and he pointed out the paradox confronting structural analyses in that 
the more obvious the structural organisation, the more difficult it becomes 
to reach it because of the often inaccurate conscious models lying across
the path that leads to it (1953: 517). Levi-Strauss expressed such
%
reservations and thought that for these reasons, a study of the culturally 
produced models often proved to be unsatisfactory. On the other hand, he 
alsd thought that it was by no means that this should always be the case, 
and therefore the anthropologist could not dispense with studying what 
he termed the conscious or ’home-made1 models of a culture. Indeed, he 
said, 'they probably rank among the most significant facts ... they 
furnish an important contribution to the understanding of the structures, 
either as factual documents or as theoretical contributions similar to 
those of the anthropologist himself (1953: 527).
In the People’s Republic of China there is a very well-defined 
model of marriage patterns presented in the media. Throughout the 
movement for social change in the marriage system, it has been the aim 
of the Chinese government to establish a spontaneous social movement in
38
support of a single model by articulating meanings of symbols and rituals 
and making latent functions manifest. It could be argued that jit is this 
very existence of a clearly defined ideology representing social structure, 
processes and social relations as they 'ought to be 1 which has obscured 
the variety of social practices from observers. In this social field, 
perhaps the most obvious problem facing the anthropologist is that 
suggested by Levi-Strauss or the assessment of the accuracy of the 
conscious model. To overcome this problem this thesis followed the 
example set by Barbara Ward who supposed there to be not one, but a 
variety of conscious models in a similar social field.
Ward (1965) used the concept of the 'conscious' or 'home-made' model 
as a basis for a discussion of the problems of uniformity and variation 
posed by the unique temporal and spatial span of Chinese society and 
culture. She suggested that to talk of 'the Chinese family' or 'the 
traditional structure of China' is as misleading at the level of ideal 
patterns as it has long.been known to be misleading at the level of 
actual patterns of behaviour. Indeed, she thought that scholars should 
postulate a number of different Chinese ideal patterns varying in time 
and space with historical developments and the demands of particular 
occupations and environments. Although there are and have been variations 
(and probably many more than is commonly believed), she suggests that in 
traditional China they are undoubtedly all variations on one easily 
recognisable theme (1965: 114). She searched for a means to provide an 
explanation of continuity and uniformity that can at the same time 
accommodate an explanation of change and variation. She concluded from 
her study of South China fishermen that there was no single version of 
the conscious model, but a variety of conscious models existing in the 
minds of the people under study which can and must be contrasted. She
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identified at least three different kinds of conscious models:
(1) ideological models, (2) immediate (home-made) models, and 
(3) internal observers’ models.
First there is the ideological model or the version of what the 
actors believe to have been the traditional literati system.* This is 
based, however.remotely,. upon relatively uniform literati practice which 
varied little from sub-group to sub-group. Because of its wider 
applicability she termed it the ’ideological model’. Secondly there 
is what she called the sub-groups ’home-made' or ’immediate’ model which 
is a model of the sub-groups* own social and cultural system as they 
believe it to be. In comparison to the ideological model, the various 
immediate models may well be expected to show wide differences. Lastly 
are the ’internal observers' models. These are models of the socio­
cultural arrangements of Chinese sub-groups other than their own. As a 
type they differ from observers' models proper (that is the models 
constructed by outsiders, including social scientists) in that they are 
held by people who share membership of the same society. Ward found that 
this breakdown into three kinds of conscious models allowed her to 
ascertain the process towards uniformity in China developing out of 
innumerable and continued shifts in the various immediate models of 
different local, occupational and ethnic groups in the direction of their 
ideological models which were in fact remarkably similar.
* ’Literati’ is a term often applied to the leading Chinese social group 
because of the emphasis on proven literary qualifications as a pre­
requisite to membership of that group. For instance, to draw attention 
to the importance of the connexion between education and political 
power in China, Weber used the term to describe the whole Chinese 
privileged upper group (1951: 107-41).
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The establishment of the People's Republic of China marks a turning 
point in China when there is not only a range of conscious models of the 
type identified by Ward, but the introduction of a new ideological model 
designed to compete and conflict with not only the existing ideological 
model, but also the range of immediate conscious models. The isolation 
and identification of the varieties of conscious models in the People's 
Republic of China requires a dual approach combining a holistic structural 
or normative approach with that based on actor-focused inter-personal 
sets (Wolff 1966; Mitchell 1966). The former reveals the 'ideological' 
conscious model and the latter the variety of immediate or home-made models. 
The ideological model can be expected to be found in law, government policy 
statements, authoritative theoretical statements in the media and educa­
tional material in all its forms. On the second level, immediate home­
made models may be revealed by the subjects themselves in the correspondence 
columns and debates conducted in the media broadcasts, magazines and news­
papers, and interviews recorded by internal and external observers. For 
example, the continuous interaction of old and new ideologies has led to 
the existence of conflicting values and custom-dilemmas among different 
sub-groups and within the life-history of one individual which are well 
revealed in correspondence columns. Individual case studies can be used 
to ascertain .the manifestations of macro-events or general large-scale 
structural changes at the level of the small scale face-to-face 
community. Changes within inter-personal sets or informal face-to-face 
primary interaction and groupings can be expected to be reflected in the 
norms governing those sets. Immediate conscious models, then, can be 
defined in terms of the role expectations of the ego-centric inter-personal 
sets revealed in case studies. By adopting this dual approach it is hoped 
to identify the variety of conscious models which influence social behaviour 
in China today.
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It is suggested that the new immediate conscious models isolated 
and identified in this study represent a variety of attempts to^  mediate
the conflict between the pre-existing and new ideological models. The
\
new ideological model may serve as a standard against which to compare 
the syncretic forms. By examining the juxtaposition of old and new 
customs in the case studies and asking what of the old has succumbed, 
what has persisted, to what extent are they substitutions or additions 
and what explanations are offered for their rejection or persistence, 
it may be possible to hypothesise the socio-economic and organisational 
conditions which contribute to and inhibit the implementation of the new 
ideological model. For this reason Chapters 9 and .10 identify and discuss 
hypotheses based on the inter-relationships between marriage patterns and 
these socio-economic and organisational conditions. In Chapter 11 these 
hypotheses are compared to those developed by anthropologists in previous 
studies who have assumed that the ’modernisation1 of marriage and kinship 
structures in the People’s Republic of China parallels those of Republican 
China and Taiwan. The final chapter presents a brief summary of the 
findings of this study which inter alia challenge these assumptions and 
assesses their relevance to the debate surrounding the relative contribu­
tions of the new ideological model and socio-economic variables to the 
process of social change within marriage and kinship structures.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELS OF MARRIAGE IN REPUBLICAN CHINA
In order to identify the variety of conscious models in the People's 
Republic of China it is necessary to distinguish the conscious models of 
marriage which characterised China on the eve of the promulgation of the 
new Marriage Law in 1950. It has been argued by Freedman that marriage 
rites in traditional China could be represented by one. basic model (1967: 
6). Ward has convincingly made the case for the acceptance of a variety 
of conscious models, but she also points out that they were of remarkable 
uniformity due to the operation and overriding prestige of the traditional, 
ideological model (1965: 115-116). In Republican China (1911-1949), new 
marriage patterns emerged which no longer reflected the universal domin­
ance of the traditional ideological model. Rather, this period is 
characterised by the presence of a number of conscious models which 
provided competition for the traditional ideological model. For the 
first time the latter came into conflict with new conscious models which 
called for the free-choice of marriage partner or the non-intervention of 
parents or third parties and the establishment of new households on 
marriage. As a result of this competition and conflict, conscious models 
developed in Republican China in opposition to the traditional ideological 
model. The new variety of conscious models then ranged from that of 
arranged marriage of the traditional ideological model to models of 
mutuals volition.
The traditional ideological model was identified by its chief 
characteristic, that the marriage contract was entirely negotiated and 
controlled by the heads of the household and the parties themselves had 
no active role in the negotiations. The traditional ideological model
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was based on the principle that marriage was an exchange between two 
households and not between two individuals. This principle had' been
laid down by the Book of Rites, which, dating from the second century
\
AD, was taken to embody the rules of propriety. It stated that the
purpose of marriage was two-fold: to establish an alliance between
households with a view to harmonising the friendship of the two lineages
and to reproduce the descent group or to beget children to ’worship in
the ancestral temple and continue the family line (PR 8 March 1960).
The injunction of Mencius that the greatest of all unfilial acts was
not to provide descendents was taken very seriously (Legge 1895: IV, 313).
Since marriage was not considered to be an individual affair, consultation
with the parties or their consent to the match was considered unnecessary.
The Shijing, a collection of poems dating from the early Zhou period
(1122-221 BC), stated that to choose one's own marriage partner was to
transgress the Rules of Heaven and violate the laws (Legge 1876: 98).
Since marriage was a matter concerning the two households, control of the\
negotiations fell to the most senior agnatic ascendants of the parties.
By virtue of his authority over the individuals of the household, the 
senior male was entitled by law to select a marriage partner and negotiate 
the marriage of any member of the household without the consent or even 
knowledge of that member. A broker called the meiren (literally match­
maker or go-between) was normally engaged for the purpose of conducting 
the negotiations, but it was the head of the household who finally 
arbitrated the choice, decided the ceremonial expenditure and put his 
name to the marriage contract. The practice of arranged marriage and 
employing go-betweens to negotiate the marriage contract was said to have 
become such a time-honoured custom that it had crystallised into the 
belief that all marriages were brought about by the 'command of the parents
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and the words of the go-between1 (Levy 1949: 101).*
The literature on traditional China suggests that there was little 
competition from*alternative forms of marriage. The parties to the match 
may have had some form of veto power over arranged marriage. There are 
cases in which young people protest against the traditional ideological 
model of marriage through attempted and successful suicides, entering 
religious orders, or joining anti-marriage associations, but these are 
avenues of escape or avoidance rather than strategies providing for 
alternative forms of marriage. ,The procedures of mate selection from 
the initiation of negotiations to their conclusion were characterised by 
a lengthy, elaborate and densely symbolic series of ceremonies, rituals 
and prestations. It was in the nature and number of these that there was 
some variation from geographic region to region and according to the 
wealth and status of individual households. A few of the more obvious 
variations exist in the personnel who actually undertook the negotiations, 
the age of marriage, definitions of preferential mates and ceremonial and 
ritual forms (Chiu 1966; Freedman 1967). Despite these varieties of 
conscious models, it was the almost invariable power of the jiazhang 
or head of the household which has allowed anthropologists to talk of one 
basic model in traditional China. It can also be identified as the 
dominant conscious model in the first half of the twentieth century.
The traditional ideological model remained dominant over much of 
Republican China and almost entirely in the rural areas. All the village
* It is interesting to note an exception among the Miao peoples of the 
remote south-western Guizhou province. According to an old Mia.o album, 
probably dating from the mid-eighteenth century and translated by 
Eberhard, the most striking feature of their marriage customs was 
the complete freedom of young people in the choice of their marriage 
partner (1970: 225).
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studies undertaken during this period, even in 1948-9, describe the 
traditional ideological model of marriage as the immediate conscious 
model operating in each village. In the 1930s' these were the findings 
of a young Chinese sociologist in a village oh the outskirts of Peking 
(Lang 1946: 122), of Gamble in a number of north China villages where 
marriage reform had been introduced (1954: 379), of Fei Hsiao-tung in a 
village in Jiangsu, one of the most industrialised provinces of China 
(1939: 40).and of Osgood in a village on the outskirts of Kunming city 
in Yunnan province in the late 1930s (1963: 273). Olga Lang writing 
in 1937-8 concluded from her own and other studies that in the villages 
of China it was still absolutely impossible for the young people to take 
any part in choosing their own mates (1946: 122). She herself investigated 
360 marriages in 170 families in the villages of north China, Fujian and 
Jiangsu, and found that all the matches but one, where a college student 
had been requested to give his consent to the match, had been arranged 
in the traditional manner. . Only three women of the 170 married admitted 
to ever having heard of alternative forms or 'modern marriage1 (1946: 123). 
This pattern seemed largely unchanged in the 1940s. Although more 
villagers in the rural areas might now be aware of an alternative, it 
remained an internal observers1 model rumoured and practised somewhere 
else, but not- in keeping with local customs. Martin Yang (1945: 103-122) 
found marriage in a north China village to still be arranged in the 
traditional manner, although he also found there was some knowledge of 
the Modern ways1. This he said was the result of the migration of one 
or two young men to the cities who had married second wives and established 
new households, thus abandoning their first wives in the village. These 
city ways were bitterly criticised. In another village located on the 
outskirts of Guangzhou (Canton) in South China, C.K. Yang found in 1948-9
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that parents still controlled the marriage negotiations with no modifica­
tions, although here again they lived too close to the big city not to
\
have heard of marriage as a result of free choice of partners. He found 
that they regarded such patterns of marriage as another of those 'strange 
fashions characteristic of a strange modern urban living especially 
among the foreignised rich city folks' without any thought that it might 
one day modify their own village customs (1959: 83; 176).
Arranged marriage: customs and practices
The central characteristic of the traditional ideological model,
the control of the marriage negotiations by the older generation, might
remain unchanged, but an examination of these village studies illustrates
that variations in the form and content of the rites and prestations of
marriage varied according to locality and the wealth and status of the
individual household. Since the local variations cannot be outlined here
in their entirety, a few of the more obvious variations can suffice to
illustrate that there was a range of conscious models in these details.
The negotiations for marriage were normally initiated by the head of
the groom's household who employed a go-between, either a professional
matchmaker or a friend or relative, to search for a potential mate or
approach a particular girl's family and mediate the exchange of contracts
and gifts. Cases are known in which the parents themselves directly
entered the negotiations. It was normally the groom's parents who were
responsible for inaugurating the proceedings leading to their son's
betrothal except in cases of uxorilocal marriage (matrilocal residence),*
* Virilocal marriage was the normal form of marriage in China, although in 
exceptional circumstances the groom might take up residence in the wife's 
household. This form might occur where there were no sons in the wife's 
household and the groom might expect to acquire land and otherwise better 
his circumstances as a result.
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when the girl’s parents normally initiated the negotiations. In some 
cases the senior woman of an extended household, especially if she was 
widowed, might control the negotiations. In rarer cases the family of 
the bride might initiate a betrothal through a matchmaker as was known 
to have occurred in Phenix village (sic), Guangdong (Kulp 1925: 170).
Where the senior members of the bride’s or groom’s households were kin 
or old acquaintances they may already have come to some informal arrange­
ment at the time of the birth or during the early childhood of the parties 
and only later did they employ a go-between to negotiate the details of 
the contract. Whatever the varieties in detail, however, the control of 
the negotiations invariably lay in the hands of the older generation.
The age at which the negotiations were initiated ranged widely from 
birth to early teens. It was not uncommon for merchant and gentry classes 
to informally negotiate a betrothal at birth, and the traditional ideo­
logical model derived from their practice, while not explicitly stated, 
seems to have been characterised by early betrothal. The poorer the 
peasant household, the longer the betrothal of sons might be delayed 
because of the household’s inability to provide for the expenses 
associated with betrothal. In the rural villages for which there is some 
evidence, the age of betrothal seems to range between six or seven to 
twelve, thirteen or fifteen years. In Kaihsienkung village (Yangtze 
Plains) a betrothal was usually negotiated when a child was six or seven 
although it could occur later (jl939: 40), in Kao Yao village in Yunnan 
province, betrothals were usually contracted about the age of ten or 
eleven, although many were negotiated from the age of five onwards (jl963: 
276), and in Taitou village in Shandong, betrothals ‘were said to occur 
later than in some other parts of China. There girls were betrothed at 
ages twelve or thirteen onwards while boys were perhaps fifteen years
(|19A5: 106).
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Among the literati, the socio-economic status of the potential 
spouse seems to have been the most important criterion in the selection 
of a marriage partner. A common popular saying associated with the 
choice of spouse reflects the importance of this criterion. In establish­
ing alliances, households were said to be guided by the old maxim that 
’wooden doors should match wooden doors and bamboo doors with bamboo 
doors’ (Yang C.K. 1959: 29). According to a study of lineage rules and 
a number of field studies this rule of homog<uny. was more particularly 
interpreted to mean that there should be hypergamy for daughters (Fei 
Hsiao-tung 1939: 50; Yang M. 1945: 107; Liu Hui-chen Wang 1959: 79).
In most of the immediate conscious models this criterion was shared with, 
if not dominated by, concern for the reproduction and maintenance of the 
household. Hence the concern with the physical health and fertility 
history of the potential daughter-in-law and her family. These were of 
partic ular importance to households where there was likely to be only 
one woman of child-bearing age recruited into the household and where 
the household relied on the labour of the daughter-in-law to provide 
services requisite to the maintenance of the household as a unit of 
production and consumption.. Beyond the more general criteria, particular 
rules defining categories of prohibited and preferable mates varied 
considerably and there seems to have been no one conscious model.
Although alliances with those of the same surname and with cross 
cousins were prohibited by law, this was not always so in practice.
Both Freedman (1958: 4-5) and Hsu (1948: 80) point out that in some parts 
of China, marriage between persons of the same surname, though not of the 
same lineage, apparently occurred, although frequently the surname of one 
of the parties might be slightly altered in the genealogies. In the single 
lineage village, Phenix village in Guangdong, for example, marriage with
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no blood connection was preferred, but because the number of surnames 
limited the local range of selection, people of the same surname but
V
five generations removed might intermarry provided they had a name
\
which might be changed and provided a slight change was made in the
character. He quotes some classic examples of this: ling is changed to
mu by dropping one-half of the character; wang is changed to wu by adding
a dot (Kulp 1925: 167). In Kaihsienking and Kao Yao villages, marriage
was largely exogamous and sometimes a husband or wife might have the
same surname but be members of different lineages (Fei Hsiao-ltang 1932:
86; Osgood 1963: 277). In Taitou village four lineages were represented
within the village, but intermarriage within the village was discouraged
here as it seems to have been in most of China (Yang, M. 1945: 115).
Categories of preferential spouses defined by kinship seems to
have varied widely throughout China. A sampling of the literature
indicated that the different forms of cross-cousin marriage were allowed,
preferred or discouraged and that matrilateral and patrilateral marriages
were not always symmetrically categorised. In a study of 42 lineage
genealogies mainly drawn from the central provinces of China, Liu Hui-chen
Wang found that twenty-four of the lineage rules prohibited marriage with
spouses of the same surname (1959: 82). Even matrilateral cross-cousin
marriage-was thought to be comparable to a violation of surname exogamy.
One rule for example stated:
fA cardinal principle of marriage is to avoid persons of 
close blood relationship; hence, the rule of clan exogamy 
and of not even marrying a person who happens to have the 
same surname. Cross-cousin marriage, though nominally a 
marriage between two persons of different surnames, is 
in reality a contravention to this principle and therefore 
a serious mistake in social custom.1
(1959: 82)
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Field studies of a number of villages in varied geographical locations 
illustrated the range of immediate conscious models in the twentieth 
century.
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Whatever the variation in criteria for selection, economic and 
political calculations by the elder generation were couched in the 
belief that all matches were 'made in Heaven* and were the predestined 
fate of the individual. One of the first rites symbolising the initiation 
of negotiations was the matching of the horoscopes or 'eight characters'. 
Each individual of China has an eight-character horoscope: two for each 
year, month, day and hour of birth. These horoscopes were matched by 
technical divination or by correlating their joint presence on the altar
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of the household with the degree of peace reigning in the household
over the subsequent few days. A favourable divination removed t^he
1
responsibility for future relations between the husband and wife, 
members of the household and between affines to a supernatural level. 
Eberhard from his study of the custom in Taiwan and in lineage genea­
logies has suggested though that the rite could be and was either 
manipulated to give the desired answer or its astrological implications 
were in fact ingored. He concluded that the rite performed a useful 
function in allowing a match, deemed to be unsuitable according to other 
criteria, to be refused without attributing blame and interrupting social 
relations (1963: 207).
According to the ideological model the first phase of the negotiations 
or the betrothal were said to be concluded by the exchange of a formal 
contract prepared at the behest of the heads of both the families con­
cerned and by the payment of the betrothal gift by the prospective 
groom1 s family to the prospective bride's family. The form and amount 
of the betrothal gift was negotiated by the heads of the families through 
a go-between and usually involved the transfer of clothing, jewelry, 
household goods, food and money. For all households it represented a 
major outlay. It was a requisite to marriage in all immediate conscious 
models, and individual sons would remain unmarried or become the 'bare 
sticks' in families too poor to afford the payments. What did vary was 
its total value and its constituents. The betrothal gift varied accord­
ing to' the resources of the families concerned. For the merchant and 
gentry family, the amount transferred was an opportunity to advertise 
their social status and could include large numbers of articles and a 
cash sum. Among those on the margin of subsistence there were often no 
gifts in kind, but it was entirely a cash transaction. It may be that
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the proportion of cash to the total value of the betrothal gift decreases 
with increase in socio-economic status. Either prestation or delivery 
of the betrothal document was sufficient to signify the conclusion of 
the betrothal, a necessary step in the procedures of mate selection.
The law fixed no age limits under which persons were forbidden to 
marry and the age of marriage tended to vary according to sex, geo­
graphical location and socio-economic status. It is likely from an 
estimate of gentry practice that marriage by about 18 to 20 years or 
earlier characterised the ideological model. Field studies record 
varying ages of marriage. In Kaihsienkung village 92 per cent of the 
girls and 75 per cent of the boys were married before 16 years (1939: 
40,52), in Phenix village the girls were married at an average age of 
close to 19, while boys were a little younger (Kulp 1925: 170,175).
In Taitou village the average age was about 20 for both boys and girls 
with no cases of boys under 19 or girls under 17 recorded or known to 
the author (Yang, M. 1945: 113). In Kao Yao the average age of marriage 
ranged from 14 to 20 (Osgood 1963: 279). In West Town the lowest age 
approved for marriage was 17 years for males and 16 for females, but the 
majority of boys and girls married two, three or four years later than 
that (Hsu 1948: 88). An average age of marriage for China as a whole 
was calculated in 1929-31 in one study by taking 12,456 farm families 
in 62 localities and 11 provinces in China as a sample. It was calculated 
as 20.78 years for boys and 18.47 years for girls. In the families 
resident in north China it was found that marriage was at an earlier 
age than south China where ,62.2 per cent of men and 79.6 per cent of 
women compared to 46.4 and 67.5 per cent were married before the age of 
19 (Chiao 1934: 28,31). This trend was reflected in the average and 
modal ages of marriage computed for north and south China.
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TABLE 1: Average and Modal Age at Marriage for the Persons Married 
During 1929; 12,456 Farm Families, 22 Localities) 11 Provinces, 
China (1929-31)
MALE FEMALE
Average age: China 20.78 18,47
North China 20.77 17.58
South China 17.82 16.52
Modal age: China 20 17
North China 18 17
South China 20 19
(Source: Chiao 1934: 32)
Another study ten years later in northern rural China, which was 
based on a sample of 5,255 families, showed that although a large number 
of boys were married before- they were 15 years, the males did not marry 
universally as early as the females, the largest number of whom were 
married when they were 18 (Gamble 1954: 39-44). When the age of marriage 
was correlated with ownership of land the influence of a family’s socio­
economic status strikingly affected the sons’ age of marriage and less 
so, but still-noticeably, affected the daughters' age of marriage.
The most significant figures are those that show that while one- 
third of the males in the families with less than 50 mu of land were 
married before they were fifteen years old, the proportion rose to 80.5 
per cent in the families with more than 100 mu of land. In the latter 
group 40 per cent of the males were married by the time they were fourteen 
years of age. The correlation of the higher age of sons’ marriages with 
declining socio-economic status reflects the inability of the poorer
households to meet the costs of marriage.
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TABLE 2: Age of Marriage and Size of Family Farm in Republican China





Size of farm: MALES
Under 50 mu* 14.7 33.3 61.0 20.3 490
50-99 mu 15.6 48.9 80.7 5.2 219
100 mu and over 26.3 80.5 94.6 1.8 57
15.8 41.4 69.3 14.6 760
Size of farm: FEMALES 16-20
Under 50 mu 1.4 8.6 44.9 4.8 60.7
*
50-99 mu . - 4.5 45.1 1.9 76.7
100 mu and over 1.8 12.4 57.8 0.0 73.7
1.0 7.8 46.0 3.7 72.6
couples
(Source: Gamble 1954: 44)
* 1 mu = 0.066 hectare or 0.1647 acres
According to Ching dynasty law and custom a marriage was invalid 
and without legal effect unless it was the occasion of public celebration 
and recognition (Chiu 1966:.4). No law prescribed any compulsory forms 
or procedures to be followed in the performance of marriage ceremonies, 
but the customs and rules of propriety handed down from generation to 
generation of gentry suggest an ideal model characterised by a lengthy 
and elaborate sequence of ceremonies and prestations which provided for 
the separation of the bride from her natal home and her integration into 
her husband’s household. There were some geographical variations and 
only those with wealth and status could live up to these in their totality, 
but all marriage ceremonies reflected the fact that the marriage contract
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was negotiated between heads of households and denied the importance 
of the individual participants. They emphasised the importance of the 
families over individuals by emphasising the continuity of the ancestral 
line, by worshipping the ancestors and introducing the wife to the members 
of the husband’s kin group. They made continuous references to the 
bride's future roles as a servile daughter-in-law and bearer of heirs.
In some areas the bridegroom awaited his bride at his home and in others 
he himself went to .fetch his bride and accompanied her sedan chair on 
its return journey. The extent'to which the bride's kin appeared at the 
marriage ceremonies within the groom's household varied from one area 
of China to another. But the sequence of the ceremonies and prestations, 
their number and form, chiefly varied according to the wealth and status 
of the families concerned. The wealthier the family the more elaborate 
the ceremony. v
The provision of a dowry was also a visible symbol of wealth and 
status. Dowry has been defined as the property given to daughters to 
take with them into marriage and it forms one of the series of presta­
tions between the kin of the groom and the kin of the bride (Goody and 
Tambiah 1973). Goody has argued that dowry should be treated as a form 
of pro-mortem inheritance to the bride and within the complex of women's 
property rights (Goody 1975: 1,17). Both Freedman (1966) and McCreery 
(1976) have argued that in China it is the symbolic attributes of dowry 
rather than the female claims on property which guides the provision of 
the dowry. They distinguish the definite legal rights to inheritance 
enjoyed by the basic shareholders, jiben youfen ren, from the privilege 
of receiving a dowry which might or might not be enjoyed by women as 
/the 'optional shareholders', zhuogei youfen ren. At the discretion of 
the basic shareholders, women might-or might not receive movable, as
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opposed to patrilineal, property in marriage. Freedman puts a unilateral 
stress on the symbolic significance of the dowry. He argues that while
the endowment of the bride might cause a considerable economic drain
\
on her family’s resources, they provide it
’not because the girl has any specific economic claims 
on them (she is not a member of the property-owning unit) 
but because their own status is at stake; a bride-giving 
family must, in order to assert itself against the family 
to which it has lost a woman, send her off in the greatest 
manner they can afford. And it is no accident, therefore, 
that dowry and trousseau are put on open display; they 
are not private benefactions to the girl but' a public 
demonstration of the means and standing of her natal 
family,’
(Freedman 1966: 55)
The daughters of the wealthy, then, can expect to be sent off with a 
substantial dowry in the form of jewelry, clothes, household furnishings 
and cash. The wealthier the family the more likely the dowry provided 
by the girl's household would more than match the gifts made by the 
groom’s family at the time of betrothal. Among the peasants and the 
artisan classes, the dowry was often less than the amount received in 
betrothal gifts. For the poor, the betrothal gift received for daughters 
might form the fund out of which brides were procured for sons, but it 
seems that in some areas the stigma attached to this deviation from the 
ideological model and the community gossip which it aroused caused 
families to provide for their daughters if they possibly could in order 
to escape talk of marriage by purchase, maimai hunyin (Yang M. 1945: 108).
In this respect deviations from the ideological model were rectified at
\
the first opportunity by the socially mobile.
The provision and size of the marriage feasts was also a ceremonial 
obligation which was met by all those who could possibly afford it.
Because its nature and size varied with social status, it too represented 
a relatively heavy expenditure for rich and poor alike. In Peking the
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cost of a group of weddings was found to vary from 1.5 to 9.0 times the 
monthly family income, but for one half of them the expenditure was from 
4.0 to 4.5 times'a month's income (Gamble 1933: 199). In rural areas 
where the average annual income ranged from $185 to $247,* a rough 
estimate of expenses of a wedding for the groom's family ranged from 
$200 for a wealthy family, $100 for a middle-class family and $50 for 
a poorer family. For the bride's family the expenses could often be 
twice as much for the groom's family (Gamble 1954: 383). The wealthy 
of the towns and countryside might spend thousands of dollars to mark 
the occasion of a son's or daughter's marriage.
One variation of arranged marriage sought to avoid the ceremonial 
expenses of marriage altogether. This was the tang yang xi (daughter- 
in-law raised from childhood) (Wolf, 1968: 864) or siaosiv (little 
daughter-in-law) (Fei Hsiao-tung 1939:53) system, whereby the small 
daughter-in-law was adopted into the household of the groom at the time 
of betrothal. It was a practice adopted by poorer families and the 
advantages of this form of marriage were said to obviate the need for 
marriage gifts and elaborate ceremony. In addition the girl's family 
immediately cut their total food consumption by reducing the number of 
mouths to feed and in turn the boy's family gained the girl's domestic 
labour and early accustomed her to the habits of the household thus 
reducing areas of conflict in her relations with her future mother-in- 
law (Wolf, A. 1968). In the study of 12,456 farm families in 22 localities 
in 1929-31, this custom was. reported to exist in 19 out of the 22 
localities studied, although this was not a frequent occurrence. The 
custom was present in 0.5 per cent of the households in the overall
* $ dollars - Chinese silver dollars
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sample and in 0.1 per cent and 0.8 per cent for north and south China 
respectively (Chiao, 1934:11). In the mid-1930s, however, Fei Hsiao- 
tung found that in one village, of the 439 married women 74 or 17 per
. i
cent had been siaosiv and among- the unmarried girls 39 per cent were 
siaosiv.(1939; 54). This proportion caused Fei Hsiao-tung to suggest 
that it was a form of marriage resorted to in.times of economic 
depression. According to his informants this type of marriage was very 
popular after the Taiping rebellion, but it had given way to the tradi­
tional type as soon as normal conditions had been recovered. This led 
Fei Hsiao-tung to suggest that the depression of rural industry from 
the 1920s onwards had caused a similar recurrence of the practice in 
the 1930s (1939: 55).
These were some of the variations in the form and content of the 
rites and prestations of marriage, but they were variations on one 
visible theme, the exchange of women between households which was 
entirely negotiated and controlled by the heads of the respective 
households. But in the twentieth century alternative conscious models 
had emerged which rejected the central principle of arranged marriage 
and thereby challenged the dominance of the traditional ideological 
model in the cities and in some provincial towns.
New forms of marriage
The new conscious models had their origins in the introduction of 
a new ideology and economic relations into China in the early twentieth 
century. The Western concepts of ’freedom1, ’individualism1 and ’demo­
cracy1 introduced by intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century reform movements were discussed and debated in the new
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periodic press which accompanied the movement. Articles in the Chinese 
periodicals began to contrast the procedures in mate selection i^n China
with those in Europe and North America, and the cause of T£ree choice'
\
marriage became closely linked with those of individualism, freedom 
and equality of the sexes. The reformer Wu Zhihui (1908), for example, 
openly advocated that 'men and women should freely mate, purely on the 
basis of love with both parties willing ...'. At the same time, the firs 
magazines for women demanded that, among other rights,- they should have 
the right to marry freely (Chen Dongynan 1937: 229-30). In 1907 an 
English newspaper published in Shanghai reported that an article in a 
Chinese magazine had created a sensation by asserting that Chinese women 
should be allowed individual freedom and exercise their right of choice 
in regard to their future husbands. The article contrasted the custom 
of seclusion of women and the 'garrulous go-betweens' with the free 
association of the sexes and the attentions of the 'courting swain' 
in other lands (NCH 9 August 1907).
The contents of the new periodic press encouraged young students 
to review and reject their traditional roles of submission within the 
family and especially their lack of participation in their own marriage 
negotiations. The idea of romantic love, taken up as an expression of 
the equality of the sexes, individualism, freedom and self-expression 
or self-fulfilment, became a cause of popular appeal among students in 
the New Culture or Renaissance of 1916 and the subsequent May Fourth 
movement of 1919. In this movement the term 'family revolution' was 
adopted as a popular slogan, for it was the traditional family system 
above all which was identified by the students as the chief obstacle to 
individual development, democracy and national solidarity, which were 
all seen to be requisite' to the independence and progress of their
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country. The emancipation of the individual from the inhibiting authority 
and controls of the household head and the ’old family system’ came to 
centre on the right.of the individual to choose his or her own marriage 
partner free from parental interference. Free choice of marriage partner 
became a symbol or statement of wider social rebellion in the May Fourth 
movement.
These new ideological forces coincided with the introduction of new 
socio-economic developments in Republican China which occurred as the 
result of a gradual process of industrialisation and urbanisation brought 
about by both the influx of foreign capital and the investmant of 
Chinese capital in trade and industry. Large numbers of manufacturing 
industries began to be established in cities like Shanghai, Tientsin 
and Wuxi which introduced new and cheap commodities into the markets 
of China. These had the effect of changing patterns of consumption, 
reducing the spare-time and side-line production of'the individual 
households and increasing their reliance on sources of cash income.
The combined effect was to reduce the self-sufficiency of the household 
as a unit of production and increase the amount of surplus farm labour 
per household. At the same time the new employment opportunities in the 
professions and in the manufacturing sector, although highly concentrated 
in the main urban areas, recruited and absorbed the surplus labour from 
a wide rural hinterland. Peasant youths were encouraged to move in 
unprecedented numbers from their individual households to small local 
towns and from there to large industrial centres. The establishment of 
schools in rural areas allowed numbers of boys and girls to undertake 
further education and move into the expanding clerical, business and 
professional occupations. By the late 1930s it was estimated that in 
some areas of China there was hardly a household which did not have
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daughters and sons working in urban areas (Lang 1946: 159). It was the 
migration of young, people to the cities which was a key factor contribut­
ing to the dispersal-and decreasing solidity of the hu (household).
This mobility and the new forms- of economic support alternative to that 
of the parental household allowed for and even encouraged the practise 
of new conscious models in marriage.
The demand for free-choice of marriage partner called for the non­
intervention of parents or third parties in the negotiations of marriage 
and the establishment of a new household on marriage. The literature of 
the period, autobiographies, biographies, letters and articles indicate 
that a range of marriage patterns developed in Republican China which 
challenged the dominance of the traditional ideological model. The new 
variety of conscious models ranged from consultation with the parties in 
the initiation of the marriage negotiations to marriage by mutual 
volition. The procedure of selection can be broken down into three 
stages: the initiation of the negotiations, mechanisms providing for 
consent by third parties, and the conclusion of the negotiations.
Thus the range of conscious models can be summarised as follows:
Figure 2: The Range of Immediate Conscious Models in the Republic of China
INITIATION' CONSENT CONCLUSION
Traditional Ideological Model Parents - Parents
Immediate model 1 
Immediate model 2a 














In the first new immediate conscious model the parties are invited 
to give their consent to the negotiations which are conducted iki the
same manner as in the traditional ideological model. The parents
\
'
initiate the marriage negotiations, but once the initial terms are 
agreed the young people ‘are consulted to give their consent to the 
match prior to the conclusion of the negotiations. It may be a purely 
verbal consultation or an exchange of photograph , or the go-between in 
conducting the negotiations may arrange for the families to meet or more 
often to view one another in the public gardens or in a tea house at a * 
specified time. In one gentry household in H«bei province at the same 
time as the elders of the family reminded its members Tthat marriage 
was not a relation for personal pleasure, but a contract involving the 
ancestors, descendants and property’, they allowed the daughter of the 
home to choose one from a number of suitable spouses chosen by them.
She was allowed to choose one of five cards proposing marriage which 
were lain face down in the presence of the elder of the household 
(Wain 1933: 114-7). In another case the parents who had chosen a 
marriage partner for their son actively encouraged him to get to know 
the girl before proceeding to their final acceptance of the match (Chin 
1948: 4).’ Although this concession to the younger generation was often 
reduced to a mere formality, the establishment of the principle of 
consultation formed an important adaptation of the traditional ideological 
model. Although this pattern demanded the least compromise on the part 
of both generations, it normally required the initiative or at least tacit 
consent of the older generation in order to modify the procedures of mate 
selection. Perhaps this is why it seems to have been the least common 
of the new immediate models to be introduced into Republican China.
A more common alternative involved a radical departure from or even a 
complete rejection of the traditional ideological model.
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In the other new immediate models it was the younger generation 
who took over the initiative in the negotiations of their marriage.
In the second immediate model the parties to the marriage initiated 
their own negotiations, obtained their parents’ consent and either 
the parents took over and concluded the negotiations (2a) or the 
parties themselves, with the requisite consent, remained in control 
of the negotiation process (2b). If parental consent was requested 
but not forthcoming, the parties often declined to pursue parental 
consent either because they feared potential or experienced real conflict. 
Consent too was often rendered unnecessary by the dispersal of the house­
hold as a result of death or migration. In both these circumstances the 
parties proceeded to directly conclude their own negotiations (model 3). 
The appropriation of initiative in the marriage negotiations by the 
younger generation very often required two important procedures. Prior 
to choosing their own marriage partners and initiating negotiations, 
they were often forced to defy their parents and break ofr betrothals 
previously arranged by their parents. This often formed the main 
stumbling block to the establishment of the new conscious models 2 and 3. 
Many of the personal documents written by the younger generations in the 
early decades of this century illustrate that the defiance of betrothal 
was the first step in the initiation of the negotiations. There were 
few precedents to follow. In one autobiography, a young student 
described how anxious she was and puzzled as to what course to adopt 
when she finally decided to defy her mother and father and break off her 
betrothal (Chao 1947: 77).
There was the question who should bring the question to 
whom. . There was no precedent to follow, because the 
thing was unprecedented. I thought at first that, since 
the families had made the engagement, they should be 
responsible for breaking it. On the other hand, since 
it was on the ground of freedom of the individual that
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I had based any move I thought I should write to my 
cousin myself.1
In another autobiography written ten years later, another girl student 
described how she returned home to fight the old system with its own 
weapons and on its own ground. TIf she did not, how could she with a 
clear conscious contract a marriage of her own choosing’ (Hsieh 1943:
145). Her parents adamantly countered all her arguments for free- 
choice charging her with defiance of parental authority, ruin of the 
family reputation, disgracing the ancestors and opposing the will of 
Heaven. Finally her attempts to challenge custom and tradition caused 
them to imprison her within the household.
The second step in the initiation of the marriage negotiations was 
to exercise free-choice marriage and select a partner for oneself. The 
opportunities for finding a mate without the introduction of parents or 
go-between were far from institutionalised. The new pattern required 
the establishment of a whole new pattern of association between members 
of the opposite sex which were neither those of avoidance nor those of 
marriage. In a gentry household in Hebei province in the early twentieth 
century, one woman of the older generation countered the arguments of 
the rebellious young by asking: 'What will become of girls when they have 
go to out and hunt for their mates?’ She thought that 'if their families 
cannot help them get married, then they will have to become bold and 
deceitful, preying on any man they can get yet pretending that they are 
not wanting one. Only the most artful will mate. Shy, plain, good maids 
will wither into a fruitless age’ (Wain 1933: 73). There was little 
association of the sexes outside of educational institutes and most of 
those who initiated their own marriage negotiations relied on mutual 
friends, cousins, brothers and sisters to introduce or make the first
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contact with one viewed from afar. Love letters were a common means of 
establishing communication and enjoyed a certain fashion among Istudents 
at the new schools and higher educational institutes (Hsieh 1943; Wong 
Su-ling 1953). The case of one college student described by Lin Yueh- 
hwa in The Golden Wing (19.48: 113-4) can be considered representative 
of model 2a. He was determined to negotiate a marriage of free choice 
and was interested in a student at a girls’ mission school. Twice he 
wrote to her seeking her friendship, but he received no reply. If she 
had answered his letters, it would mean that she considered herself 
engaged to him, for that was the general convention of free marriage 
at the time. When the young man wrote his third letter, he simultane­
ously sent a message to his own brother who was a good friend of the 
girl's uncle - the husband of her father's sister. After receiving 
some advice and guidance from her uncle, the girl replied to the student's 
letter proposing to her by post. They exchanged photographs and the 
sworn brother and girl's uncle began to talk the matter over with the 
two families who made the arrangements to conclude the negotiations.
In many cases where the young people selected their own marriage 
partner, the parents took over the negotiations and concluded them in 
the traditional manner according to customary rites and ceremonies 
often concealing the .fact that they had not initiated the negotiations 
themselves.
In some cases the young people merely wrote to their parents or 
asked their consent to the match in person before proceeding to conclude 
the negotiations themselves (2b). In these cases they normally took 
this request for consent as a sign of their intentions and dispensed 
with betrothal ceremonies altogether. Wong Su-ling related in a personal 
history how she and a fellow student courted for two years during the
*
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anti-Japanese War before he proposed to her by letter. She replied in 
the same way that she would be willing to accept, but only if he would 
secure the permission of her family in the usual manner and if he would 
be willing to establish their own separate and independent household. 
Whereupon he immediately wrote to his father to ask his permission, even 
though, as she said, he had considerable property of his own and could 
act independently. They had both agreed 'that we desired to have his 
father's consent and blessing'. Securing permission from her family 
took months because of the distances and difficulties involved in 
communicating with them through intermediaries, and it was not until 
they had both gone to America that they had at long last 'squared the 
matter with the requirements of Chinese custom enabling us to feel that 
we were really engaged1 (1953: 367).
Others did not request parental consent but proceeded directly of 
their own accord to conclude their own negotiations. One young daughter 
of a gentry family eloped with a Chinese lawyer she had first met in 
Paris. They set up house together and notified their families and friends 
of the fact in an announcement which appeared in the newspapers the 
following morning. At the time the daughter was officially censured by 
the elders of the household for repudiating a marriage contract already 
negotiated by. them and she was accused of dishonouring her family. As 
a punishment she received no dowry. (Wain 1933: 129). Where couples 
concluded the negotiations themselves, they tended to follow new 
ceremonial forms which had evolved with the new forms of negotiation.
The most obvious characteristic common to the new form of ceremonial 
was its simplicity - often ten minutes or so in contrast to the lengthy, 
densely symbolic and expensive traditional marriage ceremony ordered 
and paid for by the kin of the parties. Some of those who had come from
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Christian-converted families or had been educated at mission schools 
opted for a Christian ceremony. A few attended the group ceremony of
marriage established by the government in the 1930s in which a ^ity or
\
government representative usually officiated. These were established 
during a national saving campaign in 1935 to reduce the expenses 
associated with marriage. According to an observer scores or even 
hundreds of couples bowed three times to the flag and portrait of Sun 
Yat-sen, twice to each other and once to witnesses, family and friends 
(Ayscough 1938: 64). However, the majority usually evolved their own 
individual forms which made no reference to Heaven and Earth, the will 
of the ancestors, fertility and the provision of descendants or the role 
of the daughter-in-law in the husband’s household. It was rather a 
contract between two individuals who were to establish their own 
household based on their mutual regard and congeniality. Several 
influential marriages set ceremonial precedents. In 1914 Song Qingling 
and Sun Yat-sen made their vows to each other in the presence of a few 
friends. Song Qingling wrote to an American friend describing her 
marriage ceremony as ’the simplest possible, for we both hate surplus 
ceremonies and the like’ (Hahn 1942: 83). Couples began to announce to 
their friends in person at a small dinner party or by post or in the 
newspapers that they had signed a marriage contract and had changed 
their address (Wain 1933: 129; Chao Bu-wei 1947: 193). An example of 
one of these contracts reads
’T.L.K. ofZhili Province and S.J.S. of ZhejiangProvince, 
having agreed to be married to each other, are today, 
the 28th day of June 1918, united in wedlock before the 
Witness T.Y.P. The affections of the two are over-flowing 
and will continue though their hairs turn gray.'
Signed: T.Y.P., T.L.K., S.J.S., S.C. (Tyatt 1922: 72-3)
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Other couples arranged a short ceremony at which they had the 
marriage contract read. The marriage ceremonies between the daughter 
of a cabinet minister and the son of an ex-governor, which took place 
in 1918 (Tyau 1922: 71), two returned students at the same time (Tyau 
1922: 72) and Chiang Kai-shek and Song Meiling in 1927 (Hahn 1942: 118) 
illustrate the varying combinations of the old and new symbols. They 
all include the bowing of the bride and groom to each other and the 
reading of the contract, but they vary in the degree to which they refer 
to the Will of Heaven and incorporate the ancestors, kin categories and 
the go-between. The first example included obeisance to the ancestors 
and distinguishes the go-betweens, the parents, family elders and other 
kin from the rest of the guests. The second, more Western-influenced 
with bridesmaids, groomsmen and the exchange of rings, merely divides 
the go-betweens and a single category of kin from the guests and the 
third includes obeisance to the flag and the portrait of Sun Yat-sen 
and makes no distinctions among the guests . The marriage ceremony was 
usually followed by a dinner party or light refreshments. The simplifica­
tion of the marriage ceremony was a symbol of the rejection of the 
traditional ideological model and it generally had the.effect of 
dramatising the role of the parties. This reduced the importance both 
of parents and kinship groups previously highlighted in the traditional 
ceremony and decreased the ceremonial expenses and therefore the 
dependence of the younger^on the parental household.
The distribution of free-choice marriage .
The new immediate conscious models were practised in the cities and 
in some provincial towns by certain social categories. They were mainly
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adopted by college and high school graduates and returned students from 
abroad who later entered the professional occupations. But even within 
these groups many still adhered to the traditional model although their 
number decreased towards 1949. In 1925 a questionnaire circulated among 
the readers of a Shanghai newspaper revealed that about half those with 
a college education considered romantic love the most important considera-
j
tion in marriage, thus giving it precedence over obedience to parental 
wishes and the desire to have children; however, only 26 per cent of 
readers with high school and none of those with elementary school 
education shared this opinion (Pan Kuan-tu 1934: 135ff). In the mid- to 
late 1930s Olga Lang found there to be an almost overwhelming rejection 
of the traditional ideological model among unmarried high school and 
college students who were asked Thow they wanted their marriage to be 
arranged'? ( Ste "T-Ode.
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Parties consent
2 Parties initiate, 
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3 Parties initiate, 
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(Source: Lang 1946: 288)
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Despite these preferences she expected to find a gap between their 
expectations and what actually happened in practice. When she also 
investigated the marriage patterns of students who were already married, 
she found there to be a much higher proportion of marriages which had 
been arranged by their parents. In one sample of 194 married college 
and high school students, 83 had never seen their brides before marriage 
and only 40 had chosen their brides for themselves. In another student 
group of 203 married college and high school students (9 of whom were 
women) she found the following results (Lang 1946: 122,215):
TABLE 4: The Distribution of Conscious Models (b)
NUMBERS PER CENT
Arranged marriage 87 43
Parents initiate, parties consent 53 26
Parties initiate, parents consent 6 3
Parties initiate, no consent 42 21
Not known 15 7
203 100
She found that among those who were already graduates and were now 
employed in the government bureaucracy and the professions in Peking 
and Shanghai, the old ideological model had begun to fall into disrepute, 
although her samples do seem to have been somewhat small. For example, 
she reports that only two out of ten engineers and doctors interviewed 
in Shanghai had had their marriages arranged as in the traditional 
ideological model, and among 23 families of professional workers, 
educators and officials in Peking there were 16 cases of ’m o d e m
r
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marriage' (Lang 1946: 124). But despite these small samples, it was 
certainly among the groups of city students and graduates that the new 
immediate models were primarily to be found and practised.
In the 1930s, Olga Lang reported that among all other urban social 
categories from landlords or rich merchants to factory workers, devia­
tions from the traditional ideological model were exceptional rather 
than the norm. Among the landlords and rich merchants she interviewed 
there were no modern marriages. In Peking among the middle classes* 
she found out that nine out of 46 marriages were conducted in a 'modem 
manner' and in only three out of 112 marriages in eighty-one lower middle 
and working class** families did the bridegrooms reveal an acquaintance 
with the new conscious models (Lang 1946: 123-4). M o d e m  marriages, 
which were exceptional among the industrial workers in Tientsin, were 
more common among the industrial workers of Shanghai. She found 
that in 25 per cent of 95 families of industrial workers interviewed in 
Shanghai there were deviations from the old model, and in the 124 
marriages recently negotiated in these families, only 26 were concluded 
with the consent of the parties (Lang 1946: 124). Despite the contact 
of the young women industrial workers of these cities with the new 
ideas, she found the majority to be against m o d e m  marriages and very 
few supported romantic love as a basis of free choice. Rather a majority 
thought that marriage was still a family affair and that a decent girl
* 'Middle' classes as defined by Lang include small merchants, owners of 
small workshops and factories, as well as salaried employees, teachers, 
clerks and petty civil and military officials.
** 'Working' classes comprise wage earners engaged in manual labour 
and 'lower middle' classes include workers who do not receive wages 
or salaries but are paid directly by their customers: e.g. small 
artisans, rickshaw coolies, peddlers etc.
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must accept the mate chosen for her by her parents. Even among the
i
most advanced workers' group in the most-Westernised cities of China, 
the Young Women's Christian Association students in Shanghai, Tientsin 
and Wuxi, two-thirds of those interviewed said that their marriages 
would be arranged by their parents. In her investigations among these 
factory and working groups, Lang was greeted with remarks such as:
'This new idea is something for the rich people like modern dress and 
umbrellas’; 'Modem marriages are improper'; 'We don't'have such things 
in our native village'; ’As for m o d e m  marriages public opinion frowned 
upon them for it was shameful to choose one’s own mate'; 'Children 
should be married as their parents were' (Lang 1946: 123, 266-7). She 
concluded that though some of the factory workers might not actually 
disapprove of the new conscious models, they nevertheless seemed remote 
from the realities of their own lives.
Ai-Li S Chin, a sociologist investigating attitudes among young 
people in China in the late 1940s, thought that by this time the process 
of revolt against the traditional ideological model had spread, beyond 
the first circle of college graduates, returned students and the residents 
of the treaty ports, to a second circle of white-collar workers and high 
school students, and also to the smaller non-westemised towns (1948: 1-2). 
The field studies conducted in the mid to late 1940s display a range of 
models. When Morton Fried undertook an anthropological study of a small 
market town after the end of the anti-Japanese war, he found that among
the sons of gentry and those who had been stationed in Shanghai or
Zhejiang during the war, the ideas of free marriage were 'quite strong'
and that these groups were anxious to be thought of as 'modem' in their
ways. These groups and their peers whom they had influenced now insisted 
that they have a choice in marriage or at least a chance to see and meet
r
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the girl beforehand (1953: 40,58). In a market town in Siquan 
investigators found in the mid-1940s that the parents still arranged 
the marriages of their sons and daughters although by this time they 
counselled with their children in about one third of all cases. A few 
young couples were known to have initiated their own negotiations, but 
instances such as these, were rare and had aroused immense gossip and 
criticism (Treadley, 1971:155, 267). In West Town, Yunnan province, on 
the other hand, Francis Hsu found that the choice of marriage partner 
was almost entirely conducted according to the traditional ideological 
model. In the last few years there had been cases of broken betrothals 
and in each case at least one party had been a student. In one case 
the murder of the betrothed was believed to be the only means available 
to break the betrothal, and in the other two cases the parties involved 
had never been able to return to and reside in West Town. Hsu thought 
that these examples, noted for their deviancy, only seemed to indicate 
the strength of the traditional norms (1948: 91-93).
In their totality, the illustrations and surveys available for the 
urban and rural areas in the 1930s and 1940s seem to indicate that while 
a variety of^immediate models had existed for at least forty years and 
were certainly increasingly popular among certain social categories, much 
of the population in the rural areas and even a proportion of those who 
lived in the treaty ports and who shared in the new education continued 
to adhere to the traditional model. In both rural and urban areas the 
balance of socio-economic and ideological forces working for change were 
far outweighed by those encouraging the persistence of the traditional 
ideological model. ; Song Qingling, } a reformer in the mid-1920s, summed 
up the balance of forces at that time. She said that ’the whole weight 
of traditional forces is against us,, traditional intellectual forces,
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traditional economic forces, and, in addition, traditional social and 
family forces' (Dean 1927: 654). Moreover the new conscious models 
themselves had a weak ideological basis. Although the new conscious 
models rested on a sufficiently coherent selection of new ideas to 
provide competition for the traditional ideological model, the new 
conscious models were vaguely formulated in terms of abstract ideas 
circulated through the medium of m o d e m  schools and in magazines or 
periodicals largely confined to the metropolitan areas. In contrast 
to the traditional ideological model which had all the time-honoured 
teachings and legal sanctions on its side and elaborate rituals and 
ceremonies prescribing its practice, the new models relied on vague 
formulations and there were few historical precedents in ideology or 
social practice.
Obstacles to change
The new ideology of individualism or romantic love were advocated 
as the 'road to happiness', but it was the map and directions which were 
missing. When it came to the practicality of the new models the 
essential problem which revealed itself in a study of letters and 
biographies is the lack of established alternative behavioural patterns. 
The autobiographies of those who adopted the new models in the first 
decades of this century illustrate the anxiety which the lack of 
prescribed alternatives aroused. For instance, at each stage of 
the initiation and the conclusion of their marriage negotiations the 
young students Bu-Wei Chao (1953) and Wei Tao-ming (1943) puzzled out 
by themselves what they should do. From the beginning to the end of the
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negotiations there were no precedents to follow because in their 
immediate circles the 1 thing was unprecedented1 (Chao 1947: 77)1 After 
Bu-wei Chao and her prospective husband had broken their betrothals 
(it took them many years), they were ready to get married. 'But,1 she 
asked, Vwho should marry us? How should we be married? Who was to 
give me away? Or should we have a wedding?' (1947: 191). In the absence 
of an established alternative, another young girl resorted to the unusual 
tactics of creating chaos in the large household while.the horoscopes 
of her sister and her parentally-chosen mate sat on the family altar.
In this way she and her sister hoped that the apparent signs of 'bad 
luck' would impress upon the household the inauspicious nature of the 
proposed match (Wong Su-ling, 1953: 131).
Similar problems appear in the letters published in periodicals 
in the late 1940s. Ai Li-chin concluded from her study of those 
published in one periodical (West Wind) that for those pursuing the 
new conscious models there was a vacuum in standards. That is, there 
was no agreement as to who is a desirable partner and what are permis­
sible or prohibited patterns of behaviour. 'The emancipated young men 
and women,' she says,
'are faced with new unfamiliar situations for which there 
are no established patterns and no agreed-upon cues, with 
which to judge or interpret other people's behaviour.
This problem extends to the very question of how to find 
friends of the opposite sex as well as how to behave once 
acquaintance is made. It is not merely the problem of 
choice between alternative patterns of behaviour...
Case after case shows the petitioner, after stating his 
particular slant on the marriage question, asking,
'Where can I find a suitable person?' or 'How can I 
meet friends of the opposite sex?'
(1948: 4)
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In the face of conflicting role patterns and no authoritative cues, 
young people regarded the editors of the progressive periodicals as 
’experts’ in the new patterns of behaviour and turned to them for 
support and advice. For instance a clerk in a department store wrote 
in a letter to West Wind that he had fallen in .love with a customer's 
daughter. For three years he had not dared to speak or write to her.
f ’ *
He asked the editor for advice on how to let her know of his love for 
her. Another young man wanted to know how to express his love for a 
girl and what is a -sign of rejection? In another case a young man 
wanted to know how to behave while visiting his prospective fiancde 
(Chin 1948: 4). In response to letters such as these the editors of the 
magazines published articles to advocate the adoption of the new models 
and to familiarise their readers with procedures and standards of 
behaviour appropriate to the new models. A well-known series of articles 
was published by the Ladies’ Home Journal to educate young girls in the 
choice of marriage partner. One article entitled ’Choosing a Husband’ 
emphasised the importance of investigating with great care the habits 
and character of the other party and it outlined in some detail the 
qualities he be sought for in the prospective groom. They included 
appraisals of his appearance, knowledge, age, occupation, the property 
at his disposal, kin relations, health, and his attitudes towards 
marriage, the home and other related questions (Tyau, 1922: 73-5). 
Sometimes editors agreed to intervene in cases of conflict. In one 
case an editor responded to an appeal by a young girl reader and 
arbitrated an agreement between her and her parents. Taking advantage 
of the publicity offered by his pages, he cajoled the older generation 
into signing an agreement with their daughters wich allowed them to 
choose their own marriage partner or at the very least provide for their
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consent before the conclusion of any betrothal negotiations (Hutchinson 
1924: 103-4). I
The role of the new periodic press in the spread of new id$as has
\
\
been well-documented (Chow Tse-tung 1960). Their very reporting of 
cases of conflict strengthened the resolve of those who adhered to 
the new conscious models in theory to resist the old in practice. In 
one case of a suicide on the eve of an arranged marriage, the newspapers 
reported that they had definite evidence that the girl had been influenced 
by Tthe literature on female emancipation1 (Witke, 1967: 143). Another 
father retorted to his rebellious daughter that what could he expect 
from her nowadays when all she read was romances in which girls committed . 
suicide simply because they are not allowed to marry the young man of 
their choice and stories in newspapers about girls breaking with their 
families because of disagreements with their parents. He thought that 
since the young people are 'influenced by these novels and newspaper 
stories it is quite natural that we should have a girl who is dead set 
against her parents and the rules of propriety' (Hsieh, 1943: 143).
But the influence of the editors was limited to those who were literate 
and in the habit of reading the progressive newspapers and magazines, 
and though their general attitude might be one of encouragement to 
youth's struggle against their family, an editor was rarely able to 
give direct and personal support and penetrate the domestic power 
structures. Indeed, their very weakness sometimes led them to advocate 
a compromise sblution or personal solutions based on the appropriation 
of further education or economic independence when the very acquisition 
of these were reliant on the support of kin networks.
That the new models were adhered to in theory by more of the 
younger generation than actually' practised them was largely due to the
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fact that the struggle for freedom of marriage largely represented a 
rehellion of the younger generation against parental authority.! In
the ensuing conflict between the two generations there were few*sanctions
\
\
available to the younger generation to defy those in support of the 
household head. Although the Family Law of 1931 did not prohibit 
marriage according to the traditional ideological model, it did provide 
for the first time legal recognition for marriage by free choice con­
ditional upon parental approval. The provision of the. code undermined 
the principle that marriage was a family affair, and thus took from the 
family head his automatic right to choose his children’s mates.
Article 972 of the new Civil Code required the consent of the parties 
concerned before the negotiations could be concluded, but there was no 
law requiring the end of the betrothal itself or that the marriage 
contract be signed by the bride and groom. Subsequent legal cases both 
established the right of a woman to request the law courts to dissolve 
a marriage contract made by her father on her behalf and made the law 
applicable to all contracts settled prior to its promulgation (Chiu,
1966: 110). But a major limitation of the new law was its lack of 
active enforcement, few had access to the means to apply legal sanctions 
and even more remained ignorant of its very existence (Fei Hsiao-tung, 
1939: 81-2).
It was a rare case in which parents did not have the support of 
local kin and community networks. In case after case reported in the 
newspapers, letters, autobiographies and village stories, kin and 
neighbours came to the aid of the parents in advising or threatening 
the young or in meting out some punishment after the deed was done.
The household or kin group formed a reservoir of status, not only 
advantageous in negotiating marriage alliances among the literate, but
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for all households or kin groups vis h vis other members of primary 
groups based on kin and neighbours. Neighbourhood groups mighty vary
from the single surname villages whose members comprise a single lineage
\
to multi-lineal villages. But whatever the form of the local community, 
its sanctions, especially in the form of gossip, operated in favour of 
those who practised the traditional ideological model-* and against those 
deviating from it. Margery Wolf made some enquiries as to just what 
'having face' amounted to in a village in Taiwan. She was informed 
that when no-one was talking about a household you could say it had 
'face1 (1972: AO). All members of the household and kin group shared 
in the appropriation or 'loss of face' within their primary groups.
It was the lack of sympathy among the immediate face-to-face informal 
circles which often contributed to the capitulation or the despair of 
the young and brought about a number of suicides. In one article 
published in Ta Kung Pao in 1919 which was written on the occasion of 
a suicide on the eve of an arranged marriage, it was suggested that had 
the girl in question had access to some kind of support she might not 
have met with such an untimely death. The article argued that
'... if neither her parents nor her future in-laws had 
granted her free will, but there had been in society a 
very powerful source .of public opinion to support her, 
and there had been some new world where the fact of 
haying been away to seek refuge elsewhere was considered 
honourable and not dishonourable, then surely Miss Chao 
would not have died.'
(Witlce, 1967: 138)
The question of social ostracism and especially the reaction of young 
girls in the face of unidirectional social pressure are clearly indicated 
in the following' letter written to a periodical by a boy who had been 
betrothed since 'before he could walk'.
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'Some of my friends told me: "Get rid of her now, otherwise 
you will repent after marriage." But I cannot take this 
advice. Society does not allow me to take such a step.
I have no doubt that I can endure the ostracism of 
society; but how about her, the poor woman? If I should 
break the engagement she would feel ashamed. Maybe she 
would commit suicide.'
(Burgess and Locke, 1945: 52)
<
The advice and support of peers or of editors of periodicals and lawyers 
was no match for the kin support and economic sanctions at the disposal 
of the older generation of the household.
The functions of the household in the economy continued to be such 
that parents not only had the monopoly of time-honoured teachings and 
customs on their side, but they could continue to apply economic 
sanctions in support of the traditional ideological model. Although 
for Ward (1965) the coincidence of ideological and immediate conscious 
models of marriage rested mainly on the social prestige or the political 
authority of the literati, it can be argued that the socio-economic 
functions of the household or the domestic group made it relevant to all 
classes. It was even more appropriate to the structure of the household 
of the majority of the population which seems to have differed from 
that of the literati in certain fundamental respects. The membership 
of the literati household frequently included representatives of as 
many generations as possible selected in one patriline and as many male 
siblings as possible plus their spouses and all their children. Such a 
family structure institutionalised maximum proliferation both vertically 
and horizontally. In comparison, among the peasants and artisans the 
household might include three generations or frequently the life-span 
of the individual was such that the nuclear two-generational type was 
the most common form of residential pattern (Fei Hsiao-tung, 1946;
Hsu, 1943). However the structure .varied, the household as a common 
residential group was a recruitment base organised around blood and
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marriage ties and a small-scale unit of production and consumption.
It was the unit in which resources were pooled and distributed for 
consumption. The maintenance of the domestic group required at the 
very least the recruitment and organisation of’ labour, the powers over 
which were vested in the senior generation. For these reasons they 
worked to maintain control over the choice of marriage partner, the 
timing of marriage and after marriage, they encouraged the dependence 
and obedience of the young couple on the household. Nowhere was this 
control more important than among the non-literati, who often only had 
access to the reproductive capacities of one woman of child-bearing 
age in each generation and did not have the resources to hire labour. 
They exclusively relied on labour recruited through marriage. It is 
interesting to note that it was precisely those who lived in the large 
households of the extended type where these conditions did not hold, 
who were most likely to adopt the new models.
It was in the interests of the older generation to maintain their 
controls, and although alternative sources of economic support were 
increasing, the household and by extension kin groups remained an 
important base for the recruitment and organisation of labour. For 
the majority of the population and especially in the rural areas it 
remained the -primary source of economic support. Ironically enough 
it was often the progressive young students who were especially vulner­
able to the ultimate sanction - the withdrawal of economic support.
For example, one student wrote a letter to a magazine pointing out that, 
although his unseen betrothal was illiterate and older than he was, he 
feared he would not dare break the engagement as he was economically 
dependent on his father. He thought that he might have done so in 
different circumstances, but not in the present situation:
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'My father is a good friend of her father. If I should 
break the engagement, my father would be very angry.
Most probably he would stop my allowance and refuse to 
pay any tuition for me. In that case ’I could not study 
in the school.. I do not know what I should do. I have
thought about my problem so much that I am sick of it.’
(Burgess and Locke, 1945: 52)
In another case reported in a newspaper ,a girl refused to enter an 
arranged marriage and subsequently left home to attend the National 
Higher Normal School for Girls in Peking. Once she ran away she had
no familial economic support and, although girl friends gave her money
from time to time to meet living expenses and school fees, she was 
scarcely able to make ends meet. In the end prolonged hardship was 
said to have so weakened her that by the winter of 1918 she was stricken 
with tuberculosis and after hospitalisation died in August 1919 (Witke, 
1967: 145). The possibility of such a fate may have discouraged some 
students from talcing just such a step. But if the withdrawal of economic 
support was the ultimate sanction in the hands of the older generation, 
it is also significant that those who withstood the forces encouraging 
the persistence of the traditional ideological model were those who 
escaped by means of scholarship or employment from the efficacy of both 
economic sanctions and pressures of local public opinion.
Time and again those who married according to one of the new 
conscious models had escaped from their-home environment. This form 
of escape was made increasingly possible by the new socio-economic 
conditions which potentially provided the young with a source of economic 
support alternative to that of the household unit. The development and 
expansion of industry and manufacturing and institutions of education 
had opened up a variety of new employment opportunities ranging from 
factory and clerical to business and professional opportunities. The 
spatial distribution of these opportunities and their concentration in
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the treaty ports and cities demanded a highly'mobile labour force.
This encouraged the migration o f ■large numbers of young people to the 
cities and allowed for the establishment of independent and separate 
households on marriage (Freedman, 1966: 44ff),> These alternative forms 
of economic support considerably weakened the sanctions at the disposal 
of the older generation. In community studies it was those who were 
mobile, beyond the reaches of the sanctions of kin and local community 
who had adopted the new models in practice. In West Town those who had 
broken their betrothals sought refuge in nearby towns (Hsu, 1948: 91-3). 
In Taitou village when the young men of the village migrated to jobs 
in the cities and divorced their village wives, the bitter criticism 
of their action was largely ineffectual because the ’real culprits' had 
placed themselves out of reach and beyond the ties of the old communities 
and the family rules(Yang, M., 1945: 117). In a survey undertaken in 
a factory in a provincial town in the 1930s most of the women workers 
interviewed there said they had taken jobs in order to escape from
intolerable family situations and intended to return to their homes only
if the conflict was resolved to their satisfaction (T'ien, 1944).
The migration and dispersal of members of the households reached 
a high point in the 1940s with the anti-Japanese and civil war, the 
increasing demand for industrial labour, and the deteriorating agrarian 
conditions due to famine, drought and invasion. Where household members 
dispersed, the possibility of the household head conducting the 
negotiations on behalf of the young or the consultation by the young 
of the older generations was removed, and free-choice by default was 
forced on the individual. Marion Levy writing in the late 1940s noted 
that it was often the case that the mobile young lost contact with
their families for long periods of time if not completely (1949: 298).
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Due to illiteracy and the physical difficulties in communications, he 
thought that even young people who adhered to the traditional ideological
model in principle found that they were forced into a situation in which
\
they had to make decisions for themselves which would formerly have been 
taken for them by others, and that they had to search for new rationales 
for their behaviour. Levy terms this new phenomenon ’individualism by 
default’ as opposed to 'individualism by ideal’, and he concluded from 
his observations that, though the mobile had absorbed a certain amount 
of 'individualism by ideal' as the result of contact with the new conscious 
models, 'individualism by default’ would seem to have been a more effect­
ive and widespread solvent of the ^traditional model, than ’individualism 
by ideal’ (1949: 298).
If the new socio-economic conditions provided new forms of economic 
support and encouraged migration which were necessary for and even 
encouraged the practise of the new conscious models, in themselves 
these were not sufficient conditions. Many of the mobile still adhered 
to the traditional ideological model in practice. In the 1930s and in 
the 1940s both Lang (1946) and Chin (1948) found that many in college 
and in the labour force in the industrial cities retained the traditional 
ideological model on the grounds that it formed the time-honoured 
customs of their kin and home communities. In some areas of China 
the new socio-economic conditions had little effect, and over much of 
Republican China the traditional ideological model remained dominant.
None of the new immediate models achieved the status of a new ideological 
model in Republican China. Rather, the new models were introduced by 
minority social categories and negatively formulated in terms of 
deviancy from, or rebellion against, the traditional ideological model.
But despite these weaknesses the new conscious models did offer, in
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part at least, patterns of social behaviour alternative to the traditional 
ideological model, and because they were supported by one of the most 
articulate of social categories who were vociferous in their demand for 
change, the new conscious models assumed an importance in society far 
beyond that which might have been warranted by any reckoning of their 
actual numbers relative to the total population, {WCt was not until the 
establishment of a new government in 1949, that a new ideological model 
was introduced into China which incorporated the principle of mutual 
volition and provided for and actively encouraged widespread competition 








The new ideological model was initially introduced into China in 
1950 when the new Marriage Law outlined and introduced a marriage contract 
appropriate to the establishment of a socialist society. The drafting of 
the law was begun in winter 1948-9, eighteen months or so before the law 
was promulgated. The drafting was undertaken by a number of government 
departments and organisations and was based on the distillation of the 
experience accumulated by the Communist Party in the Soviet bases in the
previous twenty years, the Marriage Laws of the Soviet Union and Eastern
r
Europe, and the social code for the National Republic under Chaing Kai- 
shek. Several months were also spent in investigating local marriage 
customs in different parts of China. Chen Shaoyu, Chairman of the Law 
Compilation Committee, reported that the committee constantly received 
suggestions and help from the judicial organs of the People's Supreme 
Court, the Ministry of Justice and a number of local judiciaries, the 
Ministry of the Interior, local civic organisations, women's and mass 
organisations, and representatives of the national minorities. Altogether, 
he reported, the process of drafting and redrafting took up to seventeen 
months before the final version was adopted by the compilation committee 
(Fu, 1955: 119). In a decree issued by Mao Tse-tung the law was made 
public and became effective as of 1 May 1950. On that date, the 
government announced the abolition of all laws upholding the traditional 
ideological model and the establishment of a new ideological model, the 
basic principles of which were expressed in the first chapter of the 
Marriage Law:
88
Article 1: The arbitrary and compulsory feudal marriage 
system, which is based on the superiority of 
men over women and which ignores the -children’s 
interests shall be abolished.
Article 2: Polygamy, concubinage, child betrothal, inter- 
ference with the re-marriage of widows and the 
extraction of money or gifts in connection with 
marriage shall be prohibited.
f
These basic principles were elaborated in the following chapter of 
the Marriage Law and numerous educational materials throughout the 
following fifteen years have discussed and expanded on these principles 
and provided the details for the operation and study of the new ideo­
logical model. Chapter two of the Marriage Law was devoted to contract­
ing a marrage and the fundamental principle on which the new Marriage 
Law was based was without doubt ’freedom of marriage’. The first article 
of Chapter 2 noted that:
J
'Marriage shall be based upon the willingness of the two 
parties. Neither party shall use compulsion and no third 
party shall be allowed to interfere.1
Subsequent educational materials have clarified * what the slogans
'freedom of marriage’ ziyou jiehun or 'free-choice' marriage hunyin
ziyou entailed. It was normally defined as the provision of full rights
for the individual to handle his or her own matrimonial affairs without
any interference or obstruction from third parties and without regard
for social status, occupation or property (KMRJ3, 27 February 1957).
The same newspaper article described free-choice as the 'fundamental
principal on which the new Marriage Law was based, the foundation for
the establishment of new family structures and relations, and the weapon
for releasing people, especially the women, from the suffering caused by
the feudal marriage system’. The new Marriage Law placed the negotiations
of marriage within the control of the individual parties for the new
marital bond was to primarily rest on the congeniality of the parties.
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At each stage of the negotiations of marriage, the details of the new 




The new Marriage Law made no reference to betrothal as a procedure 
of marriage and Article 2 of the Marriage Law expressly prohibited the 
exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage. At the time of 
the passing of the law, Shi Liang, the Minister of Justice, explained 
that the absence of betrothal in the Communist Law was due to the fact
c-
that it was associated with the negotiation and arrangement of marriage 
by persons other than the parties concerned. It was also symbolic of 
the power of the head of the household and it was the occasion of payments 
of money and gifts now banned by the new law (Pang Dunzhi, 1950: 43-8). 
Since betrothal dingqin or dinghun was often the first step in the chain 
of marriage prestations it was hoped that its prohibition would encourage 
the establishment of new marriage customs which did not include monetary 
transactions. The symbolic character of the payments was also stressed.
It was argued that they symbolised a business transaction or a meta­
morphosed form of marriage by purchase. An editorial in Zhongguo Qingnian 
stated that 'betrothal gifts' caili were nothing but a pretext for the 
buying and procuring of women with money and other goods (ZQ, 19 November 
1964). The practice was said to have symbolised the exchange of women 
between groups of men and to have harmed countless numbers of women by 
reducing their status in society. According to the new ideological model 
it was not only an outmoded custom in economic terms, but its symbolic 
meaning was also seen to be irrelevant in the new society based as it was
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on the equality of women. Instead, the new ideological model prescribed 
a period of courtship contributing to the growth of equal and mutual
understanding between the bride and groom prior to the marriage ceremony.
\
In China, with its history of segregation and arranged marriage, 
courtship had been negatively sanctioned, as was evidenced by the low 
or almost non-existent institutionalisation of this form of social 
behaviour. Now the new ideological model positively sanctioned and 
encouraged courtship, tanging shuoai or jiao pengyou, as a Tnatural, 
expected and proper prelude to marriage1 (GRB, 22 November 1962).
Indeed, a period of courtship was viewed as a necessary prerequisite to 
marriage by self-determination and^as therefore seen to be a new and 
integral part of the marriage procedure. It was therefore a feature of 
educational materials designed to propagate the new ideological model.
In the Zhongguo Qingnian, perhaps the foremost educational forum for 
young people, it has been stated time and again over the past twenty-five 
years that courtship was a necessary constituent of the new negotiation 
process prior to the introduction of new forms of marriage. The main 
function of courting was said to be the growth of mutual understanding.
In 1962 an article, written in response to queries about the proper
length and functions of courting, stated that many problems in marriage
could be- avoided if before a man and a woman got married they thoroughly 
understood each other. It went on to elaborate on the functions of 
courtship:
'Before a man and a woman get married, they should 
thoroughly understand each other. From political stand, 
ideological quality, attitude towards labour and habit 
of living to disposition, likes and dislikes, one must
make a careful analysis and judgement. It is necessary
to see whether or not the other party has the same
ambition, interest and disposition as one's own and 
whether or not in the future they can live together and 
live in happiness. * This kind of understanding cannot be
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just reached through impressions gained within a very- 
short time, but it must grow through a comparatively long 
period of contact and observation. Nor can you depend 
upon a third person’s introduction. It is necessary for 
you to contact each other directly and know each other.
Only mutual understanding, respect and confidence can 
produce deep love - and then you can talk about marriage.1
(ZQ, 14 September 1962)
A booklet written two years later to advise cadres on new forms of 
pre-marital behaviour again defined courtship as a necessary process in 
the development of mutual understanding and romantic love. Moreover, 
it emphasised that the need to establish courtship as a new custom was 
'an absolutely essential stage in procedures leading to new forms of 
marriage’. A period of sustained contact over a considerable period of 
time was said to be necessary to facilitate learning to understand one 
another and therefore young couples were all to be encouraged to court 
each other openly (Lu Yang, 1964: 19). The new ideological model thus 
discouraged betrothal and prescribed courtship as a prelude to ’free- 
choice' marriage. Freedom of marriage or ’free-choice' marriage was 
also to be distinguished from 'absolute freedom of a marriage' and 
'freedom of love', which by implying frivolity and promiscuity were said 
to be incompatible with the new social system in which individual 
interests were to be combined with social interests. Therefore, freedom 
of marriage could only be defined as that freedom which did not harm 
the interests of others, it could never by ’one's own absolute demand 
which disregarded consequences for the collective and society' (GKB,
& March 1958; ZQ, 14 September 1962).
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Age of marriage
Article four of Chapter 2 set down the legal ages of marriage.
It read that ’a marriage can be contracted only after the man has reached 
20 years of age and the women reached 18 years of age’. The new ideo­
logical model distinguished between the statutory and appropriate 
shio^ude ages of marriage. The new legal ages contrast with previous 
legal codes and w sxa an increase of two years over the most recent legal 
code of the Nationalist Republic, which in 1930 had stipulated that 
marriage between a male person under eighteen and a female person under 
sixteen is voidable (Art. 980), The new statutory age of marriage was 
said to have been worked out by the government as a compromise between 
the principle of opposing early marriage and the due regard for the 
consciousness of the population who have long been socialised into 
practising early marriage. The legal age has been established as the 
minimum age of marriage and has. been contrasted with the appropriate age 
which is defined as ’the age worked out by the young men and women them­
selves according to their own circumstances and in full awareness of the 
advantages of late marriage and the disadvantages of early marriage'
(SRB, 7 November 1962).
All the educational materials stress that this is a persuasive 
campaign of long-term education. It was thought that the undesirable 
custom of early marriage 2aohun formed over a thousand years would not 
be eliminated in a short period of time and all the educational materials 
stress that their aim is to help young people exercise full rights to 
decide on their own marriage date whether early or late. ’This is a 
problem of their own and they must handle it themselves.’ 'It is 
absolutely incorrect to look upon love as if it were a criminal act and
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penalise lovers or obstruct young people’s wedding plans as this would 
be nothing but a reflection of the feudal concept’ (ZX, 3 Aprill1956). 
Instead,
'... it is up to each young person himself or herself to, 
or not to, get married or to be in love. Provided two 
people's love is moral, provided they are both willing 
to get married, and provided their marriage is in accord­
ance with the provisions of the Marriage Law, nobody-should 
normally interfere with or obstruct them. Nor should 
people discriminate against or jeer at young people who 
are already in love or who are already married.’
(ZQ, 1 June 1962)
It has often been said in these materials that an alternative to 
persuasion and education would be to eliminate the custom of early 
marriage by raising the statutory age of marriage, but the same materials 
point out that to raise the legal age of marriage would be to raise it 
beyond the level of awareness or consciousness evident in Chinese society. 
As one article said, 'If w e .go beyond the consciousness of the masses 
by fixing the marriage age, at too high a level, that will also be 
improper' (GRB, 7 November 1962). The first aim was to raise the levels 
of awareness and consciousness in order that young people would delay 
their marriage consciously and willingly. The cr^buragement of late 
marriage, wanhun, called for the launching of an educational campaign 
to associate the appropriate age of marriage with age of physical 
maturity, age at which education and training is completed, age at 
which self-support begins and the age at which thoughtful exercise of
marital choice occurs,
\
Now that marriage is to be negotiated on the basis of self- 
determination and free-choice, young persons ©ere recommended to attain 
a certain maturity before they could assess the qualifications of their 
life partners. Young people who are still at school or have just begun
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to take part in social labour were said to have very little knowledge or 
experience of life. It is argued that if a young person is ideologically 
immature, and if his. mind is not firm or his character not fully formed, 
then he is likely to constantly change his interests and ideology.
That is, 'aproposed mate might be ideal today, but not be so tomorrow1 
(ZX 3 April 1956). Moreover, young people were thought to be more 
likely to approach the question of marriage purely on the basis of their 
feelings for one another. They might subscribe to the ideal of romantic 
love on the principle that flove is supreme’, lianai zhishang, or the 
central and main purpose of life. They may think that marriage is a 
simple affair of self-gratification and provided both sides get along 
well with one another, then there is no reason why they cannot get married. 
In other words, they may not take the time to weigh the matter slowly and 
carefully by appealing to their reason rather than to their own emotions and 
a kind of love which, based on no profound ideological basis and long-term 
common goal, is not easily consolidated and developed (Henan ACDWE 1955: 69; 
ZQ, 6 September 1956). It is only among the older and more experienced 
age-group that marriage partners were thought to have sufficient under­
standing of each other's thinking, personality and character to find 
solutions to practical problems. The educational materials all stress 
that the older the prospective marriage partners the more likely it is 
that marriage will be ’approached with a great deal of care and in all 
seriousness’ (GRB, 8 March 1958).
Above all, youth is portrayed as the 'golden age’ in an individual's 
life cycle and a period for acquiring knowledge and skills and for 
establishing a philosophical view of life. Just as the best moment 
for making a plan » Sea day is in the morning, and the best season for 
making a plan for the whole year is. the spring, so the best moments far
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formulating life’s plan is in youth (ZQ, 10 May 1962). Between twenty 
and thirty years- of age, young people are represented as energetic and
vigorous, their brains are at the peak of their performance, their
\
memories most retentive, their imagination the most powerful and their
\ learning efficiency is at its highest levels. They are especially
\
sensitive to new ideas and they can accept new ideas and increase their 
knowledge quickly. Young people were exhorted to make the best of their 
youth and concentrate on learning skills and techniques, reading books 
and seeking truths in order to raise their standards of knowledge and 
technical levels, and thus lay a foundation for study and work throughout 
the rest of their lives. Moreover it is claimed an individual’s choice 
of purpose, life-plans and view of the world are all decided during these 
years. Young people are reminded that they are just like tall buildings 
erected from the ground upwards. Without the solid foundations laid in 
an earlier stage of construction and without the efforts of the brick­
layers, significant mansions cannot later rise from the ground (GRB, 15 
November 1962). When young and energetic youth then have the opportunity 
to develop their individual slcilld and political understanding and contri 
bute to socialism, why should they choose early marriage and be tied 
down to children and household affairs? (ORB, 22 November 1962). Early 
marriage, was thought to direct the precious energy and attention of 
young persons, and especially young women, away from work and studies 
and towards the interests of their ’narrow family’ and domestic cares.
Many young people have offered their life histories to the media as 
negative models illustrating the plight of young people who were once 
energetic and active in studies, at their work, in social activities and 
in political study and who after marriage have become preoccupied with 
household chores. Besides young women, students have also been singled
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out as a group especially liable to a great burden in the event of early 
marriage. Students are reminded that the annual expenditure for one 
university student is equivalent to the fruits of labour of six to seven 
peasants toiling throughout the whole year (ZQ, 21 July 1962). Many are 
said to have been initially conscientious, but after marriage they have 
found it difficult to concentrate in classes and to study after classes 
and during holidays. They don’t get proper rest so that their memory and 
comprehension faculties decline and their once-good study records decline. 
As one article warned,, 'they would not work so well, their political 
enthusiasm would fall, they would become indifferent to social work, 
their relations with the other students would become weaker and weaker 
and they would gradually lose ground and degenerate* (GRB, 8 March 1958). 
Rather, students studying in schools were encouraged to make the best 
use of their lives at a time when they 'were energetic and eager-to-leara 
and could devote themselves to their studies in an effort to master more 
knowledge, be concerned with the political life of the country, cherish 
their own ideals and train and advance themselves in every possible 
way'. Students were often reminded of the 18th-century Russian scientist 
Romonosov who withstood the pressures of his father get married 
because he thought marriage at nineteen would adversely affect his 
concentration on and exploration of the world of knowledge (ZQ, 1 June 
1962). One national model who had delayed marriage was said to have 
established the correct priorities for all young people. 'In the past,' 
she said, 'there was a proverb which said 'found a family and establish 
a career'. This placed founding a family.in front and establishing a 
career in second place. She felt that young people ought to reverse this 
order and 'establish a career' first and then 'found a family' (Lu Yang, 
1964: 10).
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Young people were reminded that the nearer the prospective marriage 
partners to the legal age of marriage, the less likely they werp'to be 
economically independent. Many were still studying and received no 
wages and those who were in employment were likely to be apprentices or 
among the less skilled whose income only allows for a little surplus 
after covering the living expenses of a single person. They were warned 
that marriage inevitably entails an increase in living expenses, no matter 
how small the new family may be, and the financial difficulties can often 
affect family relations and lead to discord. A common example of such 
difficulties are those of the young couple where the husband is not much 
over twenty and still studying in senior middle school. In one case the 
young husband had not the means to clothe himself, to furnish their house 
or later when a child was born to provide for its well-being. With each 
practical problem he was forced to turn to his elder brother for help and 
the result was that he also taxed his elder brother to the extreme. The 
inadequacy of the basis of self-support is said to be common among young 
married couples (GRB, 8 March 1958).
Young people are also encouraged to delay their marriage on
physiological grounds. The new ideological model introduces sanctions
resting on a so-called 1 scientific basis1. As one article said, ’We
must believe in science, but not in hearsay that has no scientific
basis’ (Lu Yang, 1964: 30). Generally it is stressed that youth is a
period of physical development and bodily growth. Although by the time
young men and women have reached the legal age of marriage, their
• *
reproductive organs are fully developed, numerous articles have pointed 
out that they have not yet attained full physical maturity. An old 
proverb is quoted which says that at 22 and 23 one leaps a little (grows 
a little in height) and .at 24 or .25 one blows a little (grows in strength).
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This is said to have some truth, for example the endocrine system of 
young girls is not fully mature, the process of calcification of the 
bones will not be completed until 23 or 25 years of age, and the cerebrum 
is still undergoing a complex process of cerebral building. The complete 
formation of the epithelial cells of the cerebrum, it was argued, results 
in the rap*id development of the power of thinking, inference, abstraction 
and generalisation and for this final stage o'.f growth and development to 
be attained, a youth is required to lead a lifa of regular rest. Although 
women enter puberty at 12 to 14 years and men at 14 to 16 years, they only 
approach maturity at 20, and not until the age of 25 does the body grow 
to complete maturity. It was only after the various parts of the human 
body have developed and matured that marriage was to be considered.
A second group of reasons have to do with the claimed impairment to 
health of excessive sexual activity at a young age. Youth was said to be 
a time when the sexual impulse is relatively strong and the power of 
restraint relatively weak. The latter was said to be due to inadequate 
development of the function of cerebral inhibition often bringing about 
serious consequences for sexual harmony and harmony of married life and
for bodily growth and physical well-being. The examples were given of a
man of twenty years whose indulgences in excessive sexual activity 
affected his central nervous system resulting in neurasthania, low 
spirits, headaches and discomfort. One boy warned that after his 
marriage at the age of 15 he had suffered from neurasthania. He had 
eventually become impotent and felt ’extremely painful mentally and
physically1. (ZQ, 12 April 1962).
Generally the age of marriage has primarily been linked to the 
regulation of fertility and is widely quoted as a means of limiting 
population growth (Lu Yang, 1.964: 30) . In the educational materials for
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young people there is mention of the benefits of late marriage to society 
as a whole, but there is more emphasis on the benefits of late iharriage
to the health of the mother and the child. If children were b o m  to
\
mothers of immature physical development not only the health of the 
mothers, but also that of the children, would be directly affected.
Several eminent physicians have written articles stating that from the 
standpoint of obstetrics and gynaecology the most suitable age of child­
birth was 25 years (ZF, 1 April 1957; ZQ, 21 July 1962).. In making this 
suggestion the women's magazine said that they were directly attacking 
the popular belief that both conception and delivery of children were 
more difficult after the age of 20. According to another source, one of 
the obstacles to raising the age of marriage was overcoming the fear that 
conception and birth were more difficult for women in their thirties 
(Chen, 1973: 87).
Problems associated with the early age of women and difficult births 
have been stressed in the educational materials. Indeed, it was said 
that approximately half the difficult cases in birth involved 16- to 18- 
year-old mothers. The old saying that early and too many childbirths CvcfL 
harmful to mothers, that they are 'weak and feeble before they are really 
old' was said to have a scientific basis (NFRB, 15 May 1962). For instance, 
if a girl bears a child before she. becomes fully mature physically, 
calcium for example would be extracted from her body to develop the 
bones of the embryo even before the process of calcification in her own 
bones is fully completed, it is to the detriment of both mother and 
child. Although the exact cause of cancer of the cervix and uterus are 
not known, evidence is cited which suggests to young people that there 
is a strong link between it and the early age of first births such as 
16 to 18 years. For this combination of physiological reasons^ marriage
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at a later age Is recommended, 'Since the advantages of a delay in 
marriage after reaching the statutory age axe numerous, we should encour­
age late marriage among the broad masses of youth1 (6RB, 7 November 1962).
The most appropriate age of marriage, then, is determined according 
to such conditions as the stage of physical and mental development and 
the%work, labour, study and financial situation of both men and women.' 
Although the advocation of late marriage is linked with the campaign for 
birth control in articles on population, in the educational materials for 
young people the benefits are nearly always stated in terms of individual 
benefits - education,mature choice, physiological development, economic 
independence - as opposed to national benefits. Underlying the dis­
advantages of early marriage is the assumption that childbirth will very 
closely follow, on from marriage and it is this which will primarily affect 
the ideological, educational progress of young people, harm the health of 
both mother and child and stretch financial resources to their limits.
The recommendation of late marriage is usually stated qualitatively in 
terms of the concrete conditions, advantages and disadvantages, but on 
several occasions the educational materials have provided quantitative 
guides and stated the recommended ages of marriage.
Recommended Ages of Marriage in the People's Republic of China
MEN WOMEN SOURCE
25-26 23-24 ZQ, 6 September 1956
28-32 22-26 GRB, 28 June 1962
25-29 23-27 ZQ, 12 April 1962
25-29 23-25 ZQ, 21 July 1962
25-29 23-27 ZQ, 9 May 1963
25-30 23-28 LuYang, 1964, p.28
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These figures are well above the legal age of marriage; the minimum
recommended ages of marriage have not noticeably increased over the years,
although there has been a gradual increase in the upper limits. There is
some difference in the recommended ages for men and women. The average
recommended age for men is 28 to 29 which is three to four years older
than the average age of 25 recommended for women, which may suggest a 
(
recommended age difference of approximately three years between spouses. 
What is perhaps the most impressive factor about these figures is the 
breadth of their range. The range for women being a total of seven years 
between 22 and 28 years of age and for men a total of eight years between 
25 and 32 years of age. This width of range may possibly be accounted 
for by the variation in appropriate ages given for young people in urban 
compared to rural areas. It is general policy that people in the cities 
must be urged to marry even later than those in the countryside (SWB,
20 November 1974), and more recent figures given to visitors in China 
suggest that a range of 23 to 25 in rural areas and 25 to 28 in urban 
areas is the ideal (Keeson, 1975:flj Johnson, 1976: 45) . This difference 
is also reflected in the ages of role models. For instance, Weng Yujiao 
and Wen Jimkiu who are village girls delayed their marriages until they 
were in their late twenties (ZQ, 1 August 1964; RMRB, 12 June 1973) 
compared to factory worker Yi Shizhuan who was 33 years at marriage 
(ZF, 1 June 1963).
Choice of marriage partner
Article 5 of the Marriage Law goes on to define the prohibitions 
limiting the field of eligible mates. A field of eligible mates can be 
defined by the operation of two principles,;that of incest avoidance and
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ethnocentric preference. It is the balance of each which determines the 
composition and breadth of an individual’s range of potential spouses.
The new ideological model introduced on a nation-wide scale in 1950, 
theoretically removed as many restrictions as possible from the marriage 
field in order to establish a broad field of eligible mates and increase
the range of choice for each individual. The marriage prohibitions as
1 • '
outlined in the Marriage Law reduced the number of kin restrictions in a 
society which was often taken as an anthropological example of a society 
where the field of eligibles was determined largely by the principle of 
incest avoidance. Article 5 stated that where the men and women were 
lineal relatives by blood or where the man and woman were brother and 
sister b o m  of the same parents or where the man and the woman are half- 
brother and half-sister, marriage is prohibited. The question of prohibit­
ing marriage between collateral relatives by blood within the fifth degree 
of relationship is to be determined by custom.
The first section of the article represents a much reduced field of 
prohibitions in a society where the number of prohibitions was so large 
that surname exogamy was the rule. Previously a person was forbidden or 
at least discouraged from marrying another of the same surname no matter 
how distant' the relationship or different the zu or lineage. Since the 
number of surnames has been estimated as approximately 500, this rule 
succeeded in substantially circumscribing the field of eligibles. By the 
new Marriage Law of 1950 the exogamous group is to consist of direct lineal 
blood relatives, but in contrast to the Ching dynasty (1644-1911) and 
Nationalist Civil Codes (1930), affines are exempt from this rule.
Similarly collateral relatives by marriage were not included in the list
, CoUi'.W’aI ,
of prohibitions. As to prohibiting marriage between ^ relatives by blood
beyond of brothers and sisters^of one or both parents but within the
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fifth degree of relationship,* the question was to be determined by
custom. This concession to custom is probably designed to accommodate
the cross-cousin-marriage. .
Within the prohibited five generations on the maternal side an
exception was made from Ching times for the marriage between biao cousins
of different surname such as children of mother’s brother and father’s 
/
sister. These biao cousins, as opposed to cousins of the same surname 
or tang cousins, were permitted to marry, and it seems may have been 
encouraged to marry in various historical periods and in certain geo­
graphical regions of China (Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu 1950: 98-102).
In educational materials published after the promulgation of the new 
Marriage Law, Chen Shaoyu and Li Zuyin argued that biao cousin marriage 
was now allowed and that there was no need to maintain the prohibitions 
against intermarriage between collaterals. Socio-economic conditions 
would increasingly remove the conditions encouraging biao cousin marriage 
and in the meantime the matter could be left to custom (Meijer 1971: 167; 
Chang Fan, 1952: 39-41, 58-66). The remainder of the prohibitions are 
to do with medical disabilities which might render a person unfit for 
marriage. Those specifically categorised as such include the sexually 
impotent, those who suffer from venereal disease, mental disorder and 
leprosy.
The concept ’freedom of marriage' included the freedom of each 
person to select or choose a spouse zhao duixiang unhindered by traditional 
socio-economic criteria.. 'Freedom of choice’ meant not only that an
* The term five generations or wu fu includes four generations of paternal 
and maternal ascendants, four generations of ego’s own descendants, and 
five generations of the descendants of the ascendants mentioned (Mei]er, 
1971: 166).
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individual might voluntarily marry according to his or her own choice 
and without unreasonable interference from others, but also that this 
choice should not be -bound by race, social status, occupation or property 
(KRMB, 27 February 1957). The government planned to broaden the field 
of eligible marriage partners not only by reducing the mnnber of prohibi­
tions,! but also by abolishing socio-economic criteria as a factor govern­
ing choice of marriage partner. The field of preferential mates is not 
defined in the law, but is discussed at length in the numbers of 
educational materials published since its promulgation.
Within the field of eligibles, desirable or preferential mates were 
defined according to their state of political consciousness. According 
to the new ideological model, ideal partners were politically compatible 
and in ideological agreement zhitong daohe (literally to be of one mind 
and purpose) (Henan ACDWF, 1955: 29-36; Song Tingzhang, 1957: 9-16).
This criterion for selecting a spouse, xuanze airen di biaozhun, was 
expressed in a variety of ways. As one article said of the new standards 
in selecting a spouse, he or she must be 'industrious in production and 
advanced in ideology' (P'S C, 1 December 1952). 'In choosing a life 
partner,' said another, 'the fundamental thing is to have a common 
interest in politics as well as in ideology.' It went on to say that 
it is the quality of political thinking and attitudes towards labour that 
are important (ZQ, 16 June .1963). A booklet written to advise on these 
matters stated that the most important condition is the character of the 
person; finding out whether he/she shares the same political standpoint, 
ideological views, class sentiments and revolutionary ideals. Therefore 
there is a need to understand clearly the person's political viewpoint, 
attitude towards work, style of life and quality of thinking (Lu Yang, 
1964: 115).
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The preface to a booklet published in the same year and entitled
Between Husband and Wife again stressed that the individual parties to the
marriage contract should 'respect and love each other' and that this should be .
the exclusive basis of their relationship. 'In a socialist society', it said
'love between a husband and wife is built on common political
thinking and on the foundation of struggling together for the 
revolutionary cause. The relationship between husband and wife 
isifirst of all comradeship and the feelings between them are 
revolutionary. By revolutionary is meant that politically he 
should take her as a new comrade-in-arms, in production as well 
as in work, he should take her as a class sister and labour to­
gether, at home he should regard her as a life companion, besides 
that a couple should respect and love each other, help each other, 
and encourage each other so as to achieve progress together.'
(ZF, 1 October 1964)
All the definitions have in common the emphasis on the partner's licliang 
(standpoint) or shijie guan (literally 'world outlook')or political attitudes 
defined in the broadest possible sense, and make no reference to their socio­
economic characteristics.
The omittance of socio-economic characteristics is in direct contrast 
to the traditional ideological model in which marriage restrictions were 
also based on differences in social status. After 1911 : law no longer
prohibited marriage between persons of certain classes or social status, but 
despite this legal change, village studies in the 1930s and 1940s suggest 
that the families negotiating a marriage continued to be guided by the maxim 
of matching doors. From 1950, preferential mates were not only left socially 
undefined, but the new ideological model specifically rejected socio-economic 
dimensions of preference. A passage from Engels was often quoted in support 
of -this aspect of the new ideological model. . In The Origins of the Family, 
Private Property and the State he pointed out that:
'Full freedom in marriage can become generally operative only when 
the abolition of capitalist production, and of the property rela­
tions created by it, has removed all these secondary economic 
considerations which still exert so powerful an influence on the 
choice of partner. Then no othe.r motive remains than mutual 
affection.' (1954: 77 in RMRB, 13 December 1963)
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This ideologically prescribed field of eligibles, disregarding as it 
did previous socio-economic restrictions and divisions in society established
a theoretically broad field of eligibles. As one article pointed out, ’now '
\
there is sweet grass everywhere’ (ZQ, 16 June 1963). The new unrestricted
marriage market was intended to offer an increasingly wider choice of mates,




Article 6, the last in Chapter 2 of the Marriage Law, provided for the
validation of the marriage contract through registration:
fIn order to contract a marriage, both the men and the women 
should register in person with the people’s government of the 
district or township in which they reside. If the proposed 
marriage is found to be in conformity with the provisions of 
this law, the local people’s government should, without delay, 
issue marriage certificates,’
Both parties were instructed to proceed in person to the local street office
in towns or brigade or commune office in the rural areas with the relevant
documents showing name, age, marital status and occupation. There they were
acquainted with the legal conditions of marriage and provided with a marriage
certificate. This marriage certificate furnished conclusive proof of marriage
and the couple were henceforth recognised as man and wife in the name of the
law and their rights and interests protected. This was the first time that
individual marriages had obtained the legal recognition of the political
authority or the state. There is no provision in the 1950 law for a further
\
ceremony, and whether or not a marriage ceremony is held after registration 
is said in educational materials to be very much up to the two parties them­
selves. A* booklet published in 1964 reminded readers that it is unnecessary 
to have any kind of marriage ceremony, jiehun yishi, once the marriage certi­
ficate is issued, for it obtains the legal recognition of the state and they
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arc henceforth considered legitimately husband and wife. It pointed out 
that a public ceremony of the traditional kind does not further legitimise 
the marriage in the eyes of the political authority, but it went on to say 
that it is also recognised that as it has been customary to perform some 
kind of ceremony, there may still be some necessity to allow for formal social 
recognition in addition to the new political recognition (Lu Yang, 1964: 35),
The new ideological model recommended that the social recognition of 
marriage take the form of a simplified ceremony■in which the couple proclaim 
themselves to be man and wife in the presence of their friends and family at 
an evening party at which light refreshments were served. The new model dis- 
regarded thej^practices of choosing auspicious days, huangdao jiri, the tradi­
tional sequence of rites of separation from the bride’s natal family and 
integration into her husband’s family, the transfer of the dowry, jiazhuang, 
and the celebration of the marriage feast, bai jiuxi, at which an exclusive 
list of guests w#,3 invited to attend and proffer their gifts. What is ad­
vocated is a" curtailment of the traditional ritual with the elimination of 
symbols which were said to take their meaning from the superstitions and 
extended kin relations of the old society and a reduction of marriage expenses 
to end the financial dependence of the young people on their parents. The 
educational materials in support of the new model assumed that the advantages 
■of economy and simplicity would be self-evident once the repercussions of the 
expenses and the significance* of many of the symbols for social relations 
were explained and understood.
A strategy for reform
The reform of the marriage system has been described as ’a constant and 
serious political task1 (P’s C, 1 June 1952), and it has been based on a dual 
strategy to promote the new ideological model and create new socio-economic 
conditions appropriate to free-choice marriage. Initially, in 1950, the
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main aim of the government was to introduce the new ideological model as 
a universal measure of social behaviour and to familiarise every house­
hold in urban and rural areas with the details of the new ideological model 
(P's C, 1 June 1952). For each stage of the negotiations of marriage, the 
new law had established the principles on which the new ideological model 
was based and the specific guidelines‘for the implementation of the new 
ideological model in practice were elaborated and publicised in educational 
forms. The promulgation of the law and publishing of educational materials 
were immediately followed by the .organising of government personnel and 
the leaders of the Women's Federation, the peasants’ and students' organi­
sations and the Trade Unions, at both national and local levels, to make 
a detailed and systematic study of the law in order to understand how the 
new ideological model differed from the old ideological model. Once they 
had grasped the significance of the new marriage and family system they 
were to popularise the details of the new model in small study groups and 
in the media. All aspects of the media were marshalled in their support. 
There were articles in the press, periodicals, wall newspaper^ and it 
was featured in films, drama, local theatrical performances, rhymes and 
songs. It was the subject of lectures in schools, winter-schools for 
peasants, an’d factory classes, travelling exhibitions were organised and 
the radio constantly broadcast discussions of it. The Women's Federation 
and the East China Publishing House, for example, co-operated to produce 
comic strips, drawings, popular stories and songs and pictorial charts.
I n -1951 they organised an esdiibition based on the Marriage Law. It was 
held in Shanghai and attracted an estimated 260,000 visitors in ten days 
and in Zhejiang a similar exhibition was visited by 10,000 people in the 
first five days (NCNA, 27 October 1951).
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Investigation teams were organised throughout the country to report 
on progress in education and in the implementation of the law. At first 
the reports of progress in the media were encouraging, but they had 
principally come from the major-cities and their immediate suburbs where 
the majority of the population was often already familiar with new 
marriage and family systems and legislative procedures. The first signs 
of the many problems that were to appear were.revealed in reports and 
letters in the press towards the end of 1950 which reported individual 
cases of violations dl, the new law (RMRB, 29 September 1951; 9 October 
1951). These first reports soon led to many others and it was found that 
the irregularities were by no means confined to isolated cases, but were 
widespread. This was reported to be particularly so in the rural areas 
where the new concepts of freedom and choice and equality were directly 
introduced for the first time. In 1951-2, Shi Liang, the Minister of 
Justice, estimated that in only three out of 2,086 x i a m  or counties of 
China was the new ideological model a widely accepted form of social 
behaviour. The same article reported that in East and Central-South 
China, for example, free-choice marriage and other marriage reforms had 
gained little or no acceptance with the public. In the whole of the 
North-West and even in certain parts of otherwise advanced provinces 
like Zhejiang and Shandong, the marriage reform had left the old customs 
unaffected (RMEB, 4 July 1952). It was this persistence of old ideas and 
apparent misconceptions about the new ideological model which caused the 
government to once again plan an intensive and nation-wide campaign to 
familiarise the people with the details of the new forms of marriage.
The government decreed that March 1953 was to be set aside for a 
special family-byrfamily and street-by-street campaign to conduct 
education in the new forms of marriage. The Vice-Chairman of the
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Commission Leading the Campaign explained the significance and purpose 
of the campaign as a period of intensive publicity and discussion to
enable everyone to clearly demarcate the differences between the old and
\
new marriage systems and to eliminate the influence of the social customs 
within the consciousness of the people (RMKB, 20 March 1953). The pre­
paration for the campaign began in earnest in January and February of 
1953 and several teams of social investigators were sent out to make a 
practical study of the problems involved. In numbers of sample villages, 
factories^ and urban neighbourhoods experiments were carried out to 
identify the problems likely to be encountered in each area and the most 
useful methods of work to rectify problems discovered (CR, September 
1953). Once the Marriage Law team arrived in a village or district, the 
movement to reform the marriage system tended to pass through three 
stages. The first was the training of local cadres. The success or 
failure of the campaign was found to depend on the extent of the badre's 
own familiarity with and training in implementing the law (RMRB, 19 March 
1953). The penpatetic work teams usually held local conferences for 
training cadres which lasted about four and a half days and explained the 
nature, policies, aims and methods of the Marriage Law campaign. In one 
rural subdistrict in Siquan province, of the 160 village administrators, 
functionaries of the peasants’ and women’s associations and members of 
the Communist Party and Youth League, at least half were found to be 
influenced by the old ideological model (CR, September 1953). Once the 
cadrea were acquainted with the details of the new ideological model and 
understood the critique of the old ideological model, they were to 
inform, educate and explain the general outlines of the Marriage Law 
to the people.
Ill
Cadres were urged to adopt a repertoire of plays, ballads, lectures 
and exhibitions to familiarise the people with the principles of the lav? 
before organising the different social categories into discussion groups. 
The older generation, mothers, wives, husbands and the youth were all 
encouraged to meet separately to discuss the differences between the old 
and new ideological models in direct’ conjunction with their own experi­
ence. In one village in Hebei province, the young women met separately 
several times to study and discuss the Marriage Law. On the third 
occasion the woman leader of the peripatetic Marriage Law team suggested 
that each woman speak from her own experience and compare the old and 
new ideological models with the customs or immediate models of their 
small village. 'Let us speak today,1 she said, 'from our own experience, 
let us speak of our own individual problems, then we can see if old 
feudal ideas are still holding any of us prisoners and how we can deal 
with the matter.' Several of the women began to speak of their own 
problems and the group concluded that the influence of the old ideological 
model still affected their own perception of the marriage system. The 
village was a tightly-knit neighbourhood community where it was said 
'each family knows quite well what the other one thinks on all important 
subjects' (P's C, 1 March 1953). For instance ever since childhood it 
was known that marriages were arranged, or a divorced or remarried woman 
was regarded with contempt .in the village. Despite their acquaintance 
with the new model, the older generation still shook their heads and sighed 
with disapproval at those who dared to claim their rights under the 
Marriage Law. Even the leaders of the new organisation, such as the 
Women's Federation, were found to be still influenced by the old 
ideological model.
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The third stage involved the selection of local role models or the
publicisation of the cases of those who had claimed their rights under
the new law and the establishment of organs to provide support for those 
adopting the new ideological model and to arbitrate disputes in the 
future. In providing new organisations of support and establishing a 
system of marriage registration, the government was aiming to provide a 
power base alternative to that of the domestic group and the local village 
elders. It forecast that the authority of the household head could only
be sustained in the family if it had the total support of the local
community and once an individual defying family authority could be given 
alternative support, the power of the household head to control the 
marriage negotiations would be broken. To provide sanctions in support 
of the new ideological model the government broke with its custom of non­
interference or non-intervention in the domestic sphere. Government 
cadres were encouraged to think of love, marriage and family life as 
serious problems for collective concern and not as the private affairs of 
the individual which were of no concern to the government. They were to 
reverse the old adage that 'even an upright magistrate does not inter­
fere with family affairs' (Smith, 1902: 292). Many articles were written 
which exhorted cadres and government and popular organisations to concern 
themselves wi-th marriage and the affairs of the domestic group.
At the conclusion of this third phase of the campaign, it was
estimated that overall it had effectively acquainted a high proportion
of the population, perhaps as many as 70 to 80 per-cent of the country’s 
population, with the details of the new model. ‘ But it was also recognised 
that the campaign had been somewhat uneven in its influence in all these
areas (P's C, 16 November 1957). The educational campaigns of the first
few years constituted a period of initial experimentation in introducing
113
the principles of the new marriage system to the population at large and 
at their conclusion they had certainly acquainted the majority of the 
population with the principles of the new Marriage Law. They hdd intro­
duced a new ideological model to compete with the old ideological model. 
However, the experience of the crash policy in the first three years 
had also suggested that education in the principles of the Marriage Law 
would take some time and should continue on a regular and universal 
basis (CR, September 1953; NCNA, 5 March 1955). Since-the introduction 
of the new marriage system was largely aimed at j the accepted
and shared thought systems within the consciousness of the people, its 
methods were primarily to be those of education and persuasion. Thus, 
the specific guidelines for the establishment of new marriage patterns 
have been constantly and consistently elaborated and publicised in the 
media from 1953 to the present day.
In the early 1950s the government had also deliberately made the 
conclusion of land reform policies a necessary precondition to a full 
campaign publicising the Marriage Law^ in the belief that the redistribu­
tion of a share of land to each individual member of rural households 
would provide a source of economic independence for the younger genera­
tion, and especially for women. This would improve their bargaining 
position’ in any conflict with the older generation over the control of 
the marriage negotiations. , In the mid-1950s the government embarked on
a new set of policies to socialise the ownership of the means of produc-
/
tion and reorganise production^which would have the effect of substituting 
individual peasant producers by collectivised units. It was anticipated 
that these new measures would reduce the economic functions of the 
domestic group which had previously encouraged the head of the household 
to control the negotiations of marriage or exchange of women in the
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interests of the domestic group. The new policies to transform the 
mode of production were designed to remove the property basis and the 
economic functions of production and consumption from the domestic 
group. In rural areas the introduction of mutual aid teams, co-operatives 
and communes and the establishment of joint state-private enterprises, 
co-operatives and neighbourhood factories in urban areas, were all 
designed to reduce the/^doraestic group as the unit of production and 
collectivise the ownership of production. Collective ownership would
f
; remove the functions of the household to dispose of family properties, 
to recruit and organise production and supervise consumption. Instead, 
private properties would be reduced to a minimum, labour would be 
collectively organised and recruited according to age, experience and 
physical strength rather than on the basis of individual households, 
and individual members of the household were to be provided with their 
independent sources of economic support. It was anticipated,that the 
establishment of collective, services^such as dining facilities, child 
care, laundry, Sewing and mending and other services)would mean that a 
larger part of consumption would be removed from the individual house­
hold. By reducing the functions of the household in the economy, these 
policies would, it was claimed, provide the material conditions for 
1 free-choice marriage1 and eliminate familial control of the negotiations 
and choice of partner according to socio-economic criteria.
Both economic policies and the substitution of one ideological model 
for another were designed to complement each other within a dual strategy 
working towards the same end - the establishment of new marriage 
procedures and patterns. It has been increasingly common to debate 
the implementation of policies in China in terms of cyclical or circular 
patterns of left and right or moderate and radical oscillations
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(Winckler, 1969; 1976). An examination of the policies to do with 
marriage does not argue for the repetition of a well-defined single.
stereotyped cycle, rather they can be distinguished by the almost constant
\
flow of educational materials directing attention to some aspect of the 
new ideological model. It is possible, however, to correlate a greater 
flow of educational materials during ’right' or 'moderate' periods as 
opposed to the 'left' or 'radical' phases. During the former, as in the 
Socialist Education Movement of the early 1960s, marriage received greater 
attention in the media as a result of debates surrounding such questions 
as the place of the individual and individual happiness in a revolutionary 
society. In fact much of the material cited in the present study is 
drawn from this period.
There have been two exceptions to the general emphasis on education, 
and these have both occurred in 'left' or 'radical' periods. During the 
Great Leap Forward (1958-59), there was more attention given to the 
economic strategy to do with the reorganisation of the relations of 
production and the reduction of the role of the household as a unit of 
production and consumption which were designed, among other goals, to 
have direct effects on the reform of the marriage system. The Cultural 
Revolution, on the other hand, was much more concerned with the re­
arrangement of social strata and class relations, and although the 
policies seldom directly encompassed those to do with marriage and 
domestic and kin groups, they certainly had repercussions for all of 
them. ' Since the Cultural Revolution, and especially in the recent 
movement to criticise Confucius and Lih Fiao, the flow of educational 
materials has resumed, although in much reduced numbers. Perhaps this 
reduction is due to the continuing absence of the magazines Zhongguo 
Qingnian, Zhongguo Funu and Gongren Ribao which formed popular channels
for the educational materialsIptWe
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As a result of the shifting priorities within this dual strategy, 
both ideological and economic variables will be shown to have intervened 
in the competition between the old and new ideological models to produce 
syncretic forms which distinguish the immediate conscious models of 
different sub-groups in Chinese society today. The next chapters set 
out to identify the variety of these immediate models which characterise 
the negotiation of marriage, the choice of marriage partners, the age of 




THE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS
The substitution of parentally~arranged marriage fumu baoban e m u
y
hunyin by marriage of self-determination or', free-choice marriage 
hunyin ziyou brought the new ideological- model into direct confrontation 
with the traditional ideological model and out of this competition and 
conflict have arisen a number of syncretic immediate conscious models 
throughout China. An examination of the social behaviour and role 
expectations exhibited in the case studies reveals the operation of at 
least four immediate conscious models, two coinciding with the old and 
the new ideological models and two involving combinations of elements 
of the old and new ideological models.
Figure 3; The Range of Conscious Models in the People's Republic of China

























The models can be distinguished according to the patterns of authority 
and controls which they exhibit. They range from model (1) in which 
the negotiations, from their initiation to their conclusions, are entirely 
monopolised by the elder generation or parents to model (4) where the 
controls are exclusively operated by the parties to the marriage
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negotiations. Models (1) to (4) may therefore be placed on a continuum 
between th£ two poles of ideological construction according to the degree 
of parental participation in the negotiation of marriage. There is 
evidence that this range of patterns of control have characterised and 
continue to characterise immediate conscious models in the People's 
Republic of China. *
. *
There is some reason to believe that model (1), or arranged marriage 
of the traditional ideological model, with very few modifications, 
continued to operate in Chinese society after 1949. A number of case 
studies display a parental monopoly of controls of the marriage procedures. 
That is, the older generation initiate the negotiations and conclude the 
marriage arrangements without consulting with, or requesting the consent 
of, the principle parties. The negotiations which they undertook con­
sisted of selecting a likely spouse, fixing the amount of the betrothal 
gift and the date of the ceremony. The negotiations were normally 
conducted through a third person, sometimes a professional go-between, 
but more often by a member of kin or a neighbour who have offered their 
services. The go-betweens are usually given the name of jieshao ren 
or 'introducers' to distinguish them from the traditional brokers or 
go-betweens whose services were not outlawed. A number of letters and 
broadcasts show that young people, even in the 1970s, suddenly find that 
their marriages have been arranged without their prior knowledge.
In 1963, for example, two letters were written to magazines by 
young people whose marriages had been arranged in this manner. One 
young girl returned home to work in the countryside after graduation 
from primary middle school to find that her mother had initiated marriage 
negotiations with the prospective groom's family. The young people were 
not consulted and, despite the girl.'s expressed fears that she had never
met, and that she knew nothing of the prospective groom, her mother 
proceeded to finalise the marriage negotiations (ZQ, 26 November 1963). 
Another young girl suddenly found that she had been betrothed for six 
years and that the marriage arrangements were due to be concluded in 
the near future - all without her knowledge, let alone her consent 
(ZF, 1 February 1966). The newspaper Anwhei Daily reported a case as 
recently as in March 1974 in which a young girl was betrothed without 
her knowledge. The negotiations had been conducted by a matchmaker and 
with the approval of her parents. The young girl said she was shocked 
when she first learned of the news and returned home at once to reject 
this marriage arrangement. She met with no response from her parents, 
who said that they adhered to the old maxim that ’the parents’ orders 
must be obeyed and the words of a matchmaker must be heeded1, In this 
belief the parents proceeded to prepare for the marriage ceremony and 
disregarded both their daughter’s wishes and the opinions of some of the 
local commune members. After consultation, the families of the bride and 
groom agreed to hold the wedding on 15 December 1973. On that day the 
groom’s family used every possible means to take the struggling bride 
to the home of the bridegroom (SWB, 21 March 1974). The case studies 
in which this model, more or less intact, persists are relatively few 
and they are almost entirely taken from the rural social field where they 
are the occasion of conflict between the younger and older generations.
The second immediate model incorporates characteristics of the 
old and new ideological models. In the relevant case studies the 
parents take it upon themselves to initiate the marriage negotiations 
and the terms are agreed much as in model (1), but the parties are also 
introduced to each other and the conclusion of the marriage agreement 
is dependent upon their consent. . Parents no longer have the monopoly of
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the negotiations. The case studies which illustrate these marriage 
procedures usually.begin with the parents' search for suitable mates.
As young people approach marriageable age, parents approach kin, friends 
and neighbours and in rare instances employ professional brokers to aid 
them in the search for a suitable mate and in. conducting the preliminary 
negotiations leading to.a proposal of marriage, qiuhun. A tentative
i
choice, or in rare instances a short-list of suitable candidates (e.g.
CR, September-October 1953), is presented to the son or daughter to 
solicit their opinions and consent. This stage of the procedure seems 
to be no mere formality. In one village study conducted in 1970, one 
set of parents involved in marriage negotiations considered several 
prospective mates for their son and several times the match seemed very 
suitable in every respect, but each time the negotiations were abruptly 
ended when the young people turned down the idea as the result of prior 
knowledge of the partner from schooldays, reports of mutual acquaintances 
or as the result of a meeting. In one case the couple who had been school 
mates turned down the match and in another case in the same village, the 
school teacher and her prospective partner had several talks together 
and it was said that she put him through several tests before giving her 
consent to the match (Chen, 1973: 72-86). That the consent of the young 
people was an- institutionalised prerequisite to the conclusion of the 
negotiations in model (2) is evidenced by the great disappointment or 
even helpless anger expressed by parents if that consent was not forth­
coming. The parents of one girl found an acceptable suitor for their 
daughter through the introductions of an elderly woman neighbour. To 
their fury the daughter rejected not only him, but a number of very 
desirable partners including an army officer, a cadre and a technician. 
They were each rejected in turn. ' Although the parents were very angry,
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it is noticeable that they did not consider either the use of coercion 
or proceeding on their own initiative to.the conclusion of the I. 
negotiations (ZF, 1 May 1964).
In contrast to the previous two models, in the third immediate model 
the young people themselves took, the initiative in the negotiation of 
marriage, ask for their parents’ consent, and the marriage arrangements 
are concluded either by the parents and/or the principal parties. Where 
the younger generation took over the initiation of marriage negotiations, 
the negotiation process took on a new form. The principals usually came 
to a decision to marry after a period of courtship. Third persons played 
a much less conspicuous role. Young people might continue to be and 
usually were informally introduced to each other by workmates, friends 
or relatives, and there are a number of cases where government organisa­
tions are reported to have intervened and played ’matchmaker’ to couples 
who have been shy or fearful of openly admitting their initial affection 
for one another. For example, in some cases young couples were reluctant 
to express their affections because they either feared ridicule or were 
anxious about the likely opposition to their match. In these cases, 
leaders of the women's organisations or Youth League or Party cadres 
might give them encouragement and provide the opportunities for them to 
openly advertise 'their relationship’ (e.g. WC, March 1962j ZF, 1 January 
1966). The conclusion of the negotiations might take either of two forms. 
In some cases parents take over and conclude the negotiations as in 
models (1) and (2) by settling the form of exchange between the two 
families. In other cases the parties, or the parties and parents 
combined, might disregard traditional procedures and arrange the ceremony 
as in the new ideological model (see Chapter 8). In any event it is the
control of the Initial negotiations by the parties which primarily 
differentiates this model from others.
Despite the fact that in many of the case,studies illustrating
model (3) parents might bring considerable pressure on their sons and
daughters to marry, they did not themselves proceed and initiate the
negotiations on the behalf of the young people. Rather parents accepted
/
the right of the younger generation to choose their own marriage partners, 
and even in cases where the young people were to delay the decision for 
some years, the parents did not seek to take the initiative and conduct 
negotiations on their behalf. What parents do seem to have expected, 
though, was that they had the opportunity and right to give their consent 
and that this was viewed as a necessary prerequisite to the conclusion of 
the negotiations. Letters to the media indicate that some couples who 
were wishing to marry were worried by the fact that their parents dis­
approved of the match and were withholding their consent. In these 
cases the refusal of consent by the parents was often enough to cause 
either or both of the young people to doubt the wisdom of the match and 
contemplate the breakup of the negotiations. The parents of one girl 
strongly opposed their daughter1s decision to marry a cadre who worked 
in a government office. At first the girl was not unduly worried by her 
mother’s attitude, for she thought that her mother would surely see 
reason and come round to giving her consent with time. But after a 
short interval her mother was still vehemently of the opinion that the 
match was not suitable and accused her daughter of ingratitude. These 
accusations had the effect of causing the girl to doubt the wisdom of 
the match; she said she ’had the feeling of being in a dilemma’ and 
began to feel anxious and depressed and uncertain about whether she should 
proceed with her plans (NFRB, 1 2 .May 1962). In the case of another young
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couple planning to marry, the refusal of the girl’s parents to give their 
consent caused to boy to think that the relationship between them had 
come to an impasse and he himself began to contemplate the breaking off 
of the negotiations (ZQ, 27 November 1962). Both the initiation of the 
negotiations by the parents and the consent of the parties (model 2) 
and the initiation by the parties and the parental consent (model 3) 
indicated a degree of shared control of the marriage negotiations. In 
model (4) the marriage negotiations are exclusively controlled by the 
parties themselves.
The last immediate conscious model, model (4), coincides with the 
new ideological model introduced on a nation-wide scale in 1950. In this 
model the parties to the marriage initiate the negotiations for marriage, 
allow no obstruction or intervention of the older generation to stand in 
their way and, despite the withholding of parental consent they proceed 
to conclude the negotiations themselves. Most of the role models or 
public reference groups selected for educational materials fall into this 
category. The case of Chen Meiying was published in the women's magazine 
Zhongguo Funu to illustrate the new ideological model and to remind the 
readers that the struggle for freedom of marriage is in effect one between 
the old and new ideological models. .Chen Meiying chose her own marriage 
partner after a period of courtship, but her decision met with combined 
opposition from the members'of her family and particularly from her 
father. The long drawn-out struggle which followed only served to 
strengthen the resolve of Chen Meiying and her partner to conclude their 
marriage arrangements themselves. When finally the parents, as a 
requisite to the bestowal of their consent, began to impose conditions 
on the young couple such as the amount and constituents of the betrothal 
gift which they knew the groom couldn't possibly meet, the young couple
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disregarded their opinions and demands. Their marriage took place not 
at home with the support of the older generation, but at the factory where 
they both worked and only afterwards were their parents informed of the 
event (ZF, 1 October 1963). What the case studies which reveal this 
sequence have in common is that the older generation were usually informed 
that the negotiations had been concluded after the event, and at the 
ceremony itself the young couple were often praised for adhering to the 
new ideological model or holding the 'correct viewpoint in choosing life's 
companions, for daring to fight against the old thinking and for the way 
in which they had handled their wedding arrangements' (ZF, 1 October 1963) 
The history of their negotiations were often circulated in the media to 
encourage their peers to defy opposition and practise the new ideological 
model.
The distribution of models
Any attempt to evaluate the distribution or degree of adherence to 
any one model is handicapped by the fragmentary nature of the figures 
available and the vagueness of definition which underlies their categorisa 
ti'on. The figures available have been assembled in Appendix 4, but it is 
immediately clear that statistics such as these can hardly form the 
basis of any comparison either according to area or time period. The 
figures for arranged marriage refer to the operation of model (1), but 
the figures for free-choice marriage can refer to any of models (2), (3) 
or (4). The figures predominantly refer to the years immediately follow­
ing the introduction of the Marriage Law, and the fact that the figures 
fluctuate wildly and there is no apparent pattern probably reflects 
misrepresentations of the categories. But even if the statistics were
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useful, there is no means of assessing the relative weight of the controls 
operated by parents and parties within the category of ’free-choice1.
In the absence of national statistics, it has been necessary to rely on 
impressionistic data collected over a period of time from a number of 
sources. There is a remarkable degree of coincidence in these sources 
in favour of models (2) and (3). These two syncretic models seem to 
represent a high proportion of the selection procedures. All the available 
evidence suggests that model (2) determines most role expectations and 
therefore social behaviour in rural areas and model (3) represents the 
most common procedure in the urban social field.*
It was stated at the end of the first campaigns for marriage reform 
that in most rural areas, the marriage system was at the stage of 
'individual decision and introduction by others or semi-voluntary in 
form' (Kan, 1965: 4). One report in the mid-1950s stated that in the 
great number of villages, the people stand at the stage of social revolu­
tion where marriage is arranged through the introduction of another 
person. The report went on to estimate the proportions for one province, 
Shaanxi, where 10-15 per cent of the population were said to follow the 
new ideological model, 5-10 per cent adhered to the old model, and 80 
per cent combined old and new models (CNA, 13 March 1955). Shaanxi was 
a part of the old Soviet base where the new ideological model had at this 
time been in operation for approximately 20 years, albeit in low profile
* It is difficult to draw a precise line between rural and urban China.
It would have been preferable, if the materials had allowed, to refine 
the usual rather simplified distinction between- 'urban', which usually 
refers to the major cities and industrial towns, and the 'rural' social 
field which includes villages and local market centres. Marketing 
towns and minor cities of the types distinguished by Skinner (1964-5) 
probably fall somewhere between. It is probably preferable to think 
of the simplified categories of 'rural' and 'urban' as forming the 
poles of a continuum. .
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because of the war conditions of that period. There is every evidence that 
the predominant models in operation continued to combine elements of the old 
and new ideological models. In 1964 a village reader pointed out that young 
people were commonly introduced by friends and relatives (Lu Yang, 1964) and 
in the 1970s, an internal observer noted that this type of marriage was still 
common in rural areas (Chen, 1975: 186). Certainly my own impressions from 
Guangdong confirmed this impression.’ When I askdd how a couple had met, in 
nearly every case it was through a mutual acquaintance, relative, friend or 
neighbour. That introduction by the parties and parental consent, or models 
(3a) and (3b), was viewed as the most acceptable norm of behaviour in urban 
areas is suggested by the number of references to it as a common pattern in 
the case studies and by the redefinition of the new ideological model to 
approximate its form.
Both these immediate models seem to have been such common procedures 
that they have each become widely accepted as forms of marriage by 'self- 
determination’ .or ’free-choice1 marriages and have been officially promoted 
as such. Model (2) has been defined as a form of 'free-choice marriage1
(ziyou jiehun) . In 1955 the Central Committee of the Movement for the
Thorough Implementation of the Marriage Law issued a statement to this effect. 
It said that marriage contracts in which the principals were first introduced 
.to each other by third parties and then expressed their own agreement to the 
match were to be recognised as a form of marriage by 'free-will'. 'It is in­
correct,' the statement concluded, 'to consider that the introduction by a 
third party means an arranged marriage' (NCNA, 5 March 1955). This immediate 
conscious model defined as marriage by free choice,, ziyou jiehun, was observed 
to be distinguished in the minds of its holders from 'free choice in the 
m o d e m  way' or jindaide ziyou jiejun. As Jack Chen, living in a village in
Honan, noted in the 1970s, the former was considered to be the accepted
custom or standard of behaviour in the village and in other villages of its
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inhabitants' acquaintance. Although at the same time they were dimly aware 
that somewhere else in China the hew ideological model might be the 
custom, they did not .accept it as appropriate to'their way of doing 
things' (Chen, 1973: 72). 'Free choice in the m o d e m  way* tended to 
refer to model (3) in which the parties initiated the negotiations but 
the conclusions were dependent upon parental consent.
' j
Although model (3) did not conform to the new ideological model, 
it was a constantly recommended form of behaviour in the educational 
materials published to give guidance to young people. They normally took 
pains to state that taking the advice and consulting with parents did not 
in any way constitute parental interference in marriage negotiations or 
mean that a marriage was not to be categorised as 'free choice' (ZQ, 16 
December 1956). Advice columns recommended that young people should 
consult with their parents. If they opposed the match, the young couple 
were recommended to patiently persuade and reason with them even if it 
meant delaying their marriage for quite some considerable time in order 
to win their consent (ZQ, 27 November 1962). Only as a last resort and 
at a much later date were the couple advised to disregard the wishes of 
their parents and conclude the marriage negotiations themselves (NFRB,
12 May 1962). Although models (1) and (4) have the status of ideological 
models, the new ideological model has in fact been informally redefined 
to incorporate the immediate models (2) and (3). It is these two models 
which commonly constitute the recommended procedures of marriage and 
determine most role expectations, and therefore social behaviour. In turn 
these new immediate conscious models derive from patterns of social 
behaviour or strategies which were widely evolved to accommodate to 
varying degrees both the old and new ideological models and mediate the 
conflict between them.
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The threat to the older generation
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The case studies suggest that the conflict between the two models
\
has largely been played out between the older and younger generations 
and that this conflict has centred around the rights and authority of the 
older generation to control the domestic domain. The new ideological 
model demands that they should relinquish this power. Even the prelimin­
ary formation of the syncretic forms demands that both■generations share 
the control of the marriage negotiations, and the persistence of these 
models over time has required the continual collusion of both the parents 
and the parties in this power sharing. The form that the models have taken 
suggest that the older generation has worked to maintain its control of 
the initiation of marriage negotiations in rural areas, and at the very 
least, retain their consent as a prerequisite to the conclusion of the 
marriage negotiations in urban areas. In both rural and urban areas the 
older generation rightly foresaw the consequences of the new Marriage 
Law for the traditional distribution of power within the household.
Formerly the reputation of the head of the family rested on the order­
liness of the affairs of the household and his ability to exercise 
authority over the members of the domestic group. His monopoly of the 
marriage’ arrangements of the younger generation contributed to the power 
base of the jiazhang or household head. The conflict between the old and 
new ideological models can be viewed as a struggle for hegemony within 
the household.
That the parents felt their controls to be threatened by the new 
law is evident from the following poem:
’With freedom of marriage,
Gone is the father’s prestige;
Now comes the Marriage Law,
Mothers are no longer held in awe.1 (CR, July 1962)
129
In case studies parents frequently perceive free-choice marriage to 
be a direct attack on their authority, and they expressed their hostility 
to the new practices accordingly. The young people’s initiative in the 
marriage negotiations is commonly interpreted as disobedience or 
rebellion against parental authority causing their loss of power within 
the household and therefore their loss of dignity, or loss of ’face1 
within the community (ZF, 1 October 1963). When a young girl was court­
ing the boy of her choice her mother who indirectly heard of the matter 
was furious. She harassed her daughter with the words, 'What kind of 
nonsense is this? It’s downright rebellion. A young girl goes out and 
looks for her husband, see if I won’t break her legs.’ The neighbours 
and government cadres had to intervene to prevent physical injury (WC, 
October 1952). The father of another girl who had chosen her own spouse 
in a rural village refused to give his consent on the grounds that 
'This free-love business, it’s nothing but losing face business*
(RMRB, 12 January 1957).
In later case studies, in the 1960s, parents often expressed their 
hostility less directly and instead resorted to delaying tactics to 
compensate for their loss of direct control. The most commonly cited 
reason for withholding consent was their disapproval of the qualities of 
the chosen partner. Sometimes before they would give their consent, 
parents imposed conditions on the parties such as the demand for certain 
goods and payments which they knew to be either unacceptable or impossible 
for the parties to meet. In a case published in Nanfang Ribao in 1962 the 
mother of the prospective bride, seeing that she could not change her 
daughter’s mind by employing 'tough or soft tactics’, demanded that the 
groom should send her ’gifts’ such as ten crates of rice grain, ten 
catties each of chickens, ducks, pork, peanut oil and 100 yuan in cash
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before she would consider giving her consent. The young couple could 
not oblige; but the mother continued to press her demands until the 
Party committee intervened (6 October 1962),
Wh&ther they expressed their hostility directly or indirectly, the 
older generation often invoked traditional moral and ritual obligations 
and mobilised the support of kin and neighbours in support of their 
threatened authority. The alarmed and angry reactions of the parents 
of young people who had chosen their own marriage partner were often 
expressed in terms of filial piety or the obedience and obligations of 
the young to the elders and their ancestors. Just as the older genera­
tion had an obligation to the ancestors and future descendants to arrange 
the marriages of the younger generation, so they had an obligation to 
obey their parents in this most important matter. As the father of a 
girl who had chosen her own marriage partner saw it, ’such goings on 
not only tarnish his good reputation, but are an insult to his ancestors’. 
He is adamant, 'tradition demands obedience' (P's C, 1 March 1952). In 
addition, the case studies reveal that the older generation time and again 
mobilised kin and neighbours in support of' their traditional controls of 
mate selection. Parents turned to kin and neighbours for help in the 
search for suitable mates (indeed most go-betweens usually turned out to 
be either kin or a neighbour) and in exerting pressure on the young 
should they prove recalcitrant and cause conflict within the household. 
Collective pressure of an informal kind was often brought to bear on a 
son or daughter to reinforce moral and ritual obligations invoked by 
parents. In one case, a girl reported how she had come under the combined 
pressure of parents, kinsmen, friends and neighbours to get married once 
she had turned 23 years of age. Her parents, anxious to see her safely 
married to a suitable mate, continually warned her that an older girl
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just would not get a good husband. At their bidding and in their support, 
villagers and kin also urged her to get married and began to talk in her.
hearing of the difficulties which older girls have in finding suitable
11
mates a&d the pleasure her marriage would bring to her parents in their 
old age (ZQ, 1 August 1964). Many letters written by young people to the 
newspapers and periodicals reported how difficult they found it to defy
t
the combined pressure of kin, neighbours and friends (GRB, 27 September;
9 October 1962) .
The of the younger generation
The persistence of the new syncretic models also required the 
collusion of the parties in sharing the controls of the negotiations.
The case studies suggest that many young people allowed their parents to 
substantially retain their traditional controls either at the initiation 
of the negotiations or by having their consent a prerequisite to the 
conclusion of the negotiations. Many seem to have been fearful or 
anxious about the rights and wrongs of rejecting the traditional authority 
of their parents. Despite the fact that the new ideological model 
,rejected filial piety or blind obedience to the unreasonable demands of 
parents as iri arranged marriage, the traditional obligations of obedience 
continued to influence the .behaviour of young people and caused them to 
in the continuation of old patterns. This is evident from the 
-.study of letters written by those accused of disobedience. The obligations 
of filial piety, xiaodao, still seem to have invoked feelings of anxiety 
and guilt among a number of girl correspondents who felt that they should 
follow the wishes of their parents who had taken the trouble and expense 
to bring them up (NFRB, 12 May 1962; ZQ, 26 November 1963). Young men did
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not have the traditional economic reasons for a daughter's gratitude, 
but the concept of filial piety had traditionally been especially 
instilled in them.from an early age. The accusation of 'unfilial son* 
disturbed one young man, who in rejecting an arranged marriage was accused 
of disobedience by his father and relatives. They said that as a 'filial 
son1 he should 'follow their wishes whatever the consequences' and 'even 
if he has something to lose'. After one year had elapsed, he wrote to 
Zliongguo Qingnian to ask for advice. In that year he says that he had 
remained firm in his stand, but he felt very disturbed because some 
people still thought of him as an 'unfilial son', buxiao zhizi. 'The 
problem weighs heavily on my mind,' he says, and 'I cannot concentrate 
on my study and work. Comrade editor, what does filial piety really 
mean? Am I an unfilial son because I turn my back on an arranged 
marriage?' (ZQ, 12 February 1963).
The appropriation of controls by the younger generation were directly 
linked to the number of opportunities for their social interaction and the 
introduction of new selective procedures. Bossard has pointed to resident­
ial propinquity as an important factor in mate selection. He wrote that 
the proportion of marriages of a residential propinquity sample 'decreases 
steadily and markedly as the distance between the contracting parties 
increases' (1932:219). Stouffer revised this hypothesis to introduce the 
idea of intervening opportunities by stating that..'the number of persons 
going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of inter­
vening opportunities (1940: 846).. In rural areas in China the opportuni­
ties for meeting and establishing relationships in the village continued 
to be limited by two factors, the tradition of lineage, zu, or surname 
exogamy and segregation of the sexes. The former is particularly limiting 
in single lineage or surname villages where spouses had traditionally to
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be found beyond the village boundaries. Although the number of marriage 
prohibitions has been reduced, lineage exogamy continues to affect the 
opportunities of likely interaction of potential mates (see Chapter 7).
More widespread in influence, however, are the traditional norms 
segregating the sexes. The influence of the ancient maxims that there 
should in effect 'be some distance between men and women' continued to 
maintain their influence especially among the older members of the rural 
communities. Although peasant women were not always secluded to the 
degree expected by the traditional ideological model, segregation of the 
sexes was practised to the extent that mixed social life of young people 
was circumscribed. In the 1950s the 'under-developed social intercourse' 
(WC, May 1950) and the 'lack of collective life' (CNA, 13 May 1955) were 
specifically linked to the difficulties in introducing free-choice 
marriage in rural areas. Twenty years later internal and foreign 
observers have remarked that social relations in rural villages still 
display a certain segregation. Although young men and young women work 
together in small work teams or groups, propriety still demanded that an 
adult be in charge of the team or the group. 'In point of fact,' one 
observer noted, 'the girls chaperone themselves. In rest periods for 
example, they sat slightly apart and the boys would not be so forward as 
to intrude upon them.' It was the impression of the same observer that 
if a young man found that he could approach and make friends with a girl 
rather easily, he would be wary of marrying her himself or advising any 
of his friends to do so (Chen, 1973: 77).
The tradition of segregation and absence of precedent for the 
phenomenon of courting caused many young people to write to magazines 
expressing the wish that the Youth League would take a more active part 
in 'introducing' young people. But the replies of these organisations
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have expressed a certain reluctance to encourage this practice. They 
point out that it was not the aim to replace traditional go-betweens by 
their modern equivalents which alike would have the result of ultimately 
removing the responsibility from the young people of initiating negotia­
tions themselves (ZQ, 1 November 1956). Instead, and because the new 
ideological model demanded the introduction of new opportunities for mixed 
social interaction, the government set out to establish youth clubs and 
organisations which facilitated mixed social activities.
A nevr category of social relations
There is some evidence that the institutionalised encouragement of 
a new category of social relations between young people of opposite sexes 
which were neither those of avoidance or marriage aroused some hostility 
among the older generations of the rural villages; It was not unknown for 
the Youth League to discourage its members from openly fraternising with 
the opposite sex in fear that this might harm their reputation and draw 
attention to their affairs in a derogatory way (ZQ, 1 April 1955; 1 
November 1956) . A young girl wrote to Zhongguo Qingnian in 1964 
complaining that in her village young girls continued to be banned from 
the activities of the recreational clubs, reading room and spare time 
cultural work groups. Regardless of their daughters’ feelings, the 
parents kept them at home and prohibited them from attending any meetings 
or taking part in certain activities. In defence of their actions they 
put forward reasons such as ’when young people get together nothing good 
can happen’, and that the young people ’may not behave properly and may 
even ruin family reputations’ (ZQ, 27 October 1964). Two years later 
another young girl similarly complained to Zhongguo Qingnian that the
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activities of their village club were spoilt by the suspicions which they 
attracted (ZQ, 16 April 1966).
In this atmosphere of continuing suspicion and segregation, individ­
uals, i<f they did meet and attract each other, were often afraid to express 
their affections openly to each other in private or in public. They 
feared that they would become the subject of talk, gossip, rumour, and 
lose their reputations. Young people who had the effrontery to be seen 
together, let alone embark on a steady courtship, were often severely 
censured. Young couples remained shy, and fearing disapprobation they 
were often reluctant to come out in the open and express their affections. 
In one village when a couple did finally meet alone 'by contrived 
accident', the young man stammered out to the girl that he had been 
wanting to speak to her for almost two years now. Although she felt the 
same for him, she dared not do more than stay and talk for a few minutes 
(CR, September-October 1953). Several cases in the media report that 
after young girls were seen alone with a young man they thought they 
were automatically compromised and were therefore compelled to marry 
him (ZQ, 1 May 1956). It was often the lack of alternative opportunities 
for meeting and developing relationships with eligible mates which 
demanded a high degree of courage among those who dared to defy the norms 
and play thes'e furtive games of hide and seek.
This lack of institutional opportunities to meet and mate encouraged 
the younger generation to support parental authority and control of the 
initiation of negotiations. They lost their new legal right default^ 
as it were^ in comparison to young people resident in urban areas^
Although here too^there were a few exceptions among specialised all-male 
or all-female occupations. For example?city engineers who were frequently 
posted to distant worksites ‘ (ZQ, 1 April 1955) and all-girl -tac+tx-its. <&
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some 20 li outside the city limits (RMKB, 15 November 1956) had problems 
in gaining access to mixed associations. On the whole though(in urban 
areas young people had not only a greater number, of opportunities for 
association in work enterprises, well-developed recreational activities 
and neighbourhood activities, but the norms encouraging segregation no 
longer dominated the informal relations of the social field. It is 
certainly true that those who did'initiate their own marriage negotiations 
in rural areas were those who had access to extended networks beyond the 
confines of the face-to-face community. It was the young activists, the 
Youth League members, Party members, members of locally renowned drama 
groups and those rewarded by the political authorities such as ’good 
commune members’, who had occasion to attend meetings, conferences and 
festivals outside the village and who enjoyed the opportunity to meet and 
become attracted to a partner of their own choice, that were motivated to 
reject the models of their community (P's C, 1 December 1951; KMRB, 12 
January 1957).
A conflict of interests
Those who did oppose the traditional controls of the marriage 
negotiations exercised by the older generation, either at their initiation 
or conclusion, were often forced into a prolonged and heated conflict with 
their parents. In rejecting parental authority, the younger generation 
had access to legal resources and political associations and could turn 
to them for support. The Marriage Law’s unequivocal declaration in 
favour of ’freedom .©F. marriage’ provided the younger generation with 
the legal right to reject the old pattern of family-arranged marriage.
Its clauses were often used as a weapon in verbal arguments, but
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normally sustained defiance on the support of one of a number
of political associations. In nearly all the case histories of conflict 
presented in the media, the young people turned to government cadres, 
the Women’s Federation, the Youth League or the Communist Party for 
support in maintaining their position and exercising their controls 
(NFRB, 6 October 1962; Z.,F, 1 October 1963.) . These associations cooperated 
in persuading parents and kin of the advantages of the new model and in 
cases of violence took the young couple into their protection. The 
juxtaposition of the old and new ideological models has not only brought 
the younger and older generations into direct conflict, but has brought 
the resources and sanctions of the kin and neighbourhood or informal 
groups into competition with those at the disposal of the new political 
associations or the formal social field. The form which the immediate 
conscious model took would to a large degree reflect the dominance of 
either one of the resources or sets of sanctions at any one period or 
in any one place within the particular social field.
The j v e ' of arraiaged marriage by free-choice marriage, which 
has brought the generations into conflict and the sanctions of kin or 
neighbours and political associations into competition, has been reported 
in the media to be one of the most difficult social reforms to implement 
in the history of the People’s Republic. After the campaigns of 1950 and 
1953 it was anticipated that this reform would make slower progress than 
at first anticipated, and since these early years, it has been repeatedly 
identified as the most difficult reform to „ introduce,) both at local 
and national levels. A woman leader interviewed by an Australian journal­
ist in the late 1950s said of her village: ’One of the most difficult 
things to break down was the system of arranged marriage’ (Cusack, 1959: 
54-5). In a national discussion .of the problem in the 1960s the reform
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of the marriage system was reported to be the most difficult of all 
social reforms introduced since 1949 (RMRB,. 13 December 1963). Again 
in 1970, in a village in Honan province, a resident observer summed up 
the sta’ge of marriage reform as one of transition. 'In Upper Felicity,' 
he said,
'betrothal and marriage customs have subtly changed in 
character to a half-way stage that reflects the present 
state of social relations and outlooks in the village.
The old feudal forms and content of life are being 
shed ... but the socialist order has not yet fully 
taken over.'
(Chen, 1973: 60) ,
How far the syncretic models will be -^cc^ce^L ' by the new ideological 
model as the dominant immediate model is difficult to foresee. What is 
clear is that the syncretic models arose to mediate the conflict between 
the old and new ideological models and that they have persisted to the 
extent that there has been a tendency to redefine the new ideological 
model in their direction. The confict between the generations for 
control over marriage has been temporarily or permanently resolved in 
favour of shared controls, c& the older generation in the rural
areas and partial to the younger generation in urban areas. In evaluating 
the relative weight of free choice and parental participation in negotiat­
ing the marriage contract, the main dividing line on the continuum lies 
* at the point where the parties take over the initial negotiations or 
'free choice' is distinguished from 'free choice in the modern way'.
All the available evidence points to the fact that this point tends to 
roughly coincide with the division into rural and urban social fields 
and the dominance of the informal and formal social fields. In
\
diagrammatic form this can be represented as follows:
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Figure 4: Initiation of Negotiations
INITIATION Parents Parents Parties Parties
CONSENT - ‘ Parties Parents ~
rural urban
informal sanctions formal sanctions
The point at which the initiation of negotiations is taken over by the 
parties will also be shown to coincide with points of radical change on 
similar continuums for pre-marital rituals, choice of marriage partner, 







In most societies ritual forms or categories of standardised or 
customary behaviour have been distinguished from other forms of social 
behaviour according to their sacred as opposed to profane nature 
(Durkheim,•1954: 37), non-economic as opposed to economic^practical or 
technical functions (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948; Malinowski, 1962), non- 
intrinsic as opposed to intrinsic ends (Goody, 1961: 159) and expressive 
(aesthetic) as opposed to instrumental (technical) aspects (Leach, 1968: 
525). Not all these distinctions have proved equally useful in anthropo­
logical studies, but if ritual is taken in its broadest expressive sense 
it universally serves to emphasise the status of actors in relation to 
one another and it may also be used to alter the status of the actor.
The form which pre-marital rituals take both express the power relations 
and patterns of control inherent in the procedures of mate selection and 
constitute the first phase in the rite de passage (van Gennep, 1960) or 
the ritualised transition of an individual from a single youthfulness 
to a married adulthood. It-is a characteristic of all kinds of ritual 
occasions that the participants reaffirm or emphasise in an exaggerated 
way the formal social distifictiveness that separate one individual from 
another. Nowhere are the controls of the older generation more explicitly 
stated than in the pre-marital ritual of betrothal.
Betrothal, dinghun or dingqin, or the preliminary negotiations and 
selection of a mate is marked by the transfer of property from the kin 
of the bridegroom to the kin of the bride which may or may not be directly 
for the bride's use. These negotiations and transfers symbolise the control
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of the older generation over the marriage negotiations and hence their 
authority over the younger generation. If betrothal represents I. the 
controls of the older generation and kin groups over the negotiations 
and parties to the marriage, the introduction of courtship and its 
subsequent dominance as a pre-marital ritual symbolises alterations in 
the status of the individual parties within the marriage negotiations and 
in relation to their elders and kin groups. Gluckman has observed that 
'love relationships' or congeniality fostered by courtship separate both 
spouses from their kin and kin groups uniting them in a conjugal bond 
and against the controls of the older generation (1956: 64-80). The 
introduction of marriage as an inter-personal relation between the two 
parties and based on free-choice and congeniality required transformations 
in the pre-marital ritual forms.
In the People's Republic of China the new ideological model made no 
reference to the pre-marital rituals characterising the old ideological 
model. Begrothal was not only omitted as a procedure of marriage 
negotiations, but Article 2 of the Marriage Law had express\y prohibited 
the exaction of money and gifts in connection with marriage. Instead 
the new ideological model prescribed a period of courtship, tanging 
shuo&i or jiao pengyou, as a necessary prerequisite to marriage by self- 
determination or free-choice. As a new and integral part of the 
negotiation procedures, it .symbolised the movement from a union represent­
ing inter-group to inter-personal relations. Although the diffusion of 
the new ideological model encouraged the substitution betrothal c£ a 
period of courtship initiated by the young couple themselves, a wide 
range of pre-marital rituals have continued to characterise the prelimin­
ary procedures of mate selection. In contemporary China it is not only 
that the spectrum of pre-marital rituals from betrothal to courtship is
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found, but frequently to mediate their conflicting demands preliminary 
negotiations include multiple rituals.so that the modalities of betrothal 
and courtship may co-exist at any one point in time. From the case 
studies^ in the media and observations, it seems as if the dominance of 
either pattern coincides with the types of procedures of negotiation of 
the marriage contract as outlined in Chapter 4.
Figure 5: Pre-Marital Rituals 
NEGOTIATION OF MARRIAGE
Initiation parents parents parties parties
Consent - parties parents -
PRE-MARITAL RITUALS betrothal betrothal courtship ' courtship
(courtship) (betrothal)
Betrothal
Despite its discouragement, betrothal continues to function as an 
important social institution in the People's Republic of China. It is a 
feature of the negotiation of marriage in numerous case studies (e.g.
ZQ, 30 August 1956; ZF, 1 January 1966; SWB, 21 March 1974). Observations 
in the media also refer to its continuation as a widespread custom in 
rural China. A village reader published’in the 1960s admitted that 
though betrothal neither received the protection of the law nor existed 
as a prerequisite demanded by the law, it still remained a custom in some 
areas of China (Lu Yang, 1964: 32). In the 1970s, Song Qingling included 
it in a recent list of traditional customs which were still in current 
practice in.rural China (PR, 11 February 1972), and there have been some 
references to its persistence in China in the recent anti-Confucius 
campaign (Xuexi yu Pipan. 10 January 1975; NCNA, 7 March 1975). The most
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significant feature of betrothal is the payment of a betrothal gift, 
caili, to the bride’s household or kin signifying the successful initia­
tion of marriage negotiations between the two families. After the 
introduction of the new ideological model the transfer of the betrothal 
gift continued to symbolise the successful initiation of the marriage 
negotiations. In many case studies, individuals acknowledge its absence 
in the new ideological model, but with custom on their side, they felt 
there was no need to press for its demise.
In many areas there was said to be a general consensus that the 
custom should continue, although where the amount of the betrothal gift 
was excessive it should come under attack. It was customarily said that 
’these were old rules handed down from one generation to another and 
nobody can do without them’ (ZQ, 19 November 1964). But it was also 
clear from some reports in the mid-1950s that where the custom had come 
under direct attack, a number of strategies had developed to escape 
likely criticism and counter the influence of the new ideological model. 
In Shanxi province, a survey conducted in 1956 reported that betrothal 
payments there were camouflaged by various and alternative names and 
procedures. For instance, cash deals were concluded by parents behind 
the backs of matchmakers or .two sets of matchmakers were employed, one 
to negotiate the payments and one to handle the marriage registration 
and give evidence that no payments of any kind were involved in the 
negotiations. Payments were often made in kind such as in personal 
clothing and furniture which could pass as permissible voluntary gifts 
rather than in the form of the outlawed ’cash deals’. New titles were 
formulated such as ’engagement gift’, 'money for tobacco' or 'personal 
use money1 to replace the traditional ’betrothal gift’ or payment (ZQ,
30 August 1956). Some parents just kept their negotiations very quiet
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in the face of likely opposition. For example, in one case study the mother 
of a young girl who was a Youth League member and a leader of a production
team just waited until she was absent from home and attending a meeting in a
\
nearby town, before she opened negotiations for betrothal presents with the
, prospective groom's parents (ZQ, 26 November 1963). It was more common,
\
however, after the initial implementation of the Marriage Law, for the trans­
fer of prestations between the bridegroom's kin to the bride's kin to remain 
an open and tolerated procedure of the betrothal negotiations.
The betrothal gift usually consisted of a combination of payments in
kind and cash. In some case studies it entirely consisted of a cash sum,
but more often it also consisted of household and personal items for the kin 
of the prospective bride and the bride herself. The normal amount of cash in 
rural areas seems to have averaged about 300 yuan in the 1950s and 1960s. In 
1958 it was estimated to range from Y100 to Y300 with average nearer Y300 than 
Y100 (Kan, 1965: 8). In the process of computation it is evident that there 
was room for bargaining and hence for the introduction of inequalities. It 
was not unknown for families to simultaneously negotiate with several suitors 
in order to see who could furnish the most attractive betrothal gift (ZQ,
30 August 1956), In rural areas of Sh<Pinxi in North China, for example, the 
sum generally ranged from Y300 to Y400 and at times it reached Y1000 <NCNA,
31 January 1953). Another estimate for the rural areas in Shcvnxi province 
put the average amount at Y500 with a minimum of Y200. Some were said to 
reach Y1000 plus, but these were unusual. In one of the villages cited there 
were twelve betrothals recorded for 1954-5, and gifts fell somewhere between 
Y300 and Y500 (ZQ, 30 August 1956) . In parts of South China and in 1965 it 
was reported in Nanfang Ribao that betrothal payments were not less than 
Y300 to Y400, and might reach as high as Y600 to Y700 plus gifts of food
(18 January 1965). By the 1970s the available figures for one village in 
Henan province suggest that by this time there had been some reduction in the
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value of the gifts. There the betrothal gift might consist of moveable 
property such as a bicycle or a sewing machine, a clock or household items 
valued at a total of 60.to 80 yuan together with a small amount of cash
(Chen, 1973: '80-85).* - \
y , . . .
In my own work m  Guangdong, it was difficult to ascertain how far the
custom of betrothal gifts persisted. Certainly both the bride's and groom’s 
family contributed to the expenses associated with marriage (see Chapter 8).
In each case presented to the author, the groom's household contributed gifts 
to the new conjugal fund, but whether these were, at any point sent to the 
bride's household as part of the initial negotiations it was difficult to 
tell. Documentary evidence would suggest that the custom probably persists.
Some case studies have included detailed inventories of the contents of 
the betrothal gifts, and these show some small changes between the constitu­
ents listed for the 1950s and those for the 1960s. From North-east China a 
case was reported in the press in which a bride's father made a list of the 
presents his prospective son-in-law was expected to contribute. They in­
cluded items of summer, autumn and winter clothing, leather shoes, cloth, gold 
and silver ornaments and cash (CR, September 1953). Simultaneously the parents 
of a girl residing in Xinjiang province demanded a list of gifts which included 
two suits of cadre uniforms one of which was cotton-padded, one gold ring, 
one pair of gold earrings, one pair of silver bracelets, two pairs of shoes,
160 feet of white cloth and Y1000 in cash (NCNA, 9 February 1953). In 
comparison, in the 1960s there were no reference?, to jewellery for personal
use by the bride as a constituent of the betrothal gift, although clothing
\
for her personal use still constituted a popular request. In one meeting 
of young people in a rural village, several of the participants described
* This figure can be placed alongside the general range of wages which 
lie between 30 and 104 yuan per month with the average lying around 
60 yuan per month.
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the demands of their parents. One girl reported that sjie and'her parents 
had demanded a bicycle, a sewing machine, a big leather chest, a quilt with 
sillc surface as part of a list of twenty household and other personal items. 
Another had asked f o r ^  bicycle, too to three silk dresses and a pair of
leather shoes (ZQ, 22 February 1962). In the 1960s likely demands were
composed of cash, about Y300, household items such as furniture, sets of 
bedding and a sewing machine, personal items of clothing and perishable 
goods including chickens, fish and meats (ZQ, 19 November 1964; ZQ, 16 
January 1966). ,.
It was evident from an examination of the contents of the betrothal gift
that not all the items negotiated were eventually intended for the use of the
young couple or the conjugal as opposed to the familial fund. Some were ob- 
viously intended to directly benefit the kin of the bride’s household. In 
one case an elderly man used the occasion of his daughter’s betrothal to 
furnish himself with a superior coffin. He asked for Y1200 and a good coffin, 
but he later called off the arrangement when he found the coffin to be of 
inferior quality (ZQ, 30 August 1956). There was the odd case where the 
kin of the bride clearly benefited from the dissolution of a betrothal and 
the household accumulated capital and possessions in this way. In 1958 
Zhongguo Qingnian referred to case studies where families * by
negotiating betrothal agreements many times over (Kan, 1965:8). Another 
report in 1970 from Henan province referred to a case in which a very desir­
able young woman was said to have found betrothal gifts good business. It 
was revealed at a meeting that she had broken no fewer than three betrothals 
and was even now embarking on her fourth. The observer reported that he 
thought that this would be the last because of the subsequent publicity 
attending her case (Chen, 1973: 187). It is much more likely that the crit­
icism attending the non-returnability of the payments normally caused them 
to be returned on the breaking of the betrothal, and it was the high and
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returnable nature of the payments which would disrupt the economy of
Ithe bride’s household on the dissolution of the betrothal that !led to 
pressure on women to remain betrothed. ^
y
Mechanisms for consent
Where the parents monopolised the negotiations, as in model (1), 
courtship played no role in the procedures of selection, but where the 
consent of the parties was a pre-requisite to the conclusion of the 
negotiations, as in model (2), courtship might play a small part as a 
means by which the young couple gave their consent to the match.
Following the betrothal feast in one village in the 1970s at which the 
couple were given the first opportunity to get acquainted, it was ob­
served that after a short talk they decided that they apparently liked 
each other’s company. As a symbol of their consent to the match, they 
arranged to go to the county town the next day to have their photograph 
taken together and do some shopping. This trip had become the custom 
for newly betrothed couples signifying their consent to the match. The 
two or three hours they took to walk there and back was thought to give 
them ample time to talk about ’this and that' (Chen, 1973: 83-4). It 
might be- thought that a period of courtship would follow in the interval 
between parental negotiation and consent by the parties, but it seems 
this was not so in this same village. Within a fortnight of their expedi­
tion, the young man took some eggs to his ailing mother-in-law, as he 
already called her, but for weeks thereafter it was observed that he 
seemed to forget his prospective bride completely though she was a local 
girl and they ^ attended the same school. It was explained by his parents 
that it would not look ’proper’ were he to go visiting too often (Chen, 
1973: 83-4).
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External and internal observers in rural China have noted that 
betrothed couples could rarely be- identified by their behaviour in 
agricultural work or in recreation within the village. William Hinton 
noted in his interviews with workers on a state farm that betrothed
s'
couples never thought of speaking to each other- unless they had work to 
do together. It seemed, as if this would have been a breach of the young 
couple’s code of behaviour ’which allowed for no outward sign of recogni­
tion between couples in public and especially while at work', Signs of 
mutual affection were considered by the local community to be proof of 
immorality and it was only when they travelled away from the farm, on 
shopping trips on Sundays, that they .felt free to disregard such restraints 
(CR, September 1953). From more recent case studies, it seems as if such 
restraints have continued to inhibit courtship patterns among betrothed 
couples.
Where the parties themselves initiated the negotiations, as in model 
(3), betrothal gifts were sometimes exacted by the girl's parents as a 
condition to their consent to a free-choice match. The mother of one 
young daughter on hearing of her affections for a young man, said to the 
girl, ’Before you are married into his family, we have to ask for some­
thing from them. So you can wear something nice at your wedding. We 
will not esk for a number of things. All we. want from his family is 
Y300 in cash, together with a set of furniture, two complete sets of 
bedding, 4 dresses and a sewing machine (ZQ, 16 January 1966). Sometimes 
items were demanded by the girls themselves, but generally the negotiation 
of betrothal gifts by the kin of the bride or the bride herself was a 
much less common procedure where the young couples themselves had initiated 
the negotiations. An investigation conducted into the custom in the state- 
owned Fourth Cotton Weaving Works in the North-east provinces showed that
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as early as 1953 in only 18 out of 40 cases was the groom required to make 
gifts of cash, cotton y a m ,  oxen and clothing (NONA, 31 January 1953) . 
Where the parties undertook the negotiations themselves courtship was 
the predominant pre-marital ritual, but in both rural and many urban 
areas courtship was a new form of social behaviour. As such there was 
not only much opposition to its introduction which involved the breaking 
down of the traditional norms of segregation, but there was also much 
uncertainty and confusion concerning the form which the new ritua] 
should take.
Courtship
In both rural and urban areas courtship rituals were frequently 
simplified and foreshortened into a few hasty meetings. Where rural 
couples themselves undertook the initiation of negotiations it was rarely 
the result of a sustained period of courtship, rather it was often the 
result of a number of rushed and secret encounters. A brief stroll in 
each other’s company and in the absence of others often sufficed to 
enable couples to make their promises. Many a couple got to know each 
other through mutual family, friends and only then did they take a stroll 
together'*to'say what was on their minds’ (WC, October 1952). In another 
village a couple were not s,o fortunate in having mutual friends, and it 
was many months before they found the courage to meet alone and admit 
their feelings for one another. They passed a note to each other and 
she gave him a towel to mark their new relationship, but it was not 
until three months later and at the village fair that they again met and 
talked of marriage. Still they did not keep each other’s company, 
although she worked hard to gain'the consent of her mother (CR, September
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1953). ' Over the past twenty-five years it has frequently been remarked that 
older villagers were just not. accustomed to the idea of courtship, and a young 
couple walking or talking openly together was enough to draw attention and
imply a commitment embarrassing at a tentative stage for the young couple.
* * * * •
Even the sustained contact of individuals of the opposite sex through work
was enough to cause gossip in a village. 'They are always together, and
they are not yet married'.' (P's C, 16 June 1949; ZQ, 27 October 1964). The
widespread introduction of the bicycle may have affected courtship rituals,
and in villages within walking or cycling distance of towns with their theatres,
opera shows, restaurants and shopping centres, couples may have more easily
kept each other's company away from the controls of the village, Despite the
urging to reach an understanding and build a new relationship of congeniality
through the rituals of courtship, in rural areas courtship is characterised
by its restrained nature, even in the 1970s.
Courtship was more of^an urban phenomenon and there the rituals were
more elaborate. The stroll in the park, visits to the theatre, opera or movies,
eating in a restaurant and visiting friends were all part of the courtship
rituals, but even in towns its patterns were not uniformly institutionalised.
In the media there is constant criticism of couples who have rushed into rash
or hasty marriages, caoshuai jiehun, without taking the opportunity to get to
know each other in a period of courtship. Courtship patterns were rituals
often foreshortened into a short series, or even a single, visit to the
theatre, an opera or movie before marriage took place. An article in Renmin
Ribao in 1957 reported on this phenomenon after some investigation of courting
patterns in the city of Tientsin. During a series of enquiries at street
offices where marriages were registered, it was found that some couples had
hpe
had rushed into marriage there afterj^cursory acquaintance of one dance, one
or two movies or a few strolls in the park (9 March 1957). Other articles 
reported the cases of couples who embarked upon marriage after a brief
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encounter at the movies or in a railway ticket office (KMRB, 27 February
1957).- The stroll, visit or entertainment had become a symbol o^'courtship
signifying a level of understanding on the part of the couple which was often
not present. A student at the Xinjiang Medical College observed that there- 
/■
courting couples had often taken refuge under the cover of Sworn Brothers and 
Sisters1 Clubs, members of which were in the habit of exchanging notes in the 
class 'pledging help to one another, and expressing their respective views 
which were often couched in sentimental words' (ZQ, 21 August 1962). In the 
larger cities observers report that it is not an uncommon sight to see young 
couples enjoying each other's company. On my first trip jro fruangdong in 
1977 I was greatly surprised by the amount of free association between the 
sexes in where couples were openly to be seen in the streets or in
the park. According to my own observations and those of others, this intimacy 
of association contrasts strongly with that evident in the cities of the 
north of China and in rural areas. In rural areas it seems as if pre-marital 
rituals are generally characterised by the persistence of betrothal and in 
both rural and some urban areas courtship remains at a low level of 
institutionalisation.
The persistence of betrothal
A number of explanations for the persistence of betrothal and rationalisations 
about this particular ritual sequence, its form and content are revealed in the case 
studies. Betrothal continues to symbolise the continuing conception of marriage 
as a facet of inter-group relations between the kin of the bride and groom. In the 
case studies the most frequent explanation given by the older generation for 
the continuing transfer of the betrothal gift was that it took the form of 
compensation paid by the wife-receivers to the wife-givers. It compen­
sated the bride's parents for the expenses of the girl's upbringing.
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Many parents stated that after many years of raising a daughter they 
thought they ought to get a handsome sum in return (e.g. ZF, 1 October
1963). Negotiations were known to be' broken off because the gift did not 
reach the required value - a value in exchange for the daughter which 
became the condition of the marriage. In one case study, a mother 
rejected a betrothal gift because of its low value. She used the follow­
ing words in an exchange with her daughter: 'I have raised and brought 
you up and do you think this little sum of betrothal is enough? In the 
days of the past at least two times the amount-would be asked for1.'
(ZQ, 19 November 1964). In cases of conflict arising over the value of 
the gift, the requests of the girl's parents often had the support of 
most of the village. One girl's parents were greatly dissatisfied with 
the proffered gifts saying that they 'had taken great pains for many 
years with the upbringing of their daughter, but were now to be given in 
return so small a present that it was not even enough for the exchange 
of a pig'. Many of their fellow villagers thought that they were being 
'quite reasonable' in their approach, for it was not too much to ask for 
a betrothal present for a daughter whom the parents had brought up. 
Moreover, they said, it was a 'matter of convention' that when a daughter 
was to be given away in marriage, the groom's parents should give a 
betrothal' gift to show their gratitude to the bride's parents for their 
having brought up their future daughter-in-law (NFRB, 25 December 1964).
That the older generation felt that investments in daughters should 
be recouped at marriage is borne out by the fact that it is the parents 
of daughters rather than those of sons who more often insist on compensa­
tion in the form of betrothal gifts. Although some parents of sons 
thought that, the parents of the daughter should be compensated for their 
loss (ZQ, 19 November 1964), many were only too pleased to adopt the new
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ideological model and be relieved of their obligations. One mother of
sons said she was very pleased when her son married in the new way for
\
it meant that she didn't have to pay a penny for her son's bride, (P's C,
1 June 1951). Many parents operated a dual standard. Families who
r*
insisted on gifts in return for their daughters often encouraged their 
sons to marry in the new way. Jan Myrdal in his interviews with one 
father in Liuling village in the early 1960s, recorded the words of the 
father who had paid dearly for his wife and he certainly intended to get 
some of it back when his daughter married. He explained, 'Look at the 
cost of a daughter'.' The Same father, however, had allowed all his sons 
to marry in the new way for this had meant that he did not need to pay 
anything for his daughters-in-law (Myrdal, 1967: 289-90). A similar 
rationalisation for the persistence of the custom was offered by the 
daughters of households. Many appear to have believed that even if they 
had initiated the negotiations themselves, they should accept betrothal 
presents to show gratitude to their parents who had brought them up for 
sixteen to twenty years (ZQ, 24 April 1962).
Another explanation forwarded for the continuation of the custom also 
symbolised the exchange of women between domestic or kin groups. It was 
claimed that only the transfer of the betrothal gift to the bride's parents 
could guarantee stability in a marriage. This was especially so when the 
groom's family felt themselves to be disadvantaged in negotiating an 
alliance. What qualities they lacked could be made up in the value of 
the betrothal gift. In areas of poverty and agricultural infertility, 
the parents of boys had traditionally been forced to give large betrothal 
gifts in order to secure wives for their sons (P's C, 16 November 1957).
In one mountainous area of north Fujian which had a reputation for its 
bitter quality of life, the parents of the groom felt most uneasy when
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the parents of the girl refused to accept the proffered gifts. They 
feared that the bride would not stay in the-mountainous area very long 
(ZF, 1 February 1966).
A^more widespread rationalisation, however, for the persistence of 
the betrothal gift was that in its present reduced form and lower value 
and with the establishment of new economic relations in Chinese society, 
it had now lost its original symbolic meaning and function. It had merely 
taken on the form of a ’warm pleasantry’ symbolising good relations 
between the two families which were of little economic or symbolic 
significance for the position of women. It had been argued in educa­
tional materials that the continuation of the betrothal gift symbolised 
a business transaction or a metamorphosed form of marriage by purchase.
An editorial in Zhongguo Qingnian stated that 'betrothal gifts’, caili, 
were nothing but a pretext for the buying and procuring of women with 
money and other goods (ZQ, 19 November 1964). Educational materials also 
stressed that the meaning attributed to the custom had not altered despite 
the fact that what is now demanded in exchange has sometimes changed in 
form. The demand for money and jewelry may have become a demand for 
watches and bicycles, but these gifts, even if voluntarily given, were 
still seen to be substitutes for the value of the women being exchanged 
in marria'ge (Lu Yang, 1964: 42-3). It w&s also pointed out that prior to
1949 the custom of demanding the provision of the.betrothal gift had
prejudiced the entry of many into the marriage market. Poor peasant 
lads had been unable to afford the high costs of betrothal and marriage, 
and they often had had to forfeit a wife. • In the past many bridegrooms’
families had been forced to borrow heavily in order to find a sum several
times their annual income, and many a bride was said to have received silk 
in her betrothal gift only to find herself eating chaff after her marriage
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in order to pay the interest on the debts so accrued. Many women had 
suffered ill treatment as a result of the economic pressure on their 
husbandsT households. In*support of this interpretation an old saying 
was quoted: 'A daughter-in-law who is bought is like a purchased horse 
to be ordered about’ (ZQ, 26 November 1963).
Despite the educational campaigns, the persistence.of the betrothal 
gift was popularly defended on the grounds that the traditional meaning 
and function of the betrothal gift were no longer applicable or valid in 
contemporary China. Now it was said incomes were secure and higher, and 
the expenditure involved in the betrothal gift was less, therefore debts 
were few and even the poorest now had access to wives. The practice no 
longer harmed countless numbers of women, nor was it insulting to their 
status in the new society. Women, equal, economically independent and 
with their rights of free-choice in the selection of marriage partners, 
could no longer be likened to goods bought or ’a form of private property’ 
to be exchanged at will. Under these circumstances many wondered why 
they should not indulge in a 'warm pleasantry' (ZF, 1 February 1966).
Even in the 1970s some young people were quoted as saying, ’With 
bumper harvests in the past two years and with plenty of money and grains, 
why shouldn't we accept some betrothal gifts?’ (RMRB, 24 January 1972). 
Some young people have thought that in the circumstances of better times 
and lower-value gifts, they would be rather foolish not to ask for gifts. 
'What is wrong in asking for a few gifts from the fellow's family or a 
small dowry for one’s parents?’ (Lu Yang, 1964: 32). Others saw material 
and social advantages in the persistence of the custom, and while it 
continued to .be the local custom they did not want to be the only ones 
missing out.. 'If when I get married, I ask for betrothal gifts and a 
dowry others will not criticise me and if I wait till after I marry then
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it won’t be so easy to get anything1 (Lu Yang, 1964: 32). Some young
I '
women were quoted as saying: ’If other people have all asked for this or
I
that and i f .1 decline to accept anything, will it not be a reflection on 
my family’s social standing and way of doing things in a grand style?'
(ZQ, 19 November 1964). When one young girl did reject betrothal gifts 
she reported that, although she was praised in the media, opinion was 
divided in her own village. Some said she had set a good example to other 
girls, but others thought she was ’foolish1 because she didn't take the 
opportunity to ask for a few sets of clothing as a gift from her husband’s 
family (KMRB, 24 January 1972). In 1975 the women in one production brigade 
described how in 1974 they still took the practice for granted as a 'warm 
pleasantry’ or harmless custom. It was not until the anti-Confucius 
campaign of 1974 that they became aware that the custom implied disdain 
for women by likening them to a commodity to be valued and exchanged.
As women of new China now engaged in independent economic, political and 
social activities, and enjoying equal rights with men, they thought this 
custom, a form of marriage by purchase, should now be broken. To demon­
strate their new consciousness of the meaning of the custom, twelve girls 
of the brigade went in person to return the betrothal gifts to the 
families of their betrothed without cancelling their engagements (NCNA,
7 March 1-975; Xuexi yuPipan, 10 January 1975).
Obstacles to courtship
V
In the competition between the customary, and newly-recommended pre­
marital ritual forms, not only have a number of economic and symbolic 
explanations rationalised the persistence of the betrothal gifts, but a 
number of factors have worked against the institutionalisation of court-
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ship as the dominant pre-marital ritual. Some of these factors are 
inherent within the very definition of the institution itself. The 
definition of courtship in the new ideological model seems to preclude 
it as a form of recreation or as a procedure of mate selection which are 
two commonly held functions of courtship in other cultures. Courtship 
is normally defined to include all forms of behaviour by which a partner 
seeks to win the consent of the other (Burgess and Locke, 1945: 361).
It is described as the process whereby individuals awaken their interest 
in the opposite sex, are gradually involved and increasingly interact 
with a few partners and eventually with one partner only. In North 
America social scientists have found that the connection between court­
ship and marriage is less direct and courtship provides an opportunity 
for trial and error selection or may be viewed simply as a form of joint 
recreation. Social scientists who have surveyed conscious motives for 
courtship, at least in its early stages, have found that it is seldom 
marriage-oriented, rather courtship is regarded as an end in itself or 
as pure recreation. Reasons for courtship were found to be as diverse 
as self-improvement, group pressure or to gain admission to a 'couples 
only' category (Lowrie, 1951). Nevertheless a period of courtship does 
also provide opportunities for intimate and personal acquaintance which 
has significant consequences for marriage patterns where mate selection 
is highly personalised. In contemporary China, however, 'love is a 
prelude to marriage', and the definition of courtship precludes it as 
a' form of recreation or as a procedure of mate selection.
Although the new ideological model recommends the development of 
mutual understanding and congeniality in courtship, it recommends that 
these should be based on the foundations of encouraging each other and 
helping each other in production, work and study rather than in
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recreation or through the exchange of gifts. Role models might conform
to this prescription, but it is in their leisure time that most! young
couples have sought to differentiate courting relations and invest them 
with a significance distinguishable from the new ideals of comradeship
-r-*
or friendship. The bases for the bonds of friendship have been described
in articles on social relations (ZQ, 21 August 1962). One such article
suggested that ’friends ought to be comrades in our socialist society. 
Sentiment between friends is lofty, and the relationship between one and 
the other is equal and co-operative, full of solidity and love. Common 
ideals, common interests, and common lives.of labour and war have bound 
us tightly together and have created a brand new comradely relationship
tf
between us (Lu Yang, 1964: 17}. The relations of romantic love and 
courtship have had to be given a characteristic of their own over and 
above these ideal ’work-share activities’. How was courtship to be 
distinguished from the common friendship of comrades? This was the question 
put to the editors of Zhongguo Qingnian by Xing Fei of Heilongjian (ZQ,
1 April 1956). Most young people resident in urban areas who have 
described their courtship in the letters to the media have almost entirely 
referred to leisure or recreational activities such as taking walks, 
visiting parks, the cinema, the theatre and sightseeing (GRB, 11 September 
1962; 5 October 1962; 9 October 1962).
Courtship has also come to be associated with the exchange of gifts, 
perhaps in the tradition of betrothal practices, to express and different­
iate this personal relationship from others. An article in Zhongguo 
Qingnian in 1962 suggested that spending money on amusements or gifts 
was very common and had come to be associated with the state of 'being 
in love’. There was even a saying, 'invite the loved one to the 
restaurant today and the provision stores tomorrow1 (ZQ, 1 January 1962).
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One young man in a machinery plant who was courting a fellow worker found 
it an expensive business. His girlfriend began to hanker for gifts which 
she said would publicly express his love for her (GRB, 18 September 1962). 
A boy ^.n Guangzhou who made frequent trips to other provinces was 
encouraged and expected to bring gifts, native, and special products as 
well as commodities of popular brands, to please his girlfriend. *1 
bought her cotton cloth bags and woollen sweaters from Peking, fragrant 
toilet soap and plastic products from Shanghai, a silk umbrella from 
Hangzhou and an embroidered quilt cover from Changsha1. 'Each of these,' 
he said, 'she received as a token of my love, saying "You truly love me"' 
(ZQ, 1 January 1962). The bestowal of gifts seems to have played no 
small part in winning consent. A girl worker in a department store was 
much taken by a young man who bought her some woollen dress material. 
'Things like these,' she said, 'impress me greatly' (ZF, 1 May 1964).
It was the common association of courting patterns with recreational 
activities and the exchange' or bestowal of gifts which seems to have led 
to some conflict between personal and political interests.
In educational materials a high degree of concern with recreational 
activities was often interpreted to mean a preoccupation with the individ­
ual and the private, both of which detracted from the social contribution 
of young-people to the public, the collective and the construction of a 
new society (Qingnian Chubanshe, 1953: 30). In all educational materials 
participation in study and production took priority over recreation and 
the public and collective take priority over the individual concerns of 
love and marriage. The sayings 'Compared with revolutionary work, 
marriage and love is really a small matter' (ZQ, 14 September 1962),
'An individual must try and place love in a secondary position to the 
revolution in one's life^ (ZQ, 1 April 1955) and 'Compared with the under-
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takings we have been called upon to do, marriage after all takes second 
place' (ZQ, 2 February 1963) are all representative of the emphasis of 
the educational materials. Tensions between the ideal of the educational 
materials and common practices in courting are revealed in the letters of 
young people to the media.
Young couples, and especially students, seem to have experienced some 
conflict between the two sets of priorities and find it difficult to budget 
their time and attention between both sets of activities. Frequently they 
comment on the disquiet they experience when they embark on courtship and 
the ways in which they resolve the conflict. For example, one couple 
found they just could not participate in so many collective activities 
if they were to see and get to know each other. They felt ’it was better 
for us to be alone together’ even though this meant that they were 
segregated from the other students for much of the time. A second couple 
who spent much time together said that they had to constantly remind them­
selves not to spend too much time on courtship so as to detract from their 
studies. A third couple found it difficult to concentrate on any activity 
which did not involve the other. They tried to limit their meetings to 
once a week, but the male partner reported that though ’his eyes might be 
on the book, his heart was already at the theatre or the park’ (ZQ, 16 
June 1963). Sometimes the conflict in priorities seems to have made for 
dissension between the courting partners and eventually the dissolution 
of the partnership. A girl working in a store became dissatisfied with 
her courting partner once he had shown a certain reluctance to continuously 
keep her company by strolling in the park.of attending the cinema. He 
thought such activities would soon affect their work. He was soon 
replaced by a young man who knew more 'how to please me I' He took her out 
to restaurants or for a stroll in the street or in the park (ZF, 1 May 1964).
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The definition of courtship also implied a certain degree of commit­
ment on the part of the couple. This, was not only the result of its 
novelty as a pre-marital ritual and the exaggerated amount of social 
recognition which it received due to the gossip, talk and joking which 
it aroused, but because it was conceived of as less a procedure of mate 
selection than as a form of anticipatory socialisation for marriage.
In courtship, young couples were exhorted to develop the life-long habit
of practising thrift in anticipation of marriage and establishing a house­
hold, and to derive mutual satisfaction and support in solving life-long 
occupational, livelihood and study problems. One educational article in 
Zhongguo Qingnian stressed that love and courtship were only the prelude 
to marriage or common life between a man and a woman and above all life- 
companions need to develop a relationship to enable them to find mutual 
support for a long and not entirely smooth life after marriage. The lines 
of a Russian poem were quoted to illustrate the ends of courtship:
’Life is not idling under the bright moon,
Nor is a sigh on a long bench.
Anything may happen! There’ll be mud as well as wind or snow.
For it will take a whole lifetime to live together.
Love is just like a beautiful song,
But this song is not so easy to compose.1
(ZQ, 14 September 1962)
The expression of these sentiments is indicative of the tendency to play 
down the significance of courtship as anything other than preparation for 
marriage itself. For instance, as one article stressed, the mystification 
of romantic love was to be avoided and no encouragement was to be given 
to the full enjoyment of the sweetness of love for its own sake (GRB, 22 
November 1962). This direct relationship between courtship and marriage 
has led to:a certain amount of tension among young people as to the 
degree of commitment implied by embarking on the rituals of courtship.
The procedures for choosing a marriage partner from several candidates or
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courtship with more than one partner were sometimes confused with 'fickle-
i ;
ness of love', luantan lianai, or a tendency to swing with the wind and
\
'abandon the old and embrace the new', xixin yanjiu, which were constantly- 
criticised forms of social behaviour. For instance a girl in Shanghai, 
cited as having 'courted' as many as five or six young men in one year, 
was criticised for the habit of 'loving the new and abandoning the old'
(ZQ, 1 April 1956). A worker in Nanking who apparently advocated courting 
a number of girls 'so that he could pick the loved one’ to his liking from 
a great many prospects' was given the nickname of 'one toying with love' 
(GRB, 5 October 1962).
A lengthy case history of a courtship cited in Zhongguo Qingnian in 
1956 became the occasion of widespread debate on the stability of court­
ship and its relation to marriage. The debate was occasioned by a letter 
which a couple wrote to the editor describing how they had both been the 
subjects of 'criticism'. She, because after promising to try and cultivate 
her love for another man and finding she couldn't, had fallen in love 
with the young man correspondent. She had therefore been accused of 
taking the new as she got tired of the old. The young man had been 
criticised for butting in and edging the other young man out or sabotaging 
the love of another which was metaphorically stated as 'undermining the 
foundation of the wall'. Apparently Zhongguo Qingnian was flooded with 
letters as a result of the.publication of their case history. Many 
questioned the definition of courtship as a permanent relationship lead­
ing directly to marriage. Was this not abandoning the principles of 
'free will' or voluntariness which were the foundations of the new form 
of free-choice marriage or marriage by self-determination? To carry an 
initial decision through however much it had turned sour was surely no 
different from the feudal concept of 'virtue' based on the premise that
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’love should never change1. Surely it was not wrong to change one’s mind 
even though an initial choice had been made? Other letters countered the 
above arguments and suggested that a change of mind was indeed wrong and 
that the girl should be criticised for changing her mind after promising 
to try and love another young man. Some admitted that they frankly did 
not know which view was correct: to hold to a given promise, carefully 
or carelessly made, or correct an error and make a new choice (ZQ, 1 
April 1956) . A village reader on 'love and marriage published in 1964 
did recognise two possible outcomes of courtship, one that leads to 
marriage and another that leads to its break-up. In a forced relationship, 
the author said, it is often the case that 'the melon that is gathered 
by force is not sweet' and the rejected often feel cheated as a result 
and suffer, therefore in these circumstances a break in relations should 
not be averted. But the same booklet then immediately went on to criticise 
'fickleness of love' which was characterised by changeability and un­
trustworthiness, zhaosan musi, thereby hardly failing to associate change 
with frivolity (Lu Yang, 1964: 19).
The new immediate conscious models are characterised by a combination 
of elements of both betrothal and courtship. In the rural areas certain 
factors have encouraged the. persistence of the betrothal rituals and 
gifts, although these have been slightly modified by mechanisms providing 
for the consent of the parties. In the urban areas, courtship has become 
the dominant pre-marital ritual although the new immediate conscious 
models differ from the new ideological model in that courtship, despite 
constant encouragement, has mainly remained at a low level of institution­
alisation. The form which characterises the new ideological model has 
been modified by the persistence of betrothal, the history of segregation 
and the tensions within the definition of courtship itself, • .
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In both rural and urban areas the form which the pre-marital ritual forms 
take directly reflects patterns of control of the marriage negotiations.
Where the older generation and kin groups initiate the negotiations, their
\
preliminary phases usually take the form of betrothal; where the younger 
generation personally take over the initiation of the negotiations, court­
ship, albeit often at a low level of institutionalisation, becomes the 
dominant pre-marital form. The forms which the pre-marital rituals take 
are not only a reflection of these controls, but at the same time the 




AGE AT MARRIAGE ' .
’When a man is old enough, he should get married; when a girl is old 
enough she should be given away1 (Lu Yang, 1964: 23; ZQ, 12 April 1962). 
This old maxim,“said to have been handed down from generation to generation 
during the past several thousands of years, is reported to have a new 
meaning in China today. A most important component of the new ideological 
model has to do with raising the age at which marriage takes place. The 
advocation of late marriage wanhun. , far from being relegated to a simple 
or minor problem of daily life, has been raised to become a major problem 
representing broader changes in ideological structures (RMRB, 30 January 
1971). At a provincial conference held in 1974 it was emphasised that:
’After establishing a socialist mode of production, late 
marriage along with planned parenthood constituted a 
profound revolution in the realm of the superstructure.
Since it was a matter of fundamental importance in 
changing existing habits and customs and transforming 
China, undertaking this reform was of great and far- 
reaching significance for the individual and the nation.
It has constituted a set policy of the Party for the 
period of socialist revolution and construction.’
(SWB, 20 November 1974)
Perhaps in the new ideological model of marriage, no aspect more than 
the age of marriage has been so widely publicised.
The new ideological model distinguished between the statutory ages 
of marriage (18 years for girls and 20 for boys) and the appropriate 
shidude.1 ages of marriage. As Chapter 3 has illustrated, these have 
been interpreted qualitatively as the.ages of marriage worked out by the 
young men and women themselves according to their own particular circum­
stances and in full knowledge of the advantages of late marriage, and 
quantitatively as 23 and 25 years for women and men in rural areas and
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25 and 28 years for women and men in urban areas. The advocation of the
'appropriate1 age of marriage has brought the new ideological inodel into
\
conflict with customary ages of marriage. The age of marriage in the
\
past predominantly coincided with the new legal age of marriage rather
s'
than with the appropriate ages of marriage advocated in the new ideological 
model (see Chapter 2). To take one survey of the age of marriage conducted 
in 1929-31, it was found that 45.1 per cent of men and 72.2 per cent of 
women were married at or below the new legal ages (18^and 20), and only 
15.5 per cent of men and and an even smaller proportion of women married 
at the approximate average age recommended in the new ideological model.
Table 6 : Age of Marriage for-persons married in 1929-31 in 12,456 farm 




2 0 - 2 4  39.4 25.4
25 - 29 10.1 2.3
' 30 + / 5.4 .1
100.0 100.0
(Source: Chiao, 1934: 28);
\
In the absence of national statistics today, it is necessary to turn 
to more localised and impressionistic data s.uch as local surveys and 
case studies reported in the media to ascertain both the actual ages of 
marriage and the ages at which the young people feel they are expected 
to look for a spouse.
age at marriage
MALE
Under 14 years 4.8
15-19^- 40.3
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The first surveys of the 1950s reflected the traditional custom of
child and early marriage. For instance, in 1953 it was reportel that
in a village, of nearly one hundred households in one county in Hunan
province, with the exception of one eighteen-year-old girl, all the girls 
✓
above 13 years of age had been married (NONA, 9 February 1953). In 1956 
at the time of the first campaign against early marriage, it was reported 
that by and large young people got married as soon as they reached the 
legal age of marriage. The average age of marriage in a factory in Peking 
was a little more than nineteen years of age and some students were barely 
out of middle school when they started their wedded life (ZQ, 6 September 
1956). One teacher taking a third year class in a Junior Department of 
a Girl's School in Wuhan municipality reported that of 40 students aged 
15 to 19, two were married and 6 or 7 were talking of marriage (ZQ, 16 
November 1956). In the same year the magazine Zhongguo Qingnian undertook 
a survey of the age of marriage among factory workers. It made the 
general observation that although very few young persons got married 
below the legal age, many got married as soon as they reached the legal 
ages. The survey chose as examples of this trend a cotton mill and a 
chemical plant in which 43 out of 55 and 24 of the 29 female workers were 
married before they reached twenty-one years of age. The average age of 
marriage was said to be nineteen years of age. The survey concluded that 
an absolute majority of young people married early, and that this tendency 
was especially marked among female workers (6 September 1956).
By the 1960s certain patterns of behaviour began to emerge which 
differed for urban and rural areas. In rural.areas young people seemed 
to marry at or near the legal ages or somewhere between these ages and 
their early twenties. After a campaign for marriage in one village
it was reported that girls tended to get married at between twenty-two
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and twenty-four, although circumstances could and did still encourage 
earlier marriage (Ifyrdal, 1967: 111). In.other villages in 1964 it 
was reported that it was quite rare for girls in their early twenties 
to remain unmarried and that most girls were married and had one or two 
children by the time they were twenty-three years of age (ZQ, 1 August 
1964). In a Henan rural village in the 1970s, marriages were negotiated 
early or nearer the legal age (Chen, 1973: 80). In one case a couple 
were informally married,'at eighteen and nineteen years of age, or below 
the legal age for the boy. Despite the refusal of the government admin­
istration to register the marriage, the boy's mother had encouraged the 
couple to live together as man and wife (Chen, 1973: 78). A county 
cadre in Guangdong province told two Canadian anthropologists that in 
the county as a whole, about one-third of the couples married near to 
the appropriate ages of twenty-three and twenty-five; in one-third of 
the cases one of the pair is younger, and in the remaining one-third, 
neither of the couple has reached the appropriate age (Johnson, 1976: 
45).
Jiang Village
In Huadong Commune in which Jiang village is located, there had 
been no special campaigns to introduce late marriage, but informants 
thought there to be general support for raising the age of marriage.
One of the leaders of the commune thought that now young people were 
married around the ages of.twenty-four to twenty-six, and certainly no 
earlier than twenty-four for men and twenty-three for girls. When the 
age of marriage was surveyed in the one village, of all those now 
resident there and married in the 1970s, the average age of the ten
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couples was 26.3 for men and 24.4 for women.
Table 6 : Age of Marriage, Jiang village
MALE •
29




























These figures are higher than the average of marriage for previous
decades. The age of marriage was obtained for all those men and women
under the age of 60 years and a comparison by decade would seem to
suggest a general increase in the age of marriage.






















Where both partners were still alive it was possible to compute age 
differences between spouses for the previous thirty years. Thel average
age difference was 2.8 years and in all cases except two the wi£;e was
\
younger than the husband. The age differences between spouses had not 
altered* significantly over the past three decades.
Table 8 : Age difference of spouses in Jiang village 








In many households' there were sons and daughters living at home in 
their early- to mid-twenties who were not yet married.
Table 9: Age and marital status in Jiang village
AGE SINGLE MARRIED WIDOWED TOTAL
0 - 9 39 - 39
1 0 - 1 9 23 - - 23
20 - 29 23 12 - 35
30 - 39 - ' 22 1 23
40 - 49 - ' 8 - 8
50 - 59 - 8 3 11
60 - 69 - 2 4 6
70 - 79 - 1 1
80 + *- — . 1 1
85 52 10 147
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In the other two villages where interviews were undertaken the 
average ages of the six couples married in the 1970s was 26.3 for men 
and 24.5 years for women. These figures all seemed higher than previous 
documentation on the age of marriage would have suggested and the actual 
ages of marriage largely fell within the appropriate age categories.
The fact that the sample is made up of wealthy communes in the Pearl 
River delta and range between 15 and 40 km from the city of Guangzhou 
may have some bearing on their average ages of marriage.
In the urban areas it seems that young people might well wait until 
their mid-twenties before they get married. Most of the role models 
either wait to their late twenties or early thirties to initiate marriage 
negotiations, but many letters to the media indicate that urban corres­
pondents are more likely to marry when they are in their mid-twenties.
The most significant correspondence on the age of marriage was aroused 
by the publication of educational articles advocating late marriage in 
Gongren Ribao (Workers’ Daily) in 1962. The editors of that paper 
revealed in November 1962 that they had received in response to their 
articles nearly 500 letters weighing up the advantages and disadvantages 
of late marriage, and subsequently they published a selection of these 
in a discussion entitled ’Is it good or bad to get Married Early?’ In 
these letters the urban correspondents were divided between those who had 
got married at 23 and 24 and those who at the ages of 25 and 26 remain 
unmarried and think that this age is still too young for marriage (GRB,
18 September 1962;. 5 October 1962). From my own personal observations 
among cadres and professional workers in their late twenties in the 
summer of 1973, it was evident that many of this group were still unmarried 
at this age., In the second visit questions on the age of marriage were 
asked of those who lived in a factory housing complex and an urban housing
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estate and who were married in the 1970s. The average age of the four
I
couples was 28.5 for men and 25.75 for women. The available evidence 
does begin to allow for a continuum to be drawn up between the legal and 
appropriate ages of marriage and to begin to correlate actual ages of 
marriage with rural and urban social fields. However, the dominant 
feature of the correspondence columns is that in both rural and urban 
areas young people experience considerable pressure to marry as soon as 
they reach the legal age of marriage and until they have actually married.
Letters to the media reveal these expectations among the ego-centric
networks of the correspondents.
Pressures to marry
Many correspondents refer to the pressures of public opinion and 
particularly those from parents, kin and neighbours in favour of early 
marriage or at least against the delay of marriage or late marriage.
In many cases the young people described the pressures that they ex­
perienced once they passed into their early twenties. One correspondent 
noted that all young people over the age of 20 become the subject of
gossip if they remain unmarried (GRB, 9 October 1962). One young man
who was 25 said he had reached the age when he had become 'desperate 
about possible spinsterhood if he did not settle down fast' (RMRB, 15 
November 1956). Many of the role models who delayed their marriage until 
their late twenties said that they had been under constant pressure to 
marry since their early twenties (ZF, 1 June 1963; ZQ, 1 August 1964). 
Their individual experiences are corroborated by general commentaries 
on the problem.
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Several correspondents to Gongren Ribao generalised from their own 
experience and referred to the importance of this social pressure in 
working against the raising of the age of marriage. They reported that 
from their experience and observations it was very difficult for young 
people to withstand the persuasive influence of others, particularly from 
friends, parents and kin. Several described how relatives and friends 
exerted pressure. Three young factory workers wrote that they had 
discussed the question at length and concluded that, although the policy 
of late marriage theoretically speaking rested on sound ideological and 
economic foundations, in actual practice the question of taking up the 
matrimonial problem at the age of 30 for the man and around 25 for the 
woman could not, they feared, find ready acceptance by the general public 
in society and much less so in the factories and in the countryside. 
Although some people think of getting married later,1 they said, ’a 
number of persons around them will often chide them, put pressure on 
them, or jeer at them and express pity as if they have done something 
wrong1 (GRB, 18 September 1962). Another correspondent warned that from 
his experience the difficulties of withstanding these types of social 
pressure exerted in favour of early marriage should not be underrated 
(GRB, 27 September 1962). Again in the 1970s there are references to the 
continuing influence of parents, kin and peers, and in 1973 cadres from 
Guangdong province suggested that the pressure of parents in favour of 
early marriage was still a deterrent to the full implementation of the 
new ideological model (Johnson, 1976: 45).
Although young people in both rural and urban areas report that they 
have, experienced social pressure against delaying their marriages, the 
sources of this social pressure differ. In rural areas the pressure 
was predominantly that of the parents who, with the support of kin and
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neighbours, wished to find wives for their sons in order to acquire the
services of a daughter-in-law or enjoy their grandsons. Parents often
\
expressed their opposition to the implementation of the new policies in
\
terms of their desire to 'drink a cup of tea provided by a daughter-in- 
law' (Johnson, 1976: 45), or with the folk saying 'plant seedlings early 
and you will enjoy a rice crop early; have, a daughter-in-law early and 
you will enjoy happiness.[grandsons] early' (GRB, 11 September 1962). 
Parents and kin often encouraged young people to marry-early in the hope 
of enjoying their grandchildren and particularly grandsons. One 23-year- 
old was the only son of parents who were quite advanced in age and 
therefore increasingly worried about his matrimonial problem and the 
birth of grandchildren. He noted that his relatives and friends were 
also very concerned about him and some of them had zealously introduced 
him to girls they knew well (GRB, 9 October 1962). Another young man 
reported that he had been unable to withstand the influence of his parents 
and had got married at an early age. They had openly wanted a male child 
early in line with the custom of 'finding a wife for one’s son early so 
that one can enjoy a comfortable life early' (GRB, 27 September 1962).
In Upper Felicity village in 1970 it was the wish of the boy's mother 
to have a grandson which encouraged her to defy the law and the govern­
ment administration and bring a wife into the household for her under­
age son (Chen, 1973: 78).
Other parents might express their preferences for early marriage in 
terms of bringing another woman into the household. One mother initiated 
marriage negotiations on behalf of her son on the grounds that it was 
time she had some extra help in the household (Chen, 1973: 80). A 
transportation worker who was less than 19 years of age reported how he 
was encouraged to marry despite his young age by kinsmen and friends,
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who ’seeing that he was without help in everyday life’ introduced him to 
girlfriends and persuaded him that it was time 'to set up a small family' 
(GRB, 14 July 1962). It was not only sons who were pressured to provide 
descendants; girls too found their parents often became anxious as they 
approached marriageable age and expressed their preference for early 
marriage in terms of a wish for grandsons (ZFj ,1 June 1963) .
By far the most important factor operating in urban areas against 
the adoption of the appropriate age of marriage was the fear that, 
unless young people find a prospective spouse while they were young, 
they will indeed miss out. Age itself is perceived to be an important 
criterion in mate selection. Many of the correspondences reveal a great 
deal of anxiety among those of the appropriate age who now find difficulty 
in searching for a suitable mate, and among the younger correspondents 
who anticipate a declining field of desirable mates as they get older. 
These fears are often induced by parents, kin and especially peers. The 
following examples of this type of pressure are taken from several differ­
ent letters. ’You are not very young, you should start looking for a 
mate1 (GRB, 16 October 1962). One twenty-year-old was advised by his 
workmates to look for his girlfrield right now. ’When you grow several 
years older, you will find it difficult to get one' (GRB, 11 September 
1962). One 26-year-old correspondent reported that he and his friends 
felt greatly pressured by folk saying such as 'a man cannot find his 
mate when he is old, and a woman is no longer wanted when she is old’
(GRB, 18 September. 1962). A similar folk saying that a ’woman past the 
age of 20 and men past the age of 25 need no longer think of finding 
suitable and.compatible mates’ was reported by one girl to be commonly 
cited in her factory (GRB, 18 September 1962). A 24-year-old technician 
with a number of skills and educational qualifications was constantly
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told that 'it will be too late to get married when one is a little older, 
nobody will be after you when you reach the age of 30...’ (GRB, 18 
September 1962). One set of parents advised their 21-year-old son,
'You must grasp the right moment for handling your marriage problem.
When you grow older, the young, beautiful and progressive girls will have 
boyfriends already so you will eventually be unable to find an ideal 
wife.' These words sounded very reasonable to the young steel worker 
and as a result he was very much worried that if he delayed his marriage 
he might not be able to find his ideal mate in the future (ZQ, 28 July
1964). These types of social pressure were commonly cited and some young 
correspondents reported that as a result of conflicting pressures they 
had become preoccupied with their mating problems. One young boy said he 
had become so bewildered and confused that he could neither study in the 
daytime or sleep well at night (ZQ, 28 July 1964).
The conflict between the demands of the new ideological model and 
the influence of peers, parents and kin is particularly acute among those 
who were originally influenced by the new ideological model to postpone 
their marriages until the problems of those older than themselves and 
who are looking for a mate caused them to question that decision. Where 
the correspondent's reference groups include such a category, their 
experience is likely to cause the correspondent much anxiety and he is 
tempted to reconsider his original decision to postpone his marriage.
Some of the letters merely .imply the influence of such a reference group. 
The older workmates of one twenty-year-old kept telling him that he 
should look for his mate now as it is much more difficult to look for a 
mate later (GRB, 11 September 1962). Another letter, however, states 
the problem particularly clearly. The correspondent says that after 
having read some of the educational articles in the papers he has learned
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that many advantages can be reined from late marriage but, as he goes 
on to say: j
’Yet in my mind there is still some worry and anxiety that '
I may not be able to get a wife when I grow old. Many
of my male comrades around the age of 30 have already 
built for themselves a certain foundation either with 
respect to work or study or economic power, and conditions 
really permit them to fall in love and get married. As a 
matter of fact, they do want to fall in love and get
married. However, girls do not wish to fall in love with
men at their age. Girls are unhappy when they are told 
that their boyfriends are men of around thirty. "Who 
would marry a man who has already lived half of his life?" 
they would say. Unable to find a wife, these men become 
pessimistic and disappointed, and regret they have wasted 
their youth. I am going to be 26 soon, and I still feel
it is a little bit too early to get married at that age.
I want to think of my marriage when I reach 30. Yet I
am worried that I may be like these comrades. What should 
I do? ’
(GRB, 11 September 1962)
Another correspondent expressed similar fears. He was nearly 26 and, 
though he thought it seemed a bit early to get married, he and a number 
of friends had lately all become vexed and worried.by the difficulties 
experienced by those who were older than themselves in finding a suit­
able mate. ’What shall I do,1 he says, ’if I fail to find my mate when
I grow older year after year? After pondering the matter, I am in
conflict with myself and do not know what to do’ (GRB, 18 September 1962).
The correspondence columns reveal that it is not so much the fear 
of remaining single that influences young people so much as finding an 
’ideal1 or ’suitable* mate or a ’good prospect’. They rarely elaborate 
in this context what they mean by ’ideal’ or ’suitable’, although the
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words young, beautiful and progressive feature regularly. (For^defini- 
tions of ’ideal’ and ’suitable’, see Chapter 7). There is some indica­
tion that the conflict between raising the age of marriage and age as 
a criterion of choice has brought the older and younger youths into 
competition for a common pool of girls. One correspondent, herself a
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school teacher, complained in the media that government cadres and members 
of the army constantly sought out girl students as objects of their 
attention and looked upon schools as the place for them to seek out 
mates. She thought that because they were older and therefore experienced 
more difficulty in finding a mate, they felt that they should court 
younger girls who would be less discerning or discriminating than the 
older more culturally advanced girls (ZQ, 16 November 1956). College 
students certainly felt that there was cause for anxiety if they had not 
found a mate among the many boys and girls at college, for it was thought 
to be much more difficult to find a suitable mate once they had been 
assigned to a work place (ZQ, 16 June 1963).
It seems that the anxiety invoked by the fears of finding a suitable 
mate were particularly characteristic of urban areas. In the cities the 
increasing practice of young people taking the initiative in negotiating 
their own free-choice marriage has meant that they themselves feel the 
responsibility of making the choice of a suitable marriage partner.
There is probably less anxiety displayed among the young people about 
finding an ideal mate in rural areas, as this choice is still very much 
the responsibility of the elders of the household who control the negotia­
tions for marriage. Moreover in urban areas, the gradual abolition of 
betrothal and its replacement by informal pre-marital courtship has left 
no system of spouse reservation that is given social recognition to allay 
the fears of young people that they will not find a good mate or, if 
they do find one, that they will not lose him or her unless they have 
that formal social recognition. Again this contrasts with social 
practices in rural areas where the custom of betrothal to which there was 
there was no legal age barrier continued to operate a system of reserva­
tions which is given social recognition. The custom of betrothal and the
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fact that marriage negotiations in the rural villages are likely to he 
concluded nearer the legal than the appropriage age, mean that they do 
not experience the longer period of anxiety expressed by urban corres­
pondents between the legal and actual ages of marriage.
Alternative strategies • '
In urban areas young people have sometimes mediated the conflicting 
demands of the new ideological model and the social pressures from peers 
and kin by modifying the new ideological model. A strategy commonly 
mooted was that of falling in love early but delaying marriage for a 
few years. This resolution was seen not only to allay the anxieties 
about finding a suitable mate, but if the courtship was handled well 
surely it would also fulfil the aims of the new ideological model to 
promote progress in work, study and political consciousness (GRB, 5 
October 1962). Several correspondents advocated 'falling in love early1. 
One did so in order that he might pick a loved one to his liking from a
great many eligible mates. 'This time of youth,' he said, 'was an
opportunity one must not miss. A very good opportunity that may not
come again and should be prized' (GRB, 5 October 1962). Another felt
that young pe'ople were caught in a dilemma of avoiding love early and 
not wasting their energy and the fear that they may not be able to find 
suitable mates when they were older. He concluded that the resolution of 
the dilemma depended on the way courtship was handled by the individuals 
concerned (GRB, 9 October 1962). The only disadvantage of this strategy 
was perceived to be the lack of guarantees in this informal arrangement, 
that is that one of the partners might change their minds in the inter­
vening period before marriage. A 26-year-old factory worker who wanted
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to postpone his marriage was pressured by his prospective spouse who 
feared that he would change his mind in the meantime,. If she didn’t 
make sure of him now she might miss out later (GRB, 5 October 1962).
A few urban correspondents rejected the new ideological model 
altogether. One young man who became very anxious as a result of social 
pressures in favour of early marriage got married at the age of 20 (ZQ,
28 July 1964). This solution was rationalised by another correspondent 
who thought that early marriage at least brought peace of mind early and 
since one is going to get married anyway, does it matter if it is early 
or late (GRB, 16 October 1962)? The close correlation of early marriage 
and early childbirth in the educational materials has led some to ask 
that if families are planned will this not alleviate many of the dis­
advantages of early marriage (ZQ, 1 June 1962; 7 July 1962)? One 
correspondent thought that individual solutions to the problem depended 
upon personal circumstances. ’It was probably all right,1 he said, ’for 
those who possessed skills and who were drawing higher wages to remain 
single until they were older, but it was impracticable for those without 
qualifications' (GRB, 18 September 1962). Others were more skeptical 
and suggested that the whole policy of late marriage was thought up by 
those who were already married and did not have to worry about getting a 
wife themselves. 'They just want to comfort us and make us bachelors 
happy’ (GRB, 11 September 1962). All the advantages linked to late 
marriage were said by another correspondent to ’simply give some consola­
tion to those of us who were still single' (GRB, 18 September 1962).
Despite such sentiments, there is sufficient impressionistic evidence 
to suggest that the age of marriage in rural and urban areas is probably 
increasing, and certainly the data obtained from Jiang village would 
support these impressions. The most important factor working in favour .
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of raising the age of marriage has been the introduction of the new 
ideological model. Most of the letters to the media illustrate that 
the correspondents were familiar with the advantages of late marriage and 
especially its implications for study and political progress as listed 
in the educational materials. Moreover the emphasis of the educational 
materials has been adapted to alleviate current fears and anxieties of 
young people such as the potential difficulties of finding a mate when 
older. The educational articles have begun to'stress that the more young 
people devote themselves to study and work, the more they themselves fall 
into the category of ’desirable1 or ’ideal' mates and that as more and 
more young people follow the recommendations of the new ideological model, 
the less will the fields of desirables narrow with age. One letter 
written in support of the new ideological model quoted a saying now 
common in Zhejiang province that just as ’there is a hole, for each snail 
so there is a mate for each person’ (GRB, 9 October 1962). The influence 
of the educational materials on young people is mainly implicit in their 
letters, although in one letter a correspondent explicitly states that 
at a time when he was wavering in his opinions the educational materials 
printed in the media were influential in determining his final decision 
(GRB, 18 September 1962).
In a few cases young people experienced unidirectional pressures 
in that the influence of parents and kin in favour of late marriage 
coincided with the demands of the new ideological model. The parents 
of a 20-year-old road maintenance worker who was courting persuaded him 
not to have a girlfriend too early for it would only divert him from his 
studies. They had said, ’What girl would love you if your work is poor 
and your thought backward?' After listening to them and giving the matter 
some consideration he felt that their advice was very reasonable and that
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they really cared for him (GRB, 11 September 1962). In another case it
I '
was the elder brother who attempted to persuade his younger brother to 
postpone his pending marriage and concentrate his efforts on study, 
although the younger brother did reject his advice in the end (GRB,
27 September 1962). Perhaps the negative examples of those around them 
were more influential than mere words of advice, for several of the 
correspondents quoted how they had been influenced by personal acquaint­
ances who had got married, borne children and become preoccupied and 
burdened with household matters to the detriment of their work and other 
interests (GRB, 11 September 1962; 9 October 1962). These cases though 
are far outweighed by the number in which parents, kin, neighbours and 
peers exert pressure in favour of early marriage.
The new policy of advocating late marriage .brought the new ideological 
model into competition with existing ideological and immediate conscious 
models held by social groups in China. This competition has brought about 
a number of conflicting pressures on young people and they have mediated 
the conflict by adopting a variety of strategies. In rural areas, where 
the older generation still controls the marriage negotiations, the pre­
dominance of one immediate conscious model has generally stabilised the 
age of marriage nearer the legal than the average appropriate ages. In 
urban areas a wider variety of conscious models has evolved as the result 
of the juxtaposition of the new ideological model with a number of
reference groups each with their own immediate conscious models. The
\
wide range in the actual ages of marriage has been responsible for the 
considerable degree of latitude surrounding the interpretation of the 
'appropriate1 age of marriage and the designation of a lower 'appropriate1 




CHOICE OF MARRIAGE PARTNER ' .
In. the anthropological study of complex societies, the criteria for 
the choice of mate and establishment of affinal alliances has been related 
to problems of stratification or socio-economic differentiation. Social 
scientists have created two poles of theoretical construction according 
to the degree of restrictions bounding the field of eligibles. They have 
distinguished between closed marriage systems which prescribe that spouses 
be chosen from one or more designated socio-economic categories of persons 
as in India, and open marriage systems in which the only group of persons 
unequivocally proscribed as marriage partners are those to whom the 
incest taboo is extended as in North America and Western Europe (Marshall, 
1968: 11). Theoretically open-marriage systems should be characterised 
by random mating in which each person has an equal opportunity to marry 
every other adult of the opposite sex. In fact, many studies by social 
scientists have illustrated that even though no explicit proscriptions 
exist, parents and peer groups are often instrumental in delimiting for 
each individual the field from which the spouse will be chosen. In North 
America, for example, despite the ideal of individualism and romantic 
love, marriage choice is structured by factors such as social class, 
ethnic origin, religion and education with a strong endogamous or prefer­
ential in-group trend characterising some status groups (Hollingshead, 
1950; Kerckhoff, 1963-4). The growing literature in the American field 
indicates a preponderance of homogamy. or assortative mating in which 
persons choose spouses of similar characteristics over heterogamy.
Wide disparities in the status of marriage partners are very infrequent. 
These studies also suggest that women rather than men are more objective
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in weighing the socio-economic characteristics of potential spouses.
Scott (1963: 512) and Goode (1970: 326) found that this was bec'ause
marriage was a more important determinant for the social position of
\
women than men in American society and therefore marriage became an 
avenue of mobility for them and preferably hypergamous. These restrictions 
operating in the open marriage systems of complex societies do not have 
the obligatory character of caste systems, but they are still effective 
and the ideology of stratification exists alongside that of individual 
equality and of romantic love. The role of marital choice in accentuating 
or confirming patterns of stratification have led anthropologists to 
hypothesise that to permit random mating would mean radical change in the 
existing social structure (Goode, 1959: 475). Goody thought that the most 
effective method of reducing divisions between a series of horizontally 
juxtaposed groups would be to introduce the principle of exogamy or at 
least preferential out-marriage (1971: 599). In China, reforms in the 
institution of marriage have been directly linked to strategies for 
reducing systems of stratification.
In the new ideological model of marriage, desirable or preferential 
mates were defined according to their state of political consciousness. 
Preferential mates were not only left socially undefined, but the new 
ideological model specifically rejected socio-economic dimensions of 
preference. The newly prescribed field of eligibles, bounded only by 
levels of political consciousness and the disregard for previous socio­
economic restrictions and divisions in society, was intended to establish 
a broad field of eligibles. As the new ideological model came into opera­
tion it was anticipated that social characteristics such as occupation, 
income and educational levels should cease to be influential. The 
government has worked to dissociate occupation and social status by
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arguing that since all jobs equally contribute to the construction of 
socialism, they should all have equal prestige and should not be ranked 
into ’grades1 on an occupational hierarchy chart. Plays such as 
’Choosing a Son-in-Law', based on a Hunan drama ballad, and first produced 
in 1953, specifically applied this principle to mate selection. In it 
a mother inadvertently .remarks to her daughter that she could never accept 
a tinker or one in such a menial trade as a son-in-law. ’I would never,' 
she says, 'marry my daughter to a tinker whose face is as black as 
charcoal.' With a great deal of word play and humour she comes around 
to appreciating the value of accepting just such a person as a son-in-law 
(WC, 1 February 1966).
Despite the new law and educational programmes designed to establish 
a broad field of eligibles and encourage random mating, a number of restric­
tions operate to limit both the field of eligibles and preferential mates. 
Although the principle of surname exogamy has now been formally abandoned, 
all the available evidence would suggest that it remains the common 
practice. In the 1950s William Geddes, in his brief anthropological 
study of Kaihsienkttng village, did not discover any actual cases of 
marriage between partners of the traditionally exogamous lineage or zu, 
even though it is now legally allowed. He thought that zu exogamy might 
still be regarded as proper, although no longer obligatory (Geddes, 1963: 
30). His impressions are supported by other materials. An article pub­
lished in Nanfang Ribao makes reference to the fact that parents are 
sometimes reluctant to give their consent to marriage between members 
of the same lineage (12 May 1962). In a more recent study in a village 
in Henan, the tradition of surname exogamy continued to reduce the number 
of eligible spouses in the proximity of the village in the 1970s (Chen,
1973). In Jiang village in Guangdong visited by the author, an informant
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suggested that now it was common for some young people in the commune to 
marry those of the same surname, although she also thought that'where
i
couples were of the same surname, it was still better to marry beyond
\
the five-generation limit.* A survey of all the households in the village 
itself showed that in fact only one of the 32 wives of the village had 
the same surname as their spouse.
The definition of eligible mates
The field of eligibles is bounded spatially by the probability of 
interaction between the spouses and their mutual networks and the norms 
of residential propinquity. Over the years numerous sociologists have 
studied residential propinquity and it is generally accepted that there 
is a demonstrable tendency for mate selection to show a negative spatial 
gradient as predicted b.y Bossard’s original hypothesis (see p. 132). In 
late traditional China, Skinner suggested that for the peasantry the 
endogamous unity may well have been the standard marketing community 
(1964: 36).
My own work in Guangdong would suggest that wives were normally
* After the promulgation of the Marriage Law there seems to have been 
very little reference to marriage between biao cousins in the source 
materials and any references seldom go beyond stating the law. There 
are one or two case studies in which young people come under parental 
pressure to marry a cousin (WC, 1 June 1953) or in which young people 
have chosen a cousin as a marriage partner (ZQ, 1 April 1955), but 
in each case further definition of the kin relation is left undefined.
The lack of material on this subject might reflect the fact that this 
custom is not viewed as a serious impediment to marriage in many 
areas, and where it is, customary rules are disregarded as in traditional 
times (?). Equally, the lack of material may reflect the fact that 
in the new ideological model a great deal more attention is given to 
the positive selection of mates.
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recruited from within, the commune and that the familiarity of this prac­
tice gave rise to propinquitous norms based on residence. Informants at 
the commune level suggested that most brides came from within the commune, 
although at the village level they suggested that they came from within 
the same production brigade. The survey data shows that the majority 
of wives were in fact recruited from within the commune.
Table 10: Source of wives: Jiang village
LOCALITY NUMBERS






Where wives were recruited from beyond the commune either both parties 
had kin, perhaps an aunt or older sister, who worked together and had 
introduced them, or mutual friends sometimes performed introductions.
Often the mutual friend of both spouses turned out to be the wife of the 
groom’s friend who had introduced girlfriends from the same locality as 
herself. On the whole there seemed to be a marked preference for local 
girls. One informant expressed this trend in normative terms when he 
suggested that it was 'better for young people to find spouses nearby 
because it would help mutual understanding between the couple’.
The data from the other communes visited in Guangdong reinforce the 
impression that most brides are recruited from within the commune, although 
in the larger villages with more than one surname, a few of the wives came
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from within the village and certainly more came from within the same 
production brigade than in Jiang village. In one commune the majority 
of the wives came from a neighbouring commune, but in fact their villages 
of origin were closer in distance than most of' the rest of the same 
commune. In urban Guangzhou, in each of the do.zen households interviewed, 
where wives had recently been recruited or were about to be recruited, 
brides had previously lived nearby. In the factory housing complex and 
the housing estate of the former boat people, the wives had come from 
within the same housing complex. To some extent propinquity of residence 
is an index, even if rough, of cultural similarities and social character- 
istics. It can be observed in China too as elsewhere that there is a 
coincidence of spatial and social distances, but the operation of both 
new and traditional norms defining the criteria on which 'choice' should 
be based point to the location of preferential mates within a field of 
eligibles already bounded by surname exogamy and residential propinquity.
The political status system
The location of preferential mates within the field of eligibles 
results from the operation of two separate and competing status systems, 
one political, and the other socio-economic. . Although the new ideological 
model introduced in 1949 conceived political status, zhengzhi diwei, as 
the level of political consciousness or 'political standpoint, ideological 
views, class sentiments and revolutionary ideals' exhibited by an indi­
vidual, in practical terms political status is defined by the degree of 
formal recognition or honours conferred upon an individual by the govern­
ment and Communist Party. On this basis it is possible to identify a 
gradient of approval and disapproval based upon the differential distribu­
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tion of political status. According to refugees interviewed in Hong 
Kong, those who were members of the Youth League, Party or who were 
honoured as labour heroes or 'five good workers'' of enterprises were held 
to embody thehighest degree of political status in the new society 
(White, G., 1974: 500). Of this, group, those who were members of the 
Youth League and Communist Party formed a clearly-bounded category of 
preferential mates. In the many letters and life-histories in which young 
people referred to the attractions and attitudes of their potential 
marriage partners, there were constant references to their political 
status measured in these terms. In the 1950s those who had a long history 
of participation in the revolution had accrued a certain romantic aura.
One young girl described her husband as enthusiastic, smart and capable, 
but what had really impressed her from the start was his personal history 
of revolutionary activity. 'More valuable than these personal qualities,' 
she said, 'was the fact that he had participated in the revolution since 
1939 and was a member of the Communist Party. It was these things which 
put a spell on me' (ZF, 1 November 1955). Another young girl said she 
just could not believe her luck when she met an attractive young man who 
'laboured well, worked well, was honest and was a Communist League member 
to boot!' (ZQ, 22 February 1962).
There is some evidence to suggest that there was some competition 
for spouses who had achieved positions of political power and acquired 
public awards. One young bachelor in his mid-twenties who was an official 
in village .government and a leader of the local militia was described as 
the 'object of purposeful attention from all the young unmarried women 
of the villages for 10 li* around1 (CR, May 1957). Another who had been
* A JJL is a measure of length reckoned to be approximately 1890 feet.
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elected a ’five good commune member’ many times over had attracted the 
attention of the local girls some of whom,had 'come forward of their own 
accord and offered to marry him' (ZQ, 22 February 1962). A survey of 
marriage patterns in the mid-1950s had suggested that the cases of girls 
marrying cadres in order to gain Party membership for themselves and win 
support of the leadership was unfortunately many (ZQ, 4 January 1955).
The competition for cadres, Party members and others similarly categorised 
seems to have aroused the resentment of those hot similarly endowed. A 
discussion ,of the problem of mate selection in Hunan province in 1957 
revealed that many young men were rather resentful of the way in which 
young women were attracted to cadres rather than to fellow peasants and 
labourers (NCNA, 2 July 1957). On another occasion they complained that 
their desire to maximise political status through marriage was so high 
as to cause membership of the Youth League or Party to be almost a pre­
requisite to a ’good match’. In Shaanxi Ribao it was reported that some 
young people who were 'disappointed in love' blamed the leadership for not 
promoting them or the Party and Youth League for not accepting them as 
members. They complained that without either attribute they were 'just 
nonentities', ’unable even to get someone to love them’ (8 March 1958).
The desire to maximise political status through marriage led to the odd 
case in which' spouses freely exaggerated their access to political author­
ity and influence; In extreme cases young men found it prudent to 
exaggerate their political .credentials. One case of 'marriage by fraud' 
was reported in 1957. A young man was accused of fabricating a personal 
history of colourful participation in the revolution and posing as a 
member of the Communist Party in order to win his girl, and in the court 
hearing which followed the discovery of the fraud, his wife admitted to
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having been attracted- to him because he seemed to be ’a hero of the 
revolution' (XR, 28 April 1957).
If political status, expressed in terms of individual political posi- 
tion or award or membership of political associations formed a clearly- 
bounded category of preferential mates at the positive pole of the gradient 
of approval and disapproval, those who were said to be of 'exploiting 
class origins’, boxiao jieji qushen, could be said to function negatively 
on the gradient. Below those rewarded individually and positively, 
political status seems to have been awarded collectively according to 
social origins and class status, chengfen. In 1949, or thereabouts, 
members of each household were categorised according to their class 
position either on the eve of land reform in rural areas or the public 
ownership of industry in urban areas. For instance, the rural population 
was divided into landlords, rich, middle, lower middle and poor peasants 
according to the amount of land they owned and worked with their own 
hands and the number of implements in their possession (see Hinton, 1966 
and Yang, C.K., 1959). Landlords, rich peasants, and urban capitalists, 
because they had hired labour to work their land or employed workers, 
were said to belong to the former 'exploiting classes'. Poor and lower 
middle peasants and urban workers were said to be of 'good' as opposed 
to 'bad' class origins. Initially in the 1950s certain rules had been 
imposed banning inter-marriage between the two groups during periods of 
heightened class conflict. In 1952, Nanfang Ribao stated that during 
land reform, marriage between those of peasants and landlord background 
could not be tolerated for it was not unknown for landlords to marry off 
their daughters to poor peasants to establish alliances to blur class 
lines and soften the conflict (13 February 1952). Many local Party and 
Youth League organisations had similar rules still in operation in the
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mid-1950s (ZQ, 24 May 1956; RMRB, 12 January 1957). These rules were 
later criticised in the media, and the central government issued educa­
tional materials stressing that levels of political consciousness were 
not supposed to be predetermined by class origins or ascriptive criteria 
and class origins were not to affect or influence marriage patterns.
Rather, individual levels of political consciousness should be the criteria 
for those of Exploiting* class origins just as for other social categories. 
One piece of advice stated clearly that there is a distinction to be made 
between members of the exploiting class and those born of the exploiting 
classes, and that young people, in considering whether they should fall 
in love and marry those of exploiting class origins, should appraise them 
according to their own behaviour and not their family background, jia ting 
chengfen. *As long as those young people wanted progress, were willing 
to participate in politics, committed to the goals of the new society, 
then it is all right to fall in love and marry them* (GRB, 6 May 1965).
Nevertheless the government did also warn against the influence of 
ideas and standards of the former exploiting classes which might be 
disseminated through friendships which crossed class boundaries (XG,
16 October 1955), and not a few advice columns suggested at least by 
implication that compatibility in marriage was often much more difficult 
to achieve with members of the former exploiting classes (ZF, 1 February 
1963). Like the young man.who expected his wife to be a dependent and 
passive asset, they were thought to have unconsciously and collectively 
inherited some of the old ideological models from their families (ZF, 1 
May 1964). This put the onus on the young people of exploiting class 
origin to constantly prove their revolutionary character or level of 
political consciousness. Despite the advice and education that it was 
wrong to collectively discriminate against those b o m  into families of
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the exploiting classes, there was a certain tension between collectively 
allocated class origins and individual levels of political consciousness
in determining the acceptability of the individual as a potential spouse.
\
An examination of the case studies in the media suggests that social 
origins had come to be associated with certain levels of political con­
sciousness and that this correlation disadvantaged those of exploiting 
class origin in the marriage market.
What those of 'good1 class origins feared was a reduction in their 
own political status as a result of association or a marriage alliance 
with those of exploiting class origins. Refugees interviewed in Hong 
Kong in 1970 all stated that family background or class origins had an 
important influence on determining a person's 'future' qiantu or chuxi 
and therefore their marriage prospects (White, 1974: 495). There were 
many letters written by the sons and daughters of those of the exploiting 
classes which expressed concern about the effect of their social origins 
on their political status and hence their relations or alliances with 
members of other social classes (NFRB, 8 March 1965; GRB, 7 April 1965;
ZQ, 16 October 1965). An observer living in Henan province in 1970 
described the patterns of association in one village between those of 
so-called 'good' and 'bad' class origins. When working in the fields, 
he observed there to be 'no difference between them and other young people 
they are with. They chat, Joke, laugh with everyone normally, but their 
friends naturally do not like to visit them at home.' He went on to 
describe how difficult it was for them to get married, although it was 
slightly easier for girls. The main reason, besides the fact that they 
were often better read and trained in housewifely skills, was the usual 
post-marital residential arrangements in which they went to live in their 
husband's household. The patrilocal nature of marriage meant that the
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problem was especially great for young men who could take their wives 
into households that were to some extent taboo, and girls of.poor and 
lower-middle peasant or even rich peasant families were reluctant to 
accept such aproposal (Chen, 1973: 104). He quoted one case in which 
class origins were the obvious cause or factor in rejecting a marriage 
proposal. The girl involved was calculated to be ideal in every other 
way, ’she was an able housewife and field worker and good looking as well,’ 
so that the negotiations soon centred around the question : ’Should a red- 
flag poor peasant get allied in,marriage with a former rich peasant 
family?’ The father of the boy decided that it was not only this parti­
cular match that had to be taken into account, but the future of the entire 
family’ (Chen, '1973:74Phi another case quoted in Zhongguo Funu where the 
parents decided to go ahead with an arranged marriage to the son of a 
rich peasant family, their daughter used the fact of his ’exploiting 
class origins’ to convince them otherwise (1 February 1966).
Where the young people themselves initiated the negotiations for 
marriage, class origins were also found to be a factor governing choice 
of mate. Two correspondents writing to Zhongguo Qingnian and Gongren 
Ribao in 1965 were specifically concerned with this problem and their 
letters reveal the conflicting influences at work. One letter was about 
the dilemma of a young man who was a member of the Communist Party. He 
was attracted by a girl who was a middle school graduate teaching in an 
elementary school and who was quite active politically. There was one 
obstacle to their marriage, she was from a rich peasant family. Accord­
ing to some of their friends this was a matter of real concern affecting 
his ’future', but according to others he need not be unduly concerned as 
long as her level of political consciousness was high. Influenced by the 
former attitudes, however, he wondered if he had committed an ’error’ in
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his association with her because it might affect his 'future prospects’.
His letter ended with the question, 'did love and marriage with youths 
from families of the exploiting classes entail loss of class stand or 
political status? 1 (ZQ, 1 May 1965). The other letter suggests that even 
where individuals exhibited high levels of political consciousness, this 
was not enough to cancel out the effects of their origins and raise their 
political status within their immediate reference groups. The fact that 
his girl was a member of the Youth League and had made considerable efforts 
to study politics did not soften the reaction of the boy's workmates when 
he informed them of his impending marriage. They told him that as a son 
of the family of the working classes, he would lose his class stand by 
marrying a girl born of the family of the exploiting classes. The young 
man said that as a result he was very confused about the association of 
social origins and political consciousness in determining political status 
and he was also very anxious that he should not lose his own class stand 
(GRB, 6 May 1965). Indeed,, it was the apparent association of exploiting 
class origins and low political status and its importance in choice of 
marriage partner which caused a young man to contract a hasty marriage 
before his social origins could be discovered (ZF, 1 February 1963), and 
a young high school teacher in Guangzhou born of the family of a former 
landlord to hide his social origins from his future spouse (Salaff, 1971: 
322). In each instance the subsequent discovery of deception was said to 
be a factor contributing tc> the later breakdown of the marriage.
If the association of levels of political consciousness with class 
origins was responsible for placing those of exploiting class origins 
at the negative end of the gradient, the association of high levels of 
political consciousness with ’good’ class origins placed workers, poor 
and lower middle peasants in the middle ranges of the political status
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gradient directly below those positively rewarded for their level of 
political consciousness. Although educational materials pointed out that 
those of 'good’ class origins did not automatically assume high levels of 
political consciousness, there had been a tendency for the constituents 
of the 'revolutionary vanguard' or 'real proletariat' to take their 
ideological probity for granted unless there was some specific reason 
for assuming its loss. Any hint of misdemeanour, reprimand or punishment 
from the political authorities, for instance, could have the effect of 
cancelling out 'good' class origins. In one village in Henan, for example, 
a girl of poor peasant origin was thought to be a suitable match in every 
way, but there was one obstacle to the conclusion of the negotiations of 
the proposed match. Her father had been brought before the People's Court 
in regard to some affair that might have involved punishment at the hands 
of the court. Although the case against him had been dropped, it was clear 
that an explanation was. thought to be due. In this case the matter had 
turned out well, but it was said at the time that had the matter not 
turned out well, and he had been jailed, this would certainly have 
affected the chances of his daughter in marriage (Chen, 1973: 81). Those 
of 'good' class origins had a definite advantage in the marriage market 
in that they began with a 'clean record', but to remain within the 
'preferred category' they had at least not to have a blemished political 
record.
Political status measured according to reward or by class origins is 
an important factor governing marriage choice, and under its considerable 
influence the traditional social status gradient has largely been 
reversed. The new ideological model based on political compatibility 
was influential to the extent that the traditional status groupings of 
landlord, rich peasant and the urban wealthy have been replaced by new
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status groups of government cadres and certain skilled urban workers as 
preferential spouses.
Figure 6 : Choice of Mate: Political Status Gradient
professions peasants ..
. h    -------------------
exploiting technicians factory
class origins workers
But an examination of the case studies suggests that socio-economic 
characteristics also remain important criteria in mate selection and in 
the definition of those categorised as preferential mates.
The social status system
The term social status refers to the distribution of social honour 
in Chinese society or the extent to which individuals or groups receive 
respect or esteem, zunzhong or zongbai. The distribution of social status 
is revealed in the attitudes and expectations of their immediate reference 
groups such as relations, neighbours, fellow-workers or friends which in 
turn reflect the immediate conscious models. It was mainly distributed 
according to occupation with its corollaries of level of education, income, 
life-styles and degree of mobility or 1 future'. Traditionally, marriage 
was seen to be an opportunity to maximise the resources of the household 
or kin group through the negotiation of a suitable alliance, and there 
is evidence to suggest that both families and the young people who them­





of social mobility. They sought a partner who in the eyes of the 
immediate reference group was considered to have 'future'. Some local 
sayings such as 'Ask not.if he is a member of the Party, ask not if he 
is a member of the Youth League, but ask only if he has money' (HZX, 15 
December 1956) or 'First, look to see over the house, second look over 
the person, third look to see if he can earn one hundred per cent' (Lu 
Yang, 1964: 13) were said to indicate priorities in mate selection. In 
letters and life-histories, young people explicitly considered the occu­
pation, the income, the likely standard of living and the extent of the 
family burden of future spouses (e.g. ZF, 16 April 1959; 1 May 1959).
A lengthy correspondence conducted in the pages of Zhongguo Funu in 1963-4 
on the subject of mate selection indicated that the prospects for a 'good 
livelihood' after marriage were an important dimension in assessing the 
suitability of a spouse. As one correspondent said, she hoped to choose 
a man who had high pay, a high position and who was young and smart (ZF,
1 September 1964). Another congratulated herself on finding a good 
husband. His salary was not low and he had no heavy family burden making 
for a good livelihood (ZF, 1 September 1963). Others in aspiring for a 
settled and comfortable life gave priority to men who had a high position 
and earned much income (ZF, 1 September 1963).
Those with skills and high wages included specialist occupations in
factories or the government bureaucracy, and professional jobs such as 
engineers, professors and doctors, technicians, scientists and jobs of 
skilled industrial work which were rated highly in terms of remuneration 
and welfare benefits. Within the rural social field, a range of wealth 
is displayed according to local environmental factors which contribute to 
variations in the wealth of local areas and the ratio of wage earners to
wage dependants which affects the resources of individual households.
199
In two case studies, parents were reluctant for thier daughters to marry 
into mountainous areas because of the lack of facilities such a! uneven 
roads, less fertile land and unreliable sources of good food (P’s C, 16 
November 1957; ZF, 1 February 1966). In order to maximise opportunities 
for a favourable marriage alliance the accumulation of household status 
symbols were reported to characterise the period of negotiation. In the 
village of Upper Felicity in Henan the purchase of a transistor radio, 
sewing machine, cycle or clock was said to be a sure sign that a family 
was embarking on marriage negotiations (Chen, 1973: 80-1).
Figure 7: Choice of Mate: Social Status Gradient
unskilled skilled
factory workers factory workers
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An examination of the case studies suggests that there are two 
competing status systems in operation. At times government policies have 
contributed to the importance of each status system relative to the other* 
and there has been some vertical jockeying for positions on each gradient, 
but the location of points of congruence or concurrence on both gradients 
defines the field of preferred as opposed to eligible candidates. The
* For instance at certain periods there has been more attention and 
recognition given to groups of high political status or greater 'red1 
qualities. At-other times it is the technicians or the 'experts' 
with formal educational qualifications who have been rewarded.
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preferential mate was one who combined both socio-economic and political 
status and it was this combination which characterised most immediate 
conscious models. As one girl in the midst of choosing a mate and faced 
by a constant discrepancy in political and social status was heard to 
utter: ’Wouldn't it be wonderful if I could find a suitor whose thought 
was good and who earns more money' (ZF, 1 September 1964). Another girl 
described how she had always thought that she would like to choose a husband 
who had a high salary, a high position and who was young and smart. She
fell in love with a 'deputy chief of a section at her place of work
who was also a Communist Party member and rated as an 'activist' in study.
She had some criticisms of him, but on the whole she concluded that 'it
would be nice to have a husband like him... I felt that he would be a 
good husband in which I could take pride in the presence of other people!'
Her neighbours and friends also advised her 'to stick with him' (ZF, 1 
September 1964).
This concept of the ideal mate who maximises both political and social 
status resources had by the 1960s been incorporated into the new ideo­
logical model and modified its original form. The combination of both 
resources as attributes of the ideal mate was proffered as the ideological 
model of behaviour in one booklet of advice in marriage and family matters.
In answer to the question, what kind of marriage partner is most satis­
factory in prospect, it replied that political compatibility is of course 
the most important criterion. That is, political standing, ideological 
views, class sentiments and revolutionary ideals were listed as the first 
criteria in choosing a mate, but then .followed economic situation, 
cultural level, appearance, suitability in age, taste, demeanour and 
compatibility in temperament which were all to be taken into consideration 
albeit as se.condary characteristics; 'In love and in looking for a partner,'
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it said, ’considering the other's profession, whether he works well, 
how much his income is, the spaciousness of his home, and whether he is 
good looking - these cannot be considered wrong. The mistake lines in 
only considering these secondary issues...’ (Lu Yang, 1964: 12-17).
Preferred categories of spouses
There Were several social categories who were most likely to meet 
these joint criteria and several reports in newspapers have identified 
or located fields of preferential mates. One report said that women 
workers in the cities preferred to marry technicians, army officers and 
factory managers rather than workers, and that in rural areas women 
preferred to marry factory workers (RMRB, 23 August 1956). Another 
described a situation in which young women in rural areas seek mates 
among army men, factory workers and cadres rather than peasants (ZQ, 1 
November 1956). Another referred to the preference of young girls in the 
rural areas for factory workers and cadres in the cities (KMRB, 14 January 
1957). In a survey of views expressed in a correspondence in Hunan 
province, a paper concluded that the young people in the rural areas seek 
mates who were cadres working for the government or factory workers (NCNA,
1 July 1957). In the correspondence columns of the 1960s the preferred 
category of spouses were again those that combined political and social 
status or government cadres and skilled industrial workers, that is those 
ranked high on both status gradients. In these case studies it is normally 
difficult to ascertain the balance of political and socio-economic criteria 
in determining the choice of marriage partner, but the cases and comment­
aries uniformly suggest that there are clearly defined status groups and 
that marriage is still viewed as an avenue of social mobility and 
especially among young women (e.g. GRB, 8 March 1958).
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A folk saying was said to reflect the calculated socio-economic 
interests of women: 'In the case of a man, one part of ability is one 
part of happiness. In the ease of a woman, one part of looks is one part 
of happiness.1 (Lu Yang, 1964; 14). That is in looking for a prospective 
mate, a woman looks primarily at a man's ability or earning power and a 
man looks at a woman's appearance. It was suggested in the educational 
materials that the concern of women with marriage choice was a remnant of 
the old tradition of economic and social dependence of women on the 
prospects of their marriage which was summed up in the constantly heard 
refrain 'Marry a man, marry a man, clothes to wear and food to eat'.
This was said to have no basis once women entered social production and 
were economically independent, and it is certainly evident that the new 
ideological model had influenced them to the extent that few women continued 
to feel comfortable in the presence of those whose only attribute was their 
wealth. The operation of a number of restrictions on marriage choice and 
the presence of clearly defined status groups according to political or 
socio-economic criteria suggest that there was not only a certain amount 
of hypergamy, but also a certain degree of homogamy or marriage within 
status groups.
One means by which status groups may enhance their distinctiveness 
is the encouragement of endogamy or in-group marriage. One of the most 
clearly bounded of status groups was that at the apex of political status 
or those who were members of political organisations, and it would not be 
surprising to find that this group tried to maintain their social distance 
by placing restrictions upon those marrying out. There is no doubt that 
the Communist Party and especially the Youth League provided unique opport­
unities for regular social interaction among young people of similar 
political status in the urban and especially the rural areas. In the
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rural areas it was the young political activists, the Youth League members,
Party members, members of the local drama, troupes and those rewarded by
\
the political authorities such as ’good commune members' who had occasion
\
to attend meetings, conferences and festivals outside the village and who 
had the opportunity to meet and become attracted to a partner of their own 
choice. These opportunities laid the foundations for a certain amount of 
organisational endogamy and there is some evidence that this trend was 
reinforced by placing restrictions upon those marrying out. These rules 
operated in local organisations to actively encourage those at the apex of 
political status to monopolise and minimise the outwards and downward flow 
of political status. For instance, two government organs in one locality 
laid down the following stipulations:
(1) Prior approval of the organisation must be obtained before 
courting a woman and before betrothal and marriage.
(2) Marriage to a woman comrade who is neither a Party or Youth 
League member is prohibited.
(3) Marriage to a woman revolutionary cadre who comes from a landlord 
or rich peasant family is prohibited (ZQ, 24 May 1956).
An article published in a national newspaper the following year 
suggested that such rules which had a purpose during the intense class 
struggles' of land reform and socialisation were still widespread. The 
newspaper article went on to reprimand all. Party and Youth League organisa­
tions who continued to operate such restrictions and rules on the grounds 
that where people were encouraged to marry within their own organisation 
that group is on its way to becoming a new class (RMRB, 12 January 1957). 
Although these restrictions were directly counter to the principles of the 
new ideological model, there was not only some endogamy among those parti­
cularly advantaged, but also the very categorisation of certain groups as
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the disadvantaged caused some exploiting class endogamy. At the same 
time though, there was also some attempt by them to improve their political 
status through establishing marriage alliances with cadres (ZF, 1 November 
1955; Meijer, 1971: 136). It is difficult to document the degree of 
homogamy and hypergamy which has continued to characterise contemporary 
Chinese marriage patterns. The degree of stratification and the continu­
ing reactions towards heterogamy and their adoption as models of emulation 
certainly suggests a preponderance of homogamy•and assortive mating over 
heterogamy. In the absence of detailed data on homogamy it is possible, 
however, to examine the patterns of heterogamy and identify the sanctions 
favouring homogamy or marriage within status groups and those that work 
against homogamy and favour heterogamy or marriage between status groups.
Heterogamous marriage
Heterogamous marriages usually involve wide disparities between the 
political and social status of marriage partners. The maximisation of 
both political and socio-economic status was more difficult to achieve 
for those at each end. of the spectrum on each of the gradients of status.
The absence of one was normally not enough to compensate for the other, 
and the further apart their location on each of the continuums, the more 
difficult they were to combine. For instance, if those with maximum 
political status were low-salaried or if those who had high salaries had 
no political status, then tension or conflict often resulted. The most 
common social categories involved in heterogamous marriages were technical 
personnel, who usually ranked lower in political status than in social 
status, or peasants who ranked higher on the gradient of political status 
than in social status. An examination of the tension and conflict generated
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by heterogamous marriages explicitly reveals the norms and expectations 
which surround the choice of a marriage partner.
In this context two correspondences in 1957-8 and 1963-4 featured in 
Zhongguo Funu and each lasting several months, provide very interesting 
case materials. The first was occasioned by a letter from a typist who 
had fallen in love with a chauffeur, but was thrown into a state of great 
conflict and anxiety as a result of the criticisms of her sister and her 
peers that they were not well-matched. According to the editors, after 
the publication of this letter,.more than a thousand replies from readers 
were received and over 700 writers were in favour of her marrying the 
driver (ZF, 14 November 1959). Among the letters selected for publication 
were a number of case histories which consisted of matches between a 
college-educated wife and a grade-school-educated soldier, a technician, and a - 
worker, an elementary school teacher and an automobile driver, a high 
salaried (16th grade) wife and low (21st grade) salaried husband (ZF, 14 
January 1960). In all cases the women had enjoyed a much higher social 
position than the husband and in each case she went through considerable 
mental conflict resulting from criticisms of colleagues and close 
relatives. The college-educated wife of the soldier husband withstood 
the negative reactions of her sister and schoolmates to the difference in 
their educational and occupational status, and with the support of the 
Party and Youth League she married the soldier (ZF, 14 December 1959).
This was in contrast to the bank official who, after listening to the 
criticisms and warnings of her friends and family, broke off her relation­
ship with a book-keeper and married a college student instead (ZF, 4 
December 1959).
In 1963-4 the Zhongguo Funu again invited correspondence on the 
subject of 'What to look for in Choosing a Spouse1 and many readers spoke
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of the opposition they had come up against in choosing a marriage partner 
of a lower social status than themselves. One woman, a doctor,|described
the reaction to her fiancd who had a minor position in a government organ.
\
She described him as one who was loyal to the revolutionary cause, but 
whose position and wages were low. Her sister fiercely opposed her 
marriage, and tried to caution her with the words, ’You are young, clever 
and have professional skills. You needn't worry about finding an ideal 
husband. What a foolish thing to marry such a man! His income is low 
and he isn’t skilled in any field. What happiness will there be if you 
marry him?' She urged her to be through with him right away and her 
sister’s husband made a point of introducing his friends to her, and gave 
her photographs of several colleagues, all assistant-professors at his 
university, and tempted her with their conditions of work and economic 
situations. She recalled how he wanted her to choose one from among them 
and assured her that any future demand with regard to livelihood she would 
care to raise would be met (ZF, 1 July 1964).
One girl described in detail her unhappy dilemma. Her boyfriend was 
of good class origins, progressive in thought, hard working and simple in 
life-style* He had all the characteristics she could want, but for the 
fact that his job was ordinary and his wages low. Simultaneously she met 
a technician who earned a high salary although he was not very 'progressive 
in thought’. Influenced by the new ideological model she rejected the 
technician on the grounds that ’to rest love on the foundation of money 
was undesirable’. Her family and neighbours were dismayed by her choice. 
Some advised her, 'You still do not face reality even when you are not 
well off'. Still' others called her a ’fool’ by saying ’You simply ask 
for it’. She described how reactions like these began to shake her resolve. 
She began to think they were right. ’While it is not right just to seek
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enjoyment in life in choosing a husband,* she thought, 'is it not so that 
the problem of livelihood remains a problem of livelihood? After all, 
reality is reality and after getting married one will still have to 
organise family life.1 She continued to struggle with her mixed thoughts: 
on the one hand it was not good to link marriage with money, on the other 
hand she wanted to have a secure financial foundation (ZF, 1 September 1964).
i
Some girls withstood the pressures and criticisms of their peers and kin 
and others gave in and chose again. One girl, a doctor, reported how she 
wished to marry a grade 3 factory worker, but on advertising their marriage 
plans her friends and parents immediately warned her against marrying this 
worker, who they said 'was only a class three worker' and who 'was not well 
off'. .She chose to go ahead and marry him (ZQ, 16 September 1963). Another 
girl, dissatisfied with the low rank and small salary of a Party member 
who was progressive politically and ideologically gave him up once she 
had the good fortune to be introduced to a cadre who also had a high 
grade and a high salary (ZF, 1 August 1964).
These cases all involve some mediation of the discrepancies between 
social and political status, but perhaps the cases which illustrated the 
maximum discrepancies between political and social status occurred in 
heterogamous marriages in which one partner was a peasant residing in the 
countryside. .Although poor and lower middle, peasants enjoyed a measure 
of political status, it could in no way make up for their position of low 
social status. In the ranking of occupations, peasants were placed on 
the lowest rung. Social mobility was viewed as an urban phenomenon and 
it was often said that life in the countryside had 'no future’, peasants 
had low salaries and their cultural level was usually lower than those of 
other occupations. So that for a peasant girl an offer of marriage in 
the city was often cause for congratulations and smacked of hypergamy.
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Moreover it has increasingly furnished one of the few opportunities for 
migration to the cities. In one case study, when a village girl was 
pressed by a young man to come to the city to be married, her mother was 
said to be extremely happy, and the women in the neighbourhood were heard 
to say, THurry up and go with him. Enjoy yourself. Such a good son-in- 
law can't be found anywhere even if you look with a lantern' (Lu Yang,
0«.p;W- •Alii ( fcL, ,
1964: 12) In contrast, several reports in the media mentioned the. 
reluctance of village girls to stay in the countryside and their yearnings 
for the trappings of city life. One report cites two current sayings 
which illustrate this trend: 'I shall marry a man whose hair is groomed, 
who wears leather shoes, and carries a watch; I shall not marry one 
whose head is clean shaven, who handles a hoe and works with a pick', 
and 1 my prospective husband is to be either a worker, a cadre or a 
schoolmaster, I'd rather die than marry one who works on a farm' (HZX,
15 December 1956).
In a correspondence on the.subject in the Hunan newspapers some girls 
wrote that, despite official moves to elevate the political and social 
status of peasants, they had their reasons for not wanting to marry them. 
'Farming,' they said, 'meant labour, hard living, no future and peasants 
had no "education11.1 One girl left no room for doubt as to her opinions. 
'Farming,' she concluded, 'was dark and dirty and without a future.' (NONA, 
2 July 1957). Others expressed their opposition to such a fate less 
directly. One girl wrote to Zhongguo Qingnian in 1962 describing the 
predicament in which she found herself owing to the fact that her boyfriend 
was returning to his village to participate in agricultural production.
He proposed that they both return together and make arrangements for their 
wedding, but she was afraid that both her father and elder brother would 
oppose the match because of the distance between the two villages. 'If I
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go with ray boyfriend,’ she writes, ’will it not amount to ingratitude to 
my parents and to my elder brother and sister-in-law who have brought me 
up? But if I break off relations with my boyfriend for this reason, will 
others not say I am imbued with bourgeois ideas and look down upon peasants.1 
She went on to describe how she felt very miserable and troubled in the 
face of such a quandary. The reply rather astutely asked her if it could 
be that she was seizing on her parents' and elder brother’s reluctance to 
see her get married in a faraway place as an excluse for rejecting a 
future in rural areas (ZQ, 17 July 1962).
Marriage of an urban girl to a peasant brought the maximum dis­
approbation. The parents of a senior middle school graduate, who was 
attracted to a teacher at an agricultural middle school and who was 
prepared to settle down in the countryside for life, were strongly opposed 
to their daughter's marriage plans. They said to their daughter time and 
again that there was no ’prospect* for her if she got married and went to 
live in the countryside. ’Since you have over ten years of schooling,1 
they said, 'how can you marry a teacher of an agricultural middle school 
resident in the countryside?’ To show the measure of their disapproval, 
they insisted that if she was to proceed with these arrangements she must 
return to them approximately Y3000 to defray the expenses of her upbringing. 
At the same time they embarked on a search for a suitable husband for her 
in the city (ZQ, 27 November 1962). Another girl correspondent was 
friendly with a peasant who had graduated from senior middle school and 
was ’progressive’ in thought. But when the relationship became known to 
her mother, she was very surprised, saying, 'What are you looking for in 
a peasant? If you don't listen to your parents’ words, you will suffer 
very soon. Don’t ever try to marry him.’ Her mother asked their 
neighbours and daughters to support her and to tell the girl that since
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she was a middle school student, she could, with her favourable conditions, 
'find a good prospect in a high position and make her mother satisfied’.
’If you are in love with that poor fellow, you won't do credit to your 
relatives.’ The girl fought back with the idea that one who labours 
well, comes from a poor family and did his work well was to be admired 
in the new society (ZF, 1 May 1964). A young couple already married 
feared very much for the future of their relationship when the girl was 
recruited to Teachers' Training College in the city. There she was teased 
about the status discrepancies in their match and she began to have doubts 
about her marriage until her branch of the Youth League began to maximise 
her husband's political status by emphasising the contribution of the 
peasantry to the history of the revolution and the value of their labour 
to present-day society, thus causing her to think again (ZQ, 16 September
1963). In all these cases it was the girl who was to live in the country­
side and who was thought to be marrying or to have married beneath her 
status.
Residential propinquity has served to circumscribe the number of 
marriage alliances crossing the rural-urban social fields, but the low 
social status and obstacles to inter-marriage with peasants has been 
brought into sharp relief by the recurrent government policy to encourage 
young urban school graduates to migrate from the cities to the countryside 
and settle permanently. Since 1957 there has been a policy to encourage 
educated Chinese youths or urban school graduates and others to migrate 
arid settle in the countryside and work on the communes or on State Farms 
in the countryside or in isolated border regions. These educated youths 
are collectively referred to as xiaxiang youth (Gardner, 1971; White, G.,
1974). The term derives from the name of the movement to send youth 'up 
the mountains and down to the countryside', shangshan xiaxiang. It is
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difficult to obtain exact figures, but it was estimated in 1971 that 
their number lay between 50 and 60 millions (Wang Hsueh-wen, 1971: 90) .
It is an attempt'to effect large-scale permanent migration for educated 
youth,* and they are expected to ’strike roots’ in the rural areas. As 
a sign of their intention or determination to settle in the rural villages 
for life, each xiaxiang youth is encouraged to establish a family and 
settle down permanently, anjia luohu. There is evidence to suggest that 
it is the problem of marriage which is one of the obstacles to their 
integration into peasant society and the cause of much dissatisfaction 
and disaffection among young people, a few of whom have found their way 
to Hong Kong (Lelyweld, 1974; RMRB, 30 January 1971). Not only did they 
fear that marriage in the countryside would ’root them there permanently’, 
but the new migration patterns brought young urban-educated youth into 
close association with the peasants. Examples of their intermarriage 
have been given publicity over the years and their study again reveals the 
discrepancy in the political and social status of the peasants.
One case of intermarriage was written up in the newspapers in 1957, 
the first year of large-scale migration of this type. A young girl 
student became friendly with a boy from a poor peasant family who was a 
Youth League member and enjoyed a certain measure of popularity in the 
village. But before she made up her mind to marry him she agonised over 
whether or not her schoolmates would laugh at her and whether it might not 
be better therefore to find a cadre or a worker who ’were more suitable
* This movement is not to be confused with the xiafang movement or system 
■ of downward transfer which required■that all the personnel of government 
and party, armed services, enterprises and industries, students as well 
as teachers, spend at least one month a year at a lower or basic level 
of their respective units or in rural villages where they participate 
in manual labour.
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matches for middle school graduates’. She eventually decided to go ahead 
and marry him and the wedding was much applauded for bridging traditional 
social class barriers and a reversal of the trend of village girls to 
move to the city on marriage. It was said at the time that village girls 
should cease to look down on peasants and follow the new trend initiated 
by this marriage. Another girl student in the same village was already 
said to have followed her example and fallen for the Secretary of the 
Youth League Branch (GRB, 29 December 1957). In one case recorded an 
educated youth who was already married was sent to the countryside to 
do pig-raising work. As a result his marriage was put at risk. His 
removal to the countryside and his new occupation was much to the chagrin 
of his. mother-in-law, who vented her displeasure on the young man. ’I 
intended that my daughter should marry a great man. But now she has 
married a pig-raiser. What a disgrace!’ Under her influence the girl 
soon began to feel that her life would indeed be intolerable if she had 
to stay in the countryside with a ’filthy and tired pig-raiser* for a 
husband (ZQ, 16 September 1963).
Two decades later in 1974 a similar case was cited in which a xiaxiang 
girl teacher of the commune middle school was married to a peasant boy.
This marriage aroused similar conflicting reactions. It was hailed by 
some as a revolutionary act ’taking the road of integration with peasants 
and workers’, but it was also ridiculed by others who thought that a 
university student should marry another university student and not a
peasant in the countryside.(SWB, 14 February 1974). This was also the
\
experience of another teacher who found that the idea that ’it is ridiculous 
for a Peking-born college graduate to marry a peasant’ was a common reaction 
to her plans for marriage. Her father was among those who voiced dis­
approval. ’Marrying a peasant and living in the countryside all your life,
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what future will you have?’ A fellow teacher called it a 'scandal*. The 
girl concerned thought that these comments showed that people still thought 
college graduates- should only marry workers and cadres. She wondered if 
the reason was that peasants were still associated with the idea of 
'dirty* manual labour (SWB, 14 February 1974).,
Most of the cases cited in the media concern xiaxiang girls and 
peasant husbands. It seems to be so, from a number of cases, that educated
girls did find it easier to make inter-class marriages and were themselves
considered to be an asset to a peasant family. In one of the above 
examples one peasant boy’s mother reacted by telling others in high 
spirits that she 'never dreamed her son could find a middle school student* 
(GRB, 29 December 1937). It is noticeable, too, that in the case studies 
the girls chose,future husbands who maximised both political and social 
status. They chose peasants high in political status who were members 
of the Youth League or Party and renowned for their physical labour. In 
rural terms they had as much 'future* as could be expected, and certainly 
this was so in comparison to the xiaxiang boys. It was much more difficult 
for an inexperienced xiaxiang boy to earn as much as a peasant boy long 
experienced in agriculture (White 1974: 504). Also, custom often demanded 
marriage expenditure which the xiaxiang boy could not afford, and he was 
much disadvantaged in his ability to provide for his wife compared to a 
peasant boy and his household. In comparison some peasant boys often 
seemed to combine the maximum political and social status within the 
the village, but they were carefully chosen. As one xiaxiang girl said 
on the occasion of her friend's wedding to a peasant boy, 'I'm positive 
about looking for a peasant boy,' but she also went on to say that 'it
might take longer to find a suitable one' (ORB, 29 December 1957).
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The data presented and many similar cases strongly supports'" the
■ . . . . . " V
proposition that both political and social status influence choice of
\
marriage partner. In both urban and rural social fields the preferential 
mate as displayed in the expectations of immediate reference groups was 
someone who combined both socio-economic and political status and it was 
this combination which characterised immediate conscious models. Where 
there were discrepancies in the status systems, tension and conflict 
often resulted and the most likely status groups to be involved can be 
located diagrammatically.
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The tension and conflict generated by heterogamy reveals that in 
nearly every case the marriage negotiations were initiated by the younger 
generation and that each status system has a basis of support. The political 
status system is supported by the Party, the Youth League and other organ­
isations, and time and again young persons planning to defy the norms of 
homogamy find support in these organisations to withstand the pressures
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from their immediate reference groups of friends, relatives and neighbours. 
Certainly before the Cultural Revolution, the norms of homogamy pre­
dominated over heterogamy, but the principle of homogamy and the import­
ance of the socio-economic status system in choice of marriage partner 
was criticised during the Cultural Revolution.. • The adaptation of the 
new ideological model in favour of a syncretic model incorporating both 
political and socio-economic status came under attack. At the same time 
there were criticisms of the new stratificatiori,patterns based on the 
political status assumed by Party, political cadres, the Youth League 
members, the presumed association of social origin and political conscious­
ness, and the new differentials in wealth and educational opportunities 
which .had emerged since 1949. If and how these criticisms have influenced 
choice of marriage partners has yet to be determined.
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CHAPTER 8
THE CEREMONIAL OF MARRIAGE
The new ideological model substituted the elaborate series of presta­
tions and ceremonial forms, jiehun yishi, by a simple registration ceremony 
at which the marriage obtained the legal recognition of the political 
authority or the state. There was no provision for further ceremony or 
ritual in the 1950 Marriage Law, and whether or not a marriage ceremony was 
held after registration was an option rather left open in the educational 
materials. Once the marriage certificate was issued, it obtained the 
legal recognition of the state and the partners were considered legitimately 
husband and wife, and any further ceremonial, or the celebration of marriage 
in either its traditional elaborate or simplified forms, did not further 
legitimise the marriage in the eyes of the political authority. At the 
same time it was also recognised that because it had been customary to 
perform some kind of ceremony in the past, there may still be some 
necessity to allow for formalised social recognition in addition to the 
new political recognition (Lu Yang, 1964: 35). The variation in immediate 
conscious models that can be identified all combine some form of social 
as well as political recognition.
The form that the political recognition takes, or the registration 
of marriage, is standardised throughout China, and in all the immediate 
conscious models it is the preliminary to some form of ceremonial inviting 
social recognition of the new partnership. It is this latter form of 
recognition which is often referred to as the marriage itself. In one 
case recorded in 1963, a young couple on completing their registration 
on the afternoon of Chinese New Year's Eve and obtaining their marriage 
certificates, returned at once to one another's home to tell their parents 
that they'planned to get marrie_d the following day' (my emphasis) (ZF,
2X7
1 June 1963). The form which the social recognition took ranged from 
the simplified ceremony in which the couple proclaim themselves to be
husband and wife in the presence of their friends and kin at an evening
\
tea party to a more elaborate form which retains many of the traditional 
customs. The form which social recognition takes in the immediate 
conscious models combines in varying proportions a mixture of old and 
new customs. The most commonly retained customs include the use of the 
bridal sedan chair, the transfer of the dowry, the ritual integration of 
the bride into the husband's family and the marriage feast.
The bridal sedan chair
A significant feature of the traditional ceremonial was the use of 
the bridal sedan chair customarily hired by the groom's parents to trans­
port the bride to his home. Only an inferior form of marriage contracted 
to avoid the expenses of bringing up a daughter or the cost of a marriage 
ceremony was associated with its absence, and the practice of sending the 
bridal sedan chair seems to have been one of the more tenacious of the 
procedures which characterised the traditional marriage ceremonial. In 
rural areas and as late as 1974 its use was reported in the media (SWB,
21 March 1974). In the case studies the use of the sedan chair was a 
common cause of conflict both between the generations and
between the parties to the negotiations and their kin. 
Those'who supported the custom based their claims on the fact that it 
was a sign or symbol of a right and proper marriage and it invited public 
recognition that the ceremonial was being properly conducted, mingmei 
zhengzhu. In this respect its absence was to be interpreted as a cause 
for loss of status or 'face', timian. The mother of a son who refused to
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be married with the sedan chair followed by a parade of the dowry was
I '
very angry that the bride did not even 'have the decency to arrive
i
properly1. She said that she was aware of the advantage of the hew ways 
and all the arguments against the continuation of this old practice, but 
nevertheless 'what sort of day was it when they had lost face on this 
greatest of days in one's life' (P's C, 16 June 1949).
Fifteen years later, in the mid-1960s, young couples still came 
under considerable pressure from their parents to duly celebrate their 
marriage. In one case, the parents stated that 'as we had a bumper 
harvest this year we should make the wedding presentable and gi.ve the 
daughter away in the right manner, so that everybody involved can take 
pride-in the event'. The 'right manner' included the use of the sedan 
chair and in their argument with the younger generation, the parents had 
much local support. 'People get married only once in a lifetime, it is 
natural that she should sit in the sedan chair!' The young couple were 
aware that it was an old custom not encouraged by the new ideological 
model, but listening to local opinion they became perplexed and uncertain 
what to do. Under their influence the prospective bride began to feel 
that if she didn't sit in the sedan chair, people could cite an old saying 
that without the sedan chair 'goods delivered were just not presentable'. 
Indeed, it took some convincing to persuade her otherwise (ZQ, 30 January 
1964). The two commonly cited reasons for its continuing use seem to 
centre around the desire to distinguish the occasion from all others by 
giving it due importance and to avoid arousing gossip and talk. As one 
mother said to her daughter, 'getting married.is something that happens 
once in a lifetime. It should not be taken lightly. You had better take 
a sedan chair' (ZQ, 16 January 1966). When a prospective groom suggested 
to his bride that they arrange an' alternative form of transport to the
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sedan chair, she responded, ’when other people get married, the bride 
either sits in a sedan chair or rides a horse and if X walk to your door, 
people will talk' (ZQ, 19 November 1964).
In the past the use of the.bridal sedan chair symbolised the control 
of the marriage negotiations by the older generation. It played a signifi- 
cant part in the rites of separation by expressing the resistance of the 
bride to leaving her own home, and it also highlighted the fact that she 
had been carried to her husband's home at the behest of his parents 
(Yang, M., 1945: 113). There is some evidence to suggest that the latter 
symbol of the sedan chair was responsible for its continued use in the 
1960s. Young people, and especially brides, colluded in its persistence 
precisely because it absolved them from a certain amount of responsibility 
should tension and conflict result from their introduction into the new 
household. In the past there is evidence to suggest that at the same time 
as the daughter-in-law was establishing a relationship with her new 
husband and obtaining a foothold within the household, the mother-in-law 
was making concerted efforts to maintain the special relationship with 
her son which she had worked so hard to establish as a means of manipulat­
ing control of the affairs of the household and as a guarantee to her 
security in her old age (Wolf, M . , 1972: 35-6). On occasions of complaint 
or conflict the daughter-in-law could always claim that she had been 
brought to their door by the sedan chair.
That brides were still wary of losing this defence was illustrated 
by the following case study, in which the groom persuaded his bride to 
dispense with the chair on the grounds that they were getting married of 
their own free will. Their marriage had not been arranged by their parents 
and therefore she need not now have this defence for 'women had straightened 
their backs and both mother and daughter-in-law were now masters of their
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house1 (ZQ, 19 November 1964). In the same year an educational booklet 
suggested that one of the reasons why. the sedan chair was still used 
could be due to the-fact that its abolition gave any mother-in-law the 
excuse to adminish ’You came to this house on your own two feet’, meaning 
that she had of her own free will walked into that household (Lu Yang, 
1964: 34). There is no doubt that where the sedan chair has persisted, 
it has been in rural areas where marriages are more likely to have been 
initiated by the older generation and where patrilocal marriage was the 
norm. Where the sedan chair was dispensed with, and there are no cases 
cited of its use in urban areas, the bride either walked to the bride­
groom’s house accompanied by her friends or by the groom himself. Where 
registration was made on the same day, the parties to the marriage often 
met at the registration office and then walked from the place of registra­
tion to their future home for further celebrations.
The dowry
In traditional times the sedan chair was usually accompanied by a 
procession of porters carrying the items which made up the dowry. The 
goods which accompany the bride to her new home are not necessarily now 
referred to as dowry, jiazhuang, but simply as gifts or presents made by 
the families and friends of the bride and groom. In rural areas, however, 
these gifts retain certain characteristics which identify them in effect 
as the traditional dowry. They are normally provided by the kin of the 
bride on the grounds that its absence would draw adverse attention to the 
bride's household and they provide the foundations for the conjugal fund. 
There are several cases referred to in the media throughout the past 
twenty-five years. In the 1950s one girl's father intended to sell some
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of his stores of rice in order to furnish his daughter with a dowry. He 
calculated that he would buy her four suits-of clothes, two of serge and 
two of calico,.some pieces of furniture, some pots and bowls, mirrors, 
face powder, soap cases and the like. When his daughter questioned his 
intentions, he defended the custom saying that ’since you were old enough 
to work, you’ve done a great deal for the family. I as your father must 
be seen to do you justice’ (P's C, 16 June 1949). In another case in the 
mid-1960s, the bride’s family set about to sell the fat pigs raised by the 
family. It was forecast that tbey would probably fetch 70 to 80 yuan each, 
which was to be used to buy their daughter a dowry consisting of a dressing 
table and trunks, wardrobe and some cosmetics for their daughter. When 
the daughter remonstrated she was informed that this was a matter of prime 
importance in her life. ’How can your wedding be conducted in the manner 
you have in mind? If we don’t spend some money and provide you with some 
form of dowry, will not other people laugh at us?’ (ZQ, 16 January 1966).
In cases citing the persistence of the practice, the overwhelming argument 
cited.in its defence was the contribution to the status and social standing 
of the bride's family.
Guangdong Province, 1977
In rural areas in Guangdong province in 1977, , in every family which I 
interviewed the bride and groom had been provided with gifts by their 
parents, and brothers and sisters. These gifts were always composed of 
the furnishings for their rooms set aside for the use of the conjugal 
couple. They included a bed, bed clothes, a wardrobe, chest, often a 
desk and chair and a clock, other substantial items such as a bicycle, 
sewing machine or a fan and personal articles of clothing. The amount
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which the bride’s family contributed to the new fund varied substantially 
between the rural counties of Guangdong and the rural suburbs of Guangzhou. 
In one county 40 km away from Guangzhou, the groom's parents said that 
they had contributed 900 to 1000 yuan to both the furnishings and the 
celebrations in comparison to the bride's family whose expenses ranged 
from 150 to 300 yuan. Two of the groom's- families there specifically 
stated that they would or had spent less on their daughters at the time 
of marriage because they had needed or would need all their funds to pay 
for their sons' marriages. In other suburban communes nearer to Guangzhou, 
the expenses incurred by both families were more evenly matched and ranged 
from 300 to 400 yuan for each family. The bride's family provided much 
of the movable property and the groom's family contributed to the latter 
and provided for the banquet and celebrations occasioned by the wedding 
itself. In one case for example the bride contributed a bicycle, and 
much of the furniture, while the groom's family had bought the bed, some 
other furniture and the banquet. In another case, the groom's family had 
contributed the wardrobe, bed and the banquet while the bride's family had 
contributed a bicycle, a chest and a desk and chairs. Many of the more 
substantial items such as a bicycle, sewing machine and fan were not in 
the couple's room but were placed in the sitting room for the common use 
of the kin of-the groom. They were normally- identified as the young 
couple's property and would be taken by them in the event of the division 
of the household.
In every family visited by the author where there had been a marriage 
within the last five years or so, the furnishings of the room which the 
young couple inhabited were a great source of pride. They were without 
doubt the most elaborately furnished rooms of the household and served as 
a constant reminder of the total amounts afforded by the kin of the bride
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and the groom at the time of the marriage. Each family could quite 
precisely remember how much was spent.and .the details of the contributions 
made by each family.- For the kin of the bride there may have been some 
conflict between the funds that were lost to them, and the desire not to 
lose status, and where there was competition for son's and daughter's 
marriages, the daughter was seen to have less claim on the familial funds. 
Normally however the marriages were spaced sufficiently to allow accumula­
tion for the marriage expenses of each member of the family. In several 
the ability to accumulate in order.to meet marriage expenses at all was 
a privilege once only enjoyed by a few and now gifts were provided for 
all brides and grooms. One widow with two daughters in their early 
twenties was saving for the marriages of both her daughters although 
neither of them had any plans for marriage in the near future. In urban 
areas the room of the conjugal couple was equally a source of pride, but 
this reflected on the resourcefulness and thrift of the young couple rather 
than on the contributions afforded by their families. Normally the young 
couple had saved up for their marriages themselves and used their individual 
savings to provide for the furnishings. In one family the bride and groom 
had used their individual savings to buy clothes and in another they had 
bought a sewing machine, a bed, a cupboard and bed coverings. In addition 
each couple had received small gifts in kind and in cash from their kin, 
friends and fellow-workers. In urban areas the amount used to cover these 
expenses and the celebrations themselves ranged from about 300 to 600 yuan.
Compared to other customs such as the practice of the betrothal gift, 
the bridal sedan or wedding feasts, the continued transfer of gifts with 
all the connotations of the traditional dowry seems to have given less 
cause for concern on the part of the political authorities. In the new 
ideological model there is no mention of the dowry, and in the educational
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materials tlie marriages of role models are marked by its absence or it 
is presented as an outmoded custom which is offered by the pareAts of
the bride but rejected by the bride herself. But interestingly praise
\!
has been bestowed on families who retain the form of the dowry, but 
invest it with a new political and revolutionary significance. In one 
case a girl was praised for rejecting the dowry offered by her parents. 
Instead she had claimed that if she were to take a dowry at all it should 
be composed of revolutionary ideas and farm tools (ZQ, 16 January 1966). 
Another girl described in the media how she walked unescorted to her 
husband's home and took with her 'four volumes of the Selected Works of 
Mao-Tse-tung, two bamboo baskets, a spade and a pick’ (RMRB, 24 January 
1972). The parents of one bride were praised for their adoption of the new 
ways and were selected for emulation. They had pondered for quite a long 
time on the question of a dowry for their daughter and after due consult­
ation they finally came up with the idea of giving her their farm tools, 
a hoe, a sickle, a pick and a rake, as a kind of dowry for their daughter. 
The tools were awards which they had won and they hoped that the constant 
sight and use of tools engraved with the words ’award1, 'increase produc­
tion and practise economy' and 'practise industry and thrift in house­
keeping1 would remind their daughter and son-in-law of the hopes and 
expectations of the older generation (ZQ, 24 April 1962). In all these 
cases the new content of the dowry has been praised for emulation, which 
'is in great contrast to the adverse comment which the reduced form of the 
betrothal gift to a 'warm pleasantry' had aroused. It may be that, in 
comparison with the betrothal gifts which is the first in a series of 
prestations, it is viewed as a counter-prestation and by concentrating 
efforts in breaking the cycle at its point of initiation, the dowry will 
automatically disappear with the abolition of the betrothal gift. On the
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whole though it seems that it has been invested and is still invested 
with less meaning than the betrothal gift. . It can’t be construed as 
payment for the bride as. can the betrothal gift, it expresses and accrues 
status for the wife-givers and it is instrumental in providing the 
necessary furnishings for the room set aside for the parties and the 
basis of their conjugal fund.
The celebration of marriage
The celebrations inviting social recognition of the marriage of the 
bride and groom were marked by ceremonials which varied from those which 
were .simple and in accord with the new ideological model to those more 
elaborate which involved a selection of rituals inherited from the tradi­
tional ideological model. The new and simple ceremonials emphasised the 
role of the bride and groom as individuals in a new partnership of equals 
which was in marked contrast to the traditional ceremonials at which 
supernatural sanctions had been imported to stabilise the union and inte­
grate the bride into her rightful place in the groom's descent group and 
immediate household. Many of the immediate conscious models, and especi­
ally in the cities, followed closely the suggestions advocated by the new 
ideological model. In the new ceremonials described in the media, the 
young people normally stand side by side in the rqom of the bridegroom’s 
house or a room in the factory which has been specially decorated for the 
occasion with auspicious symbols including the characters for ’happiness' 
and ’long life’, congratulatory scrolls and couplets presented by friends 
and relatives, and numerous flowers. Red, the traditional lucky colour 
worn at weddings, seems to still predominate in the decorations. In a 
place of honour hangs the portrait of Mao Tse-tung in front of which the
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couple either proclaimed themselves man and wife (WC, June 1953) or in 
some cases they were described as bowing to. the portrait three times 
(ZQ, 19 November 1964). The bowing is reminis cent’of bowing to the 
ancestors or the gods of Heaven and Earth, but now the portrait of Mao 
Tse-tung, much like that of Sun Yat-sen before 1949, symbolised political 
rather than religious recognition. It was said to symbolise the commitment 
of the couple beyond their immediate households and kin groups, to the 
local and national communities. The new ceremony is symbolic of the 
fact that now marriage should represent inter-personal relations between 
an individual man and woman as much part of the community and new society 
as members of kin groups. At a ceremony described to me by an informant 
in Guangzhou in 1977, the individual bride and groom made short speeches 
to each other in front of the assembled guests of kin, friends and fellow- 
workers. In these they pledged to give mutual support to each other in 
the spheres of production, livelihood, study and within the household.
By these means the ceremony encouraged the individuals to take part and 
invested the conjugal role with more significance than the relation of 
the couple to their kin and especially to the bridegroom's parents. Many 
of the immediate conscious models, however, though they might approximate 
the new forms, also retained some allusions to traditional supernatural 
sanctions and marriage as a symbol of inter-group relations.
The general secularisation of the ceremonial outlined in the new 
ideological model has reduced the sacred character of the ritual, although 
a number of supernatural sanctions have continued to stabilise the union 
and guarantee good fortune. Traditionally the day of the celebration of 
marriage had been selected by a ritual specialist for its auspicious 
qualities, huangdao jiri. Days which were generally recognised to be 
specially auspicious included the third, sixth and ninth days of a ten-
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day cycle or the second, fifth and eighth days. There is evidence to 
suggest that this custom is still practised in the 1960s and 1970s. When 
the Chairwoman of a-rural women’s association in Shandong province visited 
one commune to discuss woman work, she was only there for two hours before 
four young couples had come in for marriage registration. The commune 
secretary told her that by the Chinese calendar it was the second day 
of the second month or the double two, and it was often chosen as a day 
for marriabe (CR, July 1962). The first step in one woman’s preparations 
for her twenty-year-old son’s wedding in 1965 was the consultation of a 
geomancer about the choice of an auspicious date for conducting the wedding. 
The geomancer specified the sixth day of the ninth moon (lunar calendar) 
as a ’lucky day’ (NFRB, 25 January 1965). The only case study found so 
far in which there is a conscious rejection of this custom was recorded 
in 1972 when a leader of the local Youth League intentionally chose the 
seventh day of the first month of the lunar year because it was a day not 
traditionally designated to be auspicious (RMRB, 24 January 1972). In 
rural Guangdong the 'lucky' season for marriages was reported to be around 
Chinese New Year and Spring Festival. The selection of the marriage date 
traditionally symbolised the beginning of the preparations for the 
marriage ceremony itself.
Seldom do the young couple now marry in the presence of the gods or 
are they introduced to the .ancestors at the altar. At the behest of the 
gods they used to be symbolically knitted together with invisible red and 
green threads which were believed to bind them together for life. The 
couple had traditionally been introduced to the ancestors at the altar in 
order to stress their role in the continuation of the line of descent, 
and-the constant references to fertility reflected the main injunction 
that it was the purpose of their union to provide descendants. According
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to the new ideological model, such injunctions were considered to be no 
longer relevant in contemporary China where marriage was to be by self- 
determinatioxx and stable through choice. In the case studies it is a rare 
young couple who either worship heaven or earth, the gods or the ancestors 
or who even come under parental pressure to do so. There are one or two 
occasions recorded in the case studies. In 1964 a young couple were 
described as ’walking to the altar in spanking new outfits’, but lack of 
detail forbids elaboration on what kind of altar (BMRB, 28 June 1964). In 
one case study a couple described how they had come under pressure to 
kowtow to the gods of Heaven and Earth (ZQ, 30 January 1964) , and another 
young couple in describing their ’modern new-style wedding’ explicitly 
stated that we ’did not worship our ancestors and the Gods of Heaven and 
Earth1, which may suggest that they wished to differentiate their marriage 
either from that of traditional times or others of their acquaintance 
(NFRB, 18 January 1965), There are no references to the multiple symbols 
of fertility which punctuated the old-style ceremony, although given the 
value placed on the birth of children, it would be surprising if there 
were not informal good wishes and references to the birth of future children 
at some time during the celebrations. Traditionally .this first part of 
the rights of integration, or the introduction of the couple to the 
ancestors to stress their role in the continuation of the descent group, 
would be followed by the second part of these rites designed to establish 
the relation of the couple to the living. This had traditionally 
emphasised the couple’s subordixxate place in the hierarchy of family 
relationships. They had bowed to each person superior in the family, and 
the bride often served ,tea to her husband’s parents to initiate her into 
her future role of servitude. Only one case study makes reference to the 
continuation of these rites. One couple ’paid respects to their elders
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by bowing three times to each in turn* (ZQ, 19 November 1964).
The old-style ceremony had often been accompanied by a certain 
amount of ribaldry arid teasing of the bride,* an ordeal through which, 
now unveiled, she was supposed to remain quite still and serene. The new 
ceremony was usually accompanied by many speeches, much story telling and 
good-humoured conversation. Apparently many of the stories, true or pur­
porting to be true, related to the history of the particular couple or the 
storyteller and was meant to amuse and/or instruct. In nearly all the 
accounts of new-style weddings a local cadre or leader made a speech 
listing the advantages of free-choice marriage and of a joyful and frugal 
wedding. At many, the young couples themselves were asked to describe 
how they met or of any amusing episode in the history of their attachment. 
At one new style wedding, the guests reportedly chanted, ’Let the bride 
tell us how she found her man and how she was wooed’ (P's C, 16 June 1949), 
and one young man reported that the guests had asked him to tell them the 
story of his 'falling in love with his bride' (ZF, 1 October 1963). If 
there was a history of romance, this aspect of the festivities could take 
the form of much teasing and jesting of the couple, and sometimes it was 
said they were asked to perform physical feats and give evidence of their 
affection for each other. One guest at a wedding held in 1965 thought 
this latter aspect reminiscent of the old custom of 'teasing the bride'.
He described how the guests teased the bride and groom by asking them to
* Freedman has noted that during the 'teasing of the bride' two rules of 
propriety may be broken: the rule that seniors must not behave inform­
ally with juniors, and the rule that bars the expression of sexuality 
in the house. Senior men and women might come into the room to fling 
idle remarks at the young couple. Old and young might make pointed 
remarks on the bride's appearance. Bawdy rhymes were often recited 
and the couple were required on the pain of forfeits to perform 
ridiculous manouevres and repeat tongue-twisters (1967: 20).
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cross together a wooden planlc laid across two chairs and to share the 
same piece of candy and so on. He thought the whole scene was ^essentially 
a revival of the former practice of ’teasing the bride1 and referred to 
this new-style wedding as trying to fill new bottles with old wine (NFRB,
25 January 1965).
The marriage feast
Perhaps the most tenacious of the old customs was the association of 
weddings with a feast or banquet, bai jiuxi, put on by the groom’s family 
for kin, friends and neighbours. In the new ideological model the ceremony 
was to be followed instead by a tea party for the guests which provided 
them with light refreshments in the form of tea, candies, cakes and 
pastries. This was to be the new form which invited social recognition, 
yet was both simple and frugal. It marked and differentiated the occasion 
for kin yet was less exclusive in its guest list. Compared to the 
traditional marriage feast or banquet, which provided the opportunity to 
reinforce ties of kinship solidarity by demanding their presence in a 
body and the exchange of gifts, the guest list of the informal tea party 
is less exclusively kin, and friends and neighbours of both the bride and 
groom call to partake of refreshments and offer their best wishes. The 
new tea party was not to be associated with traditional kin obligations 
or the exchange of gifts. It was less of a financial drain on the 
resources of the household and the collective productive unit. In one 
case a simple tea party was cited as costing Y2.80 (ZQ, 19 November 1964) 
and another as Y7 (RMRB, 28 June 1964). In one village, there had been 
36 funerals and 25 weddings held between mid-August 1963 and June 1964, 
and it was estimated that the brigade had saved over 5,000 catties of
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food grain* and more than Y7,000 and 1,000 men and animal working days 
by observing these.occasions in the new and frugal style (RMRB, 28 June
1964).
In the case studies an evening tea party had become a common means 
of inviting social recognition from kin, neighbours and friends and it has 
come to characterise the immediate conscious models in many areas of China
, •, t
and especially in the urban social field. One family which I interviewed 
in Guangzhou had combined both the simple form for friends and fellow-' 
workers and a more elaborate banquet for kin. In the morning they had 
met with their friends and fellow-workers in their newly decorated rooms 
and after the meeting they had provided light refreshments for them.
Later in the evening, they had held a dinner for close kin of the families, 
which included the members of the groom’s, household, his elder brother and 
sister-in-law and the bride’s brothers and sisters (her parents were dead) 
and the dinner had cost quite a considerable amount of money. In this 
way they had combined the demands of both models and appropriated the new, 
but not quite discarded the old forms.
While the large feast may have disappeared as an integral part of 
the social recognition and celebration of marriage in the urban areas, the 
provision of the large marriage feast in some rural areas has proved to 
be one of the. more tenacious of the traditional marriage customs. It still 
characterises the immediate conscious models, although in a reduced form 
in rural areas of China. In one village, inhabitants were heard to ask, 
’What does a wedding look like if a feast is not held?’ (Nanfang Ribao, 18 
January 1965). In 1965 one villager estimated that holding a feast of 
20 to 30 tables was the custom, and a feast of 8 to 10 tables which could 
cost Y200-300 was the minimum number to maintain the reputation of the 
household and ’prevent others laughing1 (NERB, 18 January 1965). There
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were constant complaints in the media that the cost of these feasts not 
only exhausted the savings of individual households, but siphoned off the 
individual surplus into consumption rather than.into re-investment in„ 
production (RMRB, 26 June 1964). Certainly, ways of meeting these large 
expenses would have to be planned in the private sector over a period of 
time. I found families in Guangdong to be saving for marriage expenses 
even though no marriages were planned or anticipated in the immediate 
future. In due course livestock would have to be raised and food prepared 
for the occasion. The media has cited evidence that some families still 
went into debt by borrowing from kin and friends in order to meet the 
expenses, and as a result some families were left in financial difficult­
ies which affected the whole household (RMRB, 28 June 1964; ZQ, 19 
November 1964). But despite the cost of the feast many families continued 
to invite their kin and friends and neighbours to partake of a feast or 
dinner.
In Guangdong in 1977 nearly every family I spoke to mentioned the 
expense of the wedding feast or banquet. One family said that they had 
answered the call of the government to spend little and be frugal, so 
they had held a feast composed of only three tables for close relatives 
which had cost about Y200I For all the grooms* families interviewed a 
substantial proportion of the average Y400 they had spent on the marriage 
had been apportioned to the provision of the feast for relatives and 
friends of both the bride and the groom. Sometimes the kin of the groom 
s-eem to have continued to compose the majority of the guests; in tradi­
tional times the marriage was almost always celebrated at the groom’s 
household to which the kin of the bride were not invited. The anthropologist 
William Geddes analysed the guest lists of two weddings held in 
Kaihsienkung in the mid-1950s. At one wedding there were eleven guests,
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two relatives and nine friends of the groom were gathered together, but 
no relatives of the bride were present, although maternal lcin o'f the
V
groom’s mother were present. At the other, twenty-persons were present
\
at the wedding. Ten were friends of the bridegroom, six were relatives
of his including maternal relatives, and four were friends of the bride,
all of whom came from her village. In both cases the relatives of the 
groom formed the predominant category of kin, but there were outnumbered
by the numbers of friends (Geddes, 1963: 30). In Guangdong in 1977,
families spoke of the attendance of a mixture of close relatives of the 
bride and groom and friends of the young couple. The inclusion of the 
kin of the bride and .friends of the young people themselves indicates a 
readjustment in affinal relationships and those characteristic of young 
peer groups.
The marriage feast was one of a series of reciprocal and ceremonial 
obligations between kin and friends. Traditionally, attendance at a feast 
carried certain obligations for kin. Each guest was expected to offer a 
gift the amount of which was normally determined by the proximity of kin 
or friend (Geddes, 1963: 25). For the groom’s family the proffered gifts 
were expected to partly, or in exceptional cases wholly, offset the costs 
of the feast and for the kin it was a matter of honour to offer the gifts 
as 'tokens of human feelings'. A popular saying illustrated that even if 
a relative has no money he has an obligation to go into debt or even sell 
the cooking pot to meet this obligation: 'Expression of human feelings is 
as urgent as repaying a loan and the cooking pot has to be carried on the 
head to be sold' (ZQ, 19 November 1964). Villagers often proved to be 
reluctant to break the circle of ceremonial obligations. In one particular 
case study published in 1964, the groom described the procedures that the 
arrangement of his impending marriage had set in motion. Relatives and
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friends began to call on the family to learn of the wedding date in 
order that they might prepare the wedding presents. All of them were 
certain that they were-to attend a wedding feast, and in anticipation, 
some of them borrowed money while others withdrew a portion of their 
savings from the credit co-operative. One cousin who was short of money 
borrowed 45 yuan from the credit co-operative and another relative sold 
his suckling pig for Y18 to be used for 'gift packets'. Although the 
prospective groom told them repeatedly that no1 dinner party would be 
given, they just would not believe his word, for according to old customs 
and practices a large dinner would always be given on the occasion of a 
marriage and relatives and friends of the family were required to offer 
their gifts (ZQ, 19 November 1964). Another case was reported in the 
same year in which the cadres and workers of a commune factory, on hearing 
that a fellow-worker was to give a wedding feast, went to choose gifts to 
take with them. Some chose bottles of wine, chickens and other kinds of 
food, and others presented red gift-packets of money or lishi. Talking 
about the custom later, many of the workers in the factory defended it 
on the grounds that 'when a kinsman or friend gets married, it would be 
impolite and people will talk if we do not give any presents and do not 
attend a feast' (RMRB, 20 November 1972). It has been suggested that the 
receiving of .presents was a factor encouraging wedding feasts and there 
are a few references in the early 1960s to cases where hosts in positions 
of authority actually made a profit (Chen and Ridley, 1969: 109).
Above all, though, the persistence of the feast was due to its 
traditional function as a status symbol in the local community and its 
appropriation by the socially mobile to advertise their new status.
There is no doubt that for many peasants, the feast has provided an 
opportunity to display newly-found subsistence, surplus and security
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gained since 1949. The parents of one groom planned to make their son’s 
wedding impressive and planned a considerable fanfare. They, said, ’We 
lived in a straw'hut by the river when we were young. Conditions now have 
improved. As •the eldest of our three sons is getting married, we have to 
make the wedding impressive and in the appropriate style of a household 
having achieved self-sufficiency’ (ZQ, 24 April 1962). As the single 
most important occasion alongside funerals, the elder villagers have 
displayed a remarkable capacity to remember the details of every banquet 
within a generation. The following case study suggests that a reputation 
dented by the absence of celebration might not be righted before the 
marriages of the next generation. One young groom, who was determined 
to conduct his wedding frugally, found his parents more adamant than 
most in their insistence that they must give a big feast of 25 tables to 
entertain their relatives and friends. They had already planned for the 
occasion and raised two head of fat pig and twenty to thirty chickens and 
ducks to ’conduct a presentable and well-attended wedding for their son’.
His father said to him that ’there is only one marriage in a man’s life­
time and it is therefore worthwhile to be wasteful just for once, and 
that he should know!’ When he himself had come to the village to be married, 
he had given a small wedding party due to lack of money. Local gossip in 
the village described him as ’miserly’, lacking in generosity and he was 
accused of having ’brought disrepute to the family’. The gossip was not 
quietened until he had borrowed 35 pieces of silver from the landlord for 
another small dinner of several tables. Now he felt the family was living 
well with their own supplies of food, pigs, chickens, ducks, and had 
practically everything they wanted and could afford'to give a large feast.
But even without their present prosperity he thought they would have had 
to borrow to give a big wedding banquet for they could ’no longer stand
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the ridicule of other people that our family is miserly and not generous f 
(ZQ, 19 November 1964). ^
\
Elaborate feasts had long been associated with households in 
positions of authority in the village such as those of landlords or 
government officials, and some of those in new positions of authority in 
the village thought that they likewise should appropriate the old symbols 
of status. The feast had long provided an opportunity for the rich and 
powerful to differentiate themselves from the rest of the community. As 
one of the most important ritual occasions for indulging in conspicuous 
consumption, a marriage had provided a unique occasion to advertise 
wealth and status. The Lienchang documents for the early 1960s suggest 
that in Lienchang and at a time of general food shortage the problem of 
extravagant feasting was more likely to be found among the cadres than 
among the other villagers. One case was cited where a brigade leader had 
arranged a thirty-four-tabled feast when his daughter was married and 
another was reported to have held an eighteen-tabled feast (Chen and 
Ridley, 1969: 107, 192). There have been several other cases where 
cadres have been criticised in the media for ’investing in pomp and 
holding grand feasts’ in order to attract the esteem of others (e.g. NFRB, 
18 January 1965, 25 January 1965).
In nearly every case recorded, those who still followed the old 
customs were aware of the contents of the new ideological model and often 
of its economic advantages, For example, after attendance at a simple 
evening tea party to celebrate with the bride and groom, one participant 
commented that ’little is spent and that much (pleasure) is got in 
return, this surely is a good way of celebrating a marriage’ (RMRB, 28 
June 1964). But despite the consciousness of the economic advantages 
and the meanings of the relations they symbolised, some of the old customs
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remained influential in determining the immediate conscious models and 
especially in rural areas. Where they survived and where social recogni­
tion continued to be invited in elaborate forms, they were often the
i
\
occasion of conflict between the generations and between the personal or 
informal and political or formal social fields.
The negotiations of marriage
At each stage in the procedures of the negotiation of marriage 
there has been a close correlation between the form which the negotiations 
take and the procedures characterising pre-marital rituals, choice of 
marriage partner, age of marriage and ritual and ceremonial forms. So 
that where parents monopolise the negotiations there is more likely to 
be a betrothal, a lower age of marriage, a homogaraous or hypergamous 
marriage and elaborate ceremonial forms. Likewise, where the young people 
themselves monopolise the negotiations of marriage, there is more likely 
to be a period of courtship, a higher age of marriage, there is a possi­
bility of heterogamy and simple ceremonial forms. Between these two 
poles, the new immediate conscious models derive from patterns of social 
behaviour evolved in the last two decades to mediate the competition 
between -the old and new ideological models. In evaluating the weight 
given to the old and new ideological models in the syncretic immediate 
forms, the main dividing, line on the continuums drawn up in Figure 9 coin­
cides with the point at which the parties take over the initiation of the 
negotiations. All the available evidence points to the fact that this 
point tends to roughly coincide with the division into rural and urban 
social fields and the support or dominance of the informal and formal 
social field.
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Figure 9: Patterns in the Negotiation of Marriages the People’s
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Insofar as people deliberately seek to influence the behaviour of 
others through directing the flow of women within society, we can speak 
of the politics of marriage. The deliberate circulation of women in 
particular directions by groups acting to their advantage has long been 
familiar to historians (Thrupp, 1948; Habbakulc, 1955) and anthropologists 
(Cohen, A., 1970). Anthropologists have located the study of marriage 
patterns within the distribution and maintenance of power between individ­
uals and groups of various compositions at national, lineage and village 
levels. In the absence of certain types of data it has not been possible 
in this study to ascertain the exact patterns of marriage and distribution
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of power between individuals, kin groups and political parties at a 
national, local or even village level, but it has been possible to identify 
two arenas of competition for control of the marriage patterns. The 
younger generation has competed with the older generation for the control 
of the negotiation of marriage, and primary or kin groups have competed 
with political associations for the control of marriage patterns. The 
greater weighting given to the traditional ideological model in the 
syncretic immediate conscious models in the rural social field required 
both the coot-v,v^ r->e^  of the parents and the parties in the maintenance of 
traditional patterns of controls. The greater weighting given to the 
new ideological model in the urban social field required that the younger 
generation take control of the negotiations. In the implicit or explicit 
bargaining process between the younger and older generations the sanctions 
at the disposal of each will determine the form which the immediate 
conscious models take.
The next two chapters of the thesis seek to examine two related 
questions: What factors encourage the older generation, especially in
the rural areas, to keep the initiative in marriage negotiations and 
withhold their consent should they lose this initiative, and secondly 
why should young people, especially in the rural areas, allow their 
parents the right to initiate their marriage negotiations, or if they 
acquire this initiative feel parental consent to be necessary to the con­
clusion of the marriage negotiations? In answer to these questions it can 
be argued that there are very real structural reasons why the old ideo­
logical model should persist and dominate the immediate conscious models 
in rural areas. Primarily these have to do with the structure and 
function of the household or domestic group and the nature of primary 
groups in rural areas. This thesis.puts forward two hypotheses. For the
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first, a qualitative examination of the data suggests that the degree
of parental participation, or the continuing influence of the old ideo-
/ . . . . .  1
logical model, in the negotiation of marriage, is directly correlated
I .
j to the sti'ucture and function of the household. In the second hypothesis, 
’ the degree of parental participation, or influence of the old ideological
model, in the negotiation of marriage varies directly with the degree to
/
J  which households are encapsulated by overlapping primary groups or
influenced by the informal field over the formal field. The potential
or real opposition between successive generations for the control of 
marriage negotiations operates firstly within the internal structure 




MARRIAGE AND THE DOMESTIC GROUP '
This chapter sets out to assess the degree to which the household 
contributes to the maintenance of the traditional ideological model in 
rural areas, the extent to which the current concept acts as part of the
r i
ideology and becomes itself an instrument of dominance and control over 
the younger generation through the relations of dependence established 
within its boundaries. In strengthening the marital bond as opposed to 
all other kin bonds, the new ideological model attempts to redefine 
marriage to form an institution symbolising the relations between two 
individuals or equal partners and not that between two households or kin
l - W j a i / * - /
groups. ^Marriage is not simply defined as the 'social form of the union 
between two sexes'. At the same time its purpose is described as provid­
ing the foundation of the 'basic social cell of society' or the domestic 
group (ZQ, 16 December 1956). The form which the domestic group takes has 
wide repercussions for the institution of marriage and it can be argued 
that the boundaries and structure of the domestic group and the socio­
economic functions assigned to it in contemporary rural China are such 
that the two aims combined in the very * definition of marriage - as a 
relationship -between two freely chosen and equal individuals of the 
opposite sex and as the foundation of the domestic group - stand in contra­
diction to one another. That is, the form which the domestic group takes 
in rural areas has encouraged the older generation to retain their controls 
over the negotiations of marriage.
In contemporary China the domestic group is defined as 'mainly a 
unit of life in which the husband and wife share their married life 
together, rear and educate their children and care for their elder near
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relatives together’ (PR, 13 March 1964). The implications of this new 
definition for the structure of the domestic group are far from clear, 
for the new ideological model seems to have left the projected forms 
which the residential group or family formation should take rather vague. 
Virilocal marriage or the recruitment of wives to the domestic group in 
which the husband resided prior to marriage was widely practised in 
traditional China and nowhere are new rules of post-marital residence 
explicitly stated. Rather, the domestic group or household is said 'to 
stem from the marital bond for either it functions to establish a new 
household completely or it perpetuates an old household for a further 
generation' (Lu Yang, 1964: 7). On the one hand the strengthening of 
the marital bond above all other familial bonds might suggest the estab­
lishment of a conjugal household, and in educational materials advocating 
the rise in the age of marriage, marriage is almost by definition seen 
to require the establishment of an independent economic base for the 
livelihood of the couple and their children. The allocation of new 
housing to young couples in the urban areas where there was no acute 
shortage of supply seems to assume the establishment of a neolocal house­
hold rather than the incorporation of the new marriage partners into a 
larger economic unit such as the joint family. Indeed, anthropologists 
who have studied the family, domestic group or household in contemporary 
China have argued for a rise in the number of households of the conjugal 
type.
On the other hand the recommendation that uxorilocal marriage 
becomes a normal form of residence alternative to virilocal marriage 
assumes the former and future maintenance of a joint or extended house­
hold of either type. In the recent campaign to provide the equality of 
women in the movement to criticise Confucius and Lin Piao (1973-5), the
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population has been encouraged to learn from those Party committees who 
have promoted uxojilocal marriage as a normal form of post-mariltal
residence. They supported any groom who chose to settle in his,wife’s
/ I  ' . ' " '/ c/j family after marriage on the grounds that men and women were now equal
' in marriage, and that the births of girls could be as advantageous to
the future of the rural household as those of boys. Parents of daughters 
need no longer fear for their future for the new custom broke with the 
traditional idea that boys were the only means by whic.h spouses might 
be recruited into the household on marriage (SWB, 30 January 1975;
11 February 1975). The establishment of these new residential patterns 
was designed to break with the old virilocal post-marital residential 
patterns, but in this case neither the old or the new advocated neolocal 
marriage. Certainly in both rural and urban areas, both generations have 
been advised to care for each other and redefine their relationship in 
order to reduce areas of tension within the household however it is 
defined (M. Law, 1950; RMRB, 9 February 1957). The current concept of 
y the household or domestic group is a very weak part of the new ideological 
model.
The new definition of the household omits any references to its 
property base or the socio-economic functions which have characterised 
the traditional domestic group in China and which underlie the usual 
anthropological definitions of the domestic group. In common these 
definitions identify the domestic group as the ’housekeeping unit 
organised to provide the material and cultural resources needed to 
maintain and bring up its members' (Fortes, 1971: 8), ’the dwelling unit, 
the reproductive unit and the economic unit1 (Goody, 1972: 106) and the 
’residential unit, the unit of production, consumption and reproduction’ 
(Sahlins, 1974: 76-100); In comparison to its policy on residential
244
patterns, the government in China is clear in its aim to reduce the 
socio-economic functions of the domestic group. In the 1950s a number 
of policies were designed and introduced in China to collectivise the 
means of production and remove the property basis of the domestic group.
In urban areas the establishment of joint state-private enterprises, 
craft and other productive co-operatives and neighbourhood factories 
were all introduced to replace the domestic group as the unit of produc­
tion. In rural areas, policies were designed to gradually collectivise 
the land, collectively organise production and many subsidiary occupations 
(see Perkins, 1969; Schrqn, 1969). With the establishment of communes, 
the production brigade and the production team became the effective 
owners of the means of production, and formed the basic units of account­
ing, planning and distribution of incomes. In both rural and urban areas 
it was anticipated that the establishment of collective consumer services 
such as common dining facilities, child care, laundry, food processing 
and other services would mean that a large part of consumption would not 
take place by and within the individual household. Social scientists 
outside China were quick to foresee the implications of these policies 
for the structure and functions of the domestic group. They suggested 
that by taking out the last vestiges of private land ownership and manage­
ment, the commune has destroyed the estate or economic basis of the joint 
family (Cohen, M. , 1976: 231) or the traditional peasant family 
(Lethbridge, 1962: 380). The payment of individual wages, collectivisa­
tion of land and the collective organisation of production were all
interpreted as weakening the control of the older generation to control
PP
marriage negotiations (Yang, C., 1959: 39^ ; Goode, 1963: 301-2, 313). 
However, despite the new definition of the domestic group and the policies 
designed to reduce its economic basis, the evidence suggests that its
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traditional structure remains largely unchanged in rural households. 
Moreover, these same characteristics both encourage the older generation 
to control the marriage negotiations and place certain resources and 
sanctions at their disposal.
The household
In both rural and urban areas the basic unit of domestic organisation 
is the household, hu, which was.• characterised in the field situation as 
the group of kin relations distinguished by a common budget and single 
kitchen. It may or may not coincide with the family, jia or jiating, 
which seems to have been a relative term with many uses in the past 
(Osgood, 1963: 355-6) as it also has in the present. In my interviews
c r /
the term^family was often used to refer to the members of a particular 
household, or it might refer to members of the household plus those 
related by blood who were not identified as present members of the house­
hold such as married sons and daughters who had their own separate house­
holds or unmarried sons and daughters who were temporarily resident else­
where. Members of a household did not always share a common residence 
and households displayed some variation in the dispersal of their 
residential arrangements (see Figure 14 in Appendix Z ) ■ In rural and 
urban areas it seems that the average size of household may not have 
changed very much. Taeuber has analysed a hitherto unpublished 1929 
s-urvey of 38,256 farm families in 22 provinces of China and found that 
the average family size was 5.2 persons (1970: 71), and her figures are 
corroborated by those of other anthropologists who place the average 
family size within the range of 4 to 6 persons (Yang, 1959: 7). In 
Guangdong province the figures collected during my interviews show little 
variation:
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Table 11: Average Size of Household: Guangdong 1977
LOCALITY NUMBER OF NUMBER OF .. AVERAGE SIZE
PERSONS HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLD,
Jiang village 147 27 5.44
No.11
Production team
250 55 ‘ 4.54
Huadong commune 63,200 13,400 4.71
Yue village 585 145 4.03
Jenho commune ' 73,532 15,568 4.70
Haomei village 480 110 4.40
Dali commune 68,000 15,900 4.30
However, the average size masks the range and variations in the size 
of any one household at different points in its developmental cycle and 
the.', differences the rural and urban social fields.
In rural areas post-marital residence is still generally virilocal. 
Marriage immediately occasions the expansion of the domestic group and 
the establishment of stem and joint families although it eventually also 
precipitates fission, fenjia, and its concomitant economic partition. 
Normally, however, the latter takes place some time after marriage and 
its timing very much depends on factors internal to the domestic group.
If the husband is the only son, then division is rarely likely to take 
place at all, whereas if he has brothers, and if he is the eldest, he 
will be more likely to separate than if he is the younger son. Moreover, 
the division may not take place until several children have been b o m  to 




Post-marital residence patterns continued to take the virilocal form 
and the formation of conjugal households was coincident with household 
division rather than marriage. Conjugal households were rarely established 
before the birth of the third child or the occasion of the second son’s 
marriage. The most common explanation given for family division was the 
present size of the household, and this was often expressed in terms of 
the number of tables required for eating, and division often seems to 
have coincided with an increase to more than one table. At any time in 
the rural social field there were households which were of the conjugal, 
stem or joint form depending on their stage in the developmental cycle.
In Jiang village, where I interviewed members of every household, there 
were in April 1977 17 conjugal families and 10 stem families (see Table 12). 
At the time of the interviews there were no joint family households, 
.although with the imminent marriage of a second son, one household was 
about to take the joint form. Several of the households had been joint 
family structures in the recent past, but family division had caused 
their break up into conjugal and stem households. This pattern 
corresponds to Levy’s claims that in' traditional China new families were 
most commonly formed through the familie souche pattern of division which 
creates conjugal families and maintains stem families (1949: 55-6). Both 
Lang (1946: 15-16) and Levy (1949: 55) have noted that in traditional 
China it may have been quite common for stem families to maintain them­
selves for many years. They pointed out that poverty and poor health 
care may have left many families with only one son surviving to maturity 
in each generation. Now, however, it seems likely that the improvements 
in diet, health and welfare services have lengthened the life-span in the
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1 7 / /
2 5 / ✓
3 6 / /
4 6 / /
5 8 / . /
6 4 - / /
7 6 / /
8 6 / /
9 7 / , /
10 4 / /
11 5 / /
12 6 / 1 
1 i i i i : i i
! 
1
13 3 / /
14 5 / /
15 5 / /
16 4 / /
17 3 / /
18 5 / /
19 7 / /
20 6 / /
21 9 / /
22 4 / /
23 5 / /
24 3 / /
25 7 / /
26 5 / ✓
27 6 / /
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The following summary shows the number of households of a particular 
structure and form of residence,■ Figures in brackets show the average 




10 (4.5) 7 (5.7)
5 (5.4) 5 (7.0)
last twenty-five years and increased the number of surviving sons. In 
Jiang village an average of 2.5 sons had survived per mother over the 
age of 40 when child-bearing could reasonably be expected to have ceased. 
While opportunities for migration to the cities remain very limited, it 
would appear that demographic factors may have contributed to a new 
vertical and horizontal proliferation of the generations in close 
proximity if not within the same household. The joint phase of the 
developmental cycle may serve a unique opportunity to specialise and 
diversify the economy of the domestic group and accumulate wealth 
immediately prior to division.
In contrast, in urban areas post-marital residential patterns are 
generally neolocal with the formation of conjugal type households on 
marriage. In principle, housing is allocated by municipal authorities 
on a neolocal basis, although where there is a housing shortage as there 
has been in some of the larger cities, young couples may live with the 
parents of one of the spouses, usually the groom’s. But even in this 







be of a limited duration until separate housing can be provided. At a 
later date, however, the parents of either spouse, perhaps on the death 
of one of the marriage partners, may move in with their son or daughter 
and the household will move from the conjugal to the stem form. It 
seems that the developmental cycle in the domestic group may pass through 
different sequences in rural and urban areas. In the rural areas the 
maintenance of the traditional structures can be attributed to socio­
economic factors specific to the rural household.
The household estate
Anthropologists who have studied the forms which the domestic group 
has taken in China have argued that the key factor in its maintenance as 
a complex, and especially joint form has been the existence of an estate 
sufficient in size to meet the claims of its members (Freedman, 1958: 30; 
Cohen, M., 1971: 231). This has been the crucial characteristic disting­
uishing the forms which the domestic group traditionally took for different 
social classes, mainly the gentry and the peasantry (Fei, 1946). The jia 
estate has been defined as that body of holdings, such as lands, residences, 
household effects, farm tools and livestock to which the process of family 
division is applicable (Cohen, 1976: 59). The Chinese Communist Party 
too has identified private property as the primary economic foundation 
of the domestic group in the past and the abolition of the land component 
o'f the estate has been a priority of the government since the mid-1950s. 
Before this time, the government had introduced the policies of land 
reform and supervised the redistribution of land on an equable basis to 
individual households. At the time of the introduction of the new forms 
of marriage, then, it may be that land reform not only did not abolish
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the land component of the estates, but actually strengthened the property 
base'of the domestic group in rural areas. The government had'initially
forecast that only land reform could lay the social and economic founda-
\
tions for the implementation of the new ideological model by giving all 
members of the domestic group, and especially women and the young, 
access to ownership of the means of production and a new bargaining power. 
Several articles in the media suggested that the redistribution of land 
and new and equal inheritance laws would create the objective conditions 
for the implementation of the new ideological model of marriage negotia­
tions by providing the basis for economic independence and freedom of 
choice for the younger generation. The new Marriage Law could only be 
carried out successfully after land reform had destroyed the economic 
basis for filial obedience (P's’C, 1 June 1951; 1 March 1953). These 
articles argued that without the means of economic independence, the 
Marriage Law itself would not have been practicable among the rural 
population.
But it can also be argued that the redistribution of land actually 
strengthened the property basis of the small peasant productive unit, 
especially for the rural peasant household hitherto landless, and 
contributed to the authority of the head of the household. Land reform 
strengthened the land component of the jia estate and its exploitation 
maximised the functionality of the domestic group as a unit of production 
and with it the sanctions at the disposal of the household head rather 
than the resources at the command of the younger generation. Within the 
domestic group individual claims to the land often remained more potential 
than real and often they held land in name only for the younger generation 
and especially the women had little experience in organising agricultural 
production (Davin, 1976: 116; Croll, 1978). The fact that women may now
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bring a share of land with them in marriage, or the household may be 
allocated a further share of land on the marriage of one of its sons, 
only served to strengthen the resolve of the head of the domestic group 
to consolidate its property base through the timely negotiation of 
marriage of one of his sons. Although the case studies reveal no direct 
correlation between the redistribution of land and marriage forms, the 
tremendous hostility with which the new marriage reforms were initially 
greeted has been well documented (see Chapter 10), and it may be that in 
the early 1950s these new economic forces did not encourage or even 
actively discouraged the older generation from relinquishing their monopoly 
of marriage negotiations. However, this situation was short lived, for 
it was somewhat altered by the collectivisation of agricultural land and 
its removal from the direct control of the individual domestic group in 
the mid-1950s. The policies of collectivisation had the effect of 
reducing the land component of the individual jia estate and the economic 
basis of the individual household. However, certain socio-economic 
~ factors specific to the rural household have continued to encourage the 
older generation to control the negotiations of marriage.
The resources of the household
The economic organisation of China demands that the rural household 
continue to mobilise its resources in order to find solutions to a number 
of organisational problems, namely production and the transformation of 
materials for consumption. Despite a.number of policies to reduce the 
socio-economic functions of the rural household, it is still a unit of 
production although greatly reduced in scope, and because community 
services are very unevenly distributed in rural areas it is also the
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primary unit of consumption. The economy of the domestic group no longer 
relies on the exploitation of the jia lands or estate but on the paid and 
unpaid labour of each member of the domestic group; In any society where 
labour forms the major part of the total means of production and where 
controls over labour is the major source of social differentiation, the 
recruitment and reproduction of labour power itself is in constant demand. 
Where the individual and private hiring of agricultural labour is prohibited 
by law, as.it is within the People’s Republic of China, then marriage 
becomes not only one of the major means of the direct recruitment of 
labour power but also the necessary component for its reproduction.
In the rural areas access to and the organisation of labour is 
necessary to combine the three sectors of the economy: the income-earning 
contribution from the public or collective sectors of the economy, the 
sideline activities of the private sector of the economy and the non­
economic earning contribution within the domestic sphere. In the collective 
sector of the economy the welfare of the family is very much dependent on 
the ratio of wage earners to dependants within the household and whether 
the wage earners are male or female. The households of Jiang village 
ranged from those in which the members of the domestic group were all 
wage earners to those in which there were only two wage earners to four 
wage dependants (see Table 15" in Appendix 3). The recruitment of a 
daughter-in-law immediately added a wage-earner to the domestic group at 
a time when it might be saving for additional housing and preparing for 
eventual division. In the private sector, the household is still an 
important unit of production. The private sector includes not only 
private plots which comprise 4-5 per cent of the total area of collectively- 
owned land, and is allocated on a per capita basis and hence expands with 
marriage, but it also provides most of the vegetables for the consumption
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within the household and its livestock. In addition to these plots, the 
private sector also includes activities such as pig and chicken raising 
and the gathering of fuel, which are traditionally defined as women’s 
tasks. These compose an important food resource and cash contribution 
to the household economy. Domestic labour involving the transformation 
of produce for consumption such as grinding com, preserving vegetables, 
sewing and cooking and child care is an important contribution by women 
to the household economy which reduces the costs of its maintenance.
Although there were important attempts in the middle and late 1950s 
to establish communal nurseries for child care and community dining rooms 
to reduce the functions of the individual household and its labour require 
ments, these were not always uniformly established or maintained with 
equal success. In the rural areas most of the community dining rooms 
did not survive the Great Leap Forward and although nurseries for child 
care have met with more success, it is my own impression and that of 
others that these are usually for children from three years upwards and 
they are by no means universally established in rural villages. For 
instance, Ruth Sidal was told that even in communes with many regular 
nurseries, half or more of the children stay with grandparents (1972: 84-5 
124-5)
The performance of all these activities within the collective, 
private and domestic spheres, primarily continues to rely on the 
distribution of the labour power of the individual household between 
the three sectors, the recruitment and self-exploitation of women's 
labour power and the interdependence of the generations.
Within the domestic group the principal divisions of labour are 
sexual and generational. Chayanov has suggested that the aim of the 
domestic group as a unit of production is household consumption, and
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thus peasant production is not exploitative of others, but it is rather 
based on a certain degree of invisible labour which he terms ’sblf-
exploitation’ (1966: xvi). The domestic group in China today is a much
\i
reduced unit of production compared to other peasant societies, but a 
certain degree ofj^self-exploitation’ remains necessary to its maintenance. 
Women are not only essential for the biological reproduction of labour, 
but their own labour is crucial to all three sections of the economy: 
the collective, the private and the domestic. In the collective sectors 
women are wage earners like men and although the types of work which each 
undertakes may differ, each contributes to the collective economy. In 
rural areas, although some women were recruited into rural industries, 
women often formed a high proportion of the local agricultural labour 
force. In Jiang village, for example, all but one of the women worked 
in agriculture in the production team.
Occupations: Men and Women in Labour Force, Jiang village
MEN WOMEN TOTAL
Agricultural production team 26 38 64
Other occupations outside team 13 1 14
Barefoot- doctor 1 1
40 39 79
\
In the production team of which Jiang village was part, thirty of the women 
members from the. village were wives who had been recruited into the village 
and ten were daughters who had yet to marry out. Except for a few older 
women who worked part-time, all the women worked a full day, although 
they worked 24 compared to men’s 26 days per month.
256
In the private sector women normally raised the pigs and chickens 
and often tended to the vegetables of the private plots, and despite 
attempts to redefine.the division of labour within the household,* much 
of the domestic labour such as washing, mending, cooking, child minding, 
is still regarded as women1s work. At particular stages in a woman's 
life cycle their labour power tends to be distributed in favour of the 
domestic and private sector. It is a common occurrence for the recruit­
ment of a new daughter-in-law, or wage earner in the collective sector, 
to release the women of the older generation to manage the side occupa­
tions of the private sector and undertake with the help of the younger 
generation domestic labour and child-care. The self-exploitation of the 
family labour in the peasantry has as its basis the exploitation of the 
labour of women and to a greater extent of that of the women of the older 
generation. Indeed, the demands of the economy of the domestic group 
contribute to the economic interdepence of the generations within the 
household. In the absence .of State pensions in rural areas, the elders 
are dependent on the wage labour of the young while the young are dependent 
on the older generation for their unpaid labour in the domestic and private 
sectors of the economy. In comparison to rural areas, the demands for
invisible labour or the self-exploitation of family members is much 
reduced in urban areas.
* To reduce the sexual division of labour and accommodate domestic labour, 
men-have been encouraged to undertake an equal share of the housework. 
Numerous role models have been published in the media of men who 
previously indulged in patriarchal attitudes and dismissed housework 
as women's work, but who with the encouragement of trade union and 
women's groups have discarded these attitudes and now undertake their 
share (CR, June 1975). This policy seems to have had some results in 
the urban areas and among the younger generation, but in 1973 articles 
began appearing in the media suggesting that the division of labour 
within the household and especially in rural areas has altered little, 
both because of 'limited material conditions and the influence of male 
supremacy1, (Hongqi, 1 December 1973).
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The contrasting socio-economic functions of the 
household in rural and urban areas can be said to have given rise to a 
new dual familial form in contemporary China. The main differences in 
residential patterns is not that between social classes as formerly 
(see Chapter 2), but between urban and rural social fields and the 
structure of the household in each can be correlated directly to their 
respective socio-economic functions. In urban areas where there is a 
minimal, if non-existent, private sector of the economy, and where there 
are institutionalised State and;community provisions for retirement and 
to service and share in the maintenance of the household, the function­
ality of the household lessens. It is less a unit of production and 
consumption and the residential patterns tend towards those of the nuclear 
or conjugal type at the time of marriage. In rural areas where the 
individual household is still called on to maximise its resources in 
order to perform a number of socio-economic functions, then marriage is 
generally virilocal. Each form has repercussions for the negotiation of 
marriage, and it is for the mobilisation of its resources and especially 
for the recruitment and reproduction of labour, that the marriage 
negotiations have remained under the control of the older generation in 
rural areas.
The recruitment of women
One of the most common explanations or rationalisations given by the 
parents in initiating marriage negotiations was that cited in terms of the 
recruitment of additional labour power, usually a woman's, to maintain the 
household as an economic unit. In Liuling village where Myrdal did his 
second study in the late 1960s, there was little opposition to one twenty-
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year-old girl's marriage because her father was in ill-health and she was
! '
the only wage-earner. The village leaders defended their condohement of
\
the match on the grounds that in these circumstances it would not have 
been right to suggest that they postpone their marriage in line with 
current educational programmes in the village (Myrdal and Kessle, 1973:
111). In the 1970s in Upper Felicity village, one set of parents at the 
time of initiating the negotiations .Sfthe elder of several children said 
that they were negotiating the marriage early as they Would be glad of a 
daughter-in-law's help (Chen, 1973: 80). This rationale is particularly 
/explicit in cases where the father or mother has died leaving many young 
family members. In these circumstances the elder son might well be urged 
to marry in order that a daughter-in-law might contribute wages or main­
tain and service the household. One medical student in just such a situa­
tion wrote to Zhongguo Qingnian for advice. His mother had died leaving 
his father, himself and a younger brother and sister. On his return home 
during the winter vacation, his father indicated to him that they were 
greatly in need of a housewife in the family as cooking and cleaning 'gave 
them a great headache'. To have someone manage the household, his father 
asked him to take a wife as a solution to the problem. Friends and 
relatives supported the father in his request, and the son in a quandary 
turned to local political associations for help in finding a way out of 
his dilemma. The political associations supported him in his refusal and 
suggested that the other members of the household themselves share and 
undertake the domestic chores (12 February 1963). It may be that the 
parents of daughters, and particularly widows., feeling their future security 
in a patrilocal marriage system to be doubly vulnerable, initiated nego­
tiations for a matrilocal marriage to ensure the recruitment of an 
individual agreeable to uxorilocal residence. Certainly some households
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with a low ratio of wage earners to dependent sons and daughters opted 
for a reverse solution and married their young daughters out, thus 
immediately reducing .the number of wage dependants. In two cases quoted 
in Zhongguo Funu parents initiated marriage negotiations with a wealthy 
family who would be able to meet the cost of their daughter’s education 
and her living expenses, in order to lighten their present ’family burden’
(1 May 1964).
That girls of marriageable wage were valued for their labour power 
is illustrated by the value placed on their labour by the payment of the 
^.betrothal gift. In Chapter 5 the most common explanation given for its 
persistence was' that it took the form of compensation to the girl’s 
family for the expenses of her upbringing and loss of her labour. Many 
parents stated that after years of raising a daughter they ought to be 
able to get something if not a handsome sum in return. Those who thought 
the amount of the betrothal gift too small complained that they were 
getting a small return for raising and bringing up a daughter. One 
indignant parent objected to such small returns on the grounds that they 
would have received more for the exchange of a pig. In rural households 
parents of daughters still expected to be compensated for the expenses 
associated with the upbringing of a daughter and the loss suffered by 
the bride’s household in marriage.
The economic pressures in favour of the early biological reproduction 
of the labour force was an important factor favouring the early initiation 
of marriage procedures by the older generation in rural areas. Although 
it is usually couched in terms of their personal satisfaction at the birth 
of a grandson and the folk sayings ’to find a wife for one’s son early 
enables one to live in comfort early’, it is clear that practical con­
siderations underlie these sentiments. One. correspondent to Gongren Ribao
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suggested that although he was only twenty-three years of age there were
. I ’advantages in him getting married now. Not only could he and his wife
work, but his parents who were still in their early fifties could also
\
work. Moreover, by the time his parents retired, his own children would
be nearing the age of entry into social production. He thought that
there certainly was some truth in the folk saying: 'Plant seedlings early
and you will harvest a rice crop early; have a daughter-in-law early and
you will enjoy happiness early* (11 September 1962). The advantages, if
not necessity, to reproduce labour power at an early age is nowhere more
explicitly stated than in a discussion reported by Parish between peasants
and a young educated youth who, in line with the new ideological model,
N
recommended that they got married at a later date. The peasants hurriedly 
retorted that he just did not understand their problem. If they waited 
until they were thirty years old then when they were fifty years old their 
first son would barely.be old enough to be an able-bodied labourer, and 
what if they got sick or ill in the meantime, or if for some reason there 
was no adult to support the household, then its members would just sink 
into poverty (1975: 618). Por economic reasons alone they felt they had 
to encourage the members of their household to marry at or as near the 
legal age as possible. In rural areas the opportunities offered by the 
negotiation of marriage to maximise the socio-economic resources of the 
household have not only encouraged the older generation to retain their 
authority and controls, but the structure and functions of the domestic 
group liave also placed sanctions at the disposal of parents which are not 
available to their urban counterparts.
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The provision of housing
Although the collectivisation of land has removed the land component 
of the jia estate, it continues, to include residences, household effects, 
farm tools and small numbers of livestock. The sixty Articles governing 
communes states that peasants shall own their own tools and house as well 
as have the right to buy, sell or rent their house and according to the 
laws of inheritance pass it on to their children. Out of this estate the 
older generation is expected to make provision for the members of the 
younger generation and their spouses on marriage. In the rural areas 
where virilocal marriage is the norm, young couples are almost entirely 
reliant for the provision of housing on the resources of the groom's 
household or on the bride's household in the event of uxorilocal marriage. 
Normally it is the groom's household which rearranges the residential 
arrangements of the domestic group to make provision within their own 
house for the newly married couple. Alternatively, they might use house­
hold savings to renovate an old wing or build a new wing on the house. 
Eventually the older generation may provide a new house to enable their 
son or sons to establish new households nearby. The exact procedure 
followed probably varies according to the wealth of the individual house­
hold, the numbers of its members and the pressures on land for housing 
in the local village or community.
Jiang village
A survey of the household rearrangement and divisions on and after 
marriage in Jiang village reveals the reliance of the younger generation 
on the older for the provision of housing. In one household the elder
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son had been provided with a room for the couple's exclusive use at the
1 '
time of his marriage, and the second son, who was about to be married,
i
was also to be allotted a room. Before both sons were married, phe 
household had anticipated such expansion and had therefore built and 
added additional rooms to the original suite of rooms ( w
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In another family where there was more than one married son and 
several other sons and daughters, the household had similarly built 
additional rooms and the eldest son had been allotted a room at the time 
of his marriage. After the birth of his third child in 1976, there had 
been a household division. Now he had his own separate household 
comprising a sleeping room and a kitchen, and he continued to share the 
large central family room. In addition to the division of the household 
residence, there had also been a division of household effects and family 
savings. For instance, the household had previously owned three bicycles
262
and one had been given to the eldest son. After the family savings had 
been .divided, he had used some of his portion ‘to purchase a second cycle 
for his wife(_5ee. >ov=0 -
'EJ< -





In a third family, two married sons were originally provided with 
rooms within the existing household, but instead of adding additional 
rooms, the household had built a new house at the time of the eldest son's 
marriage in anticipation of further expansion and eventual household 
division. This had taken place in 1975 when the original house was 
divided between the parents and their two unmarried sons, and the second 
married son and his family (see Figure 10c).
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The eldest son had moved into the new house (see Households 16 





In all these cases the younger generation was reliant on the older
■ ' . . . . 1 ’
generation for the provision of housing. This situation contrasts
1I
strongly with that in urban areas where post-marital residence is largely 
neolocal. Although a young couple may move in temporarily with either 
of their parents when there is a housing shortage in some of the larger 
cities, it is a temporary expedient based on the understanding that as 
soon as housing is allocated to them they will establish their own 
separate household. Housing is not privately owned or part of the jia 
estate in urban areas, rather it is owned by the municipal authorities 
or occupational enterprises and allocated to young couples for their
j.
life-span.
The economy of the household
The economy of the household in the rural areas is largely organised 
along collective lines which provided the older generational with addi­
tional sanctions. McAleavy has noted that in the past the general rule 
was that the fruits of the labour of all family members, whether they 
worked at home on the family land or earned money from jobs outside the 
home, had to be put in the common fund from which the family supported 
itself and which on partition was divided among those so entitled (1953: 
545). In rural areas today the household budget is reckoned collectively.
The individual incomes in kind and in cash are pooled and added to the
\
income from the private sector. In one household in Jiang village where 
there were seven persons made up of five wage earners and two dependants, 
the grandmother and a young grandson, they received an average of 72 jin 
of food grain per month per person in one year. The main source of cash 
income had been that distributed to them by the production team according
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to the number of work points they had earned. This totalled 700 yuan 
including the earnings of the son who worked in the commune shop. In 
addition the household received 120 yuan by selling an average of two pigs 
each year. They grew all their own vegetables and much of the meat came 
from the allowances given in lieu of the two pigs and their 15 chickens 
and hens. In this household, like the others in the village, not only 
was the income inclusively tallied, but also their expenditures were 
reckoned collectively. The main items of expenditure were housing, 
clothing, consumer items such as bicycles, sewing machines, radios, fans 
and wristwatches and the expenses associated with marriage. Each house­
hold had one common savings account out of which these expenses were met.
The organisation of the household economy on these collective lines 
meant that although they contributed to the common fund, the young were 
ultimately dependent on the household to meet the expenses engendered by 
marriage. These were reckoned as one of the collective expenses of the 
household. The importance of this source of support for individuals of the 
younger generation is confirmed by the difficulties which xiaxiang boys 
in rural areas experience in negotiating a marriage. They are not only 
disadvantaged in individual terms in that they were normally inexperienced 
agricultural workers earning lower wages than the experienced peasant lad. 
(White, G., 1974: 504), but peasant boys also had the good fortune to share 
in the resources of their households. Xiaxiang boys did not have behind 
them the same opportunities to distribute labour between the various 
sectors of the economy or to accumulate capital in order to meet the 
customary marriage expenses and provide housing.
In contrast, in urban areas the income and the expenses of the 
household are reckoned on an individual basis. The monthly expenditures 
of the household are calculated and.divided among each wage-earning member.
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For example in several households where members were interviewed by the 
author in the city of Guangzhou, the living expenses were reckoned on a 
per capita basis per month with all members contributing periodically to 
the purchase of some consumer item. The remainder of each individual’s 
income is at his or her disposal and for young people one of the main 
expenses to be saved for is their own marriage. The young couples X 
interviewed in urban areas had all met their own marriage expenses out 
of their individual savings and the unmarried daughters who had no 
definite plans for marriage were greatly teased about the fact that they 
were already saving up for their own marriages. The furnishings of the 
irooms of newly married couples reflected on their own individual thrift 
rather than the relative contributions of the households of the bride and 
groom as in rural areas.
Thus, in comparison to the urban familial form, in rural areas the 
structure and functions of the household with its reciprocal obligations 
and combined resources encouraged the older generation to maintain control 
of the marriage negotiations of the younger generation. What emerges in 
the rural and urban social fields is a direct correlation between the 
household composition, the economic interdependence of its members and 
the degree of parental participation in the procedures of mate selection.
In urban areas where post-marital residence is more likely to be neolocal, 
where the household co-exists alongside community institutions, and where 
the functionality of the household is minimised and it is less a unit of 
production and consumption, there is a lesser degree of parental control.
In rural areas where post-marital residence is more likely to be virilocal, 
or at least so in the first instance, where the household is more of a 
unit of production and consumption demanding the recruitment and reproduc­
tion of labour, and where community.institutions are less developed, then
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the interests in the negotiation of marriage and the sanctions at the 
disposal of the older generation are greater. Far from decelerating 
the degree of familial control over marriage, it may be that the very 
structure and functions of the patrilocal domestic group work against 




MARRIAGE AND PRIMARY GROUPS
The traditional balance of power between ,the older and the younger 
generations within the domestic group could only be maintained as long 
as it was supported by both the formal and .informal relations within the 
two-dimensional social field. The very existence of the new law intro­
ducing the new ideological model, the new political associations active 
in its support and government intervention in its favour presented an 
alternative to the established power relations of the informal social 
field and in turn brought it into competition with the formal social 
field. Formerly the government had supported the authority of the elders 
and as a colloquial saying quoted in Chapter 3 had made clear, 'Even an 
upright magistrate does not intervene in domestic affairs' (Smith, 1902: 
292). Now family affairs and procedures for mate selection, traditionally 
the concern of the elders, were incorporated into the new law which was 
designed to provide 'a powerful weapon.for the younger generation in their 
struggle against the old marriage and family systems'* (KMRB, 27 February 
1957; PR, 13 March 1964). Once an individual defying the elders' authority 
could look to resources outside the family institutions for support then 
the power of the elders was at risk, and to provide the requisite resources 
political authorities and associations were exhorted to concern themselves 
with marriage and the internal affairs of the domestic group. As one 
article stressed, 'the attitude of perceiving the masses' problems of 
marriage and family as small matters in life, as personal problems of 
individual commune members is incorrect ... marriage and domestic affairs 
are indeed large problems in the practical lives of the masses and cadres 
should be concerned with them' (ZF, 1 January 1966). It was impressed
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upon these cadres by the government that only their support, guidance 
and intervention could demonstrate that their concern and responsibility 
is more encompassing than that of relatives and friends or those who were 
traditionally concerned with domestic affairs' (Min. of Interior, 1963:
11). The introduction of the new ideological model brought the government 
and political institutions into direct conflict with primary groups. In 
nearly every case of conflict, parents in rural and urban areas mobilised 
kin and neighbours in support of their traditional controls of mate 
selection, while the younger generation turned to government cadres, the 
Party, the Youth League or Women's Federation for support. The form which 
the immediate conscious model took was likely to reflect the dominance of 
either one of the resources at any one time or at any one place within 
the social field.
In both rural and urban areas the introduction of the new ideological 
model brought the influence of the primary groups into competition with 
that of the political associations. Primary groups have been defined 
anthropologically as those characterised by face-to-face, permanent, 
affective, non-instrumental and diffused inter-personal relations (Litwak 
and Szelenyi, 1969: 465). The three types of primary group structures 
normally identified include kinship ties beyond the immediate household, 
neighbours and friends. Kinship structures may be distinguished by semi­
permanent biological or legal ties between households, and neighbours are 
characterised by the geographical proximity of members and consequent 
face-to-face contacts. In contrast friendship rests ot\ affectivity alone 
and structurally constitutes the weakest of bonds, having neither the 
permanence of the kinship link or the face-to-face contact characteris­
ing the neighbourhood. There has been little attention given to 
the structure and function of primary groups in contemporary China
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primarily because previous analyses have operated on the common 
assumption that the very form which the political and economic development 
of the People’s Republic takes rests on the decline and eventual dis­
appearance of such groups.* '
It has)been presumed that the development•of a new form of political
authority in China required social conditions which were antithetical to
. 1
the maintenance of the primary group, and that political organisations 
and associations were more effective than primary groups in achieving 
the goals of social development. In an article on new types of inter­
personal relations, Ezra Vogel suggests that comradeship or ties based 
on common political affiliation have . those based on kinship,
the neighbourhood and friendship (1965: 46). After the establishment of 
communes, Lethbridge has argued that the extension of Party control right 
down to village level has meant that compared to the government and the 
Party, family and kin can offer only the most fragile support for the 
individual (1962: 381-3). Some scholars have drawn out the implications 
of these assumptions for the control of the negotiations of marriage, 
Lethbridge concluded that the greater Party control made possible by 
the commune structure has allowed for the finer scrutiny of the marriage 
contract and helped to guarantee the free choice of marriage partners 
(1962: 383). • C.K. Yang also suggests that the establishment of Party 
controls has weakened kinship and family ties and released the young from 
their controls, thereby encouraging the development of free-choice 
marriage (1959: 36). A study of marriage patterns in contemporary China,
*j^Norma Diamond has recently drawn attention to the fact that the 
household in many rural production teams and brigades remains 
embedded in a network of male kinsmen (1975: 27).
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however, suggests that in the rural social field the influence of kin 
and neighbours are still forces to be reckoned with and that they have 
continued to compete.with political associations and authorities for 
control of marriage patterns.
The influence of kin and neighbours
. •• *
At every stage of the negotiations of marriage the older generation 
is likely to have the support of their kin and neighbours and in the 
case studies it is their influence which the younger generation found 
particularly difficult to counter. Young people who were attracted to 
each other found it difficult to disregard the local gossip, xianhua, 
of kin and neighbours and meet openly. In interviews conducted by a 
Swedish observer in Liuling village, Shaanxi province, in the mid-1950s, 
it was evident that, though not all the inhabitants maintained traditional 
attitudes and felt uneasy at the thought of women laughing and joking with 
men, most continued to think it indecent and immoral and shocking that 
young people should talk with each other (Myrdal, 1967: 291). In the 
1960s there were cases where kin and neighbours were of the opinion that 
nothing good could come of the free association of the sexes and they 
actively intervened in defence of their family reputations (ZQ, 27 October 
1964; 16 April 1966). A contemporary report said of the influence of kin 
and neighbours that 1 they criticise (the younger generation) in order to 
cause shame, and brand them as ’improper’ or conspire so that they lose 
their reputation (Lu Yang, 1964: 17-18). In 1971 in a village in Henan 
it was still the case that a girl who was seen talking to boys and making 
friends would soon be considered 'too easy’ or 'loose’ in her relations 
with the opposite sex (Chen, 1973: 77). In this atmosphere of rumour and
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gossip, individuals of the younger generation if they did meet and attract 
one another, were often afraid to express their affections openly to each 
other and in public. They feared the censure of local public opinion. '
In order to adhere to the new ideological model and delay their marriage, 
young people had to withstand constant pressure from kin and neighbours. 
Several correspondents to the media wrote that from their own experience 
and observations, it was all right to accept the new ideological model in 
theory, but when it came to putting it into practice it was very difficult 
to withstand the pressure of others, particularly parents, kin and friends.
In one letter the correspondents said that they had discussed the question 
of raising the age of marriage at length and concluded that 'though the 
policy of late marriage theoretically rested on sound foundations, in 
actual practice, it could not find ready acceptance for a number of persons 
around them will often chide them, put pressure on them, or jeer at them 
and express pity as if they had done something wrong (GRB, 18 September 
1962). Another correspondent warned against treating the problem of social 
pressure lightly because the public opinion it has formed often exerts a 
fairly strong pressure in favour of 'early' marriage (GRB, 27 September 
1962) .
The ritual and ceremonial forms associated with marriage were all 
identified with the maintenance of status in the community. The betrothal 
symbolised the ability of the older generation to maintain their authority 
and controls within the domestic group and thus maintain their status 
among kin and neighbours. Free-choice marriage was seen to cause loss 
of face or tarnish local reputations. The main criterion for the accept­
ance or the rejection of a betrothal gift was whether the household would 
maintain its standing in the village. 'If I decline to accept it will it 
not be a reflection on my family's social standing and way of doing things
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in style?’ (my emphasis) ZQ, 19 November 1964). The arguments posed in 
favour of the bridal sedan chair were couched in terms of the loss of 
status vis h vis kin and neighbours should the bride not be seen to be 
arriving in 'the proper manner or in style1. Likewise the provision of 
the dowry provided another opportunity to gain or at least not lose social 
status. In cases where the practice persisted, the overwhelming argument 
cited in its defence was its contribution to the status and social stand­
ing of the bride's family. 'If we don't spend some money and provide you 
with some form of dowry, will not other people laugh at us?' (my emphasis) 
(ZQ, 16 January 1966). But perhaps the most important social obligation 
by which reputations could be lost or gained lay in the provision of the 
marriage feast. It was required to be ofc-vcertain standard in order to 
prevent loss of status and it was an opportunity to lay obligations and 
return obligations. In rural areas households have proved reluctant to 
break the circle of obligations and invoke the gossip of their relatives 
and neighbours.
Articles in the media have reflected the concern of the government
with the general problem of countering the influence of primary groups in
reforming marriage patterns. One article on the ceremonials of marriage
summed up its discussion of marital forms with the observation that
'Although some people realise the importance of changing 
prevailing bad customs, and practices, talk eloquently about 
the evil and harm of old feudal customs, or may have taken 
a firm stand at the beginning, they are often unable to 
withstand the trial at the crucial moment. They begin to 
waver and compromise by force of habit under the pressure of 
their parents who may have given them a good scolding, or 
under the influence of their relatives and friends who may 
have used persuasion to talk them into conforming with 
tradition and the trends of the times so. that they may not 
be outcasts'from their own circles.'
(NFRB, 25 January 1965)
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In another article some members of the older generation in Zhejiang
province were interviewed in Renmin Ribao for their observations on the
new marriage system. They were of the opinion that although it might be
a good arrangement all round, the traditions of marriage had passed from
generation to generation and were too deeply entrenched to be undone
overnight. They said that they themselves did not mind, but the problem
was how to face their relatives and friends. :
’What if it sets the tongues of others wagging and makes 
your friends and relatives mad at you. You can’t get away 
from being called things like "cheap skate", "petty devil",
"cool blood animal"... People also may say things like 
"You took gifts from others before. But now you give 
• nothing in return. You just take and not give." How then 
can you hold your head up?’
(28 June 1964)
So they concluded, ’We'd better stick to the old standard', for, as they 
said, they just could not take the pressures from relatives, neighbours 
and friends (28 June 1964).
It was comments like these that caused an editorial in Renmin Ribao 
to suggest that although people may have seen through the hackneyed and 
stultifying customs, the real obstacle to social change was the heavy 
pressure of public opinion brought to bear on each person. 'Like a 
massively closely-woven net', it concluded
old habits, and influences and social opinion limit and 
dictate people's thinking and action. Everyone seems to be 
acting not out of his own will or needs, but out of despera­
tion for acceptance among relatives, neighbours and all.
The same relatives and neighbours, meanwhile, dare not do 
anything not hitherto accepted by others, if just to avoid 
gossip. Thus everyone fears everyone else ... this is so- 
called pressure of public or social opinion.'
(28 June 1964)
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The influence of political associations
Set against the pressure of public or social opinion from kin and 
neighbours was the influence of the political authorities or associations 
in support of the new ideological model. Yet there is evidence to suggest 
that the competition between the sanctions and support of primary groups 
and political associations has been somewhat uneven. Not only has the 
support system provided by primary groups continued, but the support which 
the political authorities have been exhorted to give to the new ideo­
logical model has not always been forthcoming. This was particularly so 
in the early 1950s when the new law came into operation before the new 
ideological model had a basis of power or authority sufficient to compete 
with that supporting the old ideological model. In the event of conflict, 
the mere citation of the terms of the new law was not enough and the 
formal basis of active support was often unreliable. In these early 
years there were numbers of suicides and murders among those who attempted 
to adopt elements of the new ideological model, and especially among women 
who traditionally rarely had a power base within the domestic group to 
compare with that of the elders,* The conventional interpretation of the 
events of this initial period of implementation of the new Marriage Law
* For example, a report from the Central South Democratic Women's
Federation estimated that in the year ending 30 August 1951 there had 
been a total of 10,000 deaths as the result of the introduction of the 
Marriage Law. They cited some local statistics in evidence (ZJ,
30 August 1951)
Area Date Lost lives
Changsha Special District May-August 1950 98 women (68 suicide)
Huanghua xian, Hubei July-August 1950 14
Shangshui xian, Hunan 3 months 1950 90
Ningyuan xian, Hunan 2 months 1950 17 (all suicide)
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has been that the cadres held the population in their grip and that their 
political authority enabled them-to apply the provisions of the law without 
regard for the opinions and wishes of the local population. It was this 
forced implementation of the law which primarily caused the problems 
reported in the media (CNA, 25 September 1953). But reports from the 
local investigations into the conditions .of implementation undertaken at 
the time suggest otherwise. They reveal that it was much more likely that 
those who attempted to adopt the new ideological model did not obtain the 
requisite support from cadres and political associations which they 
needed in order to implement the new ideological model.
In 1951 reports on the problems.encountered in the campaign to 
reform marriage patterns began to place particular blame on the failure 
of those in positions of political authority (local cadres and village 
leaders or members of political associations such as the Youth League, 
Women's Federation and Peasants' Associations) to support those struggling 
against feudal marriage customs. Towards the end of 1951, Renmin Ribao 
openly admitted for the first time that the increase in the murders or 
deaths of women was not due to conservative thought or feudal customs, 
but was due in considerable part to the failure or disinclination of 
Party cadres and leaders to enforce the law and give suj ; ort to individuals 
who wished t^ adopt elements of the new ideological model (RMRB, 29 
September 1951; 13 October 1951). On several occasions the national 
newspapers and periodicals described how those who resisted old customs 
lost heart or sometimes their lives from lack of public sympathy and 
political support. A column was set aside in Renmin Ribao to report on 
the implementation of the Marriage Law and draw attention to the irregular­
ities committed by local authorities. One case reported in Women of New 
China concerned the marriage of a young girl who had been promised in
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marriage by her parents who had also exacted a gift of a measure of rice. 
The girl wished to marry a neighbouring lad. of her own acquaintance and 
she therefore applied to the People’s Court for permission to terminate 
the betrothal negotiated by her parents. The court upheld the betrothal, 
as did a higher court at xian level. Three months before the arranged 
marriage was due to take place, the girl again approached the court for a 
second decision. In the face of further procrastination by the courts 
and increasingly desperate about her approaching fate, she threw herself 
into the well in the court compound and died (WC, October 1951). There 
were numbers of cases published in the media all supporting the accusation 
that cadres interfered in the freedom of marriage either by forcibly 
separating‘couples who wished to negotiate a free choice marriage or by 
forcibly arranging marriages between young people themselves (ZJ, 30 
August 1951).
Many reports in the early 1950s began to identify the negligence 
of local cadres as the ’greatest stumbling block' to the implementation 
of the new Marriage Law (RMRE, 29 September 1951; WC, October 1951).
They were accused of adhering to the old ideological model by conniving 
with local village elders to support the old marriage system. They 
either openly tolerated the old customs or adopted an attitude of 
indifference to complaints from those wishing to adopt the new ideological 
model, or they even punished those who wished to defy parental interference 
in marriage negotiations. In some cases the latter were expelled from the 
Youth League or other political associations (NCNA, 29 October 1951). 
According to these same reports the cadres were motivated in their 
recalcitrance by one of several factors. Some feared that the disappear­
ance of traditional customs would create a vacuum in morals or ’all 
confusion under Heaven’ and certain-social disorder in which sexual
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relations would become as easy as sipping the proverbial glass of water. 
They feared that their own authority as head of the domestic group would 
be threatened or they thought that marriage had never been, and never 
should be, a matter of state policy and interference. It was also thought 
to be a distraction from the real affairs and priorities of the State 
such as land reform. Others thought that it was but a temporary fad of 
the new government and that it would pass just as 'a large clap of 
thunder is followed by small drops of rainT. Custom would surely win 
out in the end and it was no use fighting it. Some shelved it in the 
belief that their communities were not yet ready for that kind of reform 
(RMRB, 20 March 1953). Indeed numbers of government circulars and 
directives were published which were full of reproofs for the large
numbers of judiciary organs, cadres and Party members who had failed to
give their full support to those abiding by the new provisions of the 
law (RMRB, 19 March 1953). Through the media, the government attempted 
to directly inform young people that they had its support and should not
under any circumstances take the law into their own hands or resort to
suicide (NCNA, 31 January 1953; 25 February 1953).
Complaints that young people failed to find support from the political 
authorities and associations declined notably after the early 1950s, 
although a few cases still appear in the media. In 1962, for example, 
an adopted daughter-in-law appealed via the media for help when the 
personnel of the government department concerned had refused to uphold 
the Marriage Law (NFRB, 5 July 1962). Over the years there have been a 
number of articles addressed to the meirbers of the Party, the Youth League 
and .the Women's Federation calling on them to pay more attention to the 
Marriage Law and support young people who resisted arranged marriages.
There is evidence to suggest that their continued reluctance was less the
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result of disagreement with or disinclination to support the principles 
of the new Marriage Law, than the fear that any action on their part 
would be interpreted as interference or obstruction in the private or 
personal sphere of marriage relations (ZQ, 1 April 1955; TKP, 12 September 
1964).
This inhibition displayed by the political associations suggests 
that there is still a tendency to divide the private or domestic from the 
public or political sphere of activities, and place the former in the 
control of the primary as opposed to political groups. This separation 
may be encouraged by the differing degrees of importance attached to the 
institution of marriage by its own definitions. Although marriage is 
defined as important for both the individual and society, it is placed 
in a position secondary to 'revolutionary activities' or 'socialist 
construction' thus implying that it lies outside these boundaries. In 
the debates entitled 'What is the Correct View of Marriage?', 'Is 
marriage a matter of minor or major importance?' or 'Is Marriage Really 
an important matter or small matter?1, marriage is accorded an importance 
as a new stage in the life-cycle of the individual, but relegated to a 
secondary position in establishing social priorities: 'Compared with 
revolutionary work, marriage and love is really a small matter* (ZQ,
14 September 1962); 'An individual must try and place love in a secondary 
position to the revolution in one's life1 (ZQ, 1 April 1955); 'Compared 
with the undertaking we have been called upon to do, marriage after all 
takes'second place' (ZQ, 2 February 1963). In case such sayings should 
lead to the neglect or abuse of marriage, it is also identified as a 
question deserving of serious concern by the individual. As one article 
has stressed, 'The placing of love and marriage in a second place to the 
revolution does not mean that as long as a person is associated with
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socialist construction, he should not give any consideration to the question 
of love and marriage. Or that even when he has reached marriageable age, 
he should dedicate himself to the revolution rather than give any thought 
to love and marriage. No we do not mean that1 (GRB, 22 November 1962). 
Although a booklet of advice published in 1964 elaborated on this theme 
by suggesting that whereas ’marriage problems, when compared to the 
revolutionary cause are minor matters and should be put in second place, 
speaking in terms of an individual, love and marriage and the organisation 
of a new family are after all, serious matters’ (Lu Yang, 1964: 11-12). 
Despite the importance accorded to marriage as a stage in the life cycle 
of an individual, in the last resort it was always associated with the 
secondary, individual, private and domestic as opposed to the prior social, 
public and political domain (ZQ, 30 August 1956; RMRB, 15 November 1956).
Primary groups in rural China
If the continuing influence of the primary groups and the inhibitions 
expressed by the political associations have contributed to the nation­
wide and uneven competition between the generations and the primary and 
political groups, the variety in immediate conscious models demonstrates 
that the competition has been even more weighted in the favour of primary 
groups in rural areas. Within the village the primary groups provided 
greater competition for the influence of political associations. It is 
noticeable that the basic-level cadres or representatives of political 
authority in rural villages have often been blamed by the Chinese govern­
ment for the failure of certain policies (Baum and Teiwes, 1968: 13).
But it may be that if the study of marriage is any indication it is not 
so much the weakness of basic-level■cadres, as the strength of the over­
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lapping primary groups which should be held responsible for the slow 
implementation of government policies. In the sphere of marriage 
negotiations, the older generation, with the support of kin and neighbours, 
has maintained much of its traditional controls and the form which the 
immediate conscious models takes can be directly linked to the differences 
in the immediate social, environment of individuals and households, and 
in particular to the structures and functions of the primary groups.
That is, where primary groups overlap and encapsulate the individual and 
the household, they may be more likely to provide a single reference group 
and unidirectional social pressures which support the controls and the 
authority of the older generation. It can be argued that in rural areas 
in China, primary groups, far from being weakened, have not only continued 
to overlap to form a single concrete and close-knit group, but that the 
inter-relationships within these groups have been formalised and 
institutionalised by the new demographic and economic policies. It is 
this structural feature of rural society which has suggested the second 
hypothesis explaining the variety of immediate conscious models in the 
People's Republic of China: that the degree to which the old ideological 
model predominates over the new, and therefore the extent to which 
parental participation characterises marriage patterns, varies with the 
degree to which primary groups overlap.
An important general feature of social structure is the way in which 
primary groups are connected with the territorial arrangement of persons. 
In China there has been no large-scale rearrangement of the territorial 
distribution of rural persons, and rural areas continued to be character­
ised by discretely-bounded villages which vary in size from a few tens to 
a few hundred^ouseholds. These villages now have a new definition and 
function and since the establishment of the communes from 1957 they tend
281
to coincide with the organisational level of either the production team 
or production brigade. Production teams may consist of any number between 
30 and 150 households and most scholars have concluded that their bound- 
aries may coincide with the territorial village. Alternatively, and 
depending on its original size, it may either combine with neighbouring 
villages to form a production team or itself be divided into production
f 1
teams. However it has been organisationally redefined, the spatial 
continuity of the village remains. This contrasts strongly with the 
redistribution of the. rural population and the establishment of Hew and 
ujamaa villages in Tanzania (Blue and Weaver, 1977). Apart from the 
exchange of women in marriage, there.is now little permanent movement 
between production brigades, teams or villages, and this very important 
demographic factor encourages a high level of involvement in primary 
groups.
I myself observed that in contrasting the social conditions of the 
past with the present, several leaders of Huadong commune and members of 
individual households in Jiang village made unsolicited references to the 
necessary dispersal of members of kin groups in the previous generations 
because of .natural calamities and emigration to the cities and Southeast 
Asia. One of the commune leaders quoted an old local folksong:
The peasantry here on the land is very.poor,
Every village links each other into a river,
The natural calamities has not its end,
And people are obliged to leave their native land forever.
This dispersal of kin groups was contrasted with present social conditions 
in which men need not leave their birthplace. This means that it is in 
the context of a territorially bounded group of the production team or 
village that.primary groups are most likely to overlap and have their 
most continuous influence on individuals and households. Within the 
discretely bounded village, neighbours may be kin and friends at one and 
the same time.
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The proportion of kinship ties to other relations in the village 
may vary from those characteristic of the southern provinces such as 
Guangdong and Fujian where single-sumamed village members comprise 
a single lineage, to the multi-sumamed villages of the northern 
provinces. In the past the southern provinces were dominated by 
lineages or large localised kin groups whose boundaries often coincided 
with those of the village. Freedman (1966) examined their historical 
forms in some detail, and evidence from other scholars suggests that 
lineage-based settlements continue to characterise southern provinces 
(Chen, 1973; Diamond, 1975).
Jiang Village
In the three villages which make up a production team in Guangdong, 
ray own survey of the households revealed that they were all surnamed 
Jiang and that they probably composed a fragment of a higher order 
lineage. Within the village each household was asked to identify its 
nearest kin. Without exception close kin, jinqin, were identified as 
brothers who had established separate households, father's brothers and 
father's brother’s sons, and a line was drawn between them and father's 
father's brothers and their sons who were either designated 'distant 
kin' or not cited at all. Only one household had no close kin in the 
village and they were recent settlers driven by crowded housing condi­
tions 'from the nearest neighbouring village where they had numerous 
kin all again with the same surname Jiang. Jiang village itself is 
characterised by geographically concentrated clusters of agnatic kin 
who are either groups of ego's brothers or father's brothers and they 
are identified in Figures 11 and 12.
\
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Figure 11: Kinship Organisation in Jiang Village
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mobility or migration out, and the continuation of virilocal marriage 
will increase the number of agnatic kinship ties in relation td others
within the village. Instead of provinces like Guangdong and Fujian
\
constituting exceptional cases of lineage-based settlements, it may not 
be too far fetched to suggest that over time the proportion of kinship 
ties within villages in the rest of rural China may increase and might 
come to approximate the forms characteristic of the southern provinces.
At present, though, it can certainly be assumed that the same demographic 
factors contribute to relations of proximity having all the intensity 
and closeness of kinship ties, and to this extent it may well be that 
kinship ties continue to directly influence the patterning of other 
social relations based on common residence and affectivity within the 
village. Structural features which provide for the overlapping of primary 
groups have been reinforced by the extent to which co-operation between 
the households is required to provide and maintain the welfare of the 
rural household and encourages a high degree of intimacy or frequency 
of contact between kin and neighbours.
A wide variety of functions formerly performed by the household 
are now undertaken by the village as part of, or {tfL whole of, a unit of 
production, distribution and accounting. Social scientists have generally 
tended to isolate the household and even conceptualise it as a mode of 
production by minimising the links between households or.to see links 
or exchanges between households as analytically unimportant to the 
underlying structure of the present form (Chayanov, 1966; Sahlins 1974).
In the past, fieldwork in villages of rural China, and Ramon Myers’ study 
of north China villages (1970) have amply demonstrated that co-operation 
between households was a widespread practice. Labour, instruments of 
production and loans of'produce and cash were exchanged between households.
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In rural China today this exchange of goods and services between house­
holds has been institutionalised and magnified by the process of 
collectivisation. By this process all kinds of exchanges have moved 
from an informal and ad hoc basis to one that is now institutionalised 
and prescribed on the basis of a common neighbourhood. The inhabitants 
of the villages are required to work together and co-operate on an un­
precedented level of exchange of goods and services. The production teams 
and brigades are now units of production, the owners of the means of 
production and the dominant units for the recruitment and organisation 
of labour within its boundaries. Members of these units not only work in 
close proximity, but the ordering of the exchange and co-operation are 
reinforced by the new ideology which encourages the individual household 
to place a high value on the exchange of goods and services within the 
collective. They are actively exhorted to solve common problems and to 
mobilise common resources to improve the level of their services through 
co-operation. The structure and functions of primary groups in rural 
society has had the effect of maintaining, if not solidifying, the bonds 
between the individual inhabitant and primary group.
Measures of solidarity within primary groups
Several measures of the solidarity of primary groups in rural areas 
are the degree to which the household is prepared to defy the norms of 
the primary groups, the extent to which ritual and ceremonial forms 
symbolise their solidarity and the success of the government in imposing 
class divisions within the primary groups. In a social field where there 
is a greater cleavage between the new ideological model and the immediate 
conscious models, an individual or household may have the choice of either
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conforming to the new ideological model of the society at the risk of 
losing status in the local community, or rejecting the new ideological 
model of the society.and conforming to the immediate conscious model of 
the community in exchange for their acceptance’ and a certain amount of 
status. The case studies suggest that in the rural areas individuals 
of both generations found defiance of the norms of the local community 
the most difficult obstacle to overcome in the establishment of new 
marriage patterns. All but those who had access to the extended networks
of the Youth League or Party beyond the confines of the face-to-face
community preferred to defer to rather than take on the local community.
In rural areas the case studies have also suggested that the cohesion
of the primary groups rests to a large degree of the maintenance of 
ceremonial and ritual forms, and village inhabitants were markedly 
reluctant to break the circle of reciprocal obligations and prestations 
within the ritual and ceremonial of marriage. Finally, there is some 
evidence that it has been much more difficult to establish horizontal or 
class links within primary groups and especially within those based on 
lineage or kin. Where villages have been dominated by a single lineage 
it seems as if the establishment of active poor and lower-middle peasant 
associations may have been more difficult. At the time of land reform, 
the most potent period of class struggle in rural areas, there was evidence 
that landlords exploited kin ties and certainly in one single-lineage 
village, the procedures of land reform had to be repeated during the 
Cultural Revolution because the kin ties had been such that little of the 
landlords' property had been redistributed the first time round (Chen,
1973: 137-8). Educational materials have certainly emphasised the need 
to draw attention to class differences within lineages (ZQ, 26 October 
1963; RMRB, 23 November 1964),
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It is the structure and function of the overlapping primary groups 
in rural areas which have enabled them to maintain a certain measure of 
solidarity and remain the primary or single most important reference 
group for the household in rural China. There' seems to have been no 
important change in the types and unidirectional nature of social pressure 
from primary groups, and there are now fewer avenues of escape from the 
pressures of the type recorded in Republican China in Chapter 2. More­
over the new economic policies have contributed to the maintenance of 
the sanctions traditionally appropriated by the primary groups. Through 
the sanctions at their disposal, the older generation have maintained their 
control of the norms of the local community which has enabled them to 
modify the new ideological model in their own interests. One of the 
primary means by which the older generation, with the support of the 
primary groups, have worked to maintain their controls of the negotiations 
of marriage has been by maintaining the norms of segregation within the 
local community.
The primary group has been singularly successful at retaining the 
norms of segregation within the rural villages and this has been a 
requisite to the maintenance of the/ “ controls of the negotiation of 
marriage. The form which the negotiation of marriage takes can be 
directly linked to the number of opportunities for social interaction 
among young people of marriageable age, and in rural areas today opportun­
ities for meeting and mating are suitably circumscribed by the maintenance 
of the traditional norms of segregation. The evidence cited in Chapter 4 
suggests that it was the lack of alternative opportunities and the amount 
of rumour and gossip surrounding pre-marital ritual forms which encouraged 
young people to collude in the maintenance of parental authority and 
controls. Moreover, the socio-economic relations between the households
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of the local community reinforces the bonds of solidity within the household 
for strains and divisions within the household must be kept at a certain 
level so as not to interfere with the welfare of the community. It would 
seem that the norms favouring parental participation in marriage proced- 
ures had a greater structural significance where inter-personal relations 
were dominated by overlapping primary groups whose influence were effect­
ively unidirectional. The extent to which ego remains wholly encapsulated 
within traditionally effective networks must vary enormously over the rural 
social field, but it is in contrast to the urban social fields that they 
can be so characterised. x
Primary groups in urban China
Urban areas in comparison to rural areas are characterised less by 
singular territorially-bounded groups than by many different communities 
based on such criteria as common participation in an occupation, on class 
membership, common interests, or previous membership of other social 
systems as well as those based on common residence, kinship and friendship. 
This social field is characterised by the dispersal of primary groups and 
just as kin are less likely to be neighbours, so neighbours are less 
likely to be work mates and so on. Cities are organised into neighbour­
hoods which are subdivided into residential groups of approximately 150 
to 500 households. They are both informally organised self-governing 
groups whose main activities include public health, political study, and 
the establishment of kindergartens, community workshops and one or two 
small-scale neighbourhood factories which, while they require a certain 
degree of co-operation between households, they are nowhere near constitut­
ing the unit of production, distribution and accounting typical of rural
neighbourhoods.
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It is also a feature of the organisation of urban neighbourhoods 
that they mainly attract the allegiance of the elderly and retired or 
otherwise unemployed .members of the community rather than those whose 
work takes them outside the neighbourhood. Friends were more likely to 
be a mixture of peers from school days or work mates sharing in the same 
occupations or neighbours, With some notable exceptions, urban areas are 
not characterised by the geographical concentration of those related by 
kinship ties. Their loss of control of housing and its allocation either 
by municipal authorities and occupational enterprises and the pressures 
on urban housing, have meant that family members have very much been at 
the mercy of its availability, and although there is much less known about 
kin relations in urban areas in the People’s Republic of China, it seems 
that there is a certain amount of dispersal.
Certainly in Guangzhou where I asked members of several households 
about the whereabouts of kin, they were either living outside the neigh­
bourhood or factory housing.complex but elsewhere in the same city, or 
they were resident in the respondent’s village of origin. The kin resident 
within the same city visited each other on rest days and, although the 
persons interviewed might have left their native villages up to fifty 
years ago, they maintained regular contact on special occasions and 
festivals with their kin there. The one notable exception in Guangzhou 
proved to be the former boat people who were rehoused- in a large estate 
along the bank of the Pearl River in 1965. In their case nearly all 
agnatic and affinal kin resided within the estate itself. There were a 
number of blocks of flats which housed 40,000 people and 7,900 households. 
The six households which I visited were all in the Bingjian neighbourhood, 
which comprised 58 two- to three-storeyed blocks composed of 11,000 persons 
or 2,700 households. In these households the wives had all come from
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within the estate and almost all the affinal and agnatic kin either lived 
within the same household or a different household in the same or nearby 
block (see Appendix 3). In the urban areas generally, however, the 
separation of different communities has meant that there is a much 
greater choice over the extent to which ego interacts with kin and 
neighbours.
The dispersal of primary groups suggests that there may be a wider
beiwSL
range of reference groups, and individuals and households^had a consider­
able range of options in selecting the group or category that they identified 
with. Indeed, the case studies confirm this supposition. They illustrate 
that young people from the urban areas are as likely to take the advice or 
follow the example of friends, peers, fellow members of class or political 
associations or even abstract categories or role models as kin or neighbours. 
In urban areas it was much more likely that the individual or household 
would come into contact with a variety of conscious models and meet with 
a range of choice in making its selection. The correspondences on the 
age of marriage, for example, illustrate that the options considered by 
a young person very much depended on the reference group with whom they 
primarily identified and it was as likely to be fellow factory workers as 
kin and neighbours. In this social field the new ideological model upheld 
by associations and organisations met with less competition from the 
influence of primary groups. Young people found it less difficult to defy 
the dispersed authority of kin and neighbours, and the older generation 
and primary groups did not have the immediacy and monopoly of sanctions 
at the disposal of their rural counterparts.
In comparison to the urban social field, then, the structure and 
function of the.rural household has encouraged the older generation to 
defy the n ew.ideological model and maintain their control of marriage
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procedures and it is the structure and functions of the primary group in 
rural areas which have enabled them to fomulate new immediate conscious 
models and maintain these controls. In the rural areas it can be argued 
that the new economic policies contribute to the maintenance of the forms
We, I Vi
which the household and primary groups^takeq Doth of which have worked 
against the implementation of the new ideological model. The isolation 
of these structures as factors encouraging the persistence of the old 
ideological model, and not forces encouraging social change in the marriage 
patterns, does not yet allow us to identify the degree to which social 
change in the marriage patterns can be attributed to the presence of the 
new ideological model itself. However, the identification of the economic 
factors inhibiting its nation-wide implementation is already sufficient to 
challenge the expectations aroused by the studies of the Republican 
period (1911-1949) and the suppositions put forward by scholars of Taiwan, 
both of which have assumed that the 'modernisation1 of family and kinship 
structures in the People’s Republic of China parallels those of Republican 
China and Taiwan. In each case, scholars have argued that it is the new 
socio-economic factors or the process of industrialisation or 'modernisa­
tion' which primarily encourages changes in marriage patterns and family 
types. A more detailed comparison of marriage patterns, the household 
and primary groups, and the various processes articulating these elements 
of structure in contemporary Taiwan and China, raises- in a direct form 
the problems of equating structural relationships in an instant of time 
and agents or processes of social change. A comparison in the following 
chapter " changes in rural Taiwan and China suggests that what we may 





A COMPARATIVE STUDY: TAIWAN
The theory linking industrialisation with the increasing isolation 
of the nuclear or conjugal family dominated the attempts by sociologists 
of the family to identify the correlations between family type and economic 
development in the middle decades of this century. Because the movement 
from a non-industrial to an industrialised state occurred relatively late 
in China, it was a popular field of study in the 1930s and 1940s, and its 
implications for the structure of the family are rather better documented 
than most. The process they observed and their analysis of social structures 
convinced anthropologists such as Lang (1946), Levy (1949), and C.K. Yang 
(1959) that it was the new socio-economic factors or the process of 
urbanisation and industrialisation which primarily brought with it the 
establishment of the nuclear family as the normal form. Levy has argued 
that the changes introduced in the economic substructure of the family 
has been a primary factor in the new revolutionary orientation (1949:
318), and C.K. Yang, while giving more weight to the new ideological 
factors than Levy, also concludes that the social changes visible in 
marriage in the Republic of China were not self-conscious or the result 
of a specifically defined conceptual form of the family, Rather he says 
1 socio-economic environmental pressure became the major factor in altering 
the basic economic position of the family and in forcing a change in the 
family economic structure1 (1959: 136). On the basis of their researches 
they both forecast an acceleration of this process of social change under 
the new Communist government.
In 1948 Levy anticipated that the greater development of industry 
and urbanisation programmes would undoubtedly lead to new forms of marriage
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and the establishment of neolocal post-marital residence patterns. He 
argued that the patterns of the Republican period which combined elements 
of the traditional patterns and elements of the patterns associated with 
urban industrial society could only be temporary social phenomena. He 
thought industrialisation had already modified the traditional patterns 
sufficiently to suppose further change in a similar direction. fThe odds 
are,' he suggested, 'that this new pattern will be simply the conjugal 
family unit of the West rather than a patchwork of parts from the one 
and the other1 (1949: 364-5). C.K. Yang anticipated that the spontaneous 
processes of the economic and social changes already well established in 
the Republican period would continue, but be amplified by the co-ordinated 
and conscious planning of an organised political power (1959: 19-20). The 
predictions and findings of these scholars m e c e  corroborated by field 
workers who took their data from the comparable and now more accessible 
social field of Taiwan..
In an attempt to ascertain the role of the new ideological model 
itself in the process of social change in the People's Republic of China, 
it seemed a good idea to take advantage of the existence of a close and 
comparative social field. As a province of China, Taiwan has shared much 
the same cultural background and the same traditional ideological model 
of arranged marriage. Recent changes in marriage patterns, family types 
and kin groups have been fully documented by a number- of scholars making 
the most of the opportunities for field work, and most significantly, 
there is one important difference between the two fields. No new ideological 
model similar to that introduced into China since 1950 has been introduced 
into Taiwan. It may be that its absence will have caused considerable 
differences in the marriage patterns, family types and kinship structures 
which characterise Taiwan and the People's Republic today.
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The majority of the population of Taiwan is made up of descendants 
of those who migrated from the Southeastern provinces of China in the 
17th and 18th centuries. Later, after 1949, a "new influx of 'mainlanders' 
arrived in Taiwan. Although the.. Japanese occupation and administration 
in Taiwan lasted for close on fifty years, the Japanese policy of maintain­
ing and utilising the existing social and economic system has caused many
i
scholars to claim that their presence had a limited direct effect on much 
of the traditional social life of the Chinese population, and that this 
was especially so in rural areas. Margery Wolf has pointed out that, 
although the Japanese had a remarkable effect on the stability, economy, 
health and communications of Taiwan, it should be noted that they made 
intensive studies of Taiwanese customary law in order to properly enforce 
it rather than destroy it (1972: 5). M. Cohen (1976), Gallon (1966: 2) 
and Barclay (1954) have also argued that the occupation government tried 
deliberately to inhibit fundamental changes in the Chinese social and 
economic order in Taiwan. In 1950, then, the province of Taiwan still 
shared the same traditional ideological model as in mainland China, but 
despite the absence of a new ideological model, the range of marriage 
patterns existing in Taiwan today shows remarkable similarities to the 
variety of conscious models of the People's Republic of China.
Arranged marriage
Arranged marriage which, in accordance with the traditional ideological 
model, is contracted between the heads of households who control the 
selection of spouses and conduct the negotiations through a go-between 
with the young partners rarely having any sight or contact with each other 
prior to marriage, is on the decline in Taiwan. Arranged marriage is said
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to be a rarity in the largest city, Taibei (Schak., 1973: 203), although 
there are still references to instances of arranged marriage in reports 
from the. capital (Tang, .1973: 132-4). In rural areas it is said to be 
more common, though still again very much on the decline (Schak, 1973: 
203). One field worker estimated that only 5-10 per cent of marriages 
in rural areas were still arranged (Arcay, 1968: 7), and in one field 
survey conducted in 1961 among 351 rural families in north, central and 
southern parts of Taiwan, only a very few respondents were reported to be 
in favour of allowing marriage negotiations to remain the exclusive 
responsibility of the parents (Yang, M . , 1962: 70). One variation of 
arranged marriage, that of child betrothal or adopted in daughter-in-law, 
tang yangxi, was reported to be quite common in Taiwan a few decades ago. 
One survey estimated that in 1925 over half the marriages negotiated in 
Taiwan were of this form ()1972: 171) . It had certain advantages in a 
society where there was some difficulty in procuring brides, it avoided 
the high costs of the normal marriage ceremonies and, above all, as 
Arthur Wolf has argued, it ensured the ascendancy of the elders and a 
certain degree of harmony in the household by raising the wife in lieu 
of a daughter (Wolf, A., 1968). According to field workers this form has 
now all but disappeared (Gallin, 1966: 164-5; Wolf, 1972; 180). The 
increase in numbers of marriageable girls due to the decline in infant 
mortility and rise in public health standards, an increased cash surplus 
available for ceremonial expenditure and the increasingly open opposition 
of young people to this arrangement, have meant that it had Ceased to be 
a safe, inexpensive and acceptable form of marriage. Instead the inter­
pretation of what is a careful and acceptable method of marriage arrange­
ment has been redefined to allow for the operation of negative sanctions 
by the young.
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New procedures of negotiation
r
The traditional sequence of ceremonial events providing for the 
selection of spouses and the negotiation of marriage agreements has been 
modified to include the 'formal meeting' of potential spouses and allows 
for their consent to the match. This innovation was introduced into the 
ceremonial framework in the 1940s and is k n o w  as miai, a Japanese term 
for an arranged meeting between prospective marriage partners (Diamond, 
1969: 52) or xiangqin, a Chinese term for meeting by mutual attraction 
(Schak, 1973: 231). Following the initial negotiations and the exchange 
of horoscopes, the go-between arranges a meeting for the young couple, 
together with their parents or some elder relative. The miai may occur 
in a public place such as a city amusement park, a movie house, or a 
restaurant, or the boy and his family may visit the girl's home where she 
may appear to serve tea and cigarettes. Whatever the venue, the miai is 
of short duration, two hours at the most, and although the young couple 
may exchange a few words or shyly glance at one another, the conversation 
mainly centres around the go-between and the adults present. It is after 
this brief meeting that the young couple are asked to express an opinion 
about the tentative choice and only after they have given their favour­
able opinion can the negotiations proceed. Through these modifications 
the young people have acquired a veto over, the conclusion of the negotia­
tions in that they could withhold their consent and at least have some 
say in whom they would not marry. This is the most common form of 
marriage negotiation in Taiwan and what is normally meant by 'modern 
marriages' in the rural areas (Diamond, 1969: 53; Bessac, 1965: 24-5), 
Although it is said to be less usual in the urban areas, anthropological 
studies would suggest that until this decade at least it was also a common
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form in the cities. A survey of undergraduate students at two universities 
in Taibei in 1961 indicated that close on 40 per cent of the 651 respond­
ents did not expect to choose their own mate (Marsh and O ’Hara, 1961: 3-4), 
and more recently more than a third of the women interviewed in Taibei 
by Norma Diamond did not have contact with their spouse until- the 
conclusion of the betrothal negotiations following the roiai ceremony 
(Diamond, 1973: 220).
This form of marriage negotiation is popular with the older generation 
for it enables them to continue to control the. selection of a spouse and 
yet be relieved of the final responsibility for the match. Few parents 
were prepared to allow the marriage negotiations to become the exclusive 
responsibility of the young, for the importance of marriage for 'family 
continuity* required that marriage still be within their control or at 
least a goodly share of their controls(Gallin, 1967: 5; Pasternak, 1972:
66). As one anthropologist has concluded, choosing a daughter-in-law 
is still a very serious business in Taiwan, and it can cost the groom's 
family half a year's income (Wolf, M., 1972: 108, 119). Each household 
negotiating the match gives due consideration to the other's economic and 
political potentialities and is anxious to improve its own prestige and 
security. Marriage alliances are seen in instrumental terms and valued 
for broadening the range of affinal ties to secure additional sources of 
capital, labour and political support (Pasternak, 1972: 61; Gallin, 1966: 
176-7)* The girl’s family wants an economic and materially stable house­
hold for their daughter, and the boy's family hopes for a large dowry 
which generally included furniture, new clothing and jewelry, as well 
as certain household cleaning items to symbolise the tasks the bride will 
perform in her husband's household. Her parents-in-law have already 
appraised her adaptability to the ways of their household, her potential
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contribution to it in terras of domestic and agricultural labour and her 
ability to bear children. The fact that she had been brought into the 
household by her parents-in-law not only weakened the conjugal tie, but 
also emphasised her dependence on and obedience to her parents-in-law 
and hence reduced the possibility of eventual household division.
Parental authority combined with the consent of the parties enabled the 
older generation to maintain their controls and at the same time be 
relieved of total responsibility in making the ultimate choice in the 
selection of spouses. Most of the anthropological field workers in Taiwan 
have reported the relief expressed by the older generation as a result of 
the new modifications. They absolve the parents of sole responsibility 
and should the marriage not turn out to be satisfactory, they can remind 
the young people that they agreed to the match and must therefore share 
some responsibility (Wolf, 1972: 102; Gallin, 1946: 206; Bessac, 1965: 24-5) 
Parents also thought that in present-day Taiwan arranged marriage was much 
more likely to end in the dissolution of the household, and their accept­
ance of the new modification was like an insurance policy taken out in 
the interests of buttressing familial solidity and stabilising and 
preserving family unity (Gallin, 1967: 6-7).
Many of the field studies of rural areas comment on the collusion 
of the young in the new modified form which allows them negative sanctions 
as opposed to initiating negotiations on their own behalf. As in the 
People's Republic of China, the initiation of the negotiations by the 
younger generation presupposes at least some form of contact, dating or 
courtship patterns, and these institutional pre-conditions are also 
lacking in rural Taiwan and not yet fully established patterns of social 
behaviour in the cities (Gallin, 1966: 202; Marsh and O'Hara, 1961: 6 ; 
Diamond, 1969: 41). From the age of eight years, except for a few
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occasions when they work side by side, village adolescents have little 
contact with others of the opposite sex,.and there are few opportunities
to meet and become acquainted in the countryside which do not attract
\
attention, embarrassment and even ridicule. The fear of rebuff, the
absence of prescriptions for their own initiation of the negotiations,
and the almost certain opposition it would arouse, caused many to bow
willingly to parental choice. They really had no particular preferences
of their own to set against those of their parents. Even in the cities,
where courting patterns were more established, couples seen together were
assumed to be formally engaged or open to the charges of promiscuity
(Diamond, 1969: 53; Schalc, 1973: 165). Some of the reasons given to
field workers for their acceptance of parental guidance and choice reveal
a basic lack of confidence on the part of the younger generation: ’I am
not able to choose one'; 'parents are more reliable'; 'I have no money
nor am X good looking1 (O'Hara, 1962: 63); or 'if parents think he or
she is acceptable then it must be all right' (Gallin, 1966: 206). It is
a lack of confidence fostered by the older generation. As a middle-aged
mother explained to another field worker,
'If you let your parents arrange your marriage for you, your 
reputation will be better. People will say that you are a 
good girl because you allow your parents to decide all this 
for you.'
(Wolf, 1972: 103)
In this manner the older generation may retain their controls and the
younger generation seems to leave the responsibility for the final selection
\
of mates to the parents and make no further attempt to actively participate 
in their own marriage negotiations (Bessac, 1965: 24-5; Gallin, 1966: 207).
The most recent innovation to be introduced into marriage negotiations 
in Taiwan is a more extensive modification of the traditional ideological
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model in that their initiation passes into the hands of the young. This 
new model gained currency in the urban areas and especially in Taibei 
among the middle classes although, according to field workers,, it is by 
no means universally practised in the cities and has barely penetrated 
the rural areas (Bessac, 1965: 24-5; Wolf, M,, 1972: 101). In a survey 
undertaken among 651 university undergraduates in Taibei, 87 per cent of 
the respondents would have liked to choose their own marriage partners, 
but only 58 per cent expected to be able to do so (Marsh and O ’Hara,
1961: 5). Those that do select their own spouse usually make their 
selection as the result of casual, informal introductions by friends 
and relatives or social mingling in peer groups at places of work or 
study or in going to and from them. Generally dating is in groups, under- 
taken indirectly through messages and letters or under some kind of 
informal chaperonage unless couples have reached an understanding that 
should lead to an engagement. The opportunities for initiating contact 
tended to circumscribe the friendship circles and make for homogamous, 
socio-economic and ethnic marriages. The most detailed study of courtship 
and patterns of marriage in Taibei illustrated that the qualities desired 
in a spouse were a combination of romantic ideals and practical consider­
ations (Schak, 1973: 220). Although the younger generation, and girls 
more than boys, identified with the cause of- romantic love and show a 
strong desire for a lasting love and companionship by'ranking common 
interests and personality traits high on the list of desirable criteria, 
women also desire a marriage which will be able to support them and give 
them financial security. Men, on the other hand, seem to be looking for 
someone who will fulfil the roles of wife and mother and display all the 
qualities that were traditionally associated with such roles, rather than 
individual companionship (Schak, 1973: 222, 229). Another study (Abbott,
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1970: 153) confirms that girls were primarily chosen as potential wives 
and mothers, and this criterion reflects the common truncation of public 
and career roles by urban middle class women in .Taibei after marriage 
(Diamond, 1973).
Dating or going for short walks, to the movies, parties or parks 
or coffee houses is generally done without the parentsT knowledge at least 
until the couple has established a firm relationship. The reason for this 
secrecy is to prevent the older generation surveying the dating partner 
as potential son- or daughter-in-law before the young people are sure 
of themselves (Schak, 1973: 211). The approval of the parents is still 
generally sought as a pre-requisite to the match, and in one recent survey 
many young people anticipated that should their parents strongly dis­
approve them would give up their date (Schak, 1973: 212). Although the 
young couple might choose their own partners, the fact that the marriage 
negotiations are still formally negotiated by the heads of households, 
who continue to employ a go-between or some other third party to arrange 
the formal engagement and exchange of gifts, . makes it difficult to 
disregard their wishes. Some parents are willing to let the young persons 
make the initial choice and check it out for themselves through friends, 
relatives or a formal go-between before embarking on the traditional 
ceremonial sequences. One field worker quoted a woman whose'son had 
married a girl he had chosen from a neighbouring household as saying
'The best thing is to let the boy and girl make their choice, 
and then have a go-between to discuss the engagement with 
both sets of parents, arrange what gifts are to be exchanged.
Then, on the wedding day, you invite relatives and friends 
to the ceremony, and have a big celebration.'
(Diamond, 1969: 55)
Young people already familiar with each other would go through the 
formalities of a miai or traditionally arranged marriage as_ jLf they were
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total strangers. Several field studies refer to the camouflage or facade 
adopted by families to suggest that a marriage conforming to the'tradi­
tional ideological model is in fact talcing place in order to maintain
\
’face’ or.acquire an aura of respectability (Diamond, 1969: 55; Schak,
1973: 213; Bessac, 1965: 24-5).
Ideological impetus for change
In examining the variety of immediate conscious models in Taiwan, 
they show remarkable similarities to those characteristic of the People's 
Republic of China, but there is one i.mportant difference. The absence of 
a new ideological model has meant that changes in marriage patterns in 
Taiwan are primarily viewed as modifications of the traditional ideo­
logical model. It is frequently the latter's characteristics which are 
used as a facade to obscure modifications and as the yardstick against 
which to measure changes in marriage negotiations. Placing the traditional 
ideological and immediate conscious models on a continuum there is no clear 
juxtaposition of old and new ideological models. The ideological impetus 
for change is weak in Taiwan and^ if anything.}change in the norms of 
family life are discouraged. Although the 1931 Family Law, still 
applicable in Taiwan, introduced some changes in these norms (see Chapter 
2), it has not so far been used in rural areas to implement changes that 
would undermine the traditional ideological model (Cohen, M., 1976: 82).
The models in the Taiwanese media tend to reflect the old ideological 
model in which traditional values and patterns of interaction are 
retained and often praised (Abbott, 1970: 165). In the media the patri­
archal sources of authority within the household are usually upheld and 
those who attempt to institutionalise changes or oppose it in any way
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are severely disadvantaged as a result and often come to a tragic end.
For example, stories portraying situations of conflict between the 
generations over the right to choose or the qualities of a spouse con­
clude in favour of the parents’ judgement. In'one of these stories, a 
couple who elope without the approval and consent of their parents come 
to an ill-fated end in which the girl commits suicide and the boy marries 
the girl originally chosen for him by his parents (Schak, 1973: 113-14). 
These morality tales promise tragedy to those who ignore the traditional 
patterns of obligation and authority which mark filial parent-child 
relations.
The concepts and norms exhibited by the foreign media circulated in 
Taiwan came closest to introducing a new ideological model in marriage 
negotiations. Periodicals, films, records and books imported from North 
America and Europe present a very different model of male-female relation­
ships, though their import is by no means unchecked by the censors and 
they are in limited circulation within Taiwan (Schak, 1973: 117).
Viewers of foreign films may learn of the movie version of courting 
patterns and marriage negotiations with their emphasis on selection by 
physical attraction and the state of being in love. Through these films 
they become aware that these love matches are the norm in Europe, North 
America and Japan (Diamond, 1969: 53). But these recent incursions of 
Western romanticism include no sustained discussion on the form and 
content of the alternative forms of negotiation such as criteria for 
choice of spouse, the appropriate age and stability of marriage and the 
symbolism of ritual and ceremonial forms, let alone a new concept of 
conjugal relations. Couples were assumed to live happily ever after once 
'Mr Right’ came along and proposed after an extremely romantic courtship. 
According to one recent study few students at a university in Taibei
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understood the content or meaning of American dating customs although 
they were all familiar with the forms they took (Schak, 1973: 2(3). The
same anthropologist observed that even the forms which dating took
\
provided little in the way of role models or reference groups, for to 
most Chinese they were either too alien and even immoral or too direct 
and brazen (Schak, 1973:170). Thus they did not constitute any well 
defined or acceptable role models for young people to follow in intro­
ducing and institutionalising new courtship rituals and marriage 
negotiations. Schak who undertook one of the most recent studies of 
marriage in Taibei has suggested that the confusion, uncertainty and 
anxiety experienced by young people there is reminiscent of that described 
by the sociologist Ai Li-chin for Republican China in 1948 (see p. 76). 
(1973: 169). Most anthropologists have concluded that the contemporary 
role models and reference groups of the media provided little competition 
for the traditional norms regarding kinship and parental authority in 
conducting marriage negotiations.
The dispersal of households and primary groups
When we turn from a study of marriage patterns to their relationship 
to the structure and function of household and primary groups, further 
and significant differences between the two social fields emerge. 
Anthropologists who have worked in Taiwan are more inclined to stress 
the primacy of economic causes in explaining the changes in the negotiation 
of marriage which have taken place in their social fields. Without 
exception, they attribute the increasing independence of the individual 
from their household and the household from the rural village or community 
to the recent industrialisation and urbanisation of Taiwan. They describe
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the rapid rate of industrialisation which has taken place in Taiwan in 
the last twenty years and the expansion of urban conglomerates to include 
numbers of textile, garment, electronics and chemical drug factories and 
their demands for a mobile labour force (Diamond, 1973: 213). The growth 
of the wage-labour market has affected life in the rural areas. The 
agricultural labourer who was primarily involved in a basically subsist­
ence type of agriculture and formely had ties to the land and the village 
community has become more and more incorporated into the market economy 
of the country. He now has widespread contacts with and knowledge of the 
urban social field. One of the major impacts of the policies of indust­
rialisation and urbanisation has been the permanent or temporary migration 
of large numbers of rural residents to work in the expanding commercial 
and industrial sector (Gallin, 1966: 2—3, 48). The concurrent expansion 
of formal education into rural areas, particularly beyond that of the 
elementary school level, meant that more young people in the village wanted 
to take advantage of the white-collar occupational opportunities opening 
up outside the village.
More and more farm households have encouraged this outward migration 
as they themselves can no longer support all their members from agricultural 
sources. The increasing ratio of head of population to land has restricted 
the possibilities of continued land division' and many families have found 
it difficult to make optimum use of all household labour on the farm.
The pressures on land are aggravated by the fact that few landowners are 
now willing to rent out their land. The land reform and recent agrarian 
policies on the side of the lessee have rendered tenanted land unprofit­
able as well as difficult to recover and sell (Pasternak, 1972: 68). As 
a result, rural households have little opportunity to augment inadequate 
holdings and instead may try to keep the family farm intact by directing
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and encouraging some of their members to take advantage of the new 
opportunities for seasonal and permanent employment to supplement the 
family income. This, had the effect of decreasing the number of persons 
involved in the agricultural sector. In 1961 it was estimated that 55 
per cent of the population were so employed in comparison to 71 per cent 
in 1915 (O’Hara, 1962: 60). In Hsin Hsing village, Gallin estimated that 
the proportion of income from agricultural sources had fallen to just 65 
per cent of the total income of each household (1966: 34-5).
Most anthropologists undertaking village studies comment on the 
importance of migration and the lure of factory work for the position of 
the younger generation within the household. Norma Diamond found that 
in K ’un Shen many of the younger people there looked for factory jobs 
in its vicinity and commuted on a daily basis (1969: 20). Marjorie Wolf 
commented on the increasing proportion of young people working in factories 
in 1968 compared to her earlier visit in 1958. She remarked that working 
in a factory after primary school was now almost as automatic for girls 
as going from the fourth to the fifth grade, and she described how 
literally hundreds of women boarded buses and trucks to go to factories 
that ringed the southern edge of Taibei (1972: 9.8-9). In Hsin Hsing 
village, Bernard Gallin found that many young villagers, especially the 
men, lived temporarily or permanently in Taibei to work in the factories 
and supplement the incomes of the village households (1966: 34-5). The 
dispersal of the jia members on a temporary or permanent basis was 
explained by the anthropologist as essentially economic in function in 
that it was a movement to diversify the economic basis of the family and 
a device to secure greater economic security (Tang, 1973: 265-6; Cohen,
M., 1976: 78). The availability of new opportunities for employment 
had had important repercussions for the role of the young within the
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household and the role of the household within the village 
community. . _
The policies of urbanisation and industrialisation with their 
concomitant effects on mobility have enabled the young to assert their 
independence from the older generation. The authority of the head of the 
household is tempered by the fact that he is no longer the sole provider 
of the annual income and the salaried younger generation is no longer 
dependent on the family estate. Moreover, it is they who contribute an 
important cash component of the family income and have acquired a new 
bargaining position with which to resist the traditional authority of the 
parents to monopolise marriage negotiations. Sons and daughters have 
proved to be less willing to return to their villages and marry a spouse 
they have had no part in selecting, let alone one they have never sighted. 
Those who do choose their own mate may in the face of sustained parental 
opposition break with their families and move away from the village.
The option to migrate, the partial and necessary dependence on cash income 
and the increasing independence of the rural household from agriculture 
has weakened the solidarity of informal social fields and dispersed 
village and lineage ties.
One of the most significant social changes affecting rural households 
in Taiwan that has been cited by anthropologists working there„?^ has been 
7 the extension of household contacts far beyond the immediate village
environs to the urban centres. The elaboration of these networks caused 
by the incorporation of the previously cohesive and tightly-knit villages 
into a broader economy less bounded by the.village has been seen to weaken 
community organisation and solidarity. Gallin is one anthropologist who 
has made much of the rapid functional deterioration in the internal social 
organisation of the village and the increasing independence of each
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individual household within it. The household no longer finds it 
advantageous to focus on inter-relationships within the village which 
in turn no longer possesses the means to meet its needs. In the 
competition for outside resources, the rural household welcomes the 
dispersal of its ties beyond the village and alliances established 
through opportune marriages have taken oh a new importance. The younger 
generation may be more independent of the rural household, but at the 
same time the older generation increasingly conceives of marriage ties 
outside the village as potential sources of additional labour, capital, 
water, loans, access to networks for support in elections and exchanges 
of visits during local festivals (Pasternak, 1972: 61). Parents in the 
rural social field themselves admit that since the conditions of their 
social environment are now so different, it may be better to relinquish 
this monopoly of the controls and modify the traditional marriage 
negotiations which still gives them some measure of control but does not 
entirely exclude participation by the younger generation (Gallin, 1967: 5).
Analogies with the People's Republic of China
In Taiwan, then, the studies of anthropologists would suggest that 
economic changes have primarily enforced adaptations to the traditional 
ideological model of arranged marriage. The independence of the individ­
ual from the rural household and the household from the village are 
identified as the significant social changes in rural Taiwan and these 
are directly attributed to the current economic policies of industrialisa­
tion and urbanisation. As for Republican China, there has been a tendency 
among the anthropologists of Taiwan to use their experience and findings 
from this province to correlate the forces working for social change and
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the factors encouraging persistence in their own social fields and in the 
People's Republic. Perhaps the anthropologist who has stretched these 
parallels to their limits is Bernard Gallin. He concluded that, although 
there were qualitative and quantitative differences between various areas 
in the People's Republic of China, there mss- no doubt in his mind that by- 
observing and analysing the nature of social change in Taiwan, anthro­
pologists derive some insights into social developments taking place 
in the People’s Republic of China. For, he says, ’many of the changes 
taking place both in Taiwan and,in the People’s Republic of China are 
primarily due to the same cause - the encroachment of urbanisation on 
a traditional agrarian culture whether enforced by the Japanese, the 
National Chinese or the Communists' (1966: 4). He suggests that it is 
part of the Communist policy of social development to break down the 
large kinship groups in order to accelerate the process of urbanisation. 
He suggests that the establishment of the rural communes is one technique 
designed to catalyse the urbanisation process. Thus he attributes the 
supposed breakdown of the traditional village and kinship and family 
relations in the People's Republic not to the introduction of communism 
and its ideological attack on such traditional Chinese concepts as large 
family and kinship groups, but as in Taiwan to similar socio-economic 
changes associated with industrialisation and urbanisation. He arrives 
at this conclusion after his studies of Taiwan where, he says,
'the process of culture change has not been under the influence 
of a communist or other new ideology. Here it appears to be 
a result of such developments as socio-economic factors and
improved communications which increasingly draw the rural
areas into closer contact and relationship with the changing
urban and industrial forms of life.'
(1966: 281)
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The negation of the new ideological model in introducing new 
marriage patterns has also been a features of the previous studies by 
scholars of the People's Republic of China. Writing in 1958, with the 
advantage of several years of direct and indirect observation since 1950, 
C.K. Yang thought that the direction of social'change under the Communist 
Party contained no new-substance (1959: 18). In the early 1960s William 
Goode analysed the links between the process of industrialisation and 
family patterns in China and concluded that the acceleration of 
industrial development and urbanisation in the People's Republic would 
continue and lead to the greater exercise of free-choice marriage and 
the establishment of some type of conjugal family (1963: 270). He based 
his conclusion as much on an important component of modernisation theory 
which links economic development and family type as on the study of 
marriage patterns in contemporary China itself. Although in this work 
he attacked the conventional formula that industrialisation undermined 
the extended family, he continued to view the individualisation and 
isolation of the nuclear or conjugal family as the most fundamental of 
the social changes associated with industrialisation. He has suggested 
that the rise of the nuclear family preceded industrialisation and was 
a pre-requisite for the establishment of the latter. Since industrial­
isation above all demanded a mobile and enterprising labour force un­
hampered by extended kin and lineage ties, he thought that the establish­
ment of the conjugal family with few reciprocal obligations between the 
generations or kin may be the independent variable. Although he con­
cludes that it may be the prior and irresistible appeal of the ideology 
of the conjugal family with its corollary of free-choice marriage to the 
oppressed, the younger and educated generation and especially women, 
which was responsible for modifying the traditional family and kinship
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structures, and he ccepWe.;, - industrialisation by the broader ideological 
and economic processes of ’modernisation1', he nevertheless continues to 
assume a universal ’fit1 between industrialisation and the small family 
system. That-is, the degree to which the extended family type has been 
-sgafUceA by the conjugal form in a social field reflects the degree 
of industrialisation and urbanisation. As the demand for a mobile and 
qualified labour force increases, so does the presence of free-choice 
marriages and conjugal households. Moreover, he argues that this is a 
universal phenomenon and in China, as in other countries, economic and 
ideological factors are uniformly working to move familial structures in 
the direction of the conjugal form (1963: 320).
In taking either Taiwan or Republican China as empirical analogies, 
or 'modernisation theory’ as a conceptual framework, Soc-^ ,) sc^ k *^=. 
like Gallin, Levy, Yang or Goode are correlating certain parallel 
characteristics in the marriage negotiations common to Republican China, 
Taiwan and the People’s Republic with common causes. My research argues 
against this correlation, for in rural areas it is the causes which 
differ. While in Republican China and Taiwan it is the economic changes 
which primarily forced adaptations to the traditional ideological model, 
in the People’s Republic the economic policies in rural areas have had 
precisely the opposite effect on the socio-economic patterns of rural 
social life. They have reinforced the interdependence of the individual 
on the household, restricted mobility, and solidified kin and village 
t.ies, all of which have worked against the implementation of the new 
ideological model of marriage. The role of the economic policies in 
inhibiting the adaptation of the new ideological model suggests that 
in the People's Republic we may have a reversal of-, the primary forces 
working for social change in rural areas. If we challenge the assumptions
3X3
that the adoption of new marriage patterns in rural China is not the
!
exclusive result of ’economic factors and closer contact and relation­
ships with the changing urban and industrial forms of life', and this 
thesis argues that we must, how are we to assess the role of the 




The emphasis on the role of ideology in introducing and maintaining 
processes of social change has been an important component of the revolu­
tionary strategy in the People’s Republic of China. In their analysis of 
the important and complex relationship between the economic ’base’ and the 
ideological superstructure, their theories of social change not only 
reject the crass determinism of .the base on the superstructure, but allow 
for the possibility that under certain circumstances ideology has its own 
power or effectivity to determine the base. The function assigned to 
ideology in Chinese society, and the emphasis placed on its communication, 
reflects the upgrading of the importance of the ideology as a level or an 
instance of the social formation and the quite central belief that 
ideology and organisation can serve as substitutes for the development 
of the material forces, at least within certain limits, until conditions 
allow industrialisation and the development of the economic base. The 
emphasis on the role of ideology as an agent of social change has been 
particularly noticeable throughout the movement to establish a new system 
of marriage. The variety of marriage patterns in China today, however, 
do not reflect the unqualified dominance of the new ideological model, 
rather they incorporate both pre-existing marriage customs and concessions 
to the new system of marriage introduced in 1950.
In the negotiation of marriage, four main types can be distinguished 
according to the patterns of control and authority which they exhibit.
They range from type (1) in which the negotiations, from their initiation 
to their conclusion, are entirely monopolised by the older generation or 
parents to the type where the controls are exclusively operated by the
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parties to the negotiations. The models, therefore, can be placed on a 
continuum according to the degree of parental and parties' participation 
in the negotiations, and in evaluating the relative weight of the control 
and authority of each, the main dividing line on the continuum coincided 
with the point at which the. parties take over the initial negotiations.
All the available evidence suggested that this point roughly coincided 
with the division into the rural and urban social fields and the dominance 
of primary groups over the influence of political associations.
In the subsequent studies of pre-marital ritual, the age of marriage, 
choice of marriage partner and ceremonial forms, there was found to be a 
close correlation between their forms and the patterns of authority and 
control characteristic of the negotiations. When the older generation 
initiated the negotiations, the preliminary procedures were much more 
likely to take the form of betrothal, whereas if the younger generation 
personally took over the initiation of the negotiations, courtship, 
albeit often at a low level of institutionalisation, became the dominant 
pre-marital form. The majority of pre-marital rituals included the 
modalities of both betrothal and courtship, for each has commonly been 
modified to provide for the mechanisms of consent or shared controls by 
parents and parties. Despite the constant efforts of the government to 
raise the age of marriage, it is likely to be nearer the legal than the 
'appropriate' age in the rural areas where the older'generation initiates 
the negotiations. In the choice of a marriage partner, whether by the 
older 'or younger generation, the customary norms of homogamy have pre­
dominated over the recommended ones of heterogamy. It seems as if the 
principles of homogamy and hypergamy defined in terms of both socio-economic 
and political status have enjoyed wide support in Chinese society, at 
least before the Cultural Revolution. The case studies incorporating
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heterogamous marriages, especially those negotiated between partners of 
differing socio-economic and urban and rural backgrounds, indicate, how­
ever, that where the younger generation initiated the marriage negotiations 
themselves, there was at least the possibility of a heterogamous marriage. 
Equally, where the negotiations were initiated.by the older generation 
they were more likely to adopt an elaborate series of prestations and 
ceremonial forms than in the negotiations initiated by the younger 
generation.
The correlation between the controls of the negotiations and the 
procedures followed at each stage of the negotiations can be summed up 
as follows: where mates are primarily acquired by persons other than the 
parties, there is more likely to be a betrothal, a lower age of marriage,
t
a homogamous or hypergamous marriage and elaborate ceremonial forms. 
Likewise, where the negotiations are conducted by the parties themselves 
there is more likely to be a period of courtship, a higher age of marriage, 
simpler ceremonial forms, and there is at least the possibility of a 
heterogamous marriage. As we have seen, most of the contemporary 
marriage patterns combine elements characteristic of both the traditional 
and new ideological models and derive from patterns of social behaviour 
evolved in the last two decades to mediate the competition between the 
older and younger generations for control of the marriage partners and 
between primary groups and political associations for the control of 
marriage patterns. The conflict between the two has commonly been resolved 
in favour of the older generation in rural areas and of the younger 
generation in the urbal social field. The projected line of social change 
proposed and introduced into China by the government in 1950 can be 
contrasted with the actual lines which social change has taken in the 
past two decades.
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In explaining the variety of marriage patterns the Chinese government 
has constantly suggested that it is the conservatism and persistence of 
old ideas which inhibit the nation-wide establishment of new marriage 
customs. In the 1950s, before and in the midst of profound economic 
changes, the introduction of new marriage patterns was seen to be dependent 
on a 'battle in which new ideas were pitted against the old' (P's C, 16 
November 1957). Since the 1950s the amount of social change has been 
correlated with the degree of exposure to, and education in, the meanings 
of the new ideological model and the ability of political associations to 
overcome the competing influences from kin, neighbours and friends. One 
article posed the problem in the following words:
'We all have our own families, parents, brothers/sisters and 
relatives. While in our own society the growth of youth 
depends mainly on the education of the Party and the State, 
the ideological influence of families and friends also 
produces an important effect on this process.'
(ZQ, 16 September 1963)
The attitudes of conservatism which characterise primary groups
have been repeatedly identified as the primary obstacle to social change
in rural areas,, and much attention has been given to the need to persuade,
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educate and convince the primary groups of the advantages of the new 
ideological model. In the role models and reference groups portrayed 
in the media, for example, the point at which change takes place is seen 
to coincide with the acceptance of the new norms by the primary groups.
In Houwang village in Fujian province, it was reported that when the 
idea of late marriage was first introduced it was the older members of 
households and kin groups who had to be persuaded of its benefits. For 
long gossip had it that those who waited to marry late were thought 'to 
be still stuck with the family, although their hair is turning grey' or 
that 'they were becoming inferior goods which nobody wants'. Apparently 
as a result of education these sayings lost their efficacy and it was at 
that point that late marriage was said to have become the common practice 
in the village (RMRB, 12 June 1973).
In appraising strategies for social change that emphasise the role 
of ideology in introducing and maintaining new directions, as in situa­
tions of 'culture contact' or in China and the Soviet Union, it is not 
uncommon to attribute the retention of old fo*rms to the degree of culture 
contact with the new ideology (Schapera, 1956) or the limits of its 
communication (Geiger, 1968), The latter example from the Soviet Union 
raises interesting parallels with the People's Republic of China for both 
Communist governments attach great importance to ideas find to will as 
levers for social change. In the Soviet Union the introduction of a new 
ideology of family, kinship and marriage has had a similar effect of 
generating conflict between the generations and the informal and formal 
social fields, and again particularly so in the rural areas. In his study 
of the role of the family in the Soviet Union, Geiger has suggested that 
the struggle between the rapid and radical changes in the orientation of 
youth fostered by the political authority and the traditionally sanctioned
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attitudes of parents in rural areas can be correlated with the degree of 
familiarity with the new ideology. He argues that the school system, 
the youth groups, the organisations and the media through which the new 
ideology is communicated, are far more effectively developed in urban 
areas than in the countryside (1968: 231). In-defence of his arguments 
he cites the evidence from Rossi and Bauer’s study of the differential 
exposure of various population groups to the mass media which has described 
the Soviet collective farmer as a person who is ’almost isolated from the 
communications network’ (1953: 658). He concludes that in this situation 
the new ideology provides little competition for the strength of 
traditional peasant religious and political attitudes.
Unlike the Soviet Union, it can be argued that in China in nearly 
every case study recorded in the media, the correspondents, both rural 
and urban based, were aware of the contents of the new ideological model. 
There was an awareness that the initiatives in the negotiation of marri­
age should have passed to the younger generation, an understanding of 
the reasons why betrothal should be discarded, an appreciation of the 
new criteria for choice of marriage partner and a consciousness of the 
advantages of raising the age of marriage and reducing the expenses and 
ceremonial associated with marriage. The correspondents might not 
necessarily agree with the new ideological model, and may even argue 
vehemently against it, but they were certainly aware'of the changes 
which it advocated. If ideological models can be demonstrated to be 
reasonably uniformly distributed, then the retention of old forms cannot 
be interpreted as manifestations of mere social conservatism or isolation 
from the communications networks. Rather, the presence of the new 
ideological model must be considered as one of the forces working for 
social change and it must be possible to isolate other variables which 
account for the varieties in marriage patterns.
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The general findings of ray research indicate that it is possible 
to isolate other factors which account for,the range of marriage patterns. 
This thesis has argued that the degree of parental control over the 
marriage negotiations is directly correlated to (a) the structure and 
function of the household and (b) the degree to which households are 
encapsulated by overlapping primary groups. These hypotheses are based 
on a coincidence of differing patterns of marriage in rural and urban 
areas with the contrasting functions of the household and primary groups 
in the rural and urban economies. What has emerged from an examination 
of the domestic groups in both the rural and urban social fields is a 
direct correlation between household composition, the economic inter­
dependence of its members and the degree of parental participation in 
the procedures of mate selection. Where, as in rural areas, the accumula­
tion of resources of the domestic group encourages the co-residence and 
econom ic interdependence of its members, the older generation has worked 
to maintain its controls over the recruitment of new members. Where, as 
in urban areas, the household is less a unit of production and consumption, 
and community facilities are more likely to service the individual house­
hold, the younger generation are more likely to have acquired a certain 
measure of control. Far from discouraging a degree of familial control 
over marriage, the new economic policies continue to allow the very 
structure and functions of the patrilocal domestic group to work against 
the implementation of new marriage patterns in the rural social field.
The introduction of new models of marriage has brought the tradi­
tional influence and authority of the primary kin and neighbourhood 
groups into competition with that of political associations. At every 
stage of the marriage negotiations the older generation was likely to 
have the support of kin and neighbours and it is their influence which the
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younger generation, even with the support of political associations, 
found difficult to counter. The degree to which they did so was found 
to vary with the immediate social environment of individuals and house­
holds. Where primary groups of kin, neighbours and friends overlapped 
and encapsulated the individual, they were more likely to provide the 
dominant reference group and unidirectional social pressures in support 
of the older generation. Moreover, it can be argued that the primary 
groups, far from being weakened as a result of the establishment of new 
political associations, have not only continued to overlap in rural 
village settlements to form a simple concrete and close-knit group, but 
that the inter-relationship within these groups has been formalised and 
institutionalised by the new demographic and economic policies. The 
reduction in migration and movement and the institutionalisation of 
economic ties within and between the villages by the reorganisation of 
the relations of production and the establishment of rural communes has 
had the effect of maintaining, if not solidifying, the bonds between the 
individual households and the primary kin and neighbourhood groups. It 
is the structure and function of the overlapping primary groups in rural 
areas which have enabled them to maintain a certain measure of solidarity, 
retain certain sanctions at their disposal and remain the primary or 
single most important reference group for the household in rural China.
In comparison* to the urban social field, the structure and function of 
the rural household has encouraged the older generation to defy the new 
ideological model and maintain their control of marriage procedures and 
it is the structure and function of primary groups in rural areas which 
has enabled them to retain these controls.
In correlating marriage patterns with both socio-economic relations 
within the household and between the households and primary kin or
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neighbourhood groups, this thesis has challenged the previous assumptions 
about social change in contemporary China. It questions the analogies 
drawn from comparable social fields which attribute change in rural 
areas to economic variables to do with industrialisation and urbanisation, 
and which negate the role of the new ideological model. It also questions 
the analyses influenced by that apparent within China itself which 
interprets the process of social change primarily in terms of the battle 
between old and new ideologies. At the very least both interpretations 
of social change operate on the.common assumption that economic and 
ideological agencies are working in a uniform direction"of social change. 
This may be so in urban China, but at the present conjuncture, the struct­
ure and function of the domestic and primary group have inhibited the 
establishment of the new ideological model in rural areas. The identifi­
cation and analysis of the specific variables working for and against 
social change within marriage patterns in rural China suggest that in 
this instance economic and ideological variables each have a certain 
sphere of operation and interact in opposition to each other.
The new ideological model of marriage has been assigned a major role 
in the conscious rearrangement of relations between the generations, the 
sexes, and between domestic, kin and other groups. Changes in the system 
of marriage have not only been primarily interpreted in terms of ideo­
logical change, but its ideology has become an important part of a 
strategy for wider social change. Reforms within the institution of 
marriage to represent new inter-personal rather than inter-group relations 
have become one of the main vehicles by which the state has intervened and 
attempted to articulatemajor changes in the relations within and between 
domestic groups.' The new forms of marriage do represent a modification 
of the relations between the generations and between the sexes and within
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kin. groups despite the fact that the traditional structures have remained 
or have even been elaborated. The fact that economic policies, and to 
a lesser extent ideology, have worked to maintain the
traditional structures of the household and primary groups suggests 
that it is the new ideological model of marriage, and to a lesser extent 
economic policies, which have modified social relations within and between 
these structures in rural areas. For instance, socio-economic and demo­
graphic factors have encouraged the maintenance or even expansion of the 
complex household, but the new ideology of marriage has worked to modify 
the patterns of authority within the household both between the generations 
and between the sexes. Despite the tension between the two variables, 
the measure of change introduced into these social relations is some 
testimony of the autonomy of ideology. That is, it can be seen to 
primarily motivate and impel changes in social behaviour despite the 
maintenance of traditional structures. At the same time the character 
of the new ideological model has itself been modified in part and shaped 
by social structures maintained by current economic policies.
Not only has the new ideological model been frequently redefined, 
but the degree of competition, tension and conflict between the aims of 
the new ideological model and the socio-economic processes have been 
responsible for the development of a variety of immediate conscious 
models. In the most recent of village studies published in the 1970s, 
the author who lived in the village of Upper Felicity for a year observed 
that despite far-reaching changes there in marriage customs, many tradi­
tional attitudes still persisted. He .thought that the nature of change 
in this institution had been more subtle than in other social institu­
tions, and it could be said to be at a 'half-way stage' that reflected 
the present stage of wider social relations and outlook in the village
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(Chen, 1973: 60). This thesis reveals that the variety in marriage 
patterns represent both a significant departure from previous marriage 
customs, a concession to the new ideological model and very significantly 
an adjustment to contemporary economic policies. The study also suggests 
that the syncretic models identified in the rural social field will only 
be substituted by the new ideological model as the dominant conscious 
model when government policies take cognisance of the fact that marriage 
not only has consequences for, but is also a consequence of socio­
economic structures. At this point ideological and economic factors may 
once again begin to combine social forces in the one strategy, a strategy 
which would uniformly substitute the procedures and symbols of marriage, 
and articulate major changes in social relations between the generations, 
the sexes, social sti-ata, and between domestic and kin groups.
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APPENDIX 1
-  ' .  ' . i '  . ’
THE MARRIAGE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OP CHINA \
\
Adopted by the Central Peopled Government Council at Its 7th Meeting 
on April 13, 1950. Promulgated on May 1, 1950 by order of the Chairman 




The feudal marriage system based on arbitrary and compulsory arrange­
ments and the supremacy of man over woman, and in disregard of the interests 
of the children, is abolished.
The New-Democratic marriage system, which is based on the free choice 
of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the 
protection of the lawful interests of women and children, in put into 
effect.
ARTICLE 2
Bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference in the re-marriage 
of widows, and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriages, 
are prohibited.
Chapter II
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 
ARTICLE 3
Marriage is based upon the complete willingness of the two parties. 




A marriage can be contracted only after the man has reached 20 years 
of age and the woman 18 years of age.
]>•
ARTICLE 5
•^ No man or woman is allowed to marry, in any of the following instances:
(a) Where the man and woman are lineal relatives by blood or where 
the man and woman are brother and sister born of the same parents or 
where the man and woman are half-brother and half-sister. The question 
of prohibiting marriage between collateral relatives by blood (up to the 
fifth degree of relationship) is determined by custom.
(b) Where one party, because of certain physical defects, is sexually 
impotent.
(c). Where one party is suffering from venereal disease, mental 
disorder, leprosy or any other disease which is regarded by medical science 
as rendering- a person unfit for marriage.
ARTICLE 6 .
In order to contract a marriage, both the man and the woman should 
register in person with the people’s government of the district or town­
ship in which they reside. If the proposed marriage is found to be in 
conformity with the provisions of this Law, the local people's government 
should, without delay, issue marriage certificates.
If the proposed marriage is not found to be in conformity with the 
provisions of this Law, registration should not be granted.
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Chapter III
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 
ARTICLE 7
Husband and wife are companions living together and enjoy equal 
status in the home.
ARTICLE 8
Husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist and look 
after each other, to live in harmony, to engage in productive work, to 
care for their children and to strive jointly for the welfare of the 
family and for the building up of the new society.
ARTICLE 9
Both husband and wife have the right to free choice of occupation 
and free participation in work or in social activities.
ARTICLE 10
Husband and wife have equal rights in the possession and management 
of family property.
ARTICLE 11 .
Husband and wife have the right to use his or her own family name.
t
ARTICLE 12
Husband and wife have the right to inherit each other's property.
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Chapter IV
RELATIONS BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN I
\ ’ '
ARTICLE 13
Parents have the duty to rear and to educate their children; the 
children have the duty to support and to assist their parents. Neither 
the parents nor the children shall maltreat or desert one another.
The foregoing provision also applies to foster-parents and foster- 
children.
Infanticide by drowning and similar criminal acts are strictly 
prohibited.
ARTICLE 14
Parents and children have the right to inherit one another's property. 
ARTICLE 15
Children born out of wedlock enjoy the same rights as children born 
in lawful wedlock. No person is allowed to harm them or discriminate 
against them.
Where the paternity of a child b o m  put of wedlock is legally 
established by the mother of the child or by other witnesses or material 
evidence, the identified father must bear the whole -or part of the cost 
of maintenance and education of the child until the age of 18.
With the consent of the mother, the natural father may have custody 
of the child.
With regard to the maintenance of a child b o m  out of wedlock, if 
its mother marries, the provisions of Article 22 apply.
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ARTICLE 16
Neither husband nor wife may maltreat or discriminate against








Divorce is granted when husband and wife both desire it. In the 
event of either the husband or the wife alone insisting upon divorce, 
it may be granted only when mediation by the district people’s govern­
ment and the judicial organ has failed to bring about a reconciliation.
In cases where divorce is desired by both husband and wife, both 
parties should register with the district people's government in order 
to obtain divorce certificates. The district people's government, after 
establishing that divorce is desired by both parties and that appropriate 
measures have been taken for the care of children and property, should 
issue the divorce certificates without delay.
When one party insists on divorce, the district people’s government 
may try.to effect a reconciliation. If such mediation fails, it should, 
without delay, refer the case to the county or municipal people’s court 
for decision. The district people's government should not attempt to 
pr*event or to obstruct either party from appealing to the county or 
municipal people’s court. In dealing with a divorce case, the county 
or municipal people's court should, in the first instance, try to bring 
about a reconciliation between the parties. In case such mediation fails, 
the court should render- a decision without delay.
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After divorce, if both husband and wife desire the resumption of 
marriage relations, they should apply to the district people’s i govern­
ment for a registration of re-marriage. The district people’s govern-
\
ment should accept such a registration and issue certificates of re­
marriage.
ARTICLE 18
The husband is not allowed to apply for a divorce when his wife is 
pregnant, and may apply for divorce only one year after the birth of the 
child. In the case of a woman applying for divorce, this restriction 
does not apply.
ARTICLE 19
In the case of a member of the revolutionary army on active service 
who maintains correspondence with his or her family, that army member’s 
consent must be obtained before his or her spouse can apply for divorce.
Divorce may be granted to the spouse of a member of the revolutionary 
army who does not correspond with his or her family for'a period of two 
years subsequent to the date of the promulgation of this Law. Divorce 
may also be granted to the spouse of a member of the revolutionary army, 
who had not maintained correspondence with his or her family for over 
two years prior to the promulgation of this Law, and who fails to 
correspond with his or her family for a further period of one year 
subsequent to the promulgation of the present Law.
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Chapter VI
MAINTENANCE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN AFTER DIVORCE 
ARTICLE 20
The blood ties between parents and children are not ended by the
divorce of the parents. No matter whether the father or the mother
has the custody of the children, they remain the children of both parties.
After, divorce, both parents continue to have the duty to support 
and educate their children.
After divorce, the guilding principle is to allow the mother to 
have the custody of a breast-fed infant. After the weaning of the child, 
if a dispute arises between the two parties over the guardianship and an 
agreement cannot be reached, the peopleTs court should render a decision 
in accordance with the interests of the child.
ARTICLE 21
If, after divorce, the mother is given custody of a child, the father
is responsible for the whole or part of the necessary cost of the main­
tenance and education of the child. Both parties should reach an 
agreement regarding the amount and the duration of such maintenance 
and education. Lacking such an agreement, the peopleTs court should 
render a decision.
Payment may be made in cash, in kind or by tilling land allocated 
to the child.
An agreement reached between parents or a decision rendered by the 
people’s court in connection with the maintenance and education of a child 
does not obstruct the child from requesting either parent to increase the 
amount decided upon by agreement or by judicial decision.
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ARTICLE 22
In the case where a divorced woman re-marries and her husband is 
willing to pay the whole or part of the cost of. maintaining and educating 
the child or children by her former husband, the father of the child or 
children is entitled to have such cost of maintenance and education 
reduced or to be exempted from bearing such cost in accordance with 
the circumstances.
Chapter VII
PROPERTY AND MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE 
ARTICLE 23
In case of divorce, the wife retains such property as belonged to 
her prior to her marriage. The disposal of other family property is subject 
to agreement between the two parties. In cases where agreement cannot be 
reached, the people's court should render a decision after taking into 
consideration the actual state of the family property, the interests of 
the wife and the child or children, and the principle of benefiting 
the development of production.
In cases where the property allocated to the wife and her child 
or children is sufficient for the maintenance and education of the child 
or children, the husband may be exempted from bearing further maintenance 
and education costs.
ARTICLE 24
In case of divorce, debts incurred jointly by husband and wife 
during the period of their married life should be paid out of the 
property jointly acquired by them during this period. In cases where
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no such property has been acquired or in cases where such property is 
insufficient to pay off such debts, the husband is held responsible for 
paying them. Debts incurred separately by the husband or wife should 
be paid off by the party responsible. p
ARTICLE 25 " - . t
After divorce, if one party has not re-married and has maintenance 
difficulties, the other party should render assistance. Both parties 
should work out an agreement with regard to the method and duration of 
such assistance; in case an agreement cannot be reached, the people’s 




Persons violating this Law will be punished in accordance with law. 
In cases where interference with the freedom of marriage has caused 
death or injury to one or both parties, persons guilty of such inter­
ference will bear responsibility for the crime before the law.
ARTICLE 27
This Law comes into force from the date of its promulgation.
In regions inhabited by minority nationalities in compact 
communities, the people's government (or the Military and Administrative 
Committee) of the Greater Administrative Area or the provincial people’s 
government may enact certain modifications or supplementary articles in 
conformity with the actual conditions prevailing among minority
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nationalities in regard to marriage. But such measures must be 





SELECTED CASE STUDIES -
The following six letters to the press are representative of those 
used' in this study. In common, they give some background information 
about the correspondents, the expectations of friends, kin and peers and 
the kinds of dilemmas they experienced in negotiating a marriage. 
Examples have been chosen to give some idea of the variation in length 
and detail, the subject matter and the degree of conflict and anxiety 
expressed by the correspondents.
The negotiation of marriage
The first two letters are to do with the preliminary negotiations 
to marriage. The first represents the type of situation in which young 
people might have pressure put on them to be married. It illustrates a 
case of anxiety induced by conflict between the competing traditional 
inter-generational and new conjugal ties. In the second example the 
parties have themselves already initiated the negotiations for marriage, 
but the older generation have refused their consent to the match.
(a) Letter from Cheng Shuizhi of Anhui Medical College published in 
Zhongguo Qingnian 12 February 1963:
I have a problem which is giving me a great headache. Please let 
me have some advice on the best solution to my problem.
336
To begin with, I became a student at the Anhui Medical College two 
years;: ago. Last year in November my mother died of an illnessj and left
my father, a younger brother and younger sister at home. On my return
\
\
there during the winter vacation, my father said that without a housewife 
in the family, cooking and washing up gave them a great headache. In 
order that they have someone to manage the household, my father asked 
me if I would take a wife as a way out. My friends, relatives and 
neighbours joined him in persuading me. But I feel I cannot go along 
with them for several reasons. First as a student, I could not settle 
down without getting distracted from my studies. Secondly I have not 
yet found a girl I love who can double as a capable housekeeper.
Thirdly to plunge blindly into an ’arranged1 marriage would jeopardize 
any future happiness. It would be a great problem if family quarrels 
were the result of the choice of a wrong partner. But their argument 
is that as a filial son, I should go along with them, even if I have 
something to lose. Over one year has elapsed since their request. I 
have remained firm in my stand, but I feel very disturbed because some 
people have called me an unfilial son. The problem weighs heavily on 
my mind. I cannot concentrate on my study and work.
Comrade editor, what does ’filial piety1 mean? Am I an unfilial 
son because I turn my back on an arranged marriage?
(b) Letter from Chen Hongting, Shaolcuan, published in Nanfang Ribao 
12 May 1962:
I am a cadre of a government organ. I was in love with a girl named 
Liu Muxue whom I was at school with. We prepared to get married last 
year as we both felt that our mutual love had ripened and that she was
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leaving school for work. Before the Spring Festival this year, I told 
the Secret" to both our parents'. Contrary to ray expectations, Liu 
Muxue's mother strongly opposed our marriage, saying that we could not 
be married and that my income was too small. At first my girlfriend did 
not mind very much about her parent's attitude-, for she thought that her 
mother's muddle-headedness would give way to a reasonable attitude within 
a short time. But when we recently mentioned our matrimonial plans again, 
Liu's mother made quite a scene. She strongly voiced her disapproval and 
accused her daughter of being ungrateful to her. Although Liu knew that 
her mother's attitude was not right, she also felt that after all these 
years she was greatly indebted to her mother for having brought her up.
She became very depressed by her mother's attitude^ and feeling she was 
in a dilemma, she began to have second thoughts.
Comrade editor, I really do not know how to deal with this awkward 
situation. I would be grateful for some ideas and advice on how to 
resolve this situation and.fulfil my dreams for our marriage.
Choice of marriage partner
In both the following letters, the correspondents describe how they 
had a choice-of two potential spouses. Although they both in the end 
choose a spouse according to the criteria set down by the new ideological 
model, they describe the thought sequences and sources of influence 
involved in the process of making the choice. It is for the latter 
reasons that the letters are interesting.
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(a) Letter from Gong Guihua published in Zhongguo Funu, 1 May 1964:
I am a cadre assigned to the lower level. In the course of choosing 
my prospective husband, I also have had a miserable time.
When I worked in a xian department store in 1958, I got acquainted 
withf a college student, studying in Nanjing. He was an upright man, 
sincere and honest. Before long, we fell in love.
Something unpleasant happened during our third meeting. As he 
went back home to visit his parents when his school closed for the summer 
vacation in 1959, he availed himself of the opportunity to stay in my 
place for half a month. In the beginning, we got along with each other 
very well. When I went to work in the daytime, he read books. In the 
evening, we either went to the cinema or took a stroll in the park. 
Several days later, he appeared to be rather reluctant to keep my 
company in the cinema house or in the park, for he would often tell me 
to go to bed a little earlier, even saying that staying out late and 
having a good time every evening would affect my work the following day.
I also found out that he would read books whenever he had time. When I 
asked him to take me out and have some fun, he would tell me'what he 
read from the book. I soon realized he was like a ’bookworm1. His life 
was too dull- and he had no tender feelings for me. I therefore became 
dissatisfied with him.
It was at this moment that an old schoolmate of mine introduced me 
to a boy friend from the city. This man was more than ten years older 
than I, and apart from being quite wealthy, he was very tender to me.
He knew how to please me and would occasionally take me out, such as 
taking a stroll in the street or in the park and patronizing restaurants. 
He even told me, ’If you like it, I. shall be pleased to buy you some
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woollen dress material.' Things like these impressed me greatly and, 
therefore, very soon we developed fond feelings for one another.
Although X had the feeling that he was rather old, he had the advantage 
of being rich. But from his speech and utterances, I found that his 
thinking was not healthy enough and he lacked the vigorous spirit of 
youth. For instance, when X asked him why he was fond of me, he said,
'You are young and attractive, so how can X not like you? For example, 
who is not fond of playing with a pretty bird?’
After sizing them up by comparing one with the other, X found that 
both were admirable but at the same time not lovable at all. For one 
was upright and honest and had the ambition to forge ahead, while the 
other, though backward in thinking, was tender and rich. I was really 
at a loss to know \tfhich of the two I should love. Xt was at this moment 
that somebody criticized me for ignoring political factors when choosing 
a prospective husband and for being susceptible to monetary inducements. 
After hearing these words, ideological struggle within me became more 
intense. I began to suffer insomnia at night and a dizzy spell in the
daytime. I also often made errors when doing my work.
The leadership of the company held talks with me several times, 
advising me to adopt a correct attitude toward the question of love and 
marriage and urging me to give first place to politics when choosing a 
husband. What the leadership told me was right, but my ideological 
problems remained unsolved. To help me further clarify ray mind, the 
organization then especially sent for my mother and my uncle who worked 
in the xian committee. My mother told me: 'You should choose an ambitious 
and progressive-minded young man as your husband. It is not right for 
you to be taken in by people who have money.' My uncle also tried to
give me a piece of good advice by saying: 'You are not clear about two
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problems when you are in love. One is: what kind of tender feelings do 
you need most? The other is: what are your major conditions for choosing 
a husband? What young people need today is the revolutionary emotions 
of the proletariat and not the vulgar, tender feelings of the bourgeoisie. 
The basis for developing proletarian emotions is the sharing of the same 
interests, aspirations and ways of doing things, and cherishing such a 
warm love for socialism that one engages in selfless study, work and 
labour when building a fine, socialist motherland. Vulgar tender feelings 
such as those cherished by the bourgeoisie should be rejected. When 
choosing a husband, you must firmly adhere to the principle of giving 
first place to politics, for ideological progress is a very important 
factor.'
I accepted the advice patiently given me by the leadership, my 
mother and my uncle and resolutely rejected the older suitor. I resumed 
correspondence with the college student after the Spring Festival in 1960, 
telling him in detail what had transpired. He was not angry with me. 
Instead, he said in his reply: 'This is because you are young and lack 
the experieh.ee. You took the wrong steps because you were influenced by 
old ideas. Such mistakes are excusable.'
We were married in 1961. My husband became a teacher in the local 
middle school while I took part in farm production. We encouraged each 
other, were considerate to each other, and got along very well.
I realize now that in looking for a prospective husband, one should 
proceed from the angle of giving first place to political factors, other­
wise no true love can be found. Since Xiao Li has not done his work well 
and has cared little for his own political progress, he is not worth 
loving. Since Comrade Wang Lan's friend is a League member and because 
both of you are getting along very well and know how to love and help
fv
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each other, is this not a good foundation for developing your love for 
each other? I hope you will get rid of old ideas, firmly put politics 
in the commanding position, and choose your revolutionary partner who 
shares your ambitions, interests, aspirations and ways of doing things.
(b) Letter from Wang Aqiu in reply to a letter written by Wang Lan 
previously published in Zhongguo Funu. The letter below was published 
on 1 September 1964:
Comrade Wang Lan:
I read your letter to Zhongguo Funu with great interest.
To tell the truth, the difficult problem of yours is not much different 
from the problem I had for a time in the past. Yet with the help of * 
our organization and comrades I finally got over it. I will describe 
to you my problem and how I finally resolved it.
I had a boy friend a year ago. A man of bitter origin, he had a 
deep affection for the Party and a strong aspiration for progress, 
worked very hard and led a simple life. But his job was an ordinary one 
and his wages were low. While we were getting along very well, unexpectedly 
another comrade came my way. He was a technical worker, earning more than 
my friend mentioned above and leading a more admirable life. But, 
politically, this man was backward. At that time, I felt the same as 
you did: to rest love on the foundation of money was both undesirable 
and unreliable. I therefore positively turned down his courtship.
Unexpectedly, my family and some neighbours heard this thing, and 
a slight trouble then followed. Some advised me: 'Your family of five 
depends on you for support. Why not choose one who earns more to help 
your family?’ Others said: ’You still do not face the reality when
■ e
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you are not well off!' Still others called me a 'fool1, saying:
'You simply ask for it*’
To tell the truth, my head had been sober and my attitude had been 
firm enough. When these people 'beat the drum’, however, I was confounded 
for a time. X thought: ’They are right. While it is not right to seek 
enjoyment of life in choosing a husband,.yet the problem of livelihood 
remains a problem of livelihood. How can the problem of livelihood be 
linked with the problem of class stand!’ But on second thoughts, I still 
felt that it was not good to link marriage with ’money’. Thus my mind 
went through a struggle. What to do? After turning it over and over in 
my mind, I approached my organization for help. My organization warmly 
helped me and gave me this advice: 'One’s conception of love is linked 
to one’s outlook on life. A revolutionary youth ought to establish a 
revolutionary conception of love.’ At the same time, they encouraged 
me: 'A revolutionary youth must dare to draw a dividing line against the 
old thought. This dividing line must be drawn clearly and without 
ambiguity and adulteration. You must dare to initiate new customs and 
habits and must never let the confused noise dizzy your head and soften 
your ears. You must stand firm!’ At first, I could not fully grasp 
what my organization said. I went over ’the revolutionary youth’ and 
’revolutionary conception of love’ word by word. After turning it over 
in my mind for a long time, I came to understand that what the Party 
said was to remind me that a revolutionary must think of revolution in 
what he thinks, says and does. Then I went over in my mind ’whether the 
problem of livelihood is a long way from the problem of class stand’.
When I compared what my organization said with the words of those people,
I felt that a dividing line did exist between the two. What my organiza­
tion said was that revolution must be placed in the first position while
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what those people said was that money must be placed in the first 
position. Clearly these were different.words spoken from different
stands. Oh, how stupid I was that I should forget Chairman Mao’s
\
teachings! Chairman Mao taught us to be good at viewing things from 
the standpoint of class analysis. It suddenly dawned upon me that this 
was "hot merely a question whether it was good to choose this or that man, 
nor merely a question of how to solve the ’realistic' problem. It 
reflected a struggle between two conceptions of love!• I deeply realized 
that the problem of livelihood is not a long way from the class stand 
and that livelihood is permeated with class struggle! If one makes a 
revolution when he is in office, he must not forget revolution when he 
is at home. One makes a revolution within the 8 hours (or work) and 
must not forget revolution outside the 8 hours (in his spare time).
Nevertheless, my recognition of this point does not mean that I had 
solved every problem. I still thought that life would be better if I had 
more money; even if it was only a smal? amount of money, I would not 
have to be so frugal. How wonderful it would be if I found one whose 
thought is good and who earns more money! But I suppressed this thought 
as soon as it raised its head. I blamed myself: How could a revolution- 
ary open a back door to himself! Looking at the Poems of Revolutionary 
Martyrs•at my bed side, I told myself: The Party is right; a revolutionary 
must be pure and must not be vulnerable to corruption in money matters!
However, reality was still reality. After getting married one will 
have to organize a family life. I sized up the 'reality' and found that 
our 'reality' would not be so bad. We would have enough food, clothing 
and articles for use. The only point would be that we have to be frugal. 
After all, one must respect facts in one's life, otherwise greediness will 
have no limit, and will gradually wear away one's revolutionary will.
• ■ C '
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Once, while we were having a chat, he casually took a book from the 
book-shelf and opened it for me to read. It was written by martyr 
Fang Zhimin, who said: fA clean and simple life, which is poor but un­
tarnished is precisely where we revolutionaries can surmount numerous 
difficulties.' I thought it over: He is right. Even when we .have
children after our marriage and our burden is heavier, we can be more 
frugal and we can work harder, which would mean nothing to us. Once 
we talked about this question: a revolutionary should look forward and 
take a broad view. -One may not confine oneself to the small circle of 
family. One will be happy and open-minded if one links with the collect­
ive. Our country is indeed becoming ever more prosperous. The boat 
will rise with the river, and our life will get better day by day.
When I thought of this, I could not help laughing. What did I laugh at?
I felt that those who said I 'did not face the reality' did not face 
reality themselves!
After this struggle of mind, I am enlightened and am more resolved.
I have made up my mind to persuade my family to change their view, and 
I will continue my good relations with my friend. This twist and turn 
has given me a profound education. We revolutionaries must not forget 
revolution. Otherwise, we shall fall into the trap of bourgeois and 
feudal ideas. If we' fall into the trap, it would be too late to repent!
Comrade Wang Lan, let us encourage each other to deal with the 
problem of livelihood in the name of revolution.
Age of marriage
These two letters were written as part of correspondences on the 




following conflicting advice - on the one hand the educational materials 
recommend that they adopt the new ideological model and marry at a 
later age; on the other hand their own reference groups or slightly 
older peers were having difficulty in finding a 'suitable' mate. These 
letters are typical of great numbers of letters on this subject which 
display a great deal of anxiety as the result of similar competing 
influences and experiences.
(a) Letter fron Yin Jie, Peking Machinery Plant published in Gongren 
Ribao, 18 September 1962:
Although the 'numerous benefits of getting married late' have been 
mentioned time and again, many people have not clarified their thinking 
on this matter. I think all these benefits only give some consolation 
to a number of single persons. As a matter of fact, only those possessing 
skills and drawing higher wages can manage to remain single even though 
they are older in age. Others cannot afford to do so. Around here, for 
instance, the following kind of talk has been circulated: 'Look for 
your mate and hurry up before it is too late! A man cannot find his 
mate when he is old, and a woman is no longer wanted when she is old.'
These words have put great pressure on us. I am nearly twenty-six years 
old and although I have studied and worked hard, I have become vexed and 
worried lately. A number of people about my age also have the same feeling. 
It seems a bit early for people of our age to think of falling in love and 
getting married, as after all the necessary conditions are still inadequate 
and besides what is more important at present is for us to apply our 
efforts indefatigably to our studies and work. But what shall I do if I 
fail to find my mate when I grow older year after year? After pondering
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over this matter, I am in conflict with myself and do not know what to
■. rdo. I have therefore entered into the discussion sponsored by your 
newspaper in the hope of getting a solution to ray problem. \
(b) Letter from Fan Zhenji, Kunming, published in Gongren Ribao,
11 September 1962:
Having seen Comrade Tao Cheng’s article entitled’’A Talk with our 
Young Friends on the Problems of Marriage’ published in your paper of 
28 July, I learned that many advantages can be reaped from late marriage. 
Yet in try mind there is still some worry and anxiety that I may not be 
able to get a wife when I grow older.
Many of my male comrades around the age of thirty have already 
built for themselves certain foundations either with respect to work, 
or study or economic power, and conditions really permit them to fall 
in love and get married. As a matter of fact, they do want to fall in 
love and get married. However, girls do not wish to fall in love with 
men of their age. Girls are unhappy when they are told that their boy­
friends are men of around thirty years: 'Who would marry a man who has
already lived half of his life?1 they would say. Unable to find a wife,
these men become pessimistic and disappointed, and now regret that they 
have wasted their youth. I am going to be twenty-six years soon, and
although on the one hand I feel it is a bit too early to get married and
\
I want to wait till I am older, I am also worried that I may be like
these comrades around me. What should X do?.
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The ceremonial of marriage
This letter is unlike some of the others in that it does not ask 
for advice, but reveals the process by which the correspondent first 
discarded the old and adopted new customs. It is more self-congratulatory
in tone that the former ones, and it has to be recognized that the
/
correspondent may well be exaggerating both the strength of the old 
customs and the degree of opposition which he had to overcome in order 
to substitute new practices. Nevertheless the- case study is an interest­
ing one for it does give some idea of the rationales for the old customs 
and their persistence, detailed descriptions of both old and new customs 
and the competing influence of government cadres and primary groups in 
the village arena. It is evident from other letters and materials that 
the situation and arguments described by the correspondent were not 
unusual at that time.
Letter from Lo Donglin published in Zhongguo Qingnian, 19 November 1964:
I was married in the early part of February this year. My wife,
Yao Jin xiang is a member of the Yaojin. production team, Wangjia 
brigade, in the adjacent village. We are both poor peasants, basic-level 
militia fighters, as well as 'five-good* commune members. We broke from 
outmoded rules and old customs for local weddings handed down from one 
generation to another and conducted our wedding frugally and plainly, 
without giving a wedding banquet and without accepting 'tokens of human 
feelings' [wedding gifts]. We held a new-style wedding ceremony, doing 
away with all those feudal and superstitious practices such as 'betrothal 
money* and betrothal gifts, and the ornate sedan chair for the bride.
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Our total wedding expenses amounted to only Y2.80. We bought two catties of 
fruit drop>s (candy), saving both money and man-hours, and yet still turned 
our happy occasion into an evening of joyful'bus tie. As a consequence, we 
were commended by the commune and the brigade. We ourselves also were proud 
of our stand, and our parents also held that our wedding had been properly 
conducted. Now let us talk about the circumstances of how our wedding was 
conducted.
I had known Yao Jinxiang for several years. We developed deep feelings 
for each other in the course of seeing each other many times and thus we 
secretly were in love. When both families learned of our close association 
at the beginning of last year, they also gave their consent and made prepar­
ations for going ahead with betrothal procedures. My mother-in-law, however, 
proposed this condition - she asked for Y300 as betrothal money for buying 
betrothal gifts, besides asking for clothes made of pique, woollen under­
wear, as well as chickens, fish and meats... She also said, 'These are old 
rules handed down from one generation to another and nobody can do without 
them.1 .If my wedding was conducted according to these old rules, the ex­
penses would come to Y400-500. My aging father was at the end of the rope, 
but he held that there was no reason why the other party, having taken great 
pains in bringing up their daughter, should not demand and accept the 
'betrothal money'. Therefore, he called on his relatives and his friends 
to borrow money for meeting the expense. When I found that things 
were not going in the right way, I asked a cadre to-go to the family of the 
bride and talk to them and patiently persuade them to break with the old 
rules. I myself called on Yao Jinxiang and told her: 'By asking me for this 
sum of money, Jinxiang, your mother has' given me a difficult problem. 
However, if you agree, I shall be ready to get a loan. But how shall we 
manage to get by in the future? Will you please think it over?’ Jinxiang 
said, ’Your difficulty is also mine. I don't favour borrowing money for
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the purpose of using it as a gift. No matter what happens, we shall be 
together always. Even if your family is poorer than I- think, I will be 
with you. Please be assured.that I will not loathe poverty and love 
wealth! I shall see ray mother and convince her.’ Later, when Yao Jinxiang 
reasoned with her mother, her mother replied, ?I have raised and brought 
you up and do you think this little sum of betrothal money is enough? In 
the days of the past, at least two times the amount would be asked for.1 
Yao Jinxiang said, !If you put it this way, are you not trying to sell me 
to another in marrying me off? 1 When Jinxiang found that her mother was 
speechless, she went on to say: ^ince we are now in a new society, we shall 
make others suffer more if we insist on doing things according to the old 
rules of the past and, besides, we may be opposed by all the others!1 When 
Jinxiang told the story of a relative, named Zhou Aifei, and how he was so 
heavily indebted after his marriage several years ago with the money he got 
by selling his house and raising a loan that he had to repay the loan year 
after year after he was married. Besides, the couple often quarrelled and 
fought one another - the consequences of asking for betrothal money1,
After hearing the story, Jinxiang1s mother had tears in her eyes. She 
no longer insisted that I should give her !betrothal money1 and 
betrothal gifts. This was how we became betrothed without spending a 
cent.
Last year my family raised two head of fat pig and 20-30 chickens 
and ducks in preparation for a big feast of 25 tables to entertain thefr 
relatives and friends on my wedding day, to show that they had straightened 
their backs and were living well year after year and in order to conduct 
a presentable and well-attended wedding for their son. When I learned 
of this, I felt that something was wrong, but I had no good reasons to 
dissuade my parents from their folly. Although I kept this doubt to 
myself for several months, I was always thinking of means to convince
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my parents whenever I did my work, had my meals or lay in bed. At the 
beginning of this, year, I accompanied brigade cadres to the commune to 
attend a meeting of all the three grades of cadres. At the meeting, 
the secretary of the Party branch of the commune said that since the 
agricultural situation this year was good, some commune members were 
getting married. He urged Party and League members, cadres, and activists 
from among poor and lower-middle peasants attending the meeting to take 
the lead in conducting weddings frugally, breaking from outmoded rules 
and old customs and establishing new social practices. As I was determined 
to become one who would be a pioneer in conducting a wedding frugally, I 
told my views on the matter to ray parents. My father, however, said,
'There is only one marriage in a man's lifetime and therefore it is 
worthwhile to be wasteful just for once. We should conduct your wedding 
presen tab ly and in a worthy way.' My mother then told me how she was 
married to my father in the past: My father was a native of Liencheng,
Jiangxi province. Because he gave a small wedding party due to lack of 
money when he was married here, he was- described by gossipers as 'miserly' 
or 'not generous' and of having brought disrepute to the family. The 
gossip was not quietened until after he had borrowed 35 pieces of silver 
dollars from the landlord for another small dinner party of several tables. 
My mother said, 'We were poor in the past so we could not afford to give 
a big wedding feast. Thanks to Chairman Mao's blessing, we have now 
straightened our backs and are living well. We have our own supplies of 
food, pigs, chickens and ducks and practically everything. Even without 
our present prosperity, we would have to give a big wedding banquet even 
with borrowed money if we were poor, for we can no longer stand the 
ridicule of other people that our family is 'miserly' and 'not generous'.
A few days later, the secretary of the Party branch of the commune and
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work group called at our home to talk to my parents. The secretary of 
the Party branch also specifically worked out an account for our family. 
He figured that if we gave a dinner party, invited guests would have to 
bring gifts with them and since the expenditure of several hundred yuan 
and the consumption of several hundred catties-of polished rice would be 
a burden on us, the expression of the 'tokens of human feelings' on the
i ' *
part of the invited guests would also be a burden on them, and besides 
one's indebtedness would affect one's livelihood in the future and would 
even more so affect collective production. The secretary of the Party 
branch explained that if this sum of money.was used to meet ordinary 
expenses, the family would be able to live much better and if these 
several hundred man-hours were used to improve low-yield farmland, the 
whole family would be able to increase its income, besides making a con­
tribution to the State. After listening to the Party secretary's sincere 
explanations and sound reasoning, my parents appeared to have been 
impressed. They consulted with each other and then agreed to conduct a 
new-style wedding ceremony, without giving a dinner party. Later, the 
two head of pig, raised by our family especially for the auspicious 
occasion and weighing each over 100 catties, were sold to the State.
When word of our impending wedding was quickly passed around in the 
whole brigade, many of our relatives and friends called on us one after 
another to learn of the wedding date. They began to prepare for the 
wedding presents. Some of them went around to borrow money while others 
called at the credit cooperative to withdraw their savings deposits.
Some others went to the market to sell their pigs. All of them were 
certain that they were to attend the wedding banquet. Although I told 
them repeatedly that no dinner party would be given, they just would not 
believe my word. According to old customs and practices, a big dinner
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party would always be given whether a wedding or a funeral was conducted, 
and the relatives and friends of the family on such an occasion would 
come to offer their 'tokens of human feelings'.,' A saying popular in this 
village goes: 'Expression of human feelings is an urgent as repaying a 
loan and the cooking pot has to be carried on the head to be sold.'
Thip means that expression of 'human feelings' is even more urgent than 
the repayment of a loan and if one has no money to do so, one has to sell 
one’s cooking pot to meet this obligation. People of the older generation 
told me that this practice had .in the past brought much suffering to many 
people, for the person who gave the dinner party became heavily indebted 
while those who gave away tokens of 'human feelings' were also heavily 
indebted. I pondered over the matter day and night to find ways of 
persuading them not to send me tokens of 'human feelings'.
X again.consulted with brigade cadres. The secretary of the Party 
branch told me that the action in giving tokens of 'human feelings' was 
prompted by word of the impending wedding banquet and that if my family 
insisted that no dinner party would be given, other people would also not 
bring tokens of 'human feelings'. The Party secretary went on by saying: 
'Accepting tokens of "human feelings" is one of the means with which the 
exploiting classes of the old society used to exploit and enfetter the 
labouring people. Since this is a feudal and traditional practice that 
impairs the interests of the labouring people, we young people should 
resolutely fight it.' I therefore made a round of door-to-door visits 
to persuade them not to bring any tokens of 'human feelings' when 
attending my wedding and I told them explicitly that no dinner party 
would be given and no wedding presents would be accepted. Brigade cadres 
took advantage of meetings of cadres and commune members to assist me in 
explaining, by patient persuasion, to my clansmen and relatives the reasons
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involved, and explaining thoroughly the advantages of the new practice 
and the disadvantages of the old practice. After repeated publicity and 
explanations, all of our relatives and friends realized that the practice
I
of giving tokens of 'human feelings’ would entail greater losses than 
gains. As a matter of fact, none of them was willing to increase his 
own burden and to ask for trouble. When my cousin, Huang Jinlin, heard 
that I was going to get married, he was short of money and therefore he 
borrowed Y45 from the credit cooperative to be used as a 'gift packet'. 
Another relative of mine, named Wang Xincai, from an adjacent production 
team, upon learning of my impending wedding, sold his suckling for Y18, 
to be used also as a token of 'human feelings’. Having explained to them 
by patient persuasion, I succeeded in convincing both of them to give up 
the idea of sending me wedding presents. Huang Jinlin returned the loan 
to the credit cooperative while Wang Xincai bought back his sucking 
for Y18, the amount which he intended as a token of ’human feelings1 
for me. Both were very happy for having done so. The rest of over 60 
families of relatives and friends, who were ready to give ’gift packets' 
[wedding presents], also stopped doing so.
As my wedding date was fast approaching, was it appropriate for the 
bride to leave her house and come to my house on foot, over a distance of 
15 li? This was another difficult problem. One day, I called at her 
house to find out whether any transportation arrangements could be made. 
She said, 'When other people get married, the bride either sits in a sedan 
chairvor rides on a horse and if I walk to your door, people will talk.’
X said to her: 'We are getting married out of our own free will and not 
the result of ah arranged marriage fixed by our parents. In the present 
new society, women have straightened their back and both men and women 
are equal, all being the master of the house. Who will say you walk to
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the door of the bridegroom’s family all by yourself? You are a five- 
good commune member and a militiawoman as well, and moreover an activist 
of the production team. You must realize that the most glorious thing 
now is to be good in thought, in labour and in work. Will it not be 
even better if we take the lead in conducting pur wedding with industry 
and^ , frugal i ty ?' Finally, we saw eye to eye on this matter. On our
i
wedding day, my bride did not put on a flower headgear nor did she wear 
a red skirt and sit in a sedan chair according to the old customs and 
practices which prevailed locally. Instead, she wore an appropriate and 
plain dress of printed cloth. It was I who took her from her house to 
my home. We walked the distance of 15 JJL, to my house, talking and laugh­
ing on the way. On that day, the production team was energetically 
improving the low-yield farmland so brigade cadres advised me not to 
perform any labour in the field and to take a good rest for one day.
I said, ’I have to labour in the field, because my wedding will not take 
place until the evening.1 When the wedding ceremony was conducted in the 
evening, Chairman Mao’s picture was hung on the wall in the middle of the 
living room with congratulatory scrolls on both sides of the portrait. 
Brigade cadres, members of the work group, and inhabitants of the whole 
village, male and female, young and old, all came to ray house to offer 
their congratulations. My bride and I first bowed three times before 
the picture of Chairman Mao and then paid the same respects to our parents 
and relatives, friends and all well-wishers. Later, brigade cadres spoke 
to the gathering and we two also did the same, pledging our determination 
to encourage each other in performing labour. In an atmosphere of joyful 
bustle, all the guests helped themselves to tea, candy, peanuts and beans, 
chatting and laughing incessantly. Younger people asked me to tell them 
the story of my falling in love with my bride, while older people asked
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me to relate how I shook off old customs and practices and became a 
pioneer in promoting new practices. Finally, we all sang together 
several revolutionary songs to wind up our wedding ceremony. My wife 
also broke from the old local custom of ’confining herself to her house 
in the first month since becoming a bride’, and left her house three 
days after her wedding together with several women commune members to 
improve the low-yield farms. Our married life is a very happy one and 
we get along very well with each other. The whole family works as a 
team, helping one another and taking an active part in farm work to make 
a good job of collective production. We are therefore praised by all 





DATA GATHERED FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, APRIL 1977
This appendix summarises the locations and a survey of the materials 
collected during interviews conducted in Guangdong province in China in 
1977. I had requested to be allowed to visit the area in the environs 
of Guangzhou (Canton) city for a period of ten days or so. My reasons 
for choosing this location and a short time span were several. I 
preferred to have a greater time in one location rather than a shorter 
period in several places, as I particularly wanted the opportunity to 
observe the contrast between social institutions in the rural and urban 
social fields. Moreover in such an extensive and varied country as 
China, the problem of generalising from a particular field situation is 
not lessened by visiting a few rather than one location. There was the 
overriding pragmatic reason that Guangzhou province is simply the most 
accessible social field from Hong Kong and the chances of gaining a 
visa for this area and for a short time period were probably much better 
than for other provinces and a longer visit. This area is thus already 
better documented than most and its unique qualities are well known to 
anthropologists of China. Because of the time factor I had to be less 
concerned with the actual marriage patterns themselves than with testing 
the correlations between the functions of households and their structure 
in rufal and urban areas and the nature of primary groups in each. In 
examining these subjects from documentary sources, I had found that I 
was far from clear about questions such as household composition, post-™ 
marital residential arrangements and relations between household and kin 
groups. I hoped that my visit might allow me to make an enquiry into
these topics.
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This opportunity to individually gather first-hand data in the 
People’s Republic of China was almost unique but of necessity very short, 
and in the absence of prolonged participant observation, the structured 
interview of selected households seemed to be the best approach in such 
a situation. Of the ten days I was in the field, I was only able to 
interview concentratedly for seven of those days and the weaknesses and 
omissions of such a limited opportunity are only too apparent. The 
principal weakness of the visit was that I was not able to interview in 
an urban neighbourhood in Guangzhou city that was neither based on common 
employment or ethnicity and thus fully test my hypotheses in one loca­
tion; at the same time, however, the principal strength of the data 
lies in the unique opportunity to survey the entire population of one 
small rural village. The fact that I had been in China before and that 
the visit came towards the end of the writing-up of this study, meant 
that I was able to be selective and concentrate on those areas where the 
documentary data was the least satisfactory. My previous knowledge of 
the subject and the area enabled me to make the most of a very short 
time in the field. In the event I was able to collect some very ur\MSu<*\ 
data on marriage, the household and primary groups from a selection of 
rural and urban locations in Guangzhou.
Locations
Jiang village like the other rural villages visited is to be found 
in the densely-populated rice-growing region of the Pear River Delta.
The small village which was entirely surveyed, and which I have called 
Jiang village after its common surname, had a population of 147 residents 
in April 1977 and was the largest of three villages which made up
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production team number eleven (230 population). In turn it was one of 
the 322 teams which constituted the 31 production brigades of Huadong 
commune. Huadong commune in Hua county is 40 km north of Guangzhou and 
it has 71,000 mu of agricultural land which is mainly devoted to paddy 
rice, peanuts, fruit, fisheries and some sideline occupations. The 
materials for this thesis were also collected from two other villages 
in different communes. Yue village (585 pop.)'composed number one 
production team of the 299 teams which made Up the twenty-five production 
brigades of the Renhe commune. This commune is a suburb of Guangzhou 
and 24 km north of the city centre. Renhe commune has 67,000 mu of 
agricultural land and mainly grows paddy rice, peanuts and has some 
forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries and sideline occupations. The 
third village, Hao Mei village (480 pop.) is one of the 343 production 
teams that make up the nineteen production brigades of Dali commune 
which, like Renhe, is also a suburb of Guangzhou city. It is located 
15 km south of the city and mainly grows paddy rice, vegetables and 
fruit.
In addition to these three rural villages, comparative data was also 
drawn from interviews conducted within two urban housing estates in 
Guangzhou city. One was the factory housing estate attached to the 
Guangzhou Heavy Machinery Plant which was composed of blocks of flats 
and single-storey bungalows, and the other was a housing estate on the 
banks of the Pearl, river which was a resettlement area now inhabited by
c^oSi Vo Vi-
former boat p e o p l e , d i s t i n c t  ethnic group (see Ward 1965). In each 
of these locations I used a questionnaire which gave all the interviews 
a common structure (for a sample questionnaire, see the end of this 
appendix). I followed a sequential list of questions on the household, 
primary groups and marriage, the replies to which I filled in at the time
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of the interview. I also tape recorded each of the interviews to act 
as a check on my written comments.
The household
The first question on entrance to each household was always to ask 
one of its members to describe the age, sex and occupation of the persons 
in the household. Members of a household did not always share a common 
residence in the villages or in the housing estate of the former boat 
people, rather a household was defined by a single kitchen and a single 
budget.
Household composition
In Jiang village there were 79 male and 68 female residents and the 
age distribution shows a surprising number of male children under
the age of ten years* and that the majority of the population is under 
forty years of age.
* On the basis of this small sample the malproportion may occur by chance. 
In commenting on these figures, William Parish has pointed out that in 
earlier studies, malproportion doesn’t begin in the earliest ages,
. but around age five continuing through to age 14. He suggests that 
this malproportion usually comes from girls in this age bracket being 
misidentified as boys by the surveyor because the surveyor judges sex 
by misleading nicknames (personal communication). In this case the 
sex of the members of the household were given by a representative of 
each household in their own household in the presence of other members 
of the household, the village and the commune. Members of the household 
wandered in and out at will and were introduced on each occasion. It 
seems unlikely that in these circumstances misrepresentation of sex 
accounts for this discrepancy in the numbers of boys and girls.
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Table 13: Jiang ■village: age distribution of pers ons
AGE IN MALE FEMALE TOTAL \
YEARS Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
0- 9 25 32 14 21 39 26
10-19 11 14 12 18 23 16
20-29 18 23 17 25 35 24
30-39 13 16 10 15 25 16
40-49 5 6 3 4 8 5
50-59 4 5 7 10 11 • 7
60-69 3 4 3 4 6 4
70-79 - - 1 1.5 1 1
80+ - - 1 1.5 1 1
79 100 68 100 147 100
Current residential arrangements illustrated on Figure 15 reflect 
past household divisions and reveal that 12 of the 27 households had 
more than one house. Unlike the other two villages in which interviews 
took place, there seems to have been a surplus of housing and housing 
land in Jiang village. Several houses, new and old, stood empty and 
several plots of land were available for building. In the other two 
villages where the pressure on housing was more acute, sons and daughters 
of a household might sleep with peers in whose houses there were a 
surplus of beds. In one case, sons who had returned from the army had 
turned an old factory building into a temporary sleeping accommodation 
until"their family’s additional house was built.
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In Jiang village the size of the households ranged from the largest 
of 9 persons to the smallest of three members.
Table 14: Jiang Village, Range in Household size









The details of the individual members in the twenty-seven households 
are given at the end of this Appendix.



































































































In the other two villages the majority of the households were 
composed of A, 5 or 6 persons and in Hao Mei village, households ranged
from one household of one person to three or four of 8 to 9 persons.
\
. - . - '
In Yue village there were more single person households and the range
was more extensive. It was estimated that about 40 households had one
or two persons and there were five or six with ten or more persons.
S'
In the two single-person households interviewed, one consisted of a man 
of about 50 years whose -wife had died and daughter had married and moved 
out of the village. He worked in the production team and cooked for 
himself. In the other a 73-year-old mother of two married sons in the 
village lived alone. She cooked for herself, but her sons supported 
her by giving her grain and some cash each month and the members of their 
households helped her by carrying water and performing other household 
tasks. The largest household in this village had 12 members composed of 
the mother, two married sons and their wives, two unmarried sons, two 
unmarried daughters and three grandchildren.
It was particularly noticeable in answer to these questions that 
in all three villages a high value was attached to the number of sons.
When members of the household were presented or listed by the senior 
representative of the household, the sons were enumerated before the 
daughters and daughters-in-law regardless of age order. In families 
with several sons there was a degree of confidence and investment in the 
future of the domestic group not characteristic of families with one son 
and many daughters. The former households gave the impression of planning 
and saving for future expansion and development, one in which sons would 
marry and recruit wives and later separate into their own households 
nearby. There is a close correlation between the number of sons per 
household and the households which had built new and additional houses.
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Of the seven households which had recently built a new house, six had 
three or more sons who were reaching marriageable age.
Household division ;>■
The second group of questions in this section concerned the post-
-r"
marital residential arrangements and the division of households. The 
relations between household division and the developmental cycle of the 
domestic group have already been discussed in Chapter 9. In all rural 
locations marriage proved to be virilocal and a widowed mother with two 
daughters refused to be drawn as to whether she would like one of her 
daughters to remain within her household following her marriage. The 
personal property of the conjugal couple was nearly always defined in 
terms of their furniture and the furnishings of their room. As far as 
could be ascertained there was no separate conjugal cash fund, rather 
they equally' contributed to and had claims on the familial fund of the 
whole household. The details for household division in Jiang village 
are given in Chapter 9. The largest joint family in Yue village 
comprised the mother, two married sons, and their wives, two unmarried 
sons, two unmarried daughters and three grandchildren, and did not plan 
to divide until all the sons were married. They had already built a new 
house in anticipation of family division some time in the future. There 
were a few joint families in Yue village, and in the commune the example 
of the largest joint family where there had been no household division 
was that composed of the parents, four married sons and their wives and 
children all totalling eighteen persons. The sisters-in-law worked in 
their production team and two of the sons worked in Guangzhou living in 
factory dormitories and returning home once a week.
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Like Jiang village current residential arrangements in both villages 
reflected past household divisions and because of the pressure on living 
or housing space in* each of these villages many households were dis­
persed in which family members slept elsewhere but ate with their parents. 
Sometimes brothers who separated from each other many years ago still 
lived in neighbouring half suites while their children slept in another 
house recently built by the family or were dispersed among several 
houses.
As in Jiang village, it was common for families in these two 
villages to divide on the birth of the third generation. In one house­
hold where I interviewed residents in Haomei village there had been a 
family division in 1972. Instead of one household there were now three.
In the year of the marriage of the second son the father decided it was 
time to divide the household. He said that there appeared to be too many 
people in the household and it made for very complicated housekeeping.
’One person might return home early for a meal and have to sit around 
and wait for everyone to come back home.’ Already in 1970, two years 
before division, he had arranged to build a new house costing 1,300 yuan 
out of the family savings. At the time of division a second new house 
was built and into that he, his wife and one unmarried son had moved.
In the original family house and the first new house resided the two 
elder married sons and their families. He had also divided what was 
left of the family savings and their movable property. Although the 
father now resided with his wife and unmarried son he was counted as a 
member of his eldest son's household because he ate with them for reasons 
which it was difficult to ascertain. The remaining 25-year-old unmarried 
son who was to be married to a 24-year-old girl from another production 
brigade in the next year was now saving to build a small house with a
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bedroom and rooms for storage for himself and his wife. The three sons 
each continued to contribute to the support of their parents and the 
three households came together to celebrate the Spring, New Year and 
other festivals and birthdays. ;>
In the factory housing complex it was usual for married elder sons 
to leave the households of parents. Sometimes they remained immediately 
after marriage, but this was seen to be a temporary arrangement until the 
young couple were given a house by the enterprise for which they worked. 
The allocation of separate housing was not always possible at the time 
of marriage for there is a general shortage of housing in Guangzhou.
In one household the family were about to partition their general family 
room in order tp temporarily accommodate their elder son on his forth­
coming marriage. In the housing estate of the former boat people all 
the houses had been distributed in 1965 and those that had been married 
subsequently were allocated rooms as they became vacant. Usually these 
were in the same block or adjacent blocks of the estate. In households 
where I interviewed, couples who were newly married or had a small child 
often remained in the same household as the parents of the husband in 
that they all ate together and contributed to one household budget.
It was not unknown for couples to remain in the same household as the 
wife’s parents. Where there was more than one child the households 
were usually quite separate. In a'case where a daughter and her husband, 
three children and husband’s father lived adjacent to her parents and 
mother’s mother they were two quite separate households although they 
shared a kitchen and general family room. The elder son and his family 
lived in a nearby block in a separate household. All sons contributed 
to the support of the parents unless the parents had a pension, when they 
usually received gifts and delicious food on special occasions.
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It was particularly unfortunate that I was unable to interview 
outside of these rather specialized urban locations, in one cake based
on common employment and in the other on ethnic ties. I have the strong
\
impression from talking to other individuals (drivers, interpreters, 
hotel workers, cadres) from the same city that elsewhere neolocal 
residence after marriage was very common and that siblings could be 
quite dispersed within the city with parents residing nearby one child 
who might just as commonly be a daughter as a son.
The household economy
The questions on the economy of the household were divided into 
two sections: the source of their income and the distribution of their 
income between savings, food and clothing, housing, celebrations and 
individual allowances. In all rural households the economy of the 
household was reckoned collectively and the wealth of the household 
depended on the labour resources of the household or the ratio of wage- 
eamers to the total number of persons in each household. In rural 
areas all the households received some portion of their income in kind 
and the remaining portion of earnings were paid in cash. In Jiang 
village- the main differentials within the village were reflected in the 
ratio of wage-eamers to wage dependents in each household. These 
ranged from one household in which all three members were wage earners 
to four households in which there were twice as many dependents as 
earners.
There is some correlation then between the ratio of wage earners 
to dependents with the structure of the household. Of those with less 
than the average ratio of wage earners to dependents, 7 out of 10
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Ratio of wage earners to total population: 0.54
Ratio of wage earners to total population in stem households: 0.61
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households were stem families and of those with the higher ratio of 
dependents to earners, 11 out of the 17 were conjugal in structure.
The main differences in the ratios of wage earners to dependents varied 
according to whether, the children of the household had reached wage- 
earning ages.
In addition the production team had allotted 4 per cent of its lands 
to the private plots and each household said that it was self-sufficient 
in vegetables. None of the households reported a surplus which was 
marketed, rather any surplus was used to feed the pigs. Each household 
reared pigs which were sold to the State for an average of 60 yuan cash 
each and the household received coupons to the value of 40 per cent of 
the meat of the pig with which to purchase pork. Most households also 
reared chickens for eggs and meat.
In one household where there were seven persons made up of five 
wage earners and two dependents, the grandmother and a young grandson, 
they received an average of 72 jin of food grain per month per person 
last year. The main source of cash income had been that distributed 
to them by the production team according to the number of work points 
they had earned and this totalled 700 yuan including the earnings of 
the son who worked in the commune shop. In addition the household 
received 120 yuan from selling two pigs each year. They grew all their 
own vegetables and most of the meat came from the two pigs and 15 chickens 
and hens. Their most substantial expenditures over the last few years 
included one new house in 1966, which cost between 1,000 and 1,500 yuan, 
an additional room in 1973, their elder son’s marriage (1,000 yuan), a 
sewing machine, and two or three bicycles. They also remarked that 
clothes made of artificial fibre were quite costly. They had saved a 
lot of expenditure by making their own furniture, although they had to
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purchase the wood and an array of tools which adorned the walls of the 
family room. In another households, also composed of seven members, 
where there were five wage earners, the average grain ration was 63 jin 
per person per month. They received a total of 1,500 yuan in cash from 
the production team, the cash wages of a daughter working in the commune 
shop and their sideline occupations. They.grew all their own vegetables 
on a 1.3 mu private plot and reared two pigs' and chickens each year. 
Their main expenses had included the materials for a new house in 1968 
and since then additional rooms, their sonTs marriage (900 yuan), their
elder daughter's marriage (2-300 yuan) and three bicycles, a sewing
machine, a radio and a number of wristwatches. They also had a 1,000 
yuan saved in the bank.
The average cash income from collective sources of 590 yuan in 
Jiang village was slightly higher than, in Yue and Hao Mei villages where 
it was 526 and 500+ respectively. In one household in Yue village 
there were eight persons of whom four were full-time members of the 
production team (the sons, daughter, daughter-in-law and the parents 
formed one full-time member between them) to three wage dependents.
Last year they earned a total of 18,000 work points from which they 
received an average of 53 jin in grain per person per month (ranging
from 72 for the oldest male to 22) and 1,100 yuan in cash. They had a
private plot of ..24 mu on which to grow cabbage, sweet potato and other 
vegetables for their own use. Last year they had sold three pigs to 
the State in return for 260 yuan cash and meat coupons. Their recent 
expenditure included the addition of two rooms to the house (houses 
here cost 3,000 yuan a module), two bicycles, two sewing machines and 
two wrist watches. They made their own clothes and they had to buy very 
little in the way of food. In Hao Mei village there was a greater cash
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income from sideline occupations than in Jiang or Yue villages. In all 
the households interviewed outwork in the form of constructing fireworks 
distributed by a state-owned enterprise could contribute as much as 300 
yuan annually to the household budget. In one household with four 
labourers the income was 2,100 in cash and kind. Of this they received 
1,400 in case after deductions of grain and medical expenses. They also 
received 300 yuan from the sale of four pigs to the state and around 300 
yuan from fireworks. Out of this income, 100 yuan is set aside for the 
support of the father’s mother .and contributed to the household budget 
of his brother. They had spent 1000 yuan on a house in 1971 and have 
bought three bicycles, a sewing machine, three wristwatches, an electric 
fan and a radio.
In urban locations the cash wages of the household members were the 
sole form of revenue for the household. In contrast to rural areas, the 
income and expenses of the urban household are reckoned on an individual 
basis. The monthly expenditure of the household are calculated and 
divided among the wage-earning members. For example in several house­
holds where members were interviewed, the living expenses were reckoned 
on a per capita basis per month with all members contributing periodic­
ally to the purchase of some consumer item. The remainder of each 
individual’s income is at his or her disposal. The incomes of the 
households varied according to the ratio of wage-eamers to dependents 
and the phase of the developmental cycle. A sample of the breakdown of 
family incomes is given below.
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mother 60 retired • 30 pens ion
son 30 vice-leader
factory worker 46
d-in-law 28 doctor in clinic 46
daughter 24 teacher middle sch. 42
daughter 22 staff worker, rev.
committee factory 39
mother 60 restaurant worker ~To
son 30 factory worker
(neighbourhood) 45
d-in-law 25 factory worker
(ne i ghb o urho o d) 39
son 2 - -
sister of mother 68 retired ' —
mother 98 retired -
son 67 retired 47
d-in-law 64 staff worker
(neighbourhood) 45
son 32 shipyard worker 47
d-in-law 28 furniture factory 42
son 3* - -
son 28 factory worker 50
son*) non-resident 25 school teacher 42
L but contribute
son\ to budget 23 public security bureau 44
mother 100 retired -
son 76 retired 60 pension























Figure 16: Urban Household Accounts: a sample from Guangzhou city
FACTORY' HOUSING HOUSING ESTATE
No. of persons 8 4 5 5 8 3 6
No. of wage earners 6 2 5 3 7 2 3
No. of wage dependents 2 2 - 2 1 1 3
Total income (yuan) 272 150 203 144 317 90 140
Per capita expenditure 20 22 29 20 15 14 15
per month (yuan)
In nearly all cases in both rural and urban areas a member of the 
senior generation of the household, and women as equally as men, tended 
to manage the family budget* (Although a qualification was nearly always 
added that decisions regarding its distribution were the results of 
joint discussions and a common consensus.
The division of labour within the household
This was the least satisfactory section in terms of hard data and 
I tended to abandon this set of questions after the first few days.
The ideology of breaking down the traditional divisions of labour within 
the household and particularly the sharing of the housework are familiar 
to residents of rural and urban China, and any answers to these questions
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were usually expressed in terms of co-operation and sharing. Only 
participant observation over a much longer time span will provide a 
clear ideal of how labour is distributed within the household.
In assessing the distribution of women’s labour time between the 
collective, private and domestic spheres of the economy it was difficult 
to generalise from individual patterns. In some households they were 
said to be responsible for the vegetables of the private plots, in 
others these same responsibilities fell to the men of the household; 
sometimes they were shared. Almost without fail, though, women were 
responsible for the livestock and maintenance of the household. The 
most interesting feature to emerge was the complementariness of labour 
between the women of the older and younger generations, or the mother- 
in-law and daughter-in-law which has historically been a rather difficult 
and clearly hierarchical relationship. It is a common occurrence for the 
new daughter-in-law to become a wage-eamer in the collective agricultural 
work team and for the mother-in-law to wholly or partly retire from the 
collective sector to manage the side-occupations and service the house­
hold.
The grandmother of the household was generally responsible for 
managing the budget, the daily housekeeping and the care of the young
children and pigs and chickens. In all these tasks she was helped by
the other members of the household, although in busy agricultural seasons 
she might not only do the cooking for her own household but also for that 
of her son's families who were in their own separate households. In less 
busy agricultural seasons the daughter-in-law might cook for the separate 
households. In several households each woman member was asked to
describe the activities of the previous day. It was a busy time with
the simultaneous harvesting of winter wheat and the transplanting of
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rice seedlings. Because of this the grandmother in one household in 
Jiang village had cooked for both her own and her son’s separate
household. She had also cleaned the houses and spent quite a lot of
\
time preparing food for the household’s pigs. This involved the cutting 
up and boiling of vegetables. She had also watered the vegetables in 
the private plots. Both her daughter and daughter-in-law had worked 
in the production team all day, and in their spare time they had helped 
the grandmother and cared for the children of the daughter-in-law’s 
household. Unlike the other production teams visited in other communes, 
there were no collective services provided by the team such as child 
care or corn-grinding.
In urban areas there were clearly not the same demands on women’s 
labour. There were no livestock or vegetable sidelines, and the house­
hold seemed to require less in the way of maintenance. Although shopping 
at the markets was necessary to acquire meat and vegetables, and if a 
retired woman of the older generation was a resident of the household 
then she tended to undertake the marketing and some cooking.
Primary groups
I was particularly keen to question the members of individual house­
holds as to the whereabouts of close kin and the kinds of economic ties 
or occasions of co-operation which characterised non-residential kin 
relations. The responses to these questions and the survey data from 
Jiang village indicate that all the male residents were sumamed Jiang, 
that they probably composed a fragment of a higher order lineage and 
that the village itself was characterised by geographically concentrated 
clusters of agnatic kin-who are either groups of ego's brothers
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or father’s brothers. The details have already been presented in 
Chapter 10. In contrast to. Jiang village which was -a single-sumamed 
village, in both the larger Hao Mei and Yue villages there were two sets 
of surnames. . Each household interviewed in these two villages could point 
to close agnatic kin or brothers and father’s brothers families who lived 
in close proximity. Mutual support between households included the 
transportation of pigs to market, and housebuilding, which I quickly 
perceived to constitute one of the main foci of kin co-operation in 
rural areas. Kin came together to celebrate festivals and special family 
occasions and affinal relatives were also frequently included in the list 
of kin who had participated in housebuilding and festivities.
In the households interviewed in the factory housing complex, kin 
were quite dispersed either living elsewhere in Guangzhou, in the native 
villages of the residents or in one case in Hong Kong. The main points 
of contact between kin of separate households seemed to be common 
support for an aged parent and joint celebrations of family birthdays 
and festivals. The kin resident in the same city might visit each other 
on rest days and especially on special occasions and festivals.
Although individuals might have left their native villages up to fifty 
years ago, they continued to maintain some contact with their kin there, 
again mostly on ceremonial occasions. The family with relatives in Hong 
Kong referred to their annual get-togethers in Guangzhou. Affinal kin 
were often included in these celebrations of special occasions and they 
frequently lived in close proximity to the households interviewed. In 
the housing estate of the former boat people most kin, agnatic and 
affinal, lived within the estate itself often in the same or in adjacent 
blocks. In one case affinal kin lived in adjacent flats and shared the 
same kitchen and bathroom facilities. This concentration of kin and
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overlapping of kin and neighbours would seem to be unusual for urban 
areas and arises out of the common ethnic ties and unique resettlement 
scheme of the mid-1960s.
\
Marriage
In every household in which I interviewed, in both urban and rural 
locations, I took the opportunity to ask a few questions about marriage. 
In particular I asked for the wife's and/or daughter-in-law's surname, 
her place of origin, their date of marriage, how they had originally 
met, the cost of the marriage and about their own conjugal fund. It was 
much more difficult to ask questions about the now outlawed betrothal 
gift and the survival of the dowry, but I soon learned that if I asked 
to see the house I was shown the bedroom of the married members of the 
younger generations’ which was a great source of pride to the whole 
family. I was informed which items were given by the bride's family 
and which were given by the bridegroom's and the cost of each article, 
but I was unable to ascertain the relation between gifts and exchanges 
made at the time of betrothal and the dowry. What was interesting was 
the differences in the presentation of the furnishings of the newly 
married'members of households in urban areas. They reflected on the 
thrift and resources of the young couple themselves who had saved up 
for their purchase. The direct responses to the various questions on 
marriage have already been distributed between Chapters 4 to 8 as 
supplementary case studies or comments on those already obtained from 
documentary sources.
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Figure 17: Household Survey; Jiang village
HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AGE OCCUPATION
NO.
1 mother 87 retired
son 47 driver in Guangzhou
d-in-law 45 production team
grandson 24 worker in communicati
grandson 20 production team
grandson 14 school
granddaughter 16 school
2 father 29 production team






3 mother 64 housekeeping
son 44 worker for machinery 
shop (county)
d-in-law 44 production team
grandson 23 electric power plant 
worker (commune)
grands on 20 production team
grandson 14 school
4 father 34 production team





5 father 57 production team
mother 54 production team
daughter 25 production team















worker in construction 
materials factory (commune) 
production team
HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AGE OCCUPATION
NO.
7 father 31 worker in coalmine





8 mother 52 production team
son 30 production team




9 father 45 production team
mother 44 production team
son 22 production team




10 father 33 barefoot doctor





11 father 63 production team
daughter 24 production team
son 23 production team
daughter 19 production team
daughter 17 school
12 father 42 worker grain processing 
plant (commune)
mother 36 production team
daughter 12 school






13 mother . 55 production team
son 25 production team
son 23 production team
14 father 38 worker machinery 
factory (county)




HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AGE OCCUPATION
NO.
15 mother 71 retired
son 30 production team
d-in-law 29 production team
grandson 2
granddaughter 7 months








17 father 68 retired
mother 67 retired
son 26 worker in coalmine 
(State)
18 father* 38 production team







19 mother 60 retired
son 33 production team
d-in-law 30 production team
granddaughter 1
son 29 shop (commune)
daughter 26 production team
son 20 production team
20 father 69 retired
son 29 production team
d-in-law 30 production team
grandson 2
son 14 school
daughter 23 production team
21 father 53 . production team
mother 51 production team
son 29 hydrorpower plant 
(commune)
d-in-law 29 production team
daughter 26 production team
son 23 production team
daughter 19 production team
son 1-3 s choo1
son 8 school
22 father 53 peasant in Hong Ko
mother 51 production team
son 20 production team
• daughter ' 15 - school
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HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AGE OCCUPATION
HO.
23 father 34 production team
mother 29 production team
son 6 school
son 2
sister of father 22 production team
24 mother 59 retired
son 33 production team
d-in-law 29 production team
25 father 54 production team
mother 51 production team
daughter 25 worker commune shop
son 23 production team
daughter 20 production team
son 16 s choo1
daughter .14 school
26 father 33 worker commune factory




27 father 38 grain processing
plant (commune)






A SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RURAL HOUSEHOLDS
1 Can you describe the age and sex of the persons in this household?
2 Where do the wives come from?
3 Who chose them?
4 At what age were they married?
5 In what rooms do married sons and daughters of the household live?
6 What property does the married couple own?
7 Where does this property coma from?
8 What do they contribute to the family budget?
9 Has there been, or is there likely to be, a division of the household?
10 Where do close relatives live in relation to the household?
11 Are there any economic ties or other co-operation with non-resident 
relations? ,
12 What are the main sources of income in cash and in kind from the 
production team?
13 Are any members of the household paid a wage which they contribute 
to the budget?
14 What proportion of income is from private sources?
15 How large is the private plot?
16 What is grown on the private plot?
17 What livestock is owned by the household?
18 What proportion of products and livestock is grown for the use of 
the household?
19 What proportion of products and livestock is sold in local markets?
20 How is the income of the household distributed between savings, food 
and clothing, housing, celebrations and individual allowances?
■21 Who manages the budget?
Questions for each woman member of the household;
1 What is the number of labour days you contribute to production team 
enterprises ?
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2 What are the main types of work which you undertake in the 
production team?
3 What is the payment you receive from'the production team for your 
work?
4 What is the amount of time you spend working in the private plot?
5 What is the amount of time you spend looking after livestock owned
by the household?
6 Is there any special payment for this? ,
7 What are the main types of housework you.undertake in each season?
8 What is an example of the type of daily housework which you
undertook yesterday?
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A. SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR URBAN HOUSEHOLDS
1 Can you describe the age, sex and occupations of the. persons in this 
household?
; i
2 Where did the spouses meet?
3 At what age did they meet?
4 At what age did they get married?
5 Did they have the consent of their parents?
6 Did they set up a new household on marriage?
7 What property did they have on marriage?
8 Where do close relatives live in relation to this household?
9 Are there any economic ties or other co-operation with non-resident 
relations?
10 What are the main sources of income of the household?
11 How is the income distributed between savings, food and clothing, 
rent, celebrations, individual allowances and other expenses?
12 Who manages the budget?
13 What neighbourhood services does the household use?
14 What domestic work is done within the household?




This set of figures has been included more as a negative example 
than anything else, in order to show the limitations of the statistical 
data available for this study. It is scattered and piecemeal, but even 
if it were not, there remains the problem of what is meant by the 
definitions of Tarranged’ and ’free-choice’ marriage. This thesis has 
argued against the use of this simple dichotomy for it ignores the range 
of conscious models in which both parties and parents combine to 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS REFERRED TO IN 'THE TEXT
(listed in order of first appearance) I
\
\
fumu baoban e m u  hunyin -fj9 ^
arranged marriage
ziyou jiehun \U
freedom of marriage w °
hunyin ziyou ^  &
free-choice marriage ' 0 ^
xiaxiang nc ^  e r
educated youth
meiren >4 /
matchmaker £  rfs
jiazhang
head of the household
Pr
-fe
jiben youfen ren %. ^  7es/7f
basic shareholders 7± J
zhuogei youfen ren Jr ^  L^ iA~ Tta ^
optional shareholders ti- /M a ^
Hr:
maimai hunyin CD ug




g ifts  o f betrothal
J*
% J  T S .
tanqing shuoai 4  i<- ,i t  ^
courtship o 7< I o /£_
Jiao pengyou ,
make friends through ^  fj fJ 
dating or courtship
dingqin/dinghun I 5 yjft-
betrothal D d\ /  6 I x  0
shidtiv ^ sl rfc , ^
appropriate /%_ )
zaohun g  , ^
early marriage y  7 3
wanhun
la te  marriage a*
lianai zhishang ’xt$ ^ h
supremacy of love ^  ^  —
b i ao d r r  -
cousins of d iffe re n t  
surnames
tang
cousins of same surname
zhao duixing ^  % 1  <&
choose a spouse g ^
zuanze airen di biaozhun \ / "19‘tf
norms for selecting a spouse i j j  11 ^
zhitong daohe -j- ,
to be of one mind and purpose ^  o
lichang jjZ $
standpoint
shijie guan ffi 4  g
world viewpoint 11 4i/^
dowry1*3"8 . ^
jiehun yishi 4 ,
marriage ceremony m 13 13 v
huangdao jiri ^  111 j!f0
auspicious days « ' s—
bai jiuxi 
marriage feasts ■ *8.
jieshao ren •
introducer 4 ft? A ...
qiuhun -p
proposal of marriage W
jindaide ziyou jiehun 




f i l i a l
4 L \y-4  iX
buxiao zhizi 
u n filia l son T '  t f f i'
)jt ft' h i
zu
1i neage
caoshuai jiehun %  rr„ -+ lit-
hasty marriage f  '- f  0 a
X 1 1 1
luantan lianai ■£ I r %I'm
- fickleness of love W To-"
xixi'n yanjiu j  £
to like  the new and j@l \&j? 
to oppose the old
zhaosan musi ±  n e TT
changeability and untrustworthy f  “  ^  -1—■
zhengzhi diwei TP (T V £ i~ f \
p o lit ic a l status
boxiao j i e j i  qushan 4 - j il % $L tfc!




jiating chengfen T X f *7?
family background




social status/respect -73" /
anjia luohu /j—* h w
s e ttle  down permanently x  5^  y
mingmei zhengzhu vrtj X  ]§3=
p\csccu\^  properly conducted 3 ^  ^
timian ' J X  tti) TI
p<-iae‘ 'face'. # JL ffcQ
fenjia ^  ^
household division
xianhua a ,a = 4"
gossip l / f  o n
jinqiV  iT-' *7-0close kin JuL- R j
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